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 i 
Abstract 
 
On December 13, 2014, the Republic of Georgia’s central government made a rapid series of 
decisions behind closed doors. These legislative moves allowed RMG Gold, the Russian-owned 
mining company operating in Georgia’s southern Mashavera Valley, to destroy the 
archaeological site at Sakdrisi-Kachgariani – the oldest gold mine ever discovered and a national 
cultural heritage site. The government’s decision followed more than a year of contentious 
struggle among competing political factions, yet in the end the mining work moved forward and 
continues expanding today. RMG’s destruction of Sakdrisi was just one event within Georgia’s 
broader political transition, de-centralizing resource governance toward corporate interests 
through a territorially based system of extraction licenses. This dissertation investigates the 
political geographies of Georgia’s resource governance transition, analyzing the politics and 
effects of mining governance in this post-Soviet market-oriented democracy. I analyze this topic 
using a mixed methods approach, combining semi-structured interviews, discourse and textual 
analysis, and a spatial database of mining sites throughout the former Soviet Union. My analysis 
illustrates how these political practices contribute to the broader geopolitical shifts within the 
country and across the region, occurring in part through the narratives and embodied experiences 
of people living near the Sakdrisi-Madneuli mining complex. Through this investigation I argue 
that the Mashavera Valley’s “malleable territories” – my phrase for this territory’s flexible and 
governable nature, especially as it relates to mineral governance, mining, and the government of 
people and things – emerge from a range of political practices, geopolitical imaginations, and 
material experiences to reshape the political spaces of Georgia and the South Caucasus. Together 
these findings illustrate how environmental struggles and practices of resource governance 
contribute to broader shifting power geometries and a lived vision of geopolitics.  
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Chapter I – Introduction: Situating Sakdrisi 
 
1.  Introduction: Situating Sakdrisi 
 
A 2014 BBC headline dubbed the conflict “Georgia’s Gold Mine Dilemma” (Demytrie 
2014) while a local Georgian news outlet cried of “Sakdrisi Gold Fever” (Burchuladze 2015; see 
Figure 1). Others reported that “Strike-Hit Gold Mine Spills Polluted Water into River” 
(Civil.Ge 2014) and “Georgia Opts for Gold Mining at Protected Historical Site” (Rimple 2014). 
 
 
 
Figure 1: “Sakdrisi Gold Fever” 
(Burchuladze 2015) 
 
The metal mines of the Mashavera River Valley near Georgia’s southern border with 
Armenia (see Figure 2) have supplied a source of extractive wealth for powerful actors in 
Georgia since the Soviet regime opened the first modern copper mine here in the mid-1970s. The 
operations developed increasing economic significance in the years following the 2003 Rose 
Revolution as the government continues rolling out a series of dramatic post-Soviet reforms, first 
under Mikheil Saakashvili’s United National Movement and then the Georgian Dream coalition 
led by Bidzina Ivanashvili and his successors. This new era of reform and intensified economic 
 
2 
development allows Georgia to claim relatively high international rankings in political freedom 
and human development – both the highest in the South Caucasus – as well as ease of doing 
business, in which Georgia ranks sixth globally (Freedom House 2018; The World Bank 2019a; 
UNDP 2018). Many Georgians welcome the relative stability reforms have brought following 
the initial era of post-Soviet independence and political chaos (Cheterian 2011; Jones 2013; King 
2009). 
 
Figure 2: Sakdrisi locator map 
(Map credit: Author) 
 
Yet aggressive efforts to reshape life, economy, and government in Georgia have met 
political resistance in many directions and venues. Forces of resistance and domination play out 
distinctly in the Mashavera Valley, as practices governing natural resources, protecting 
environmental health, and developing economic opportunities intersect in residents’ lives. The 
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effects of uneven development appear starkly here (Smith 1984), though at times the Valley’s 
political contours follow surprising patterns. 
Global histories of gold and copper extraction run as deep as the fault lines lacing the 
Caucasus mountains, and produce violence of all sorts. Empires have risen and fallen by hunting, 
extracting, hoarding, and fighting for gold. Valuable veins carry histories far more powerful than 
their inert contents might initially suggest. The Earth’s varied golden geologies drive changing 
geographies of conflict and development, settlement and expansion. Gold’s social and material 
power manifests visibly in Georgia’s southern landscape.  
For example, if you stand on the edge of the Dzedvebi Plateau and know where to look, 
you begin to see such veins cut back through time – past the economic precarity of many in the 
region today, beyond the small but thriving mining town of the late Soviet era, further back than 
even St. Nino’s adoption of Christianity early in the 4th century AD. Archaeologists have worked 
methodically in the river valley for roughly two decades, unearthing a network of settlements 
and small-scale industrial facilities spanning several thousand years and extending beyond the 5th 
millennia BC (Stöllner and Gambashidze 2016). The international team of scholars eat Georgian 
khachapuri cheese bread while digging, scraping, sweating under the sun and working late into 
the night cataloging ten thousand stone and metal tools in their database. They have recreated 
Neolithic and Bronze Age tools to test their hypotheses in action: softening rock with fire, 
pummeling it with rock axe heads, grinding it into dust for panning and scouring. These tools 
and practices – alongside the presence of small winding rock tunnels, complex adult and juvenile 
burial grounds, and mundane traces of human life including midden heaps and well-used pot 
shards – offer telltale signs of the world’s oldest known gold mine. The Mashavera Valley holds 
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sites key to understanding humanity’s long history of exchanging shiny yellow metal for 
agricultural products, weapons, prestige, and anything else we deem valuable.  
In my dissertation I focus on more contemporary events unfolding through and in relation 
to the Mashavera’s rich landscape. On December 13, 2014, the Georgian government made a 
rapid series of decisions behind closed doors that allowed the mining company operating here, 
RMG Gold, to destroy the main archaeological site in the valley at Sakdrisi-Kachgariani  
(Civil.ge 2014; GYLA 2015). The government’s decision followed more than a year of political 
protests, counter-protests, labor strikes, social media campaigns and attacks, legislative decisions 
and reversals, and media coverage both local and international. Protestors opposed the region’s 
ongoing history of mining operations, which release dangerous toxins into the ecosystems of the 
agricultural region, in addition to the loss of global cultural heritage that occurred when the 
Russian-owned gold mining company destroyed the Sakdrisi archaeological site. Meanwhile, the 
mining complex is nearly the only major source of employment in the region beyond subsistence 
agriculture, leaving the approximately 75,000 people living in the surrounding municipalities 
marginalized against the company’s entrenched political and economic sway (GeoStat.Ge 2018). 
Metal mining practices here have produced a complex and uneven political geography of 
discourses, imaginations, and material flows in Georgia’s Mashavera Valley. 
Environmental conflicts such as these have proven central to political histories 
throughout the former Soviet region. For example, ecological activism played a significant role 
in the Soviet regime’s collapse, including driving nationalist movements toward autonomy and 
providing crucial pressure points in eroding the Soviet government’s legitimacy during the late 
1980s and early 1990s (Breyfogle 2018; Davidov 2015; Dawson 1996, 2000; Josephson et al. 
2013). Environmental tensions continue into the post-Soviet era and throughout much of the 
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broad region, simultaneously shaping ecologies, political relations, and economic trends 
(Agyeman and Ogneva-Himmelberger 2009; Bond 1994; Coumel and Elie 2013; Davidov 2013; 
Gel’man and Marganiya 2010; Henry 2010). Georgia is somewhat unique among the formerly 
Soviet countries, though, not just for its notable development achievements but for the trajectory 
the government has taken to get there. As I elaborate in my dissertation, the government adopts a 
distinctly libertarian system of auctioning off exploration, commodification, and extraction rights 
for all natural resources, including forests, water, hydrocarbons, minerals, and metals (Quinn 
2017). Like most license and concession systems (Bridge 2007; Côte and Korf 2018; Geenen and 
Verweijen 2017), Georgia’s is territorially demarcated. However, territorial practices present 
unique tensions in Georgia, as nearly 20% of the country’s territory is internationally contested 
as the de facto breakaway states Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Kolossov and O’Loughlin 2011).  
Georgia’s territorial contests figure centrally in both the region’s domestic politics and 
broader international geopolitical discourse (Browning 2018; Suslov 2018a; Toal 2017), 
ensuring territorial practices here exist as relatively exceptional yet also broadly edifying of the 
deep connections among resource geographies, territorial practices, and networks of power 
relations. As a result, Georgia provides a crucial case for understanding the relationships between 
territory and extraction under newly emergent forms of capitalist governance. Through its recent 
history of reforms, Georgia in some ways offers a natural experiment in neoliberal devolution, 
rolling economic and environmental activities away from visible centers of state power in 
unprecedented fashion. Meanwhile it is also an emerging democracy with a recent history of 
authoritarian-leaning leadership and violence. The country is also rich in resources and cultural 
heritage, generating increased risks for contestation between capital accumulation and cultural 
heritage preservation. This is especially so as the recent volatility and growth in gold commodity 
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prices and resulting global intensification of gold extraction touch down around the world 
following the 2008 financial crisis. These forces all collide around the case of the new gold mine 
at Sakdrisi, emerging from a history of both Soviet copper extraction throughout the region and 
ancient mining. 
My dissertation therefore addresses the complex political geographies both emerging 
from and driving the series of events that destroyed the ancient Sakdrisi site; continue delivering 
both profits and poison to the Mashavera Valley’s people and ecosystems; and reshape divisions 
and alliances among local populations. “Georgia’s Gold Mine Dilemma” (Demytrie 2014) 
originally drew my attention to Sakdrisi, yet apropos headlines only hint at the complexities of 
economic development, environmental activism, archaeological knowledge, and political 
identifications entangled in this landscape.  
Through my research I therefore analyze the knot of power, people, and resources tied 
together here by focusing on three primary research questions that explicitly interrogate the 
region’s dynamic political geographies: 
1. How do protesters and supporters of the Sakdrisi gold mine and other mining projects in 
Georgia develop their claims in the debate over the territories’ futures, including their 
particular geopolitical and ecological narratives, imaginations, and identities?  
2. In what ways do non-state actors shape geopolitical narratives and practices at the site 
of conflict?    
3. How do non-state actors’ perspectives compare to broader political attitudes about 
territory, political identity, and natural resources in Georgia’s transitioning society?   
  
Resting beneath each question lies a fourth: What does the Sakdrisi mining project mean for 
people living here, and how has its expansion transpired? 
In asking these questions, I engage with long-held post-structural traditions in political 
geography and political ecology to investigate the power relations and discursive practices – 
simultaneously material and meaningful – that produce and constrain political possibilities in 
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Georgia’s contemporary system of resource governance. To do so, I adopt a mixed-methods 
approach, driven primarily by interviews and supported by a range of other research methods and 
empirics, including participant observation, discursive and textual analysis, and investigating 
secondary quantitative datasets. 
My analysis reveals three primary empirical findings of the event-ful geographies 
unfolding in southern Georgia. First, elite social networks and historically embedded political 
relations in post-Soviet Georgia profoundly shape the country’s systems of resource valuation, 
rent extraction, and governance, through a process I term political alchemy. Second, the use of 
territorial governing practices here drives distinct shifts in the geopolitical imaginations of 
people living within and proximal to the mining complex, revealing that RMG is mining the 
homeland. Finally, the Sakdrisi-Madneuli mining complex’s local political geographies develop 
from a series of distinct, sub-state borderings, forming a metaphorical extractive archipelago. 
The Mashavera’s extractive spaces emerge distinctly within Georgian state territory, yet through 
corporate relations and socio-material practices also connect to other mining sites throughout the 
former Soviet Union. Together, my findings illustrate how the politics and effects of mining in 
post-Soviet Georgia stem from an assemblage of practices and technologies governing lands, 
political subjects, and their environmental resources together – a collection of malleable 
territories. These findings illustrate how environmental struggles and practices of resource 
governance contribute to broader shifting power geometries and a lived vision of geopolitics. 
This opening chapter situates my dissertation project as it relates to the Sakdrisi case I 
have briefly introduced above. I next define the literatures I engage in the course of the 
dissertation, before clarifying the specific methods and approach I put to work in my research. I 
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conclude by outlining the remainder of the dissertation and summarizing the subsequent 
chapters. 
 
2.  Politicizing Environments: Literature and Framing 
 
My dissertation primarily draws from and contributes to the political geography and 
political ecology literatures. I combine these broadly defined approaches to understand how 
environments and natural resources become politicized through diverse spatial practices by 
individuals and institutions. To do so, I also engage with scholarship spanning cultural 
geography, anthropology, area studies, and science and technology studies. While I divide the 
following scholarship along thematic and sub-disciplinary lines, I also adopt a decidedly 
interdisciplinary perspective, viewing disciplinary boundaries less in terms of their differences 
and more for their overlaps and shared lineages.  
 
2.1.  Disaggregating Spatial Politics  
 
Contemporary political geographers often adopt post-structural approaches to power and 
space, a trend that has grown over the course of several decades and stands apart from the still-
pervasive “realist” views embedded in certain influential strands of international relations and 
political science (Dalmasso et al. 2018; Glasius 2018a, 2018b). For example, contemporary 
political geographers widely embrace the notion that standard objects of international political 
analysis – state, territory, society, sovereignty – set analytical “traps” through their perceived 
coherence (Agnew 1994, 2010, 2015a). Scholars instead consider these categories as the effects 
of diverse power relations, regimes, and technologies, and instead grant analytical attention to 
relational and practice-based categories – the “state effect,” “territory effect,” “de facto 
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sovereignty,” etc. – over any misleading reifications of those practices (Jeffrey et al. 2015; Koch 
2013b; Mitchell 1999).  
My dissertation combines the findings and framings of contemporary political geography, 
including popular and feminist geopolitics, and broadly defined nature-society scholarship 
including political ecology. In doing so I contribute toward a disaggregated view of 
environmental politics and natural resources that some might label “environmental geopolitics” 
(Castree 2003; Dalby 2014; O’Lear 2018; O’Lear and Dalby 2015). Undergirding both my 
approach and much critical environmental scholarship of recent decades (Bakker and Bridge 
2006; Bridge 2009; Castree 2005; Dalby 2014) is the idea that a Cartesian division between 
human and non-human entities is a socially constructed binary far less stable than people often 
recognize in everyday practice (Agnew 2003: 6). Instead, things deemed “natural” or of “the 
environment” emerge instead as the products of unstable, fluid framings that categorize the 
world both materially and rhetorically. I bring such an environmental geopolitics approach to 
bear on the political protests and contests around Sakdrisi, specifically asking: How do some 
people narrate the Sakdrisi site as a symbol of cultural heritage while others see environmental 
disaster? What drives some to ignore these elements and focus on the jobs mining brings to the 
region? Who benefits from the mining project, and who is harmed? Crucially, however, this 
constructivist approach does not imply that the world exists only as a product of human 
imagination, devoid of material properties or significance.  
In fact, it is quite the opposite. Scholars working in the post-structural tradition instead 
see socio-natures like metal mining landscapes as products of both material properties and the 
meaning social relations designate to them (Castree 2001; Peluso 2012; Swyngedouw 2004). For 
example, Gavin Bridge argues that “resources ‘become’ only through the triumph of one 
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imaginary over others” as societies transform materials into commodities  (2009: 1221), such 
that “the fact that something – whales, tar sands, genetic diversity – is regarded as a resource (or 
not) tells us rather more about a society than it does about the substance itself” (1220). Philippe 
Le Billon clarifies that the material and the immaterial always work in tandem to shape political 
geographies of the environment as "political imaginations shape geographies of enclosure and 
exclusion,” materially defining the bounds of what society may even consider a “resource” for 
human utilization (2013: 296). 
A disaggregated, or generally post-structural, politics of the environment is not without 
its criticisms, often along lines that deconstructing objects of analysis too much may leave us 
with little to work against in efforts toward environmental and social justice (Lave 2015). Similar 
criticisms demand careful and thoughtful consideration. Environmental geopolitical relations 
involve diverse forms of violence, vast reserves of “blood and treasure” (Dalby 2008: 415) 
released through conflict, and histories of inequality and oppression that, in many ways, have 
produced the modern world’s unjust contours (Auyero and Swistun 2009; Davies 2018; Nixon 
2011; Peluso and Watts 2001). However, within a post-structural approach – simultaneously 
descriptive, analytical, and deconstructive – I see the possibility to do much constructive work 
for the people and places I investigate. Analytically disaggregating political geographies of the 
environment presents rich opportunities "to think otherwise about the kinds of power shaping the 
places, patterns, and spatial processes of the world today" (O’Lear 2018: 2). John Agnew 
similarly holds that analyzing political imaginations and their alternatives “might help in 
thinking about and starting to practice a world politics no longer subject to the depredations of 
the modern geopolitical imagination” (2003: 13). As a lead archaeologist told me on a tour of the 
prehistoric Dzedvebi Plateau dig site, “If you do not research the past, the future is already lost” 
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(Interview 68). Inspired by this sentiment, I hold that political actors cannot imagine different 
worlds until we collectively define and understand the borders of the old, both materially and 
immaterially. 
My research questions’ significance therefore lies in helping understand whose blood, 
which treasure, and what effects stem from these disaggregated environmental politics. In asking 
these questions I analyze how people act to produce and contest powerful divisions and 
categories of society and resources. These elements make up a broad vision of environmental 
governance, to which I turn next. 
 
2.2.  Living Environmental Governance 
 
Morgan Robertson argues that “the state” provides a crucial analytical category among 
political ecologists for understanding struggles over defining and controlling natural resources 
(2015). Yet the histories of political geography and political ecology clearly illustrate that neither 
is “the state” a coherent, monolithic entity nor is environmental governance isolated to state 
practices (McCarthy 2007; Reed and Bruyneel 2010; Robbins 2008; Robertson 2010). This 
tension presents a key analytic focus in studies of environmental governance, which Bridge and 
Perreault define “not as the ‘governance of nature’ but as ‘governance through nature’ – that is, 
as the reflection and projection of economic and political power via decisions about the design, 
manipulation and control of socio-natural processes” (2009: 492). Resource governance unfolds 
through diverse institutions by "defining what is economically, technologically, and politically 
possible at particular moments,” lending “coherence and stability to efforts to extract, process, 
market, and consume natural resources" (Bridge and Jonas 2002: 760). Scholars of 
environmental governance accordingly question the state’s centrality, while highlighting how 
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such political categories may not capture the full complexity of power relations governing 
natural resources (Bridge and Perreault 2009: 476).  
My dissertation explores the technologies of government that may or may not fall neatly 
under inherited labels like “neoliberal” governance (Bakker 2009; Castree 2008; Castree and 
Henderson 2014; Heynen et al. 2007b; Himley 2008; McCarthy 2005a; Robertson 2004) or other 
a priori categorizations of environmental political geographies. Doing so recognizes that 
resource governance emerges from multiple intersecting governmentalities, or technologies of 
government (Fletcher 2017). In adopting this position I draw inspiration from scholarship that 
approaches eco-governmentality as a more diverse ensemble of powers – at times expanding 
beyond the realm of natural resources – to advance a collective understanding of the links and 
disconnects between territory and resources (Braun 2000; Mitchell 2002; Robbins 2007; Watts 
2004). In other words, through my dissertation I investigate the ways people narrate, define, and 
experience the government “of men and things” (Foucault 2009: 96). 
In moving beyond the environmental governance literature’s frequent focus on specific 
institutions and neoliberal governance, my dissertation likewise answers Himley’s calls for a 
more in-depth, ethnographic focus on the practices that produce or contest resource governance 
regimes (Himley 2008: 445). I also take inspiration from Bulkeley’s (2005) shift toward a more 
spatially and socially disaggregated understanding of environmental governance, in turn drawn 
from Saskia Sassen’s (2003) work on networked and territorially un-/re-bound 
conceptualizations of environmental governance (see also Rocheleau 2015; Rocheleau and Roth 
2007). I develop Sassen’s and others’ findings at greater length in the penultimate chapter, but 
my ultimate goal is to examine the power relations connecting “state” and “non-state” actors, 
negotiated through defining and struggling over natural resources but also enacted as part of a 
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broader disaggregated, lived spatial politics. As I show, political geographies of the environment 
enroll people farming the Mashavera Valley to survive; representatives of Georgia’s major 
political parties; mine employees; political activists affiliated with the Georgian Orthodox 
Church; local environmental NGO members; health care workers; former government officials; 
and so many more. My dissertation advances an understanding of environmental governance 
built on a commitment to frame environmental “politics as a social practice” and to “connect 
formal politics with everyday practice” (Bridge and Perreault 2009: 485–6).  
 
2.3.  Assembling Research 
 
Contingency and emergence in political geographies of environmental governance 
provide a third intellectual foundation for my research. I address these concepts through what 
some term “assemblage” (Robbins and Marks 2010) or “hybrid” geographies (Whatmore 2002). 
My approach generates opportunities to consider the disaggregated nature of spatial politics, 
lived experiences of environmental governance, and entrenched patterns of injustice within one 
analytical framework. Robbins and Marks illustrate one example of how assemblage geographies 
might look through their case of prion-caused illness in American elk populations. The authors 
take the socially constructed division between humans and non-humans as merely a starting 
point, showing how a purely socio-political explanation for shifting power geometries "tells only 
a fraction of the story” as both prions and elk "were active in reworking the social fabric of the 
region" – yet "while neither the elk nor the prions lobbied local officials, in the absence of their 
socio-natural and fundamentally relational condition such a radical reconfiguration of property 
rights would have been unlikely" (Robbins and Marks 2010: 176–7). In a similar fashion Sarah 
Whatmore’s hybrid geographies approach adopts a more distributed notion of agency in 
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explaining diverse socio-natural assemblages (Braun and Whatmore 2010; Whatmore 2002, 
2006).  
Scholars of global geopolitics have recently expanded hybrid and assemblage debates 
deeper into struggles over defining and controlling space, showing how entities typically 
considered non-human shape geopolitical practices through the formation of geopolitical 
“assemblages” (Dittmer 2014, 2017) or “constructs” (Flint 2016; see also: Braun 2006; Grove 
and Pugh 2015; Legg 2009; Müller and Schurr 2016). Geographers represent only a small 
portion of the broader intellectual field of scholars researching and theorizing assemblages, and 
Chapter 2 engages a greater diversity of scholarship to probe the intellectual and practical 
considerations of assemblage thinking in social science research more broadly. Ultimately, 
though, these frameworks empower me to analyze political geographies of the environment in 
the Mashavera Valley not just as immaterial mental framings but as complex “political 
machines” (Barry 2001, 2013) similar to other explicitly socio-material political geographies: 
hydrocarbon pipelines with metallic properties that may cause distribution failures; diplomatic 
documents that pile up and degrade over time; floating military blockades that could protect 
battalions or let them die; and so on. As my case study in Georgia shows, the political 
imaginations of people living near the mining complex, broader discursive scripts circulating 
through media reports and governing bodies, and multiple scales of political economy all 
intersect in the Mashavera’s political environments. 
Assemblage scholars often prioritize practices of territorialization as key mechanisms for 
such political machines, and this concept remains central to my framework. Territorialization 
refers to practices that produce territory in diverse forms as humans and non-humans alike 
interact within a political milieu: through property relations (Blomley 2017), constructions of 
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national homelands (Diener 2006; Kaiser 2002), dividing ocean spaces (Zalik 2015), and so 
forth. For Whatmore, focus on the diverse practices of territory allows "for attending more 
closely to the labours of division that (re)-iterate their performance and the host of socio-material 
practices – such as property, sovereignty and identity – in which they inhere" (2002: 6). Focusing 
on the socio-material practices comprising territory’s assembled and contested nature allows me 
to move beyond analytical categories that potentially obscure more than they reveal: territory, 
state, society, and so forth. 
The three literatures I point toward here – disaggregated political geographies, lived 
practices of environmental governance, and assemblage research – form the intellectual columns 
supporting my dissertation project. In the following sections I sketch out the methodological 
approach I adopt in implementing this intellectual framework. 
 
 
3.  Capillary Tales: The How of Where 
 
The general intellectual approach outlined above provides a framing for the questions I 
ask in my dissertation, particularly concerning political geographies of the environment as they 
take form in the post-Soviet Georgian mining industry. As a result, I investigate practices of 
environmental struggle, identification, and uneven economic development as they produce new 
geographies here – or, as I phrase it above, the how of where. This section draws inspiration 
from the disaggregated view of environmental politics laid out here to name my research 
approach capillary tales, tracing stories and scripts along the branched, diffuse, and cross-scalar 
pathways of power they travel through. I do so by connecting the research methods of critical 
and popular geopolitics, contemporary cultural geography and anthropology, and broader views 
toward mixed methodologies in the social sciences. 
 
16 
3.1.  Lived Geopolitics 
 
Critical geopolitics can simply be thought of as the analysis of “how space is ‘labeled’” 
(Agnew 2003; Dodds 2001; Dodds et al. 2013; Megoran 2017; Ó Tuathail 1996) or the 
spatialization of international politics through discursive practices, defining people, places, and 
their relationships. O’Loughlin et al. illustrate how scholars might study these geopolitical 
storylines, or the ways “geopolitical events, locations, protagonists, processes and interests are 
organized into a relatively coherent narrative of explanation and meaning” by drawing on 
geopolitical scripts “to explain the event itself and its immediate causes” (O’Loughlin et al. 
2004: 284–5). Discourse-focused studies, however, risk remaining at 10,000 feet above the 
ground, disconnected from the people living out the scripts under investigation and removed 
from the broader social and discursive processes from which they emerge. Therefore I adopt a 
more localized, disaggregated, and “thick” view of geopolitics that draws more heavily from 
contemporary anthropology to better understand the “work these formulaic or orthodox 
discourses do as political practices” (Koch 2016b: 45). As Gerard Toal explains,  
thick geopolitics rests on recognition of the importance of spatial relationships and in-
depth knowledge of places and peoples. Grounded in the messy heterogeneity of the 
world, it strives to describe the geopolitical forces, networks, and interactions that 
configure places and states. It recognizes that local conditions matter, that agency is 
rarely singular, that power is exercised geographically, and that location, distance, and 
place influence its operation. (2017: 279) 
 
For some scholars, a more “grounded” framework to inter-state relations is insufficient: 
they critique the broader critical geopolitics approach (both "thick” and “thin”) for continuing to 
ignore the everyday experiences and agencies of people living in the spaces described and 
characterized (Dittmer and Gray 2010; Sharp 2000). Instead, some analysts focus on more banal 
imaginations as they shape geopolitics in more popular, mundane ways (Benwell and Dodds 
2011; Billig 1995; Dittmer 2010a; Dittmer and Gray 2010; Falah et al. 2006; Koch 2013b, 
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2015c, 2016b; Koch and Paasi 2016; Makarychev and Yatsyk 2018; Militz and Schurr 2016; 
Paasi 2016; Saunders 2017). Narratives of national identity, people, and place circulate through 
both popular media and conversations in everyday life and as a result may include both elite and 
non-elite voices (Dittmer 2005; Dittmer and Dodds 2008). While some more “realist” scholars 
might consider popular geopolitics as detached from the machinations of formal and classic 
geopolitics, their view discounts how discursive practices drive contemporary international 
relations, world-building via geopolitical assemblage, and “identity-related practices at a 
multiplicity of levels and sites” (Saunders 2017: 5).  
When framing natural resources like Georgia’s metal resources, geopolitical scripts drive 
individual experience as they become imbricated with “resource imaginaries” such as in 
Mongolia’s mining industry (Jackson 2015b). In analyzing Kazakhstan’s changing geopolitics 
and resource economy, Koch illustrates how by “investigating elite and popular ‘geopolitical 
imaginaries’… we can begin to understand the more general processes of state-making, in which 
the ‘state,’ ‘territory,’ and ‘nation’ are conflated as one entity, and with what effect” (2013b: 
110). Koch acknowledges that elite and popular discourses are often inextricably intertwined and 
inform one another, demonstrating the value of adopting a popular geopolitical lens for analyzing 
emerging and always-contested political forms in a post-Soviet environment. 
Over the past 15 years, political geographers have largely embraced popular and 
ethnographically oriented geopolitical approaches in their scholarship, especially in post-Soviet 
space. An early pioneer of this account was Nick Megoran (2006). Through his ethnographic and 
critical geopolitics of the Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan boundary’s historical biography, Megoran 
demonstrates how mundane state practices shape local lives through a range of localized 
practices – the adoption of different alphabets, new telephone systems, changing road signs, 
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establishing conflicting time zones, shifting bus schedules, the removal or retention of political 
statues, etc. – in addition to larger macro-political economic trends of state development 
(collective vs. neoliberal, etc.) (Megoran 2004, 2006, 2017).  
A lived, thick, popular geopolitics approach also aligns with many positions within 
feminist political ecology. Feminist political ecologists foreground the heterogeneity and 
unevenness of diverse social relations – including gender, class, race, age, and other dimensions 
of subjectivity that intersect within and among us all. These uneven social relations both produce 
and cross spatial networks, driving critical political struggles especially as related to 
environmental dynamics (Elmhirst 2011; Mollett and Faria 2013; Nightingale 2011; Plumwood 
1994; Rocheleau et al. 2013; Sundberg 2015b). Yet even if lived and embodied, geopolitical 
relations still unfold through discursive and representational practices. Thus, in the following 
section I develop a framework for considering geopolitical scripts as simultaneously lived, 
discursive, and politically contested as cultural formations shape power relations across scales. 
 
3.2.  Geo-Stories and Storytelling 
 
The focus on lived experience in feminist political ecology, popular geopolitics, and post-
structural scholarship more broadly relies on a more intimate view of history and geography, 
focusing on what Foucault calls the “slender thread of events.” Foucault sees “slender threads” 
as “the main, fundamental part of history,” each of which “passes through the eye of a needle” 
(2011b: 106–7). Scholars might consider geography in a similar fashion, approaching what 
Donna Haraway calls intimate “geo-stories” (2016) or the capillary tales I develop here. 
I have approached this dissertation as an act of tracing slender threads through the 
world’s woven fabric – following flows of material and capital while also tracing the outlines 
and paths of lived stories and their telling. As I illustrate throughout, a focus on stories and 
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storytelling in many forms allows me to trace the contours of temporary, but historically 
emergent, assemblages – political machines filled with discourses, bodies, institutions, and 
metals (Barry 2001, 2013). Doing so produces a more nuanced account of political and 
environmental change that more readily allows for the contingency of these geographic events. 
Focusing on stories, discourses, and meaning follows long post-structural traditions in 
anthropology, geography, and other interpretive social sciences concerned with issues of 
representation, power, and systems of meaning. These approaches seek to undercut the academic 
compulsion to uncover and define universal, a-historical truths (Foucault 1977b, 2011a; 
Nietzsche et al. 1998), a position I find essential for seeking to understand and explain political 
change in politically tumultuous locations like Georgia that do not necessarily follow the 
framings of strictly structural explanation. Scholars in this broadly defined school of thought 
often embrace some version of stand-point epistemology, drawing from the Nietzschean view 
that all knowledge is partial, situated, and stems from each person’s position within networks of 
uneven power relations (Haraway 1988; Harding 1993; Nietzsche et al. 1998; Rose 1997). To 
this end John Law suggests that 
we cannot describe everything. Indeed, the notion of describing everything is an 
empiricist nonsense which presupposes an all-seeing ethnographic and theoretical eye. 
(For to see it all, I have to blaspheme and turn myself into God by claiming omniscience.) 
But to know that this is the case in our heads, and to know it in our hearts, these are two 
quite different things. Still, despite everything, we cling to our blasphemies. (1994: 47) 
 
The efforts to overcome “our blasphemies” underlie what John Law calls a “modest 
sociology” (Law 1994) and what Jessica Alina-Pisano terms a “realist ethnography” (2009). 
Contemporary post-structural modes of investigation differ from, for example, past “realist 
ethnographies” of the first half of the 20th century that attempted to explain a whole “way of life” 
by documenting the “plain facts” of a tribe or other social group in a functionalist manner 
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(Erickson 2011; Malinowski 1922). Rather, long-standing post-structural forms of realism have 
ossified into a general analytical approach that jettisons the notion of objective truth – that 
“facts” are ever “plain.” Scholars instead aim to "peel the onion" of social interaction in a self-
reflexive way so the ethnographer can "contextualize and interpret her subjectivity: to be 
conscious of the ways that her position conditions the observations she makes" (Allina-Pisano 
2009: 54). In other words, all truth claims are socially constructed (Foucault 2012; Legg 2016) – 
all stories are subjective. Acknowledging the world’s instability and subjectivity actually proves 
essential to establishing rigorous social investigation, whether through ethnographic means, 
interviews, focus groups, or other forms of interpretative social interaction (Mullings 1999). Law 
again contends that:  
Nothing is necessarily stable, and consistency is a product. So a modest sociology will 
seek to turn itself into a sociology of verbs rather than becoming a sociology of nouns… 
it will seek to avoid taking order for granted. Thus if there appear to be pools of order, it 
will treat these as ordering accomplishments and illusions. It will try to think of them as 
effects that have for a moment concealed the processes through which they were 
generated. (Law 1994: 15) 
 
Law’s analytical shift may seem minute, yet it bears enormous implications for the way 
scholars frame research questions and undertake research practices. Rather than understanding 
social relations by analyzing static, ossified social objects, scholars must investigate practices – 
the things people do and that produce relations with other people, ourselves, and the world 
around us. Michael Billig echoes Law’s view in his call to focus less on abstract nouns and more 
on “people and their actions” to produce a more “populated” scholarship (2013: 7). Though I 
often fall short of Billig’s sensibility, his ethic still guides my research process as I focus on an 
“enlivened” political geography, focused neither on social orders nor identity, but on ordering 
and identification (Brubaker 2006; Law 1994). 
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I pursue an “enlivened” research agenda by investigating storytelling practices, which 
provide useful pathways for empirical social science research beyond just analytical 
interpretation of stories. Storytelling provides mechanisms for what Charles Tilly terms 
“contentious politics” as stories provide the “collective, public making of claims that, if realized, 
would affect the interests of those claims’ objects” (2002: 6). Stories help us make sense of 
social processes as they afford frameworks for "sequential, explanatory recounting of connected, 
self-propelled people and events" (Tilly 2002: 26). As such, stories provide windows into 
power’s constitutive relations, allowing analysts to trace the capillary paths through which power 
operates (Foucault 2003). Interviews are especially useful tools for eliciting explanatory stories 
from people whom scholars encounter during research, as I discuss in later sections. My focus on 
events and the contentious stories people tell about them produces a view that “what matters in 
history are not structures but interactions — and, in particular, contentious interactions” (Tarrow 
2008: 228). 
“Contentious performances” (Tilly 2008) of storytelling about events and patterns also 
become readily apparent in intimate “geo-stories” (Haraway 2016), ordering space through the 
eye of the geographic needle. As I elaborate in Chapter 2, my focus on stories, storylines, 
storytelling, and scripts – specifically as they deal with natural resources, territory, and people’s 
political relations with the world – contributes to the transdisciplinary and as yet still relatively 
vaguely defined “geohumanities” (Cresswell and Dixon 2017). In the following section I outline 
the mixed and hybrid methodologies necessary to implement my “capillary” approach. 
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3.3.  Hybrid Methodologies: Mixing Geographic Methods and Approaches 
 
Stories of people and the environment do not just emerge in research from textual or 
verbal discourse (Doolittle 2010).  Readable texts circulate almost everywhere as books, 
magazines, images, films, and landscapes (Forbes 2000), all existing as the products of capillary 
discursive forces and geopolitical scripts (Dittmer 2005, 2010b; Dittmer and Dodds 2008). 
Likewise, stories take many forms, and storytelling unfolds through multiple media – often in 
ways researchers might not consider within single methodological framings (Dittmer and Gray 
2010; Dodds et al. 2010; Foxall 2013; Hughes 2013). 
Scholars utilize mixed and heterogeneous epistemologies and methodologies in numerous 
ways (Elwood 2010), some adopting different modes of data collection and analysis to develop 
knowledge about different kinds of processes and structures – for instance broad changes in labor 
markets and individual household responses to them (Hanson and Pratt 1995). Meanwhile, others 
combine diverse data types to develop hybridized epistemologies, combining interviews or 
ethnography with remotely sensed or other geospatial data to study a single phenomenon 
(Knigge and Cope 2006; Nightingale 2003).  
I embrace mixing methods as hybrid epistemology, acknowledging both the limitations of 
any single methodology and the “entangled” nature of research positionalities (Haraway 2016; 
Neely and Nguse 2015). For instance, in her research on climate change adaptation planning in 
Nepal, Andrea Nightingale illustrates how “epistemologically plural research” can produce 
richer insights about complex socio-ecological problems by probing the inevitable gaps among 
diverse empirics (2016). Yet hybrid investigations require acknowledging and embracing the 
ontological and epistemological tensions that exist among the different methodologies utilized 
(Barry et al. 2008; Doolittle 2015; Nightingale 2016).  
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Through my own hybrid approach, I follow the lead of contemporary post-structural 
anthropologists like Stephen Collier, Aihwa Ong, and Paul Rabinow, who sever the isomorphic 
assumptions between anthropology – the study of competing cultural logics and practices in 
human society (Rabinow 2003) – and ethnography. In fact, Stephen Collier embraces the 
diversity of anthropological modes of investigation in analyzing post-Soviet urban government, 
claiming his research method is avowedly not ethnographic (though he does draw some research 
practices from the rich tradition). He explains: 
Given the proliferation of other kinds of objects in contemporary anthropology, it seems 
reasonable to ask not whether a certain study is ‘an ethnography’ but how certain 
practices associated with ethnography can fit into a toolkit for contemporary 
anthropological inquiry… a technique of inquiry that begins from the specificity of a 
certain place, is oriented by the weight of its problems, by the density and polyvalence of 
the experiences that one finds in it, and that leads to other sites, where other techniques of 
inquiry must be used. (Collier 2011a: 29) 
 
Collier’s approach provides a model for studying what he and Ong term “global assemblages,” 
or “global forms… articulated in specific situations… territorialized in assemblages” (2004: 4). 
My research advances a broader focus on socio-material practices from multiple 
perspectives and methods: ethnographically influenced, discursively focused, and enrolling 
diverse empirics and the epistemologies their investigation might require. In the following 
section I review my specific research practices as I implemented them in research processes from 
the Mashavera Valley to my desk, and from Tbilisi to Syracuse. 
 
 
4.  Research Practices 
 
4.1.  Interviews: Listening in Stereo 
 
Ethnographers historically tend to focus on “the local,” with even multi-sited 
ethnographic approaches addressing multiple localities (Hage 2005; Marcus 1995). However, as 
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some leading contemporary anthropologists contend, understanding problems bound by 
geographies not-necessarily-local requires investigating the broader social and political fields in 
which they exist (Burawoy 2000), including the “awkward” scalar framings that might move 
beyond classic conceptualizations of “immersive” research in anthropology and geography 
(Comaroff and Comaroff 2003). 
I find this “awkward” scalar framing especially important when investigating “out of the 
way” places like the Mashavera Valley’s small industrial cities Kazreti and Bolnisi, removed 
from the power centers of both Soviet and post-Soviet geographies (Collier 2011a; Tsing 1993). 
Out-of-the-way landscapes inhabit an in-between-ness that destabilizes analytical focus on 
centralizing structures of global capitalism (Gibson-Graham 2004) – simultaneously central to 
the sub-state region and connected to transnational commodity chains yet also removed from 
centralized powers. Immersion here requires neither a limited focus on a single place in isolation 
nor a multi-sited ethnography following definitive political-economic links. Immersion here 
instead requires an “awkward” scalar flexibility. 
Schatz suggests that this kind of ethnography requires a guiding sensibility of deep 
engagement rather than necessitating a researcher be fully “neck deep” and “socially immersed” 
as prescribed by classical ethnography (Schatz 2009). An “ethnographic sensibility” is helpful 
because it moves past the artificial distinctions bounding “traditional” ethnographic field 
research (Clifford 1997; Fischer et al. 2009; Gupta and Ferguson 1997; Katz 1994; Marcus 1995, 
2007; Platt 2012): "between fieldwork and deskwork, between research site and site of analysis, 
between researcher and researched, and so on... a general sympathy for interlocutors is 
nonetheless the hallmark of ethnographic research” (Schatz 2009: 6–7). 
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Interviews therefore serve as the foundation of my research methodology, informed by a 
distinctly ethnographic sensibility of deep engagement and general sympathy for interlocutors. 
The 75 interviews I carried out for my dissertation took a variety of forms – ranging from semi-
structured to unstructured. Though not included in the total number of interviews, countless 
informal interviews and conversations (Bernard 2011) helped contextualize my dissertation 
research over five months of fieldwork and three summers in Georgia. My approach follows 
findings by feminist geographers who reveal how interviews profoundly relate to the places in 
which they take place and that analyzing their location and context can reveal much about the 
power relations shaping research conversations (Elwood and Martin 2000; Inwood and Martin 
2008). Accordingly, I consider each interview as "a micro-situation within a larger sociocultural 
context" and "both a product and a process" (Borer and Fontana 2012: 46) – an ongoing relation 
between interviewer and interviewee, as well as with their people and environments. 
My own personal immersion in Georgia was not limited to dissertation-specific fieldwork 
but stemmed from a total of five trips to Georgia over the eight years of my graduate education 
(totaling nine months). My immersive activities included language studies, public art workshops, 
site visits, living at the office of a collaborating NGO for three months, assisting in the opening 
of pop-up exhibits, editing documents for collaborators, and more. My experiences over a long 
temporal window allowed me to develop the ethnographic sensibility necessary to contextualize 
interviews and the dynamic practices of storytelling interview respondents undertook in sharing 
with my research collaborators and me. 
An interview, however, is neither a key to “true” experiences nor merely the product of 
thoughtless automatons drawing from ephemeral discourses. Rather, they are an opportunity to 
“listen in stereo,” as Kathryn Anderson and Dana Jack describe the process of "receiving both 
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the dominant and muted channels clearly and tuning into them carefully to understand the 
relationship between them" (1991: 11). While Anderson and Jack use this phrasing to describe 
interviewing women about their unique experiences, their approach is useful in a variety of 
settings: interviewing women, men, elites, conversations through translators, or even informal 
group conversations. In applying this “listening in stereo” approach to my fieldwork in Georgia, 
I try to inhabit the liminal space between positionalities, listening “deeply” (Koch 2019) to 
explicit words, vague implications, body language, and interactions of all sorts, rather than 
framing myself as either an outsider listening in or an insider trying to share insights beyond the 
interview’s intimacy. Doing so helped respondents feel comfortable in conversation but also 
helped me maintain awareness of my own assumptions, prejudices, and positionality within 
conversation as best I could – with the intention of seeing around them, but knowing I could 
never fully escape my own situated position. The Zapatista ethic of “walking with” people 
encapsulates this well: my research was not designed to "help" or "be like" them but "to be 
involved in the struggle for a just world from and in our own sites of entanglement and 
engagement"  (Sundberg 2015a: 123; Zapatistas 2005).  
The people I walked with most frequently, though, were my research collaborators – 
assistants, translators, colleagues, loved ones – without whom my dissertation could not have 
happened. My research collaborations enroll friends, allies, my wife, Georgians young and old, 
Georgian and American students, and more, in relations of shared interest. At each step of 
collaboration, their positionality influences mine and shapes the research project (Pratt 2010). 
For example, my most frequent collaborator is a woman named Mari. Mari is an art historian and 
environmentalist who, along with several of her allies, took a leading role in the protests against 
Sakdrisi’s destruction. She moved on to other interests after the archaeological heritage site’s 
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destruction, yet she became one of my closest friends and collaborators during the research 
process, helping as a translator and introducing me to key contacts in the region. While some 
might see her prior political commitments as a flaw of research design as inevitably influencing 
her translations and our collective interpretation of events, her subjective positionality was 
extremely helpful – and often explicitly necessary – for this project. She offered critical insights 
about the intimate dynamics unfolding in the valley, as well as lending me rapport with reluctant 
respondents (Adler and Adler 2002) in small mining communities shaped by fear of retribution 
from the mining company, in ways I never would have experienced otherwise.  
In this way interviews involve political acts of encounter, speaking, listening, and 
negotiating inherently uneven power relationships (Faier and Rofel 2014; McDowell 2010: 165). 
Interviews require actively engaging subjects in discursive exchange to assess how "stories are 
assembled and communicated and how they circulate in various domains of society" (Gubrium 
and Holstein 2012: 31). In many ways therefore the relations among myself, my research 
assistants, and the people we speak with during the course of research define “the field” more 
than any single location or practice, linking – and in some ways changing – our lives in the 
process (Caretta and Cheptum 2017).  
Interviews for this research involved a standard protocol: acquiring consent (either 
written or verbal as respondents affiliated with large institutions were typically the only ones 
who felt comfortable signing IRB-approved written release forms1); audio recording when 
                                                        
1 In some ways this hesitancy to sign releases and other unfamiliar paperwork may relate to the history of formal paperwork in 
the Soviet Union’s authoritarian past. In his account of state actors forcing people to sign false statements in the interest of the 
institutional state, Solzhenitsyn explains, "Our habit of obedience, our bent (or broken) backbone, did not suffer us either to reject 
this gangster method of burying loose ends or even to be enraged by it. We have  lost  the  measure  of  freedom... By now we  
are  even  unsure  whether  we  have  the  right  to  talk about  the  events  of  our  own  lives" (1974: 143). In my research I take 
this history of centralized political government, self-incriminating documentation, and fear very seriously. Therefore, while I still 
held myself to the requirements of Syracuse University’s IRB and widely held ethical standards of informed consent with human 
subjects, I also hold myself to additional ethical standards that might not necessarily be included within institutionalized IRB 
standards. For example, Tittensor demonstrates through his sensitive political ethnography of Turkey’s Gülen movement 
that qualities including rapport, friendship, trust, and reciprocity can stand in as effective and, in certain contexts, more 
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agreed to (or video record, though that never occurred); hand-written notes to complement and 
guide my analysis (e.g. details noticed about the setting, follow-up questions, body language or 
other observations of respondent, group dynamics if a group interview, etc.); and then 
transcribing, when necessary, for thematic textual analysis (primarily non-expert or non-elite 
conversations). Involving research assistants and translators, of course, altered interview 
dynamics, as did writing notes and making audio recordings.  
When I was unable to record conversations or take notes due to the wishes of 
respondents, I tried to sit down in a quiet location as soon as possible following each interview, 
recalling as many details as possible before my memories began slipping away – in a café 
wearing headphones, a nearby park or other open space, or, most frequently, the kitchen table in 
whatever apartment I was living in at the time. My interview protocols, positionality, writing, 
and analysis all converged in these reflective moments, often in unexpected and revealing ways. 
I next turn to the broader and overlapping analysis, writing, and storytelling practices I undertook 
to capture the “thick” contextualization for which I strive in this dissertation. 
 
4.2.  Analysis: Discourse, Text, Numbers 
 
John Creswell conceptualizes mixed qualitative research through the metaphor of "an 
intricate fabric composed of minute threads, many colors, different textures, and various blends 
of material" (2007: 35). Each researcher bears the responsibility of deciding how she will mix 
and weave materials and threads together according to the needs of her research project. I briefly 
                                                        
appropriate alternatives to the biomedical model of informed consent implemented by IRB boards and imposed on sensitive 
political ethnographies (2016). Such dynamics underlie many research dynamics in authoritarian or hybrid political regimes and 
further entrench the need to search not for indelible truths, but for the terms and bounds of locally-contingent discourses 
(Foucault 2011b: 106–7; Glasius et al. 2018; Goode 2010; Koch 2013a). 
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explain here the materials I drew together on my research loom: transcription, discursive and 
textual analysis, and quantitative stories. 
First, I developed a research model Cresswell categorizes as a "concurrent embedded 
strategy," comprising a primary qualitative method (e.g., interviews) supported by a secondary 
set of data embedded within the first (e.g., textual database, spatial database, health statistics, 
public opinion surveys, etc., many of which I employ here) (2009: 214). My primary research 
process thus began with interview conversations as outlined above, followed by note elaboration 
and, in many cases, transcription. Transcription is not a-political; rather, it is an integral, 
subjective component of the discursive analytical process affording just "one representation of 
the interview" (England 2002: 212). As such, my transcription decisions were key to shaping my 
analysis and findings. I personally undertook word-for-word transcription of conversations with 
local people living near the mine, both in English and through translators, to get as close to their 
lived narratives and scripts as possible while attempting to acknowledge and work beyond my 
own discursive prejudices.  
As I found through the course of my research in Georgia, discourses enroll and bound a 
diversity of practices, including diverse speech acts or the textual and narrative scripting 
practices often considered by geopolitical researchers: "those which are said in the ordinary 
course of days and exchanges, and which vanish as soon as they have been pronounced" but also 
"religious or juridical texts," "literary" texts, and "scientific texts" (Foucault 1981: 56–7). 
Following Foucault, "discourses must be treated as discontinuous practices, which cross each 
other, are sometimes juxtaposed with one another, but can just as well exclude or be unaware of 
each other" (1981: 67). For my work in Georgia, I approached this issue by pairing the findings 
of interviews with a large Evernote database of over 1,000 elements: policy documents and 
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legislation, expert reports, social media posts, news articles, YouTube clips, and other textual 
artifacts (including image- and video-based elements) collected throughout dissertation research. 
Combining these diverse resources allowed me to investigate the discourses, themes, and 
imaginaries circulating through the mining communities of the Mashavera Valley as well as 
broader media channels and other social arenas. 
Political geographers and other social scientists have long utilized discourse analysis to 
assess spatial, geopolitical imaginations and the work they do in the world. Key elements of 
discourse analysis include text and context – written words and their properties in relation to 
their surroundings and milieu, including the conditions and power relations that allowed the 
production of each text as well as the material effect (or potential) the text has on the world. 
Jason Dittmer (2010b) explains that language fills multiple constructive tasks and roles. Two of 
these tasks include "political building, in which power is attributed or invested in various 
material or intangible goods," and "connection building," in which an author or speaker 
establishes "a topology of values, people, and places" (Dittmer 2010b: 280–1). I view these tasks 
as constitutive of stories – narrating scripts where characters (subjects) do things (practices) in 
particular settings (places and times), granted meaning and positioned in relation to various other 
scripts. The discourse analysis I produce is thus "a situated reading of life’s phenomena" 
(Dittmer 2010b: 285) rather than an “arrival” at some pure and definitive truth. 
Within discourse analysis, a more specific thematic analysis offers a theoretically flexible 
technique for identifying, analyzing, and reporting discursive patterns as scholars encounter and 
analyze them within the world (Braun and Clarke 2006). Inductive approaches like thematic 
analysis lead to explanatory theories and hypotheses for further deductive investigation. 
However, while many qualitative researchers adopt “emergence” narratives to explain their 
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process of analysis – that the patterns simply “jumped out” at them from the data, emerging 
naturally from the source under scrutiny – the process is in fact highly active and patterns only 
emerge through and alongside the researcher’s particular labor, values, and positionality (Braun 
and Clarke 2006). 
My thematic analysis therefore followed general protocols within qualitative social 
sciences (Ayres 2008; Cope 2000). I first imported transcribed interviews, interview notes, and 
Evernote materials into the qualitative software analysis program NVIVO 12, an industry 
standard for qualitative research practices. I then read all transcribed interviews and notes, 
searching for preliminary observations, connections, and themes while applying thematic codes 
to text. I anticipated some categories based on an initial list of themes and codes I developed 
during interview experiences, while others were surprising and came through my practices of 
analysis and reflection. Regardless of designation, I marked all codes using NVIVO’s analytical 
tools. I then re-read, revised, and collated my thematic labeling, identifying geopolitical 
imaginations and scripts – subjects, practices, places – especially relating to natural resources 
and metal mining in the Mashavera Valley. I also noted anything else that struck me as 
particularly interesting or relevant to understanding the diverse socio-material relations 
circulating around and through popular discourses in the region. My searching and assessing 
process is key to the simultaneously descriptive and iterative natures of thematic analysis and 
refinement, as “qualitative data are segmented, categorized, summarized, and reconstructed in a 
way that captures the important concepts within the data set” (Ayres 2008: 868). Yet diverse 
ways of knowing require different modes of analysis.  
The hybrid epistemological approach outlined above positions the divide between critical 
and quantitative geographic approaches as a false binary constructed and emerging from a 
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history of disciplinary politics (Barnes 2009b; Creswell 2010). Indeed, joining more qualitative 
and quantitative perspectives can provide a unique lens on the multiple dimensions and registers 
of environmental governance. Barnes and Hannah argue for taking numbers and statistics 
seriously – like, for instance, the census data, health statistics, and public opinion polls I 
implement here – as "a crucial component in the construction of social reality... woven into the 
very fabric of modernity. […] Numbers create worlds embedded within wider social projects 
turning on authority and control" (2001: 279). Quantifying the practices and experiences of a 
political body are crucial to the biopolitical, geopolitical, and geoeconomic forms of mineral 
governance implemented in Georgia and elsewhere, suggesting a strong need to consider these 
numbers in context. 
Simple quantitative analyses also provide a kind of storytelling in this dissertation. The 
alternative stories of quantified worlds I encounter here involve, for example, assessing 
geographic illness patterns at the level of populations through government statistics, as 
biopolitical governing practices require (Evered and Evered 2012; Foucault 2008, 2009; Kivelä 
and Moisio 2017). I also evaluate public opinion polls to see how different geopolitical 
imaginations might circulate through discourses in Georgia beyond the communities of the 
Mashavera Valley (Ó Tuathail and O’Loughlin 2013; O’Loughlin et al. 2005). I furthermore 
engage aggregate political economic measures from international organizations (World Bank, 
United Nations, etc.) and the Georgian government alike to tell stories of capitalist governance 
through trends of international trade, development, and dispossession (Harvey 2007b; Heinrich 
2012; Henderson 2013). Finally, I have compiled an ever-growing database of mining sites 
throughout the formerly Soviet region, including documenting other sites of protest, by 
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combining data from the USGS, the industry data aggregation company Mining Atlas, and my 
own case collection from news outlets and other scholarship. 
Analysis of these data primarily consists of basic descriptive statistics and cross-
tabulations (Rogerson 2015), which I performed in the STATA software package. I undertook all 
mapping and geodatabase construction in the ArcGIS desktop suite. These more quantitative 
methods are essential for framing and contextualizing my dissertation’s qualitative focus – 
presenting opportunities to reflect on and address the silences in research (Kwan 2002; Mountz 
et al. 2003) while also offering alternative storytelling forms regarding the political geographies 
of the environment unfolding in southern Georgia. 
 
4.3.  Writing: Stories and Silences 
 
Dydia DeLyser argues for the importance of discipline in academic writing "to build 
writing into our lives in a positive way, not a painful one" (2010: 355). I have taken a long time 
to discover how to effectively turn my creative energies to the particularities of the written 
medium. However, the dissertation process has provided an opportunity to hone my         -graphy 
practices through my relationship to the geo- of the world. DeLyser also illustrates that "in 
qualitative research, the writing, in an important way, is the research" (2010: 343) as scholars 
explore, decipher, construct, and make sense of research practices and findings. 
Indeed, writing was a central and active element within the research process itself, not 
isolated to the domestic space of the desk after a distinct and foreign period in the field. Writing, 
reflection, and narrative framing instead infuse research from the proposal stage to the final edit, 
passing through ethnographic field notes, organizational scrawls on my whiteboard, 
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communications with collaborators and respondents, and so forth (Billig 2013; Emerson et al. 
2011; McPhee 2017). 
Concerns of ethical commitment to research subjects demand particular attention during 
writing practices, especially when disseminating research in its final written form as I release the 
stories I collected to circulate in the world. I follow standard IRB protocols of changing 
respondents names other than for public officials, include greater context of interviews whenever 
possible, and take explicit digital security precautions to protect the identities of people with 
whom I spoke (e.g., secure passwords for hard drives and documents, two-factor authentication 
for online backup services, not writing down respondents’ names in any notebooks or 
spreadsheets, etc.). These precautionary practices prove essential for both understanding the 
meaning of statements in context and protecting people who may have put themselves at risk to 
share their stories with my research assistants and me. Despite my best efforts, my dissertation, 
like all texts, is still rife with silences we may only ever partially transcend, if at all (Barnes and 
Duncan 1992). I close this methodological review by sketching three silences of my dissertation. 
Three silences exist within this dissertation. First, my research took place in diverse 
social environments with varying levels of discursive freedom (Glasius et al. 2018; Koch 2013a). 
Though Georgia has a much freer media environment than some post-Soviet countries, the 
communities proximal to the mining complex often remain quite hesitant to speak with people 
they deem outsiders. Much of their reticence to speak openly seems to stem from fear of 
retribution from RMG, which controls most of the region’s employment, maintains a presence of 
armed guards around the mines and village of Kazreti, and is involved in nearly every level of 
local government. While RMG does not engage in overt violence against the region’s 
populations, the threats are clear and limit who feels comfortable speaking with an American 
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graduate student and his colleagues. My interviews in the mining communities were therefore 
limited to individuals with whom I connected via snowball sampling and interpersonal 
connections (Biernacki and Waldorf 1981). I had far more conversations not occur than did, 
limiting the number and diversity of voices I engaged. I therefore feel responsible to practice 
self-reflexivity regarding my research processes followed by, as Glasius et al. phrase it, 
“transparency about our practices, not our respondents” (2018: 107–8). 
Second, at times many respondents felt uncomfortable discussing certain culturally 
sensitive topics with me. For instance, I encountered complete stonewalling on certain topics 
that, in other contexts, respondents discussed quite openly. Many times I was unable to coax 
anyone to discuss health and illness issues other than in the broadest terms when speaking with 
people as a lone, male, foreign researcher with a research assistant. However, arriving at an 
interview with my wife and occasional research collaborator, Martha, changed the dynamic 
radically as my own perceived subjectivity changed in respondents’ eyes. Respondents 
frequently treated me as more trustworthy when she was present, and many people in the 
Georgian cultural context apparently feel more comfortable discussing health issues with women 
over men (though I imagine Martha’s personality also contributed significantly to our research 
dynamics [Moser 2008]). Related shifts in inter-subjectivity, endemic to the research process 
(England 1994; Gubrium and Holstein 2012; Poon and Cheong 2009), produced some of the 
most revealing and emotional conversations of my dissertation research, while other discussions 
just simply would not have occurred otherwise. 
Third, and finally, silences exist from the methods I did not use during research – 
primarily the participatory video techniques I originally planned to utilize in my dissertation. 
Numerous scholars successfully illustrate that visual, specifically video-based projects, can 
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enhance socially engaged research in a variety of ways, both analytical and empowering (Garrett 
2011; Garrett and Brickell 2015; Hughes 2013; Kindon 2003; Rose 2012; Shaw 2016). 
Academic film-making has a complicated history of exoticized and colonial documentation of 
non-western places, cultures, and female bodies, though scholars have tried to rectify such 
uneven power dynamics through participatory models of research (Crang 2010; Elwood 2007; 
Milne et al. 2012; Pain and Kindon 2007; Pratt 2010). 
I originally proposed to frame my dissertation research around such a participatory video 
project. I anticipated drawing from my prior experiences as a television producer to guide a 
collaborative video project with people living in the Mashavera’s mining communities. I planned 
to use this process of producing a brief documentary video as a vector for new analytical 
opportunities, interrogating popular geopolitical discourses as a form of public and participatory 
geography (Fuller 2008; Valentine 2005, 2008; Ward 2006, 2007). In doing so I planned a 
collaborative method of video filming and editing as an opportunity to involve participants as 
meaningfully engaged research partners rather than simply as data resources to be used and 
abandoned once the project had concluded (see Bryan and Wainwright 2009; Rhoades 2006), 
while also unearthing connections among alternative data sources. However, the project did not 
come to fruition for several reasons.  
In part my failure stemmed from the fact that, for funding reasons, I never remained in 
Georgia for more than three months at a time, sometimes for as short as six weeks. My shorter-
term engagements limited opportunities to nourish the kinds of relationships necessary for “neck 
deep” and technologically demanding engagements. Meanwhile, I did not feel I could maintain 
my commitments in the way ethically required to not turn my research into an even more 
extractive process than international investigations typically already are. I took additional steps 
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to develop other iterations of my project – including leaving several smart phones and hand-held 
HD video cameras with a politically active collaborator, and partnering with Martha, a 
photographer, for two trips to document mining practices using alternative documentary 
techniques – yet none of these efforts panned out.  
I ultimately came to see my failures in part as another product of the fear permeating the 
region. People often did not want even their hands photographed or voices recorded, let alone 
provide video interviews, fearing company retribution. Colleagues who have tried instituting 
similarly engaged projects in the region encountered comparable patterns. Fear is a powerful 
emotion, and recognizing when not to use these powerful, and therefore potentially endangering, 
research technologies is essential for ethically maintaining research engagements (Kindon 2016; 
Walsh 2016).2 
 
 
5.  Conclusion: Chapter Overview 
 
Together my writing practices and silences form my dissertation’s foundation. The six 
chapters in your hands or on your screen are the product of labors by my collaborators and me, 
although any errors are solely my own responsibility. 
In the current chapter, Situating Sakdrisi, I have briefly introduced the case and my 
approach to the research project. This includes first sketching out the events and policies 
surrounding the Sakdrisi-Kachgariani archaeological site’s destruction and the ongoing mining 
practices in the Mashavera Valley (see Figure 3). I then introduce the broad literatures I engage 
in my dissertation, as well as the epistemological approach I develop to do so. I have closed by 
                                                        
2 I further developed these views during my experience as a Public Humanities Fellow through Humanities NY (formerly the NY 
Council for the Humanities) during AY2016-17, as well as through my engagements as a founding member of the University of 
Arizona’s Public Political Ecology Lab (PPEL). 
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reviewing the methodological practices I employed. In Chapter 2, In Media Res, I develop the 
post-structural theoretical framework I adopt in the rest of the dissertation. I draw from a 
Foucauldian view of power’s spatial dimensions to argue for an analytical focus on event-ful 
geographies, framed by a series of research vignettes. In doing so I develop an approach to 
political geographies of the environment that relies on genealogically tracing events to identify 
and explain the powerful assemblages governing the world’s environments, territories, and 
people.  
 
Figure 3: Mashavera Valley landscape (Rendered in Google Maps) 
(Sources: DigitalGlobe, Landsat / Copernicus, Google 2019) 
 
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 represent my dissertation’s empirical heart. Chapter 3, Political 
Alchemy, interrogates the recent history of mining governance in Georgia. In doing so I explain 
how Georgia’s system of controlling and extracting value and rent from territory emerged from 
socially embedded networks and political relationships, producing a particularly uneven resource 
regime in the process. Chapter 4, Mining the Homeland, analyzes national imaginations and 
geopolitical scripts of the Georgian homeland as they circulate in the Mashavera Valley’s 
3/12/19, 10)20 AMGoogle Maps
Page 1 of 1https://www.google.com/maps/@41.3026798,44.3673226,2213a,35y,26.72h,72.09t/data=!3m1!1e3
Imagery ©2019 DigitalGlobe, Landsat / Copernicus, DigitalGlobe, Google, Map data ©2019 Google 2000 ft 
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popular discourse, illustrating how mining practices change how communities identify 
politically. Chapter 5, Extractive Archipelagos, assesses the diverse political geography of sub-
state and informal borders existing across southern Georgia’s mining landscape, in part produced 
by the governing regime assessed in Chapter 3 and the shifting geopolitical imaginations 
outlined in Chapter 4. The system of socio-material borderings in Georgia produce a kind of 
“political island” around RMG’s mining complex, simultaneously distinct yet connected to the 
surrounding environment and landscape through numerous vectors. The “island” metaphor 
relates the Mashavera Valley to other extractive spaces throughout the post-Soviet region via the 
history of corporate ownership and related practices of mining governance. These links produce 
a loose string of connected spaces located within, yet separate from, varying state spaces – an 
extractive archipelago. 
Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation by presenting how the constellation of 
governing powers operating here produces new geographies that rely on competing geopolitical 
imaginations, experiences of environmental health and economic development, and the territorial 
effects produced by intersecting and competing powers. In doing so I outline two primary areas 
to which my dissertation research contributes intellectually: (1) a renewed and revised scholarly 
attention to socio-environmental events and (2) the territory effects of resource governance 
regimes as political networks, newly re-centralized within corporate entities, producing what I 
term Malleable Territories. 
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Chapter II – In Media Res: Power, Event, Assemblage 
 
 
1.  Introduction: A Mine and A Puzzle 
 
Sakdrisi announces itself with a cloud of dust, and we roll-up our windows as we 
approach the mine. The land increasingly dries out the farther southeast you drive from the 
Greater Caucasus mountains toward the cracked desert landscapes of Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
southeastern Turkey, and eventually Iran. Here near the Georgian-Armenian border, however, 
sprawling forests and scattered farming villages reveal the valley’s rich soils. 
A lumbering Soviet-era diesel truck headed in the opposite direction kicks up another 
cloud of dust on this muggy June day. I ask the driver, eyes still bleary from the previous night, 
to pull over. Anxious for a cigarette, he agrees, and there across the valley, finally, is my first 
view of the dust’s primary source: the Sakdrisi gold mine. 
Tectonic forces, the same that continue shaping the Caucasus Mountains themselves, 
produced this rich gold and copper deposit more than eighty million years ago. However, modern 
social and political forces also started converging here in 2005, when an archaeological team 
began excavating artifacts hinting at a human story of extraction at least 5,000 years old 
(Hauptmann et al. 2013). The Georgian Parliament extended this historically relevant pattern of 
extraction with its decision, made on a single night in December 2014, to allow the primarily 
Russian-owned mining company, Rich Metals Group (RMG), to begin blasting at Sakdrisi. This 
decision placed the region’s rich archaeological history, prominent agricultural sector, and 
diverse ecosystems at risk, sparking some of the largest environmental protests seen in Georgia 
since the Soviet Union’s collapse. A diverse activist coalition of students, environmentalists, 
labor organizers, and members of the Georgian Orthodox Church had camped along a river bank 
near the proposed mine site for four months. Meanwhile, sympathizers took to Tbilisi’s streets in 
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protest and a demonstration of solidarity, part of a trend toward increased political activism in 
Georgian urban society. 
 
 
Figure 4: Sakdrisi mining pit  
(Photo credit: Martha Swann-Quinn, 2017) 
 
In the end these demonstrations and protests had little effect, and the mining project 
progressed rapidly. Today Sakdrisi, along with the Soviet-era Madneuli copper mine operating 
on the valley’s other side, contributes significantly to Georgia’s foreign exports. Together these 
two mines form the economic cornerstone for surrounding communities, and RMG is actively 
surveying the rest of the region for future developments. Employment options outside the mines 
are primarily limited to farming, and those young people who don’t leave typically must decide 
between producing metals or vegetables. The region is commonly known as Georgia’s 
breadbasket, and people sell produce grown here in markets throughout the country’s urban 
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centers. The landscape is beautiful and fruitful, but the communities, company, and government 
here have complex relationships with one another. 
“We should try to move closer,” says Niko, a local environmentalist and my guide for the 
day. We get back in the car and continue driving toward the place that, less than a year earlier, 
was a hill as green as its neighbors and an invaluable archaeological site. Today we see only a 
large ocher pit, the newest strip mine in post-Soviet Georgia, growing by the day.  
Open-cast mining (also known as open-pit or strip mining), like that undertaken at the 
Sakdrisi site, is one of the most globally common techniques for extracting gold today. Open-
cast mining requires using large machines that strip surface vegetation or soil covering the 
deposit in a terraced form. Miners repeatedly blast, collect, and remove rock by the truckload. To 
extract the precious metals contained within, miners then treat the ore with poisonous chemicals 
such as cyanide, producing toxic tailings – waste – in the process. Open-cast mining therefore 
leaves the surrounding countryside altered and often profoundly polluted, affecting areas well 
beyond the location of metal deposits. 
On this morning, I am attempting to better understand what effect the mine has already 
had on this place and the people living in its vicinity. Niko leads me to a stream downhill from 
the Kazreti pit that has consistently produced copper since Soviet times. A lean and sway-backed 
cow, slowly ruminating, watches from the road as we walk a short distance down the rows of 
young corn, turning left into the brush. Before today, I have heard stories that people working 
farms between here and Bolnisi experience the effects of heavy metal poisoning with increasing 
frequency. Now I see why. 
Pushing back willow saplings and buckthorn bushes, Niko points toward the shadows. 
The line of brush covers a stream running through the field, and the water flowing through is 
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orange, opaque, almost milky – direct toxic run-off from the nearby copper mine. We navigate a 
half-kilometer downstream to where the water is taken up by a large, rusted pipe, supplying this 
polluted water as an irrigation source to many farms in the valley. 
How could this egregious pattern of pollution happen? What allowed the initial mining 
blast to take place, the first in a series of practices that produced this large, toxic, profit-
generating pit? How did that explosive event unfold in relation to the complex political, 
economic, and environmental dimensions existing throughout Georgian territory? Why did 
prolonged protests fail in this emerging democracy? What effects were these activities 
generating among the surrounding population? Were deeper connections between the 
destruction of cultural heritage and the blatant pollution flowing past me hidden in the stories I 
had heard so far? Was this indicative of broader political trends across the region? 
The obvious causal answers that immediately came to mind – personal greed, structural 
corruption, blatant disregard for the environment – angered me, and felt true, but left me 
unsatisfied. Such generalities left little traction to actually move toward greater systemic 
understanding and solutions, obscured complexities of the situation I had begun to see in my 
previous weeks of research, and potentially absolved individual people from the consequences of 
their destructive actions. Where should I begin in my pursuit of answers? How could I begin 
examining and comprehending the intersections of power, geology, culture, and ecology that 
presented themselves before me? 
------ 
The objective for my dissertation further crystalized along the stream bank that morning. 
I needed to understand how this mining development had come to exist, what social conditions 
and forces produced this situation, and what political and environmental effects the opening of 
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this new extractive venture had generated, and for whom. In this chapter, I lay out the theoretical 
/ methodological conceptual tools and underlying perspectives I use to pursue these goals. To do 
so, I first draw from geographic scholarship to theorize the spatial dimensions of power, 
especially the driving forces of politics and spatial contests in post-Soviet extractive 
environments. I next briefly explore how geographers have addressed the production of scale, 
crucial for defining how, where, and in what ways power circulates through human-influenced 
environments. From this I conceptualize “events” as the driving moments in the production of 
space, offering analytical windows onto the processes and forces behind such geographic 
transformations. I next identify the products of these processes, forces, and events as socio-
spatial assemblages. Applying Michel Foucault’s genealogical methodology to recent history 
around Sakdrisi, I finally adopt the position that these material and social forces can be traced 
through the practices and relations that produce and surround them. Throughout the remainder of 
this dissertation, I utilize a theory of practice and event to explain this new extraction site’s 
emergence as a political and ecological assemblage. Contingent local histories of identity and 
development shape this extractive assemblage, as do broader regional histories and experiences 
of political economy and extractive industries. In short, I argue that explaining such 
environmental events as the destruction of Sakdrisi and expansion of mining in the Mashavera 
Valley requires tracing outward, following the social and material practices and relations that 
have produced this event across scales. 
Niko touches my shoulder, drawing my attention back to the fields surrounding us. 
“Come – you should meet someone else,” he says while turning back toward the car. I climb in 
behind Niko, and we take off in a cloud of yellow dust. 
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2.  Power and Events in Geography 
 
2.1.  Economies of Power: Space and Scale  
 
The politics surrounding the Sakdrisi extraction project are complex, explicitly spatial, 
and often feel elusive. While geographers have long engaged in debates over the nature of 
space’s relationship with power, the conceptual approach I find most useful emerges from the 
work of Michel Foucault and scholars who have drawn from and expanded his body of research. 
This work primarily focuses on practices of power and politics, including processes of political 
subject formation, as they shape historic and geographic development. Thus, rather than taking 
guidance from any explicit spatial theoretical finding of Foucault’s (e.g., governmentality or 
biopolitics, which, though important components of my later analyses, I do not use as an 
analytical starting point), I follow the example of scholars within the broad “practice turn” in the 
social sciences to draw from Foucault’s work for both conceptual and methodological guidance 
(Jones and Murphy 2011; Koch 2014). Throughout this chapter, I specifically use Foucault’s 
conceptualizations of power and space as they emerge from his understanding of history, and 
their direct implications for historically and geographically contextualized investigations of 
contemporary social forces – akin to a spatial form of what Rabinow and Marcus term an 
“anthropology of the contemporary” (2008). 
Foucault most explicitly developed his theory of power by analyzing the historic 
development of modern institutions meant to shape human conduct – the penal system, the 
asylum, norms of human sexuality (1977a, 1988, 1990) – as well as through his series of lectures 
at the Collège de France investigating the general topic of government (2003, 2007b, 2008, 
2011b, 2012, 2016). His general theory of power moves beyond either a negative, purely 
repressive, coercive conception or one that requires ephemeral constructions absent real people 
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with real experiences and lives (e.g., “the state” as an all-encompassing presence, haunting daily 
life but never visible). Instead, Foucault’s concept of power is both broad enough to allow 
application across diverse social phenomena and specific enough to provide an analytical path, 
grounded in empirics, for spatial scholars to follow. 
In a lecture from 7 January 1976, Foucault defines this theory of power in opposition to 
both classical transactional (as discrete, possessed, and exchanged among individuals) and 
Marxist (relational, but always in service to economic organization of society) views of power. 
Rather, Foucault’s position is built on two basic premises:  
We have, first of all, the assertion that power is not something that is given, exchanged, 
or taken back, that it is something that is exercised and that it exists only in action. We 
also have the other assertion, that power is not primarily the perpetuation and renewal of 
economic relations, but that it is primarily, in itself, a relationship of force. (2003: 15)3  
 
Power is neither purely repressive or coercive nor based only in violent struggle or war; power is 
also productive and exists through the co-constitution of practices and discourses of knowledge 
and truth. Also writing against a homogenous, juridical understanding of power embraced by 
Freudian psychoanalysts in which “Power is essentially what says ‘you must not’” (2007c: 153–
4), Foucault develops a “conception of a technology of power” (2007c: 154) that is 
heterogeneous, diverse, and, most crucially, productive. In this scheme, Foucault famously 
defines government as “the conduct of conduct,” constructively organizing society through 
power relations and practices. 
The 1976 lecture series Society Must Be Defended represents an important inflection 
point in Foucault’s scholarship, providing an opportunity to elaborate on the key components of 
this theory of power and government: that power is “a relationship of force” (2003: 15), 
                                                        
3 Also printed in (Foucault 1980) with slightly different translation. 
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circulating “through individuals” (29)  and realized through actions, practices, things that 
“happen” (28). In this vision, power exists through networks of relations, simultaneously social 
and material, and as such is socially produced. Additionally, power is neither distributed evenly 
nor anarchically but collects and can become useful for individual interests through the form of 
various, contingent technologies (Foucault 2003: 32). This fluid accumulation occurs 
historically, and “from below,” operating through everyday practice and individual life – what 
Foucault  terms “capillary” means (2003: 32).   
Power’s capillary character suggests a profound spatiality to the generation of forces. For 
Foucault, space presents a crucial dimension of governing technologies, simultaneously 
providing the material components of those technologies governing “the conduct of conduct.” 
Power and space co-constitute each other, yet space also acts as the glue binding power and 
knowledge together. Space is fundamentally relational, intimately assembled as diverse power 
relations.  As Foucault states elsewhere, “space is how knowledge and power intersect.  
Language and knowledge need a ‘proper place of inscription’” (2007a, 166).  In short, space for 
Foucault provides the means for people to claim and contest both knowledge and meaning. Seen 
in this way, space is the living mechanism, the “proper place of inscription,” that joins power, 
knowledge, and material elements into productive forces.  
Foucault’s general analytical project and method relies on power’s intimate relation with 
space but also the notion that multiple powers can exist simultaneously in the same locality as 
people implement various forces in different ways. In a 1976 lecture in Brazil, Foucault drew 
from the empirics laid out by Marx in Volume II of Capital to demonstrate that even within 
capitalism’s powerful structures,  
there exists no single power, but several powers. Powers, which means to say forms of 
domination, forms of subjection, which function locally, for example in the workshop, in 
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the army, in slave-ownership or in a property where there are servile relations. All these 
are local, regional forms of power, which have their own way of functioning, their own 
procedure and technique. All these forms of power are heterogeneous. We cannot 
therefore speak of power, if we want to do an analysis of power, but we must speak of 
powers and try to localize them in their historical and geographical specificity… Society 
is an archipelago of different powers. (2007c: 156) 
 
Within this analysis, Foucault does not deny the social importance of capital 
accumulation, dispossession, production, property, or other economic phenomena within forms 
of capitalism – say, in practices of extracting precious metal within a formerly collective 
economy. However, he identifies these as locally functioning forms of power, heterogeneous 
practices that unfold contingently in relation to their socio-material contexts.  
Such a conceptual perspective bears important analytical implications. As the series of 
his lectures at the Collège de France have been published in English over the past fifteen years, 
Anglophone scholars have increasingly clarified Foucault’s method for studying power and 
politics as they shape space, history, and social forces. A key example comes from the series 
Security, Territory, Population in which Foucault characterizes this method as seeking “to know 
the general economy of power within which this project and structuring of space and territory is 
situated” (2007b: 30). As I discuss further at the close of the chapter, Foucault approached the 
relationships among people, space, and various forces, the “economy of power,” as a way to 
understand the confluence of multiple power relationships and their effects on the organization 
of space and progression of history. 
 This perspective provides a radically different starting point for analysis than scholars 
generally utilized previously in historical and geographic studies of political economy and 
human environments. In such a formulation, a mode of production is itself a technology of 
government based in a political field of practices, forces, and materials, all arranged to direct 
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“the conduct of conduct” – and it is these “prior” organizations of society and space which 
should serve as an analytical focus. As Lemke explains:   
Foucault shows that the ‘art of government’ is not limited to the field of politics as 
separated from the economy; instead the constitution of a conceptually and practically 
distinguished space, governed by autonomous laws and a proper rationality is itself an 
element of “economic” government. Already in his work on discipline Foucault 
repeatedly pointed out that the power of the economy was vested on a prior “economics 
of power”, since the accumulation of capital presumes technologies of production and 
forms of labor that enable to put to use a multitude of human beings in an economically 
profitable manner. Foucault showed that labor power must first be constituted before it 
can be exploited: that is, that life time must be synthesized into labor time, individuals 
must be subjugated to the production circle, habits must be formed, and time and space 
must be organized according to a scheme. (2012: 10–1) 
 
Foucault thus defined power as both profoundly spatial and, by necessity, historical. He 
employed various iterations of this methodological approach to study “madness,” tracing the 
concept’s emergence as a social affliction and “internment” as its treatment (Foucault 2011a), 
and the prison, where bodies were organized in confinement and destroyed in public to control 
the behaviors of populations (Foucault 1977a). In both these analyses – considering the 
emergence of practices in their specific geographic and historic contexts and analyzing them at 
power’s capillary level to understand broader patterns that may exist across society – 
technologies of power are seen as tools for organizing society through spaces, institutions, 
people, and things.  
In some ways Foucault’s scholarship aligns with other prominent socio-spatial theories 
from the late twentieth century (e.g., Lefebvre 1991; Smith 1984), revealing how power and 
space recursively shape one another through socio-material relations. However, considering the 
“where” of power introduces a key geographic issue: scale, the spatial extent of power relations, 
their “geographical reach” (Herod 2010). Scale is especially salient for investigating natural 
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resource use as social practices intersect with highly scalar ecological and geologic processes 
and systems, such as those converging in events at Sakdrisi. 
Scale presents a key problematic in geography, compelling us to consider environmental 
politics and the division of space (Herod 2010; Jessop et al. 2008; Paasi 2008). Geographers 
have considered diverse spatial metaphors to conceptualize scale as organizing space into 
“envelopes,” “containers,” and others. Other prominent human geographers, by contrast, argue 
for jettisoning the concept of scale altogether, replacing questions of extent with “flat” ontologies 
oriented toward discrete “sites.” From this perspective, the world does not comprise such spatial 
hierarchies, but rather moments of connection and disconnection between bodies and entities 
(Marston et al. 2005; Woodward et al. 2010). In some ways this perspective aligns with 
Foucault’s “capillary” understanding of power, especially its focus on actual practices and 
interactions of force as they exist in people’s lives and experiences. These scholars’ expressed 
goal of overcoming the traditionally assumed distinction – and powerful social construction – 
between macro and micro processes is productive to an extent. However, a practice-oriented 
theory of power such as Foucault’s does not align comfortably with purely “rhizomatic” and 
anarchic theories of social reality. Even with a focus on power’s aleatory functioning, Foucault’s 
vision allows for scalar effects, generated by the same intersecting socio-material relations 
unfolding in a capillary fashion. This analytic – that a series of small, intimate practices and 
relations can together produce larger-scale events – is crucial for understanding and explaining 
historical events that may produce a wide range of scalar effects both environmental and 
political: the nuclear disaster at Chernobyl (Petryna 2013); a pipeline leaking in the South 
Caucasus (Barry 2013); the destruction and production of vast forested landscapes (Braun 2002). 
Following Foucault’s project, my goal here is to trace how such scalar socio-material relations 
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unfold and what they look like to account for them as political economic forces, social protests, 
and natural resources intersect in Georgia’s mining sector. 
Disaggregated Foucauldian accounts of power, scale, and non-deterministic explanation 
have provided important analytical fodder for political ecologists, though not without their limits. 
For example, in a foundational text of the sub-discipline, Blaikie and Brookfield (1987) assume a 
hierarchical arrangement of spatial relationships between localities, regions, states, and other 
scalar political entities when developing their “chains of explanation” for land degradation’s 
political drivers. These chains connect processes occurring at a variety of scales to explain how 
global structural changes do or do not interact with local dynamics. However, in their analysis, 
Blaikie and Brookfield assume such political ecological relations operate through a “common 
sense” understanding that phenomena occurring at one scale should impact those at another as 
long as they are “related,” without offering up what these relations may entail or look like. 
Blaikie and Brookfield’s argument is profoundly scalar yet frustratingly unable to provide certain 
critical tools for political analyses of how socio-material forces actually intersect and connect 
(Peet and Watts 2004; Rangan and Kull 2009; Robbins 2004; Zimmerer and Bassett 2003).  
More generally, political ecologists and environmental political geographers have 
overwhelmingly embraced scale as a key analytic for understanding environmental politics. Yet, 
as Rangan and Kull argue, classical political ecology has most often considered scale as a static, 
a-political idea, despite how the concept is theorized (2009). That is, scale in political ecology is 
frequently seen as an object, not a political process, symptomatic of the restrictive macro-/micro- 
assumptions argued against by those scholars who adopt flatter ontologies. Some have even 
suggested that “political ecology might therefore proceed as a kind of study of scalar politics, 
exploring how various political boxes get stacked the way they do in scalar hierarchy through 
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historical and economic processes” (Robbins 2008: 216). Or, as Rangan and Kull state it, “Scale 
is the means by which ecology is made ‘political’” (2009: 36). 
However, traditional conceptualizations of scale as merely a spatial container for socio-
material processes are inadequate, as recent geographic debates regarding scale’s nature 
demonstrate. Scale is in fact the product of social processes, including the extraction, circulation, 
and accumulation of capital and commodities (Herod 2010; Lefebvre 1991; Smith 1984), and a 
social process in itself (Brenner 1999; Leitner and Miller 2007; Manson 2008; Marston 2000, 
2004). Echoing these arguments, Bridge and Perreault (2009) contend that environmental 
governance is essentially an under-theorized scalar concept, operating at a range of scales and 
through increasingly varied forms of resources, yet often uncritically accepted as Blaikie and 
Brookfield’s “common sense” hierarchy. This divergence means that, “In short, environmental 
governance is often deployed in ways that flatten uneven relations of power, and which mask 
competing claims to, and about, the non-human world” (Bridge and Perreault 2009: 491–2). 
Rather than considering scales as discrete areal units or “space envelopes,” they are better 
understood as connections throughout space, produced by relations of force among people and 
things – social and material forces intersecting in contingent ways and to varying extents (Cox 
2013; Escobar 2010; Herod 2010; Rocheleau and Roth 2007; Whatmore 2002).  
While these analytical tensions are thick, multifaceted, and at times conflicting, I contend 
that Foucault’s multi-dimensions theory of power – and the numerous scholars who have taken 
up his project through studying environmental politics – offers a way out of these conundrums. 
His work demonstrates how to assess socio-material relations and practices in a capillary fashion 
without sacrificing the important generative influences of context, scale, and uneven social 
relations. Foucault thus presented the methodological imperative to address issues of government 
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“on the basis of men’s [sic] actual practice, on the basis of what they do and how they think” 
(2007b: 358). Yet rather than focusing on moments and practices of connection alone, Foucault 
suggested we study politics as power in motion. His analyses demonstrate that power must  
be analyzed as something that circulates, or rather as something that functions 
only when it is part of a chain. It is never localized here or there, it is never in the 
hands of some, and it is never appropriated in the way that wealth or a commodity 
can be appropriated. Power functions. Power is exercised through networks, and 
individuals do not simply circulate in those networks… power passes through 
individuals. It is not applied to them. (2003: 29)  
 
In fact, Foucault staked the value of his method on the fact that it allowed us to “see that there is 
not a sort of break between the level of micro-power and the level of macro-power, and that 
talking about one [does not] exclude talking about the other” (2007b: 358).  
These “economies of power” – formed through relations among people and things, 
circulating through networks and chains, and knowable through people’s everyday practices – 
provide possible means for the actual production of scales. These “chains,” “networks,” or 
“meshes” of capillary power relations (Foucault 2007c) subsequently produce the fabric of socio-
material scales. The practices which go into their making define their extents, as well as their 
effects, such as those unfolding around the mine at Sakdrisi. In Foucault’s vision, power operates 
locally, yet through its operation and circulation, it also provides the connective means for 
forming new regional political and material formations, embedded in historical processes, 
generated through local forces, and contingent on a variety of contexts. However, while this 
perspective might seem prohibitively complex and arbitrary, it also specifies where to begin such 
an analysis. In the following section I argue that scholars may strengthen analysis of political 
environments through a focus on events, identifying moments and locations when these various 
socio-material forces join together and become immanently visible.  
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2.2.  Between Earth and Other Worlds: The Problem of Events 
 
The sky is hazy and dark with clouds. Old white sheets, covered with pink and green 
floral patterns and crumpled as they dry, fly in place on the home-made clothesline over the farm 
and fields of the valley. It is December, but the rolling slopes remain green with the year’s last 
growth. On the hill beyond the creek, several of those familiar old diesel dump trucks line the 
road, but the only sound is the white noise of muffled wind, interference coming through the 
camera’s microphone. Without warning a large black cloud erupts from the hillside, reaching to 
the sky. Half a second, later the sharp clap of an explosion reaches my ears. People shout as 
eventually the frame shakes away, following the camera person’s perspective as they run. The 
small crowd disperses, shouting and confused. 
Turning to look out the window, I realize I have not blinked for nearly twenty seconds. 
This is my first time seeing the initial explosion of the ancient gold mine at Sakdrisi eight 
months earlier, and, for some reason, I keep watching the trucks in the video. Arranged 
haphazardly, ready to collect the first small measure of what will become a seemingly endless 
stream of material, they wait to begin ferrying the slow flow of rock from beneath the hill to the 
valley floor. This place will never look the same. Scraggly forests surrounding the farm fields 
will recede as the pit grows, revealing the pallid earth beneath their roots.  The twisted, rough 
tunnels that made up the old mine are lost forever, only to be recreated in museums from 
photographs, measurements, and memories.  
The questions driving my research project, and the conceptual and methodological tools 
required to answer them, emerge from deeper questions of how power operates across scale, 
drawing together local politics and international geopolitics traditionally separated analytically; 
how the meanings and materiality of a mine relate to one another in the minds and soup pots of 
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local residents and political elites alike; and how individual events such as this first explosion at 
Sakdrisi become imbricated in broader historic trends of politics, economy, and ecological 
processes.  
 
Figure 5: Initial Sakdrisi explosion  
(Source: YouTube screengrab, Iberiana21) 
 
My chance to experience this event, the moment when a government decision exploded a 
site of cultural heritage for a foreign company’s profit, has already passed as I missed the prior 
field season due to a spinal injury. I can now only view this brief moment in contemporary 
history through backlit panels showing YouTube clips.4 What had allowed this development to 
occur, and what effects are emerging from this series of events? I have returned to Georgia in an 
attempt to answer this question and to untangle the multi-scalar political developments 
surrounding the resource extraction project at Sakdrisi. 
                                                        
4 This footage was broadcast on a popular Georgian news program: https://youtu.be/jeMzDh2xIpI?t=2m37s.  
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Human geographers have granted varying degrees of attention to “events” as an 
analytical concept. Scholars have primarily used the concept as a discrete framing and object of 
analysis for research, such as in the study of politics surrounding sporting mega-events 
(Ferbrache 2013; Gaffney 2010; Koch and Valiyev 2015; Müller 2017; Trubina 2014); natural 
environmental or weather hazards and land degradation (Hebert 2011; Sherman-Morris 2013; 
Walters and Vayda 2009); and post-colonial military conflicts from Palestine to India and 
beyond (Gregory 2010; Harlow 2012; Jones 2009). 
At their core, though, events are moments which draw together practices, processes, 
systems, flows, and networks. As Koch argues, events provide “windows” onto the active social 
constitution of subjects and spaces, which are not pre-determined but produced through 
historically grounded processes of encounter, circulation, and contestation (forthcoming). 
Geographers have implemented similar conceptualizations of events in various contexts, 
including cultural practices of bordering in the Baltics (Kaiser 2012; Kaiser and Nikiforova 
2006), battlefield calculations and tactics in besieged Baghdad (Gregory 2010), and the 1871 
Paris Commune’s history (Bassett 2008). While varying in approach, these investigations 
typically adopt a multi-scalar perspective, acknowledging that events often have effects neither 
purely local nor global, but somewhere in between. Events’ complex nature draws together 
multiple social and material forces, providing fruitful terrain for a Foucauldian, practice-based 
analysis of political events. 
Events have received surprisingly little theoretical attention in human geography, 
especially considering the concept’s importance to various intellectual and philosophical 
trajectories (Harlow 2012; McCormack 2004; Shaw 2012). Events specifically provide key 
analytical objects in post-structural political scholarship, as scholars and political philosophers 
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have tried making sense of historical change, political complexity, and unexpected global 
developments. Prominent contributors to these efforts include Foucault’s contemporaries Gilles 
Deleuze and Alain Badiou, together with contemporary thinkers such as Slavoj Žižek. Here I 
continue following Foucault’s thought as the most empirically grounded and analytically focused 
of these perspectives. As Foucault argues about the disruptive nature of events, "to recognize a 
discontinuity is never anything more than to register a problem that needs to be solved" (1991b: 
76). Foucault differed radically from his colleagues, especially in his commitment that scholars 
can explain events through empirical investigation and tracing, a position aligned with much 
critical realist scholarship in geography. 
Recent attempts to theorize events in human geography have leaned away from the 
empirical and toward the ephemeral, yet this trend is not symptomatic of evental analysis 
generally. This commitment instead reflects a specific commitment that events, defined as major 
ruptures in experience, reveal a realm of unrealized and previously unknown political possibility. 
For example, as Shaw explains while drawing from Badiou’s philosophy:  
At any one time, the world we see and experience is partial, like the tip of an 
iceberg that plunges deep beneath a murky ocean. It is a caricature based on the 
relations between objects. Such contingency is held back by transcendental 
objects that act as anchors within a world. When these transcendentals are 
overthrown by inexistent objects, a new world is constituted. In a nutshell, this is 
the definition of the geo-event. (2012: 620) 
 
Such concern with the transcendent beyond the “anchors within a world” emerges from 
the perspectives of Deleuze, Badiou, and Žižek, who concern themselves with “Events” as large-
scale disruptions in collective human experience (and as opposed to the lower-case “events” of 
mundane life I argue for below, comprising an iceberg of empirically traceable practices [Veyne 
1997: 154]). Each of these post-structural thinkers in his own way theorizes the Event as a major 
rupture, as the emergence of an entity from the field of possibility to the field of reality. They see 
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Events as indicative of a greater “beyond” – related to, yet distinct from, the world of human 
social practices – composed of pure possibility, where Events exist in “a ‘pure’ or virtual 
dimension as well as being actualized in ‘particular states of affairs’” (Deleuze and Guattari 
1987; Lundborg 2009: 1; Patton 1997). Badiou utilizes mathematics and set theory (in ways 
beyond my comprehension) to theorize Events in relatively similar terms, focusing on the 
eruption of previously unseen or invisible possibilities: “Politics is, then, all the processes by 
means of which human collectivity becomes active or proves capable of new possibilities as 
regards its own destiny” (2013: 4). However, I find explanation in this world difficult, if not 
impossible, to determine. Such an Evental approach presents complexity of socio-natural 
phenomena as both immanent and transcendent – both of this world and beyond it – rather than 
something explainable, tangible, or even really knowable (Barnes 2009a; Harvey 1969). 
Badiou offers several primary examples of political Events, almost all drawn from the 
major moments of political economic revolution in the 19th, 20th, and 21st centuries: the Paris 
Commune, the Russian Revolution, the Maoist movement in China, May 1968 in France, the 
Arab Spring. However, from this perspective, it is almost impossible to conceptualize the 
political Event outside large-scale revolution. This is especially difficult to break out of as 
Badiou, and to an extent Žižek, sets such a high bar for qualifying Events as such and with no 
possibility for the existence of partial Events – something is either an Event or not (Robinson 
2014; Žižek 2014). Žižek presents a somewhat more forgiving program for analyzing an Event, 
which he defines as “a manifestation of a circular structure in which the evental effect 
retroactively determines its causes or reasons” (2014: 4). This vague language represents many 
theorizations of Events. More specifically, “at its most elementary, event is not something that 
occurs within the world, but is a change of the very frame through which we perceive the world 
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and engage in it” (Žižek 2014: 12). From such an approach, people can only ever acknowledge 
Events as such in hindsight. Events only exist through ruptures in reality or dominant orders, a 
designation often impossible to know in the moment. Žižek’s view offers intriguing analytical 
possibility yet is still concerned only with large-scale, spectacular shifts in history, and in such a 
way that he remains focused on the immanent emergence of “other worlds.”  
Non-representational scholars also consider events as immanent, intangible moments 
defined in terms of the “excess” beyond our representations of these moments (Ben Anderson 
2006; McCormack 2003; Thrift 2004). I find these approaches equally frustrating for their 
acquiescence of explanatory power and disregard for empirics. However, these scholars do offer 
important contributions as they move their analyses from momentous, large-scale “Events” to the 
banal “events” of the everyday. For McCormack, events can be extremely small, mundane, and 
emerge from everyday relations: “events like a smile, a movement, a gesture, the playful use of 
an apparently useless object, the movement of the body when talking about movement, or the 
touch of a hand given over to the response of another” (2003: 494–5). While I find a singular 
focus on such affective encounters less convincing, these scholars usefully demonstrate how 
spatial relations develop not only through large world events but also through more intimate, 
embodied, and tangible moments. 
Research closer to historical and anthropological analysis has produced a range of evental 
scholarship I find significantly more useful for thinking through these complex connections. 
Relational webs among social systems, individual people, and material “things” extend beyond 
either the transcendental possibilities held within immanent objects or a purely socially 
constructed world. As Bruce Braun and Sarah Whatmore illustrate by bringing together a volume 
of such political-material research, meaning is not just made about things, but things themselves 
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are imbricated in moments and processes of meaning making, shaping history at many scales: 
“things are not just simultaneously material and meaningful; they are also eventful” (2010: xxi). 
Isabelle Stengers, in her contribution to this volume, develops an event-oriented “ecology of 
practices” (2010: 25), conceptualizing the event as the epistemological focal point of practice-
oriented political research. Scholars can use such a perspective to convincing explanatory effect, 
as Barry demonstrates in his investigation of a failed metal coating used in the construction of 
the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline through the Caucasus. Barry considers this failure as 
a material-political event, where materials and humans both realize capacities through their 
historically contingent relations with one another (2010, 2013). 
Many such investigations rely heavily on Foucault’s analytical perspective, for whom 
events provided a key analytical concept to investigate power relations and subject-formations. 
In opposition to Deleuze, Badiou, and Žižek, Foucault understood events in such a way that did 
not pre-suppose the immanent potentialities on which the others focus, but rather begged the 
simple question: If discursive and material practices drive the events of history, why should we 
care about transcendental, yet-unformed worlds beyond our experiences and representations? 
As Paul Veyne pithily answers, “one cannot make true or erroneous statements about the 
digestive or reproductive processes of centaurs” (1997: 176).  
Foucault instead rallied scholars to study those constituent and contingent practices 
themselves to understand how events happen – to analyze the unfolding of the world we inhabit. 
Foucault termed this event-focused historic analysis “eventalization,” defining it as “analyzing 
an event according to the multiple processes which constitute it” (1991b: 76). Foucault’s 
perspective provides the tools “to see how men govern (themselves and others) by the production 
of truth… I would like in short to resituate the production of true and false at the heart of 
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historical analysis and political critique” (1991b: 79). Foucault’s evental approach to politics and 
political development thus analyzes the powerful practices shaping truth claims in relation to the 
political event the researcher is seeking to explain. In short, an evental approach analyzes how 
people narrate, legitimate, and claim the events of geography and history (Foucault 2016; Legg 
2016). As sociologist Robin Wagner-Pacifici explains:  
events are made through the efforts of gestures and speech that give them shape; through 
the performance of boundary making that includes and excludes participants; through the 
representation of identities that are recognized or ignored. Directions are chosen, 
identities are challenged and cast, cases for taking action are put forward, taken up, or 
contradicted. Individual and collective destinies are contingent upon all these actions… 
events are unpredictable… Events are always a surprise. (2017: 2) 
 
Foucault thus defined events as far more embodied, lived, and contingent than many 
other theorists, simultaneously unpredictable yet traceable. These events emerge from collections 
of practices that, coming together in moments either monumental or banal, cause a “reversal of a 
relationship of forces” (Foucault 1977a: 54), forces that may do so because they “are not 
controlled by destiny or regulative mechanisms,” instead responding to “haphazard conflicts” 
(154). Eventalization acknowledges historical events as themselves ruptures – not of reality from 
some great underlying structure but from one event to the next, regardless of observable scale – 
and studies them as such in pursuit of explanation.  
The transcendental possibilities beyond these empirical series are somewhat analytically 
irrelevant within a Foucauldian evental approach. For instance, in Shaw’s examination a “geo-
event” is not a simple act of reshuffling existent objects as “It is only the inexistent that is 
capable of transforming a world, since only the inexistent escapes the laws of what is, and 
heralds what is to come” (2012: 622). Drawing from Marston et al.’s understanding of flat 
ontology, Shaw continues that "The methodological guideline here then is to probe beneath what 
is obviously seen, felt, and heard, to discover what objects are marginalized to enable the existent 
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world to appear. This is how power must be studied in an evental geography: as the capacity to 
police the aesthetic faultline in a world" (Shaw 2012: 624).  
While poetic, Shaw’s “methodological guideline” leaves much to the imagination to 
determine what an “aesthetic faultline” in the world could look like, what should be studied, and 
what the results of such an investigation may offer. Instead, Foucault expanded upon his 
methodological call to account for events as historical discontinuities, stating that 
Even though the ‘event’ has been for some while now a category little esteemed by 
historians, I wonder whether, understood in a certain sense, ‘eventalization’ may not be a 
useful procedure of analysis. What do I mean by this term? First of all, a breach of self-
evidence… of those self-evidences on which our knowledges, acquiescences and 
practices rest… Secondly, eventalization means… analyzing an event according to the 
multiple processes which constitute it. So to analyze the practice of penal incarceration as 
an ‘event’ (not as an institutional fact or ideological effect) means to determine the 
processes of ‘penalization’ (that is, progressive insertion into the forms of legal 
punishment) of already existing practices of internment. (1991b: 76) 
 
 Veyne explains that, within this analytical perspective, “Everything hinges on a paradox, 
one that is Foucault’s central and most original thesis. What is made, the object, is explained by 
what went into its making at each moment of history; we are wrong to imagine that the making, 
the practice, is explained on the basis of what is made" (1997: 160–1). Veyne expands further, 
stating in a footnote to the text that  
things exist only through relation, as we shall see further on, and the determination of 
this relation is precisely what explains things. In short, everything is historical, 
everything depends on everything else (and not on relations of production alone), nothing 
exists transhistorically, and to explain a so-called object amounts to showing on what 
historical context it depends… However, the notion of a single determining cause is 
prescientific. (1997: 169–70)  
 
Relations and practices, rather than subjects or objects (including historical occurrences), are the 
prime focus of history as those subjects, objects, and events are nothing more than the outcomes 
of practices: “there can be no event in the final analysis; that is a contradiction in terms” (Veyne 
1997: 180). Instead, explanation of a political event through this approach requires investigating 
 
63 
the relationships, practices, and processes that comprise it, both discursive and material 
(DeLanda 2008; Philo 2012). As Policante succinctly states, “it is not history to determine the 
struggle; it is the struggle that determines the unfolding of history” (2010: 6). If we extend this 
logic to geography, then geographic events might represent the objects of explanation for spatial 
investigations, leading scholars to analyze the socio-spatial practices that produce them.  
In this light, acknowledging environmental political conflicts like those surrounding 
Sakdrisi as “events” establishes the researcher’s goal as historicizing such moments – to move 
beyond the “self-evidence” of practices to explain their genesis, occurrence, and significance by 
studying those generative practices in geographic and historic socio-material context. Foucault 
describes this research objective as “at once too much and too little” (Foucault 1991b: 78), 
offering too many possible analytical directions and too few guiding instructions. Yet Foucault’s 
broader methodological practice offers tools to untangle the intersection of forces and practices 
visible in geographic events. In short, scholars may explain event’s complexity by investigating 
and tracing the practices and socio-material relations that produce them, “thinking history 
historically, thinking difference differentially” (McWhorter 1994: 164). 
 Analyzing the political forces surrounding gold and copper mining at Sakdrisi within this 
“sideways” historical framework (Foucault 2008; Philo 2012) thus requires establishing an 
evental entry point into the generative practices which comprise it. The first explosion of the 
mine at Sakdrisi provides such a moment from which I can trace outward the tendrils of relation 
that both produced this event and have resulted from it. However, embracing this position 
presents a final theoretical question of how this event is connected to other events, what practices 
and forces comprise them, and what practices we may ourselves undertake to investigate these 
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relations. To answer these questions, Foucault guides us to a theory of assemblage (dispositif) 
and his genealogical method. 
 
3.  Tracing the Veins: Genealogical Assemblages 
 
The tree tops sway back in forth in the wind, dropping small branches that clang on the 
iron park grate. This is our first meeting, and I am nervous; the sun is setting, I am getting cold, 
and Irakli still has not arrived. Frequenting this public space in nice weather has been a staple of 
Tbilisi daily life since the Soviet government built Vake Park, a sprawling green memorial to 
collective modernism. However, several years earlier, the city government attempted to privatize 
the park, and Irakli served as a leader of the resisting occupy effort, setting up camp with his 
fellow Guerilla Gardeners in a grove near this gate. Stemming in part from these efforts, he was 
also an organizer of the Green Fist encampment near the archaeological dig site at Sakdrisi, 
before it was destroyed.  
At last, a young man who could only be Irakli – short hair and beard, black t-shirt, eyes 
both tired and young – steps out of a cab on the other side of the fence. 
Within the first few minutes of our conversation, it becomes apparent that Irakli wears 
many hats: highly educated archaeologist, continuing student, labor rights activist, 
environmentalist. I worry that these multiple positionalities might contribute to the very problem 
he sees hindering progress with his political agenda: that leftist movements here have trouble 
uniting because of “ideological disagreements” among a diverse coalition. Despite identifying a 
variety of particularly important problems facing Georgian society – unsustainable resource use, 
social fragmentation, abandonment of labor rights, ascendance of right-wing nationalism – Irakli 
tells me the solution is that "we should fight against all of these problems – all these issues are 
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important, and not one of them separately [isolated to] a gold mine." In his estimation, these 
problems are all “coming from one source: neoliberal capitalism.” Cultural heritage “is important 
only for the emotional part,” he asserts, quickly clarifying that heritage is still important – at least 
to his personal sensibilities.  
Irakli is convinced that the fiercely libertarian political economic ideology that the 
Georgian government has adopted in recent years is the sole source of all problems in his own 
life and the lives of his friends. I have spoken to other Georgians who blame different causes as 
the source of their problems. They variably cite fraying social cohesion following the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, the “deviance” of Russian geopolitical interests in the region, American and 
European NGOs “meddling” in the affairs of Georgian society. But each explanation emerges 
from individual experiences, political scripts, and material realities. Understanding what brought 
about Sakdrisi’s destruction requires contextualizing these narratives and practices, following 
how they intersect. The task then is to trace through this overdetermined event (driven by forces 
of political economy, environment, governance, culture, health, identity, emotion) to understand 
its generative conditions, relations, and forces. As Veyne argues, “What is made… is explained 
by what went into its making at each moment of history” (1997: 160–1). 
Two teenage boys teach themselves to skateboard as our conversation winds down; 
families with toddlers on pink plastic bikes move slowly along broad paved avenues; couples 
smoke and hold hands next to the fountain; old men and women walk with exercise sticks; lone 
readers sit on benches across the boulevard from us. Irakli continues, repeating that for him and 
his fellow activists, “we don’t have time,” they must unite now and act. I, like Irakli and his 
passionate young friends, may have already lost the chance to experience Sakdrisi before it was 
blown up in pursuit of extracting and accumulating gold. However, I still have the chance to 
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understand why it happened and what it means for the political and environmental landscape in 
which we sit. Night has fallen, and I part ways with my new friend.  
3.1.  Assemblages: Environmental Politics 
 
 To understand and explain events within a Foucauldian framework, they must be 
analyzed in the context of the interconnected practices, processes, and systems – the generative 
assemblages or dispositif – which produced them. The sprawling literature on “assemblage 
thinking” in human geography and anthropology offers useful direction in investigating the 
various and competing political forces shaping the conflict surrounding events at Sakdrisi. Again 
following Foucault, I identify as most useful for this project those perspectives focused 
empirically on the connective relationships among practices, discourses, and materialities, as 
opposed to seeking some form of transcendent reality hidden behind the world’s immanence. 
The notion of “assemblage” has existed in geographic and social thought for decades, arguably 
as early as Karl Marx’s first analyses of political economy. Yet since the 1980s the idea has 
taken firm root in post-structural scholarship investigating relationships between the social and 
the material through political contingency.  
While assemblage approaches have taken many forms and labels, several key 
characteristics emerge from a broad body of scholarship. Robbins and Marks define an 
assemblage as “a dynamic structure applied to semi-stable socio-natural configurations and 
geographies that emerge over space and time” (2010: 181). Referring to examples such as the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the 11 September 2001 attacks, Dittmer contends that 
“assemblages appear stable and coherent until they no longer do… complex systems are prone to 
non-linear outcomes” (2014: 394). Scholars grant these complex, contingent, and only-
apparently-stable assemblages numerous monikers. For instance, some analyze the “mangling” 
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of actors’ specific material practices as they relate to the “military-industrial-academic complex” 
(Barnes and Farish 2006: 809). Others consider “geopolitical constructs,” which “emphasize 
agency, and hence contingency and fluidity, and not the determinism of reified structures” while 
also acknowledging “the stability of settings that limit or frame agency" (Flint 2016: 33). 
However, the more networked approaches that often accompany assemblage thinking have also 
engendered serious criticisms, most often centering on how they flatten power dynamics and 
often jettison scalar analysis.  
Critics emerge from a range of disciplines, including political ecologists. Rangan and 
Kull argue that the hybrid political ecology espoused by Robbins (Robbins 2004; Robbins and 
Marks 2010) is innovative but “remains vague about the observational scales used for explaining 
the spatiotemporal differences that emerge from the operations of actor-networks” (2009: 36). As 
Lave recognizes, many scholars oriented toward political analysis of the environment find 
discomfort with flattened ontologies due to disciplinary commitments to social justice and the 
investigation of uneven, structural power relations (2015). However, as Lave highlights from 
within the political ecology literature, considering both human and non-human as possibly 
enrolled in political assemblages simultaneously does not require equity in political 
consideration. Lave makes a compelling case against such flatter ontologies, instead advocating 
for other forms of post-structural environmental investigations and pointing to Haraway’s 
“companion” approach (2003), anthropological “social life of things” approaches (Appadurai 
2013b), commodity chain analyses, and the classic “chains of explanation” analysis of political 
ecology (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987) as more productive. In the end, Lave argues for the 
productivity of post-structural assemblage thinking without calling it such. 
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Key figures within assemblage thinking have developed useful frameworks for 
considering these uneven and power-laden contours of unflattened socio-material networks. As 
Jane Bennett (2010) argues, networks are not inherently flat, and alternative network theories can 
allow for more asymmetrical socio-natural networks than those first espoused by Bruno Latour 
(Latour 1987) by focusing on the relational concepts of capacity and power. Bennett’s “vital” 
materialism aims to overcome the tendency in western thought to “place the organic across a 
chasm from the inorganic” (2010: 57). Whatmore’s approach similarly distances itself from any 
flattened ontologies, instead characterizing these hybrid, assembled geographies as “fluid, not 
flat, unsettling the coordinates of distance and proximity; local and global; inside and outside” 
(2002: 6). Key here is the word “unsettling” – not overturning these social divisions but 
questioning them and perhaps pushing the boundaries of conventional thinking a0bout resource 
extraction politics to arrive at new understandings of socio-material processes. 
Donna Haraway’s ongoing work emphasizing the notion of “kinship” is especially 
helpful in studying our relationships with the world, a “together with” approach that moves 
beyond her earlier work on “companionship” to illustrate and highlight the shared origins of 
human and earth processes and events (2003, 2016). Haraway advocates analyzing these 
relationships via non-binary “tentacular thinking,” tracing those socio-material relationships 
through their connectivity and practices. Drawing from the work of Tim Ingold (2007), she 
argues: “Tentacularity is about life lived along lines—and such a wealth of lines—not at points, 
not in spheres” (Haraway 2016: 32). The goal of Haraway’s approach is to recognize and tell 
“geostories,” earth-encompassing “histories” that move beyond purely anthropocentric 
understandings of global and local change. Inspired by the work of actor-network theorists like 
Latour but moving beyond that flattened ontology to embrace the power-laced, lived, storied, 
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social lives of humans, Haraway claims her framework is “committed to an ecology of practices, 
to the mundane articulating of assemblages through situated work and play in the muddle of 
messy living and dying. Actual players, articulating with varied allies of all ontological sorts 
(molecules, colleagues, and much more) must compose and sustain what is and will be” 
(Haraway 2016: 42). 
Certain scholars have identified such “tentacular,” assemblage thinking, tracing forces 
through socio-material practices, as a form of “assemblage genealogies.” Pointing to scholarship 
such as Timothy Mitchell’s (1990, 2002) analyses of material government in Egypt’s move 
toward modernity as an ideal example, Robbins and Marks explain,  
Where these assemblage explanations depart from previous strands of Foucauldian 
poststructural explanation is in their insistence that people (e.g., police, doctors, 
entomologists) and social institutions (e.g., prisons, hospitals, laboratories) are not the 
sole actors in producing these configurations of knowledge and expertise. Instead, a full 
accounting must inevitably wrestle with the many other players at work in forcing the 
material/discursive worlds in which we live, with all of their consequences. (2010: 190). 
 
As Mitchell contends, materially diverse political explanations are meant to overcome the 
trend across the social sciences that “studies of power and resistance continue to be dominated 
by a single, master metaphor: the distinction between persuading and coercing” (1990: 545). 
This metaphor stems from the Cartesian mind/body divide we often take for granted in 
understanding people and subjectivities. But if we are to take seriously the implications of 
Foucault’s many findings, "Power must therefore be conceived as something two-fold, with both 
a physical and a mental mode of operation” (Mitchell 1990: 545). In analyzing Egypt’s political 
history, Mitchell (2002) adopts a distinctly genealogical approach to these socio-material 
assemblages, in turn throwing into question a purely humanistic and structural view of space’s 
political organization. Mitchell’s project lies directly parallel with some of the most influential 
strains of contemporary political geography, identifying spatial cognitive “traps” and 
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understanding the contingency of particular sovereignty or territorial regimes (Agnew 2003, 
2005, 2015b, 2015a; Moisio and Paasi 2013a; Murphy 2010, 2013, 2015; Murphy and 
O’Loughlin 2009; Paasi 2008, 2009, 2010b). 
Applications of genealogical assemblage thinking have appeared in a variety of research 
agendas over the past two decades, emerging primarily from human geography and anthropology 
to investigate a range of “global assemblages” or “global forms… articulated in specific 
situations… territorialized in assemblages” (Ong and Collier 2004: 4). For example, Anna Tsing 
has directed her analyses of an “anthropology of encounters” to such diverse objects as the 
Indonesian rainforest and the world’s most valuable mushroom (2005, 2015; see also: Faier and 
Rofel 2014). Tsing’s methodology embraces an ethnographically oriented investigation of 
encounters between people and things in ways that draw together the “global” and the “local,” 
coalescing social formations around them.  
Methodologically similar projects abound, from “entangled landscapes” of territory 
(Moore 2005: 313) to a “grounded geohistorical account” of political economic struggles (Sparke 
2006: 360). Barry provides a germane empirical example of “materialist politics” through his 
previously mentioned analysis of a leak along the BTC pipeline in the South Caucasus. 
Demonstrating that materials become entangled in politics through the production of information 
about them, Barry contends that “Metals are not the inert objects they are sometimes imagined to 
be, merely shaped by social and economic forces. They are elements of lively dynamic 
assemblages that may act in unanticipated ways, serving as the catalyst for political events” 
(2010: 110). Methodologically, his approach espouses a  
commitment to a certain form of empiricism, one that requires us to attend at once to the 
specificity of materials, to the contingencies of physical geography, the tendencies of 
history and the force of political action. The political significance of materials is not a 
given; rather it is a relational, a practical and a contingent achievement. (2013: 183)  
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Such scholarship supplies a model for my dissertation.  
To a similar end, Collier’s genealogical investigation of post-Soviet biopolitics reveals 
that “surprisingly, pipes and valves, budgeting formulas and bureaucratic norms, emerge as 
privileged sites where the relationship between neoliberalism and social modernity can be 
reexamined” (2011b: 2–3). Importantly, in studying the history of governance assemblages, 
Collier demonstrates that they are assembled through the ways that “calculative agencies were 
(or were not, thanks in part to the intransigence of the same infrastructures) framed through 
neoliberal reforms” (2011b: 27).  This perspective demonstrates how analyzing social/material 
events, at particular locations and crossing the multiple scales of global governance assemblages, 
can reveal important insights into broader governing and political economic trends within 
specific geographic and historic contexts (Ong and Collier 2004). Rabinow and Marcus refer to 
studying similar assemblage relationships as an “anthropology of the contemporary,” declaring 
their purpose in this approach is “to choose — or find — an appropriate field site and to 
document and analyze such assemblages in the course of their emergence, to name them, to show 
their various effects and affects, and to thereby make them available for thought and critical 
reflection” (2008: 57).  
Foucault’s legacy in understanding such assemblages – shaped by power-laden practices, 
enrolling people and things alike, and visible through events – manifests in a growing body of 
scholarship focused on environmental politics, economics, and cultural relations. In fact, this 
understanding of socio-material assemblage is a cornerstone of Foucault’s analyses of 
government. For example, as techniques of government shift, he suggested that the arbiter of 
sovereign power becomes someone who deals not just with management of the territory but with 
“a nature, or rather the perpetual conjunction, the perpetual intrication of a geographical climatic, 
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and physical milieu with the human species insofar as it has a body and a soul, a physical and a 
moral existence” (Foucault 2009: 23).  Government for Foucault is, in the end, about controlling 
the intersection of the material world and human history; therefore, scholars must consider the 
government of people alongside the government of the environment. This approach offers an 
avenue for “coming to terms with a planet that constantly rumbles, folds, cracks, erupts, irrupts” 
(Clark 2011: xiv) while people live out their lives upon and in relation to it. Doing so creates 
opportunities to apply the empirical project of Foucault’s assemblage genealogy to human 
practices of environmental governance. 
The title of this sub-section, Tracing the Veins, therefore nods toward three overlapping 
theoretical positions that I adopt in this research. First, that power operates through the capillary 
margins of social relations and practices, the everyday interactions that comprise the “veins” of 
political life. Second, that scholars can follow these relations and practices in a genealogical 
fashion, “tracing” intersections and divergences across time and scalar framing to better 
understand their generative practices. Finally, that assemblages formed by such relations and 
practices not only emerge from social life, but are also inherently material, such that “veins” 
refer additionally to the material traces of precious metals which in part drive these events. My 
approach emerges from research on social environments within geography and anthropology, 
embracing an understanding of assemblage that takes the materiality of these environments 
seriously rather than as merely a backdrop.5 Therefore, I finally turn to a genealogical method of 
tracing assemblage and event. 
 
 
 
                                                        
5 See (Finn 1998) for 8an example that bears the same name as this subsection. 
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3.2.  Genealogical Tracing 
 
I’ll tell you something else: Witnesses can be manipulated, too. They’re not robots. They 
are manipulated by television, newspapers, friends, corporate interests… Who has the 
real truth? As far as I understand, the truth is something that’s sought out by specially 
trained experts: judges, scholars, priests. Everyone else is ruled by ambition and 
emotions. [A pause.] I’ve read your books… You shouldn’t put so much stock in what 
people say, in human truth… History records the lives of ideas. People don’t write it, 
time does. Human truth is just a nail that everybody hangs their hats on. 
 
Former Soviet Kremlin official, (Alexievich 2017: 122) 
 
------ 
Assemblage thinking in the social sciences has become increasingly diverse, as I partially 
illustrate above. However, “genealogical” scholarship in political geography, political ecology, 
and anthropology represents a collective vision of assemblage that draws spatial practices, 
political subjectivities, and material environments together in an empirically coherent form. This 
approach offers traction for analyzing the multi-faceted environmental, cultural, and economic 
politics surrounding events at Sakdrisi. Tracing an archipelago of powers across society, I begin 
with socio-material events and follow their generative economies of power across locations and 
scales, both spatial and temporal. Doing so requires historically grounded analysis, concentrating 
on practices and discourses as they enroll material resources, and applied to contemporary 
political dynamics. 
History for Foucault had a specific meaning that changed as he moved from what he 
termed “archaeological” investigations to those of a “genealogical” nature. As Philo argues, the 
lectures presented in Society Must Be Defended provide an important crux connecting these two 
perspectives in Foucault’s work, what Philo terms “‘political historicism.’ This politicized 
approach to history necessarily tracks between the archaeological and the genealogical, usefully 
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complementing what has been cast as Foucault’s ‘critical and effective histories’ (Dean 1994)… 
what Lemert and Gillan (1982, 39) term Foucault’s ‘bellicose history’” (Philo 2007: 343).  
Archaeology and genealogy have related meanings in Foucault’s “critical,” “effective,” 
and “bellicose” historical investigations, yet represent different approaches. He summarized 
archaeology as “the method specific to the analysis of local discursivities,” while “genealogy is 
the tactic which, once it has described these local discursivities, brings into play the desubjugated 
knowledges that have been released from them” (Foucault 2003: 10–1). These two approaches 
work in tandem, analyzing discourse and practice in a locality and then tracing out those that 
went into their generation. 
Importantly, as Foucault described his method, the objects on which he focused are not 
institutions, ideologies, or theories but instead practices or “regimes of practices” (1991b: 75), 
constitutive of power relations and producing effects within the world.  For example, rather than 
studying “prisons as institutions,” Foucault investigates “imprisonment as a general punitive 
practice” (Foucault 1991b: 74). The effects of practices have historic genealogies scholars can 
trace through the practices themselves to understand the power relations and “conditions” that 
produce them and make them “acceptable at a given moment” (Foucault 1991b: 75). Foucault 
derived his historical perspective from Nietzsche’s assessments of “origins” (Nietzsche et al. 
1998), not as a singular source (Ursprung, origin, the traditional goal of history) but as the 
competing and simultaneous forces of descent (Herkunft) and emergence (Entstehung) – a 
genealogy of competing powers (Foucault 1977b). This genealogical approach analyzes practices 
and events “on their own terms,” without historical constants, to analyze how our explanation of 
historic events might be re-framed or re-ordered in an effort that they might be better understood 
or explained (Colwell 1997).  
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The first of these competing forces, Herkunft, “is the equivalent of stock or descent… it 
seeks the subtle, singular, and subindividual marks that might possibly intersect in them to form 
a network that is difficult to unravel. Far from being a category of resemblance, this origin 
allows the sorting out of different traits" (Foucault 1977b: 145). A genealogy of an event like the 
first explosion at Sakdrisi must therefore first concern itself with the differences among 
individuals and events that have produced it, coming to knowledge of those events by 
investigating the various historical forces and regimes of practices it contains as a result of that 
production. Importantly, though, historical and geographic difference – change over time and 
space – for Foucault is not interesting merely for its own sake, or for finding moments of infinite 
possibility. Instead, Foucault considered these dimensions for their ability to shed light on the 
genesis (descent) of how those differences came to be. But Foucault reiterated, “no one is more 
of a continuist than I am: to recognize a discontinuity is never anything more than to register a 
problem that needs to be solved" (1991b: 76).  
The second part of Foucault’s genealogical method is Entstehung, or emergence, 
analyzing political historical subjugations in “the moment of arising… As it is wrong to search 
for descent in an uninterrupted continuity, we should avoid thinking of emergence as the final 
term of an historical development… they are merely the current episodes in a series of 
subjugations" (1977b: 148). Concern for emergence requires considering the power struggles 
that produce differences and progression through historical events and practices. Foucault’s 
genealogical method then is concerned with forces of historical continuity and difference by 
focusing on their generative practices and effects, rather than pursuing any singular truth of 
history. This requires investigating the power dynamics and practices which drive the acceptance 
of “truths” and how they exist as unique within a progression of various social forces and 
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relations. Foucault’s methodological move, therefore, abandons the idea that understanding an 
object or event requires investigating it in itself. As Veyne argues, we must adopt a form of 
analysis which runs parallel to this profoundly relational understanding of the world, 
investigating the practices that go into making any given object or event (1997) – tracing the 
genealogy of that particular assemblage’s formative history. 
It is crucial to note that Foucault’s method is not just the study of an ethereal world 
created from words alone or in the imaginations of scholars. Foucault understood discourse as 
itself a practice intimately connected with the spatial, material components of the world and 
simultaneously shaping subjects and the contours of history. According to Stuart Elden, Foucault 
“appears not as a theorist or historian of the concept of space, but as a philosophically-informed 
historian whose studies underwrite a programme to ‘spatialize history, to inject an awareness of 
space into all historical studies, to critically examine the power relations at play in the ways 
space is effected and effects’” (2001: 7). Following Veyne, Foucault’s genealogical approach to 
history arguably offers one of his largest scholarly contributions and supplies the guiding ethos 
for my research. 
Veyne provides an emblematic example of this method through Georges Ville’s historical 
analysis of the end of gladiator fighting under Christian emperors in Rome. Rather than 
following the apparent link of causality, that adoption of Christianity led the emperors to put an 
end to gladiatorship, he instead traces a whole history of different practices of government 
related to this event. Instead following Ville’s broad contextual historical analysis of the 
emperors’ acceptance of Christianity itself, Veyne points to their adoption of a paternalistic 
ruling form as productive of both the adoption of Christianity and the end of gladiatorship (1997; 
see also Veyne 1990).  
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While Foucault applied this methodology throughout his work, his political economic 
analysis of grain scarcity in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century France provides a discrete and 
germane example of government’s socio-material nature. According to Foucault, this crisis 
emerged in relation to a series of events that produced the social phenomenon of scarcity, as a 
result (and in relation) also producing the governing technology of the free circulation of grain. 
Foucault identified within this argument the formation of “security” practices as a “technique of 
government” (2007b: 34) or “an apparatus (dispositif)” (2007b: 37) – a technology implemented 
to prevent an event yet producing unintended, contingent consequences. Foucault sketched a 
history of the “general economy of power within which this project and structuring of space and 
territory is situated” (2007b: 30).  
Foucault specifically analyzed the apparatus of actions (practices) taken by the 
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century French government regarding the free circulation of grain. 
These include “a series of controls on prices, storing, export, and cultivation” (Foucault 2007b: 
32) used to protect against the political economic phenomenon – an “event” (Foucault 2007b: 
30) – of scarcity, a dearth of grain that raises its price and upsets the population. As he explained, 
“This anti-scarcity system [implemented by the state] is basically focused on a possible event, an 
event that could take place, and which one tries to prevent before it becomes reality” (Foucault 
2007b: 33) regardless of the effects on the population and despite the expressed ideological goals 
of the governing class. The result of this series of decisions and potential events was that “the 
politics of the lowest possible price exposes one to the risk of shortages at every moment, and so 
to precisely the scourge it sought to avoid” (Foucault 2007b: 33). This analysis illustrates the 
mechanisms of security: a series of practices governing men and space to prevent a particular 
event-ful outcome. 
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 Foucault’s investigation of contradictions among governing ideologies and practices 
demonstrates what he referred to as a “genealogy of technologies of power” (2007b: 36), peeling 
back the readily apparent sources of cause and effect to critically seek alternative explanations 
(Colwell 1997). This analysis “is an economics, or a political-economic analysis, that integrates 
the moment of production, the world market, and, finally, the economic behavior of the 
population, of producers and consumers” (Foucault 2007b: 41) with the technologies and 
practices implemented in government. Viewed this way, something as seemingly banal as 
a “history of grain” would investigate the rich string of socio-material events, practices, and 
economies of power following grain “from the moment it is put in the ground, with what this 
implies in terms of work, time passed, and fields sown — of cost, consequently” (Foucault 
2007b: 36). Through this multi-scalar political economic analysis tracing the social relations and 
practices surrounding such governance events, we can see the contested descent/emergence of 
new political subjectivities – “population,” “the people,” “individuals” – alongside governing 
technologies or “technologies of power” – “security” and all its functions versus those of self-
regulating “discipline.” Lemke assesses this genealogical method through Foucault’s analysis of 
the modern state as 
marked by three analytical dimensions. First, it presents a nominalist account that stresses 
the vital importance of knowledge and political discourses in the constitution of the state. 
Secondly, an analytics of government uses a broad concept of technology that 
encompasses not only material but also symbolic devices, including political technologies 
as well as technologies of the self. Third, it conceives of the state as an instrument and 
effect of political strategies that define the external borders between the public and the 
private and the state and civil society, and also determine the internal structure of 
political institutions and state apparatuses. (2012: 25–6) 
 
In looking to explain the causes and effects of an historical event such as the destruction 
of Sakdrisi, following Foucault’s methodological example requires that we trace the socio-
material practices and forces which have generated this particular political assemblage, 
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technologies of government and particular political subjects emerging and descending from 
spatial and historical context. As Foucault contended,  
rather than asking ourselves what the sovereign looks like from on high, we should be 
trying to discover how multiple bodies, forces, energies, matters, desires, thoughts, and so 
on are gradually, progressively, actually and materially constituted as subjects, or as the 
subject. To grasp the material agency of subjugation insofar as it constitutes subjects. 
(2003: 28).  
 
This approach sets the task for addressing the Sakdrisi conflict just as Irakli presents it – 
an event crucially shaped by the historical variegations of capital expansion and market 
restructuring but just as importantly sculpted by a host of other social, political, and material 
forces. Foucault therefore applied his genealogical lens to unravel the contours of this political 
assemblage by tracing the practices, relations, and forces bound up in its production. In the 
process he uncovered how the descent and emergence of these forces affect the people and 
environments enrolled in these dynamics. To begin, I must try to grasp the problem as it unfolds 
today – in the middle of things. 
 
4.  Conclusion: In Media Res… 
 
After leaving the rusty pipe taking up water for the region’s farmers, Niko brings me 
back to his office to meet a colleague. Our conversation is perhaps less immediate than the 
orange stream of pollution I had just seen, but in some ways, it is just as jarring. Mari, a woman 
in her late thirties, is sitting across the table from me. This room occasionally serves as her office 
when she is working for Niko’s group, the Caucasus Environmental NGO Network (CENN). She 
is also a journalist, and grew up with her family in Bolnisi, a mining town located fifteen minutes 
downstream from the gold and copper mines. 
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Mari has focused on environmental problems in her work, and as we converse about what 
has happened in the homes of her family, she leans closer, eyes getting wider, gesticulating more 
pointedly.  
The younger generations are all leaving. There are no longer fish in the river. "The role of 
the government should be positive, when they have this kind of investment they should interfere 
really in detail to make sure this is good for” its citizens… but she feels the government has only 
done the opposite. 
The worst for Mari is mining’s effect on the health, bodies, and fears for the future of her 
family and friends. For instance, Bolnisi used to be known throughout Georgia for its exquisite 
potatoes. But now, she says, “All the potato plantations where the irrigation is from the river 
water… all this dirty water gets into the soil, and then where potatoes grow, so... when you are in 
hell, what do you do? You have to close your eyes! [and eat the potatoes].” Mari has some 
techniques she thinks might help reduce the danger of eating these poisoned tubers, soaking them 
in water over night or cooking them for a long time, but she has no way to know if this actually 
helps. She feels confident that she will have a job as long as CENN has a budget, but she fears 
for the health, livelihoods, and lives of her loved ones. 
As seen in this small corner of the world, mining in its large-scale modern form 
drastically alters the planet’s geology, finding rich deposits of materials society has deemed 
valuable and removing them from the roiling flow of tectonic geologic process. This 
anthropomorphic pattern began millennia ago, though with the expansion of capitalist systems in 
the past 150 years the trend of geologic extraction has reached previously unimaginable, planet-
shifting scales as every year we now move more earth than the earth itself in pursuit of minerals 
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(Bridge 2013). Yet these broad trends often become most visible in the embodied experiences of 
the people who live close to the mine. 
Later that afternoon, Mari leads me down the cobble-stoned streets built by German 
settlers two hundred years ago to meet her mother. The sores on her mother’s face and her stories 
of illness that have increasingly haunted the family – most of whom, at least to some extent, rely 
on the mines for work – betray the source of Mari’s fears. 
The power-laden relations and practices that both shape and drive these political-ecological 
assemblages are key to understanding the complexities of the case surrounding the mine’s 
explosion, and subsequent mining activities in the region. Understanding the politics of 
environmental events here requires identifying the shape of relevant discursive/material 
assemblages, tracing the practices and narratives of relevant actors, and following the effects of 
such events as they unfold at (and across) a variety of scales. In short, it requires that a researcher 
immerse her or himself “into the middle of things” – not to pursue questions of transcendence 
through immanent empirics but to search for highly contextualized explanations and 
understandings of the political and ecological events unfolding across multiple scales. 
Mari’s family bids me farewell as I begin the hour-long journey back to my apartment. 
They offer me a few slices of their evening khachapuri to take with me, as well as some plums 
and cherries from their garden. Leaving the courtyard, I reflect that our location in the valley 
makes it likely these were grown with water that has flown past the mines, and the orange 
streams trickling from beneath them. Waving goodbye, I take a bite so as to not be rude to my 
new friends, and realize that I am right in the middle of things. 
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Chapter III – Political Alchemy: Corruption, rent, and patronal networks of resource 
governance 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
I was first introduced to the complications surrounding the Sakdrisi case during one of 
the earliest interviews I conducted for my master’s thesis research on forest governance in 
Georgia. In the midst of discussing timber harvesting legislation over coffee on a sweltering July 
afternoon in Tbilisi, a World Bank representative casually began telling me how the Rich Metals 
Group (RMG) had just paid USD$13 million to the Georgian government as compensation for 
past environmental damages at the company’s mine in the Mashavera Valley (MA Interview 
008, 2012). Though I found this anecdote quite interesting, I had spent weeks trying to organize 
this interview and, given my research focus on forest resources and anxiety over wanting to 
succeed in my first international research trip, I found this news more than a bit beside the point. 
I daftly barreled through the representative’s fascinating revelation to continue discussing 
deforestation and alpine erosion, only later considering the odd details of this governing 
arrangement.  
Though the significance of this payment would not become clear to me until several years 
later, I had begun investigating environmental politics amid one of Georgia’s most important and 
widest-ranging periods of property and resource governance reforms following the country’s 
independence from the Soviet Union. As I found during my MA research, this pattern of 
fragmented political authority and sovereignty exists not just in the mining sector, but in other 
Georgian natural resource markets, including forest products and hydropower (Quinn 2017). 
This reorganization of environmental governance entails commodifying the natural resources 
found throughout Georgia’s territory, and – via a series of political practices extending beyond 
 
 83 
the realm of economic relations and amounting to what I define here as political alchemy – 
capturing the rents extracted from those valuable resources through a series of dispossessions, 
political exclusions, manipulations of social circumstances, and unequal appropriations. 
Georgia’s experiences after the Soviet Union’s collapse entailed widespread shifts in 
political economic relations, part of the pattern of upheaval and insecurity experienced by 
millions throughout the entire formerly Soviet region. Yet forces of memory, history, and the 
inertia of institutional and social patterns are equally apparent as these newly emergent relations 
carry echoes of the past (Brubaker 2011; Collier 2011b; Graybill 2007; Koch 2014; O’Loughlin 
and Kolosov 2017). These temporal tensions among past, present, and future, even in the face of 
dramatic and visibly  transformative events, illustrate Nietzsche’s characterization of history as 
the result of competing and simultaneous forces of descent (Herkunft) and emergence 
(Entstehung) (Nietzsche et al. 1998; see also Chapter 2). Bound within these histories, however, 
are geographies of competition and struggle, alliance and growth. This chapter traces the 
political, economic, and broader social relations shaping and governing the development of 
Georgia’s natural resource sector since the Soviet Union’s collapse.  
This portion of my analysis emerges from the puzzle that struck me on that earlier 
morning beside the small orange stream in the Mashavera Valley, years after the World Bank 
meeting, when I first saw the Sakdrisi pit myself: How could this egregious pattern of pollution 
happen? What allowed the initial mining blast to take place, the first in a series of practices that 
produced this large, toxic, profit-generating pit? I left the bank of that polluted stream 
unsatisfied by immediate explanations of institutionalized greed, corrupt individuals, and blatant 
disregard for the environment. My investigations in the ensuing years have only strengthened my 
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frustration with such accounts of post-Soviet extractive industries and lead me to the present 
analysis. 
 
Figure 6: Activists march in Tbilisi’s streets to protest Sakdrisi’s destruction 
(Source: DF Watch 2015) 
In this chapter I therefore first investigate my guiding question of “How Sakdrisi’s 
expansion has transpired?” before delving into the local and regional effects of mining at the 
Sakdrisi-Madneuli complex in later chapters. This question lies beneath each of the others 
considered in this dissertation, yet it also specifically addresses the project’s first primary 
enquiry, “How do protestors and supporters of the Sakdrisi gold mine and other mining projects 
in Georgia develop their claims in the debate over the territories’ futures?” (see Figure 6). 
Together the answers to these questions offer key insights into the legal and political economic 
components of Georgia’s extractive resource regime, as well as into how these forces help shape 
the political geographies of resource extraction. The Sakdrisi case provides an opportunity to 
theorize geographies of corruption in capitalist rent relations more fully under increasingly 
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decentralized resource regimes. In doing so this first empirical chapter provides both the 
historical and geographical background for the remainder of my analysis in this dissertation. 
I specifically interrogate the political practices and histories which led to RMG’s 
destruction of the Sakdrisi archaeology site and the effects of this expansion of mining activities. 
I address these topics by tracing portions of Georgia’s post-Soviet property reforms. I illustrate 
this transition through the case of mining governance, considering the specific changes in this 
sector as a territorial project grounded in shifting relations among state, society, and corporate 
interests. Drawing from the framework developed in Chapter 2, I approach environmental and 
resource governance here as an historically embedded assemblage of different political 
technologies still in transition (Foucault 2007c). These complex political economic relations of 
resource governance comprise intersections of property, value, rent, and the state. Yet key to 
moving beyond mere description of such a complex assemblage toward explanation requires 
tracing those intersections and relations, moving beyond those analytical categories to illustrate 
the practices through which they unfold geographically and historically.  
In doing so, I take inspiration from political ecologists and political economists who hold 
that such an analysis requires a Marxian theory of value as an essential starting point for 
understanding the emergence of capitalist forms of governance and the inequalities they produce. 
This view provides productive guidelines for understanding property relations under capital, 
especially considering the ways they territorialize shifting state/society power relations (Blomley 
2015, 2017). At the same time, a broad range of scholarship demonstrates the importance of 
understanding that economic value, as Marx understood it, presents just one among a variety of 
value systems, relations, and governing forces at play in a regime of resource governance – 
involving diverse and dynamic actors, institutions, power relations, cultural and social norms, 
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and material forces. I develop this perspective to analyze the complex relations surrounding the 
Sakdrisi case and to show how markets for precious metals and land appear in Georgia not just 
through the extraction of value and dispossession through capitalist exploitation. Instead, I trace 
these shifting spatial practices to argue that such economic relations also emerge through and in 
conjunction with the navigation and manipulation of broader political networks to appropriate 
the rents extracted from these valued resources. I refer to these practices as political alchemy, not 
just in reference to the long mystical history of alchemic attempts to create value from base 
materials, but also to highlight both the manipulative negotiation of these valuable relationships 
and the suspicious view of such political networks held in popular opinion. 
I structure the rest of this chapter as follows. The first section uses the recent history of 
Georgia’s resource governance legislation to outline what some might call “standard stories” 
(Tilly 2002) of capitalist political economy from the Marxist tradition of critical geography. I 
then argue for viewing ostensibly neoliberal policies as the product of multiple governing 
regimes, including regimes of value, property, and rent, as well as other socially contingent 
relations such as patronalism and corruption. In the next section I trace the corporate structure of 
mining operations in the Mashavera Valley to illustrate how these multiple regimes shape 
contemporary extractive practices in the region, moving beyond simple categorizations of state, 
society, and corporate power. The chapter ends with some general conclusions about the 
significance of this resource regime for understanding Georgian politics more generally. 
In the process I illustrate how focusing analytically on corruption per se can present 
problems for all the post-structural analytical issues laid out in Chapter 2. For example, and as I 
illustrate here, an analytic focus on corruption in the extractive sector – rather than a 
consideration of the diverse practices that comprise a governing resource regime – obscures 
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other opportunities to understand how those corrupt practices fit within broader political 
geographies and actual resource governance networks. Therefore, rather than focusing on 
practices pre-categorized as “corrupt,” I look at the broader set of governing practices and 
relations that might (or might not) get labeled as such. Doing so allows me to view corruption in 
resource sectors as not necessarily isolated to a single territory, state, legal jurisdiction, or social 
group, but rather as part of broader systems of “structured inequity” (Robbins 2000), not 
necessarily bound by the Westphalian interstate system and driven by political geographies 
simultaneously rhetorical, material, and territorial (Doshi and Ranganathan 2018). 
I draw from a range of empirics to make this argument, sketching out Georgia’s emerging 
resource governance regimes of property and rent, as well as contestations against them. These 
empirics include background interviews with key players involved in this history; participant 
observation and informal conversations with political activists, industry experts, and other 
scholars and researchers from diverse institutions; and policy analysis; and is supported by 
reporting from primarily Georgian news outlets during and after these events.  
 
2.  Regimes of Capital 
 
Structural Marxist and post-structural scholars have often actively opposed one another 
throughout the history of geographic thought, launching ongoing attacks over ramparts built 
from nearly countless manuscripts. While a complete account of these debates is impossible here 
(see [Cresswell 2012] for one of many thorough considerations within geography), I adopt the 
position that understanding what Marston and Perreault might term the Georgian political 
context’s unique “resource regime” (2017) requires acknowledging the important contributions 
generated by scholars on both sides of this debate. This section introduces key components of 
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environmental governance in Georgia while outlining key elements of the political ecology and 
political geography literatures that shape my analytical toolkit. In doing so I advance an 
understanding of what I term “political alchemy,” or the manipulation of social networks to 
capture surplus value from unequal rent relations. 
 
2.1.  Standard Stories of Capital  
  
In the months and years following my conversation in the World Bank Tbilisi offices, I 
became increasingly curious and confused during my investigations of the value of resource 
rents to the Georgian state. On the one hand, Georgia’s total natural resource rents6 are smaller 
than most other formerly Soviet countries, on par with only the Baltic states and Moldova, both 
of which are relatively resource poor. Georgia’s resource rents made up only 1.002% of the 
country’s USD$13.994 billion GDP in 2015, or just over USD$140 million (World Bank 2019b, 
2019c). This relatively small figure paints Georgia as somewhat exceptional among the formerly 
Soviet economies, many of which rely heavily on resource rent extraction in the post-Soviet era 
for economic development (Gel’man and Marganiya 2010; Markowitz 2013). To see the stark 
contrast in these economic foundations across the region, we need only compare the experiences 
of Georgia and the Baltic countries to Russia, Azerbaijan, and most Central Asian republics, 
which (other than Tajikistan at 2.06%) all had GDPs composed by resource rents ranging from 
7.16% (Kyrgyzstan) to 20.08% (Turkmenistan) in 2015 (The World Bank 2019c). 
On the other hand, Georgia is among the former Soviet Union countries whose exports 
most significantly rely on ores, metals, and minerals,7 second only to Armenia in 2015 and a 
                                                        
6 The World Bank calculates these figures as the sum of rents from oil, natural gas, coal, forest and mineral resources, expressed 
in terms of % of GDP. 
7 The World Bank defines these categories along the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
Standard International Trade Classifications (SITCs) 27, 28, and 68. These classifications include raw and crude minerals 
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trend that has held steady since the mid-2000s (The World Bank 2019b). Georgia’s output of 
metals and minerals is second only to agriculture in contributing to the country’s GNP, 
comprising approximately one quarter of the country’s exports (World Bank Group 2015: 31). 
Gold and copper tend to make up almost half these exports, and nearly the entirety of Georgia’s 
output of these two metals comes from operations in the Mashavera Valley (Safirova 2012). Put 
simply, the Mashavera Valley supplies one eighth the value of Georgia’s exports.  
Though these trends distinguish Georgia’s economy as more diversified than those of 
other countries in the region, they also illustrate a key conundrum of the Georgian government’s 
rent-seeking economic behavior, as people living in the Mashavera experience those trends of 
export dominance directly in their daily lives. Why would the Georgian government – which 
primarily relies on a strikingly regressive tax system for approximately 75% of its revenue 
streams, with “privatization” contributing only 1% of the country’s total revenues and another 
5% from vaguely defined “other sources” (The Ministry of Finance of Georgia 2018) – allow 
such an operation to continue, especially when doing so risks political de-legitimation as 
dangerous extractive activities unevenly harm local citizens? Neither international FDI nor a 
capitalist will to develop can fully explain the economic decisions forming Georgia’s resource 
governance regime or activists’ failure at Sakdrisi, despite the significance of the Georgian 
government’s "open for business" geopolitical signaling and the continued dominance of 
neoliberal thought in governmental institutions. For example, though the protests at Sakdrisi 
proved unsuccessful, activists in Georgia’s northern Svaneti region have held off development 
                                                        
(including stone, sand, gravel, and crude fertilizers), iron, copper, nickel, aluminum, uranium, thorium, silver, platinum, lead, 
zinc, tin, base metals, and precious metals, including waste and scrap. 
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and expansion of similar proposed gold mining and hydropower projects in recent years – at least 
thus far (Bankwatch 2018; Cagara 2016; OC Media 2019). 
Structural Marxist geographers have offered many possible explanations for such 
dynamics of environmental governance under extractive capitalism that might answer these 
questions. These include how different dimensions of capitalism intersect and shape one another, 
from financialization to debt and beyond (Harvey 2017; Huber 2018b; Mccarthy 2012), and 
value’s function in circuits of capital (Huber 2018a; Kay and Kenney-Lazar 2017; Labban 2014), 
among others. Underlying and driving much of this scholarship is a common understanding of 
economic social relations, a standard story of capitalism drawn from Marx’s diverse writings and 
the debates that have unfolded among his followers and detractors alike. Capital’s extraction, 
circulation, and accumulation define this story, tying together the expropriation of laborers from 
the means of production by capitalists, labor and valorization processes, property relations, and 
links between states and their territories. The story is complicated and intensified by decades of 
doubling down on “free” market economic liberalism in ways that frequently produce 
devastating global inequalities via unprecedented accumulations of wealth (Harvey 2007a; 
Heynen et al. 2007b; Peck 2013). 
These stories of capital accumulation have played out in nearly all sectors of the 
Georgian economy as citizens have grappled with the Soviet system’s collapse and replacement 
over the past three decades. The post-Soviet era’s first ten years brought serious social upheaval 
to Georgia’s population, a period that still feels fresh to many people today as the shadows of 
civil war, foreign military incursion, economic instability, and ethnic conflict remain visible 
across the country’s diverse landscapes. Following the 2003 Rose Revolution, Mikheil 
Saakashvili’s United National Movement (UNM) party instituted a wide-ranging sweep of 
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reforms as part of this effort to move past the country’s first tumultuous decade of independence, 
seeking to stabilize, liberalize, and privatize as many facets of Georgian life as the government 
could address. This ongoing transformation has included broad shifts in social structures and 
processes of commodification within Georgia’s political economy, as the country has tried 
engaging global markets, securing political status among western powers, and helping certain 
sectors of the population achieve improved quality of life. Reforms have targeted the national 
banking system, a radically simplified flat tax system, reforming the police force, offering 
universal health care (at least on paper), and creating an exceptionally aggressive privatization 
program. 
This trend toward privatization spread across all sectors of the economy, yet Georgia’s 
natural resources were among the first on the auction block. They were also some of the most 
widely privatized – mirroring similar trends throughout the former Soviet Union and the first 
steps along a path the country is still careening down. The push to privatize all state assets 
represents a much deeper shift in Georgia’s socio-political regimes, including systemic changes 
in the country’s broader property regimes. 
Following a period of informal claims defined by localized social struggles over land 
ownership (Salukvadze 1999), Georgian property reform has occurred through a still-unfolding 
series of legislation (see Figure 7 below). This series of legislative actions progressively 
solidified the transition from collective to private land ownership, with small plots of agricultural 
land distributed to families based on area of residence (urban, rural, and degrees of agricultural 
productivity) and a regularized cadastral survey and taxation system (Ebanoidze 2003; 
Salukvadze 1999). The government put collective state-owned urban and agricultural lands for 
corporate sale via auction, and occasionally joint stock corporations (JSCs) took over the 
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collective kolkhoz farms, leasing the land from the central government. However, when the 
initial stages of this process were complete, approximately one third of the country’s total arable 
land was still owned and leased by the state, while more than 1.7 million agricultural land parcels 
were registered to Georgian citizens (Ebanoidze 2003; Salukvadze 1999). In the initial rounds of 
property reform, the country’s highest tax rates were in the capital Tbilisi, followed closely by 
Sakdrisi’s neighboring district Marneuli, due to the region’s productive and rich soils 
(Salukvadze 1999). 
Year Legislation 
1992 Decree No. 48, the Land Privatization Decree 
1996 Law on Private Ownership of Agricultural Land 
 Law on Land (Immovable Property) Registration 
 Law on Subsoil 
1997 The Civil Code 
 The Law on State Property Privatization 
1998 Law on Declaration of Private Ownership of Nonagricultural 
Land in Use by Physical and Private Legal Persons 
1999 Article 21, Law on Expropriation Procedure of Ownership for 
Public Necessity 
 Decree No. 327, on Urgent Measures for the Initial 
Registration of Agricultural Land Ownership Rights and 
Issuance of Registration Certificates to Georgian citizens 
2005 Resolution N136, on Approval of the Regulation on the 
Procedure and Terms and Conditions for Issuance of License 
for Mineral Resources Extraction 
2010 The Law on State Property 
2015 Amendments to Law on Subsoil 
 
Figure 7: Chronology of property reform legislation 
(Sources: Ebanoidze 2003; Salukvadze 1999; The Parliament of Georgia) 
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In recent years the Georgian government has continued these reforms to include an 
electronic cadastral system of property titles. Watchdog groups have identified recent cases of 
the government implementing this system to dispossess villagers of legally purchased land – for 
instance, to develop public works such as a landfill – that was only recovered through the 
coordinated advocacy of international groups and residents themselves (Shermadini 2017). This 
property regime transition has maintained momentum, as suggested by the recently passed 
legislation confirming the use of blockchain technology8 to manage Georgia’s land title registry 
from the private sector – the first government in the world to do so (Shin 2017). 
 Yet regardless of the technology utilized to manage this system of land ownership, these 
actions are all related to the development of new property regimes in Georgia. Blomley generally 
defines property as “an organized set of relations between people in regards to a valued 
resource” (2015: 1). Property regimes are therefore built on relations of value, including of 
landed property as is necessary for mining and other forms of natural resource governance.  
However, as both David Harvey and Karl Polanyi argue, land is a fictitious commodity 
that does not produce value on its own (Harvey 2007b; Polanyi 2001: 76). Marx illustrates how 
value emerges from the abstraction of labor, allowing people to exchange commodities by 
alienating the actual labor that produced them and instead establishing exchange value through 
an average of socially necessary labor time (1992: 300–6). In this way, land produces no 
economic value on its own as it exists independent of human labor. Instead, people can trade 
land due to practices of primitive accumulation, wherein powerful actors, such as the post-Soviet 
                                                        
8 According to Wired magazine, blockchain technology essentially makes it "harder for digital data to go rogue" and "develop a 
wild social life all its own” (https://video.wired.com/watch/blockchain-explained). Blockchain does this through complex 
processes of cryptography that operates via a shared database with restricted access by a set of digital keys. In some ways then 
blockchain technology might offer a somewhat ideal libertarian accounting mechanism for property reforms, designed for 
transparency and security though clearly also connected to social and political economic striations of the world. 
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Georgian government, capture freely existing resources like land and bring them within markets 
as commodities (De Angelis 2001; Glassman 2006; Hall 2013; Marx 1992: 873–6; Perelman 
2000). Landowners then have the capacity to establish “ground- rent” on this land, providing “a 
basis for various forms of social control over the spatial organization and development of 
capitalism” (Harvey 2007b: 337; see also: Coronil 1997) and seen in mining industries as “rent 
in mining” (Marx 1993: 908–16). As Harvey argues, when an entity like the Georgian 
government becomes a landowner, it acquires “not the land, but title to the ground-rent yielded 
by it” (2007b: 367). This relationship between property and ground-rent9 is crucial for 
understanding nature-society relations under capitalism (Andreucci et al. 2017). Such relations 
are especially salient in a place like Georgia, where the government fills the monopolistic role of 
rent-seeking landlord, auctioning off the rights to explore and extract resources within particular 
territories, as explained below (Blomley 2015, 2017).  
Georgia’s broader system of resource governance – in which the land-owning 
government auctions off territorially delimited extraction rights to generate ground-rent – is 
archetypical of mining governance within advanced capitalism. Under such a “pure theory of the 
capitalist mode of production” (Harvey 2007b: 367), this spatial organization via relations of 
ground rent establishes property regimes as primary forms of territorial organization for 
capitalist states (Blomley 2017; Parenti 2015). Critical scholarship of rent often focuses on urban 
land rents (Slater 2017; Ward and Aalbers 2016) yet rent exists on many land uses. Critical 
political resource economists have begun illustrating how such forms of “rentier capitalism” 
increasingly define a wide range of sectors globally, including agriculture and oil extraction in 
                                                        
9 Though I realize this presents possibilities for analytical confusion, I do not delve into the detailed and unique characteristics 
among Marx’s different categories of rent (e.g., rent, ground-rent, absolute ground-rent, monopoly rent, differential rent I and II, 
and so on). For further detailed discussion of these differences and their implications, see Harvey 2007. 
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petro-states like Venezuela (Coronil 1997; Purcell 2017). In fact, Parenti views such 
relationships between states and territorial property regimes as the primary vector for the 
accumulation of surplus value – the appropriation of rent – from natural resources (2015).  
However, as I illustrate below, the monopolistic tendency of the post-Soviet Georgian 
government as landowner of Georgian territory provides a political milieu in which “free” and 
“open” markets of land access remain both uneven and limited, messy and contingent, 
illustrating the political effects of rent’s monopolistic nature.  
 
2.2.  Seeing Capitalist Natures in Georgia 
 
Sometimes referred to as ecological Marxism (Castree 2015; Foster et al. 2010; Moore 
2011; Smith 1984), the influence of such perspectives toward social-environmental relations 
under capitalism were especially prevalent in the earliest strands of political ecological thought – 
from Michael Watts’ pioneering work on famines in Nigeria to Susanna Hecht and Nancy 
Peluso’s incisive research of forest resources in the Amazon and Java (respectively) and Blaikie 
and Brookfield’s analyses of global land degradation – even if these assumptions were not 
always made explicit as such (Blaikie 1985; Blaikie and Brookfield 1987; Hecht 1985; Hecht 
and Cockburn 1989; Peet et al. 2011; Peet and Watts 2004; Peluso 1992; Smith 1984; Watts 
1983). Watts draws from the regulation theory school to define such ecological “social 
transformation” as unfolding “under the stable constraints of the most general norms” of capital 
accumulation of surplus value – a regime of accumulation (Aglietta 1979: 68). These regimes 
become "imposed by social relations of production and exchange and by property relations" and 
shape "how resources, environments, and perturbations might be managed and governed" (Watts 
2015: 34). Such attention to property relations, primitive accumulation, and commodification 
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under capitalism provide further core themes within political ecology (Agrawal 2001; Bauer 
1998; Bridge 2007; Mansfield 2004; Peluso 2007; Prudham 2004, 2015; Ribot and Peluso 2003; 
Rocheleau and Edmunds 1997; Sikor and Lund 2009). By necessity such analyses often intersect 
with considerations of the state (Harris 2017; Robertson 2015; Robertson and Wainwright 2013), 
class (Ekers 2015), and acts of enclosure (De Angelis 2001; Federici 2004; Glassman 2006; 
Harvey 2003; Perelman 2000). 
Georgia’s specific regime of accumulation has continued evolving, following the 
centralized Soviet economy’s collapse and the initial rounds of landed property reform in the 
early 1990s. The Georgian government adopted the Law on State Property Privatization in 1997, 
which the Parliament then replaced with the Law on State Property in 2010. Both set the terms 
for selling state property to private interests, including beyond landed property, representing just 
two among several rounds of economic privatization (Gujaraidze et al. 2007; Peluso 2007). The 
initial list of property types available for privatization was long and wide ranging, from 
monuments of cultural, historic, or artistic value to media communication and broadcasting 
infrastructure; the state system of water supply to cemeteries; and special economic zones to 
state reserves and precious metal deposits (The Parliament of Georgia 1997). However, under the 
2010 law, lands designated for historical, cultural, natural and religious monuments are no longer 
subject to privatization (The Parliament of Georgia 2010) – a designation that became 
increasingly significant for the Sakdrisi case. 
The final important piece of this property reform as relates to mining arrived in the 
second major wave of Georgia’s privatization following the 2003 Rose Revolution, when the 
government passed Resolution N136, On Approval of the Regulation on the Procedure and 
Terms and Conditions for Issuance of License for Mineral Resources Extraction (The Parliament 
 
 97 
of Georgia 2005). This law set up a system in which the Ministry of Environment and Natural 
Resources (MENR) auctions off territorially and temporally delimited licenses for ferrous and 
non-ferrous mineral exploration and extraction for durations of up to 45 years. Participation in 
the auction process is dictated by Article 4 of Resolution N136, which states, "All license seekers 
meeting the license conditions under the Law and assuming the obligation to meet the 
requirements set by the exploitation license issuer, may have the right to participate in the license 
issuance as conducted by auction" (The Parliament of Georgia 2005). Article 7 lays out the 
conditions for issuing the license, requiring an Environmental Impact Assessment for all 
extractive endeavors under the Law of Georgia on Environmental Permits. As Bridge explains, 
such concessions “make possible processes of primitive accumulation while leaving the state’s 
broader claims to territorial sovereignty intact” (2013: 4). 
These more specific forms of state property garner even greater focus within the legal 
framing of subsurface natural resources laid out during Georgia’s first post-Soviet property 
regime. The opening lines of the Law of Georgia No 1894, On Subsoil, defines its object as 
“located on the land territory, its territorial waters, continental shelf and special economic zones 
of Georgia.” As such, the subsoil "is a national treasure of Georgia and it is protected by the 
State," a law that “shall be in force throughout the territory of Georgia” (The Parliament of 
Georgia 1996). Within this property regime, the "Subsoil of Georgia is state property... The right 
of ownership of land shall not mean and shall not grant the right of ownership of subsoil" (The 
Parliament of Georgia 1996). The law goes on to state that "Subsoil is a part of the earth crust, 
which is exposed on the ground surface or located in layers of soil and reservoirs, as well as 
under the soil layer and the bottom of the reservoir, and which is available for exploration and 
usage" (The Parliament of Georgia 1996, emphasis added). It also defines extraction of these 
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resources as physical removal for the intent of sale or exchange: "Extraction of subsoil is the 
utilization of a certain amount of minerals as a result of mining carried out directly by a license 
holder or a hired entity at the expense of the license holder for the purposes of its direct sale or 
for its sale after its treatment" (The Parliament of Georgia 1996). 
These simple statements require closer attention. The subsoil includes “mineral 
resources” treasured for their availability to “exploration and usage.” In other words, mineral 
resources are defined as such when they are (1) known and (2) carry both use and exchange 
value. Extraction of these treasured resources is only allowed when the state and license holder 
together determine that the materials also carry exchange value – in other words, when powerful 
actors know the subsoil materials and deem them valuable within a market. Furthermore, the 
"use" of subsoil minerals includes their "extraction," "development," and "treatment," but also 
their "study.” This stipulation means that in effect license holders, almost exclusively corporate 
entities, bear responsibility for identifying and studying the resources available in the subsoil 
territory they have purchased de facto control of. This knowledge then guides all future 
environmental assessments, territorial designations, and operation expansions, with little 
government oversight. 
Finally, each stipulation bears significant levels of interpretation by the Ministry of 
Environment and Natural Resources (MENR), which holds the right to “lay down specific 
procedure for exploitation of mineral, mandatory requirements to the agent etc., as well as 
quantitative, qualitative and timing standards and rules on exploitation of this resource to be 
approved for each individual case under a separate bylaw normative act of the Minister” (The 
Parliament of Georgia 2005). These dynamics become further complicated as political transition 
from the rule of United National Movement to Georgian Dream, amid other major political 
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transitions, have caused many large-scale changes in environmental authority: eliminating 
Ministries, combining others, and allowing a rapid “revolving door” of actors between 
government and private sectors. 
The standard story of accumulation under regimes of capital sketched out here in relation 
to Georgia’s emerging property regime – through which the state commodifies land through 
primitive accumulation, the abstraction of mining labor produces value, and the landowning state 
extracts rent from the surplus value appropriated from wage laborers by capitalists operating on 
that land – is powerful, influential, and useful. More importantly, this regime is distinct and 
formative within the political economy of Georgia’s precious metal extraction sector. However, 
this story is incomplete. Though this framework supplies productive analytical categories, it 
leaves some important questions unanswered. For example, how can we explain property 
regimes and capital accumulation in the wake of transition from fully centralized, state-owned, 
Soviet landed property to a de-centralized post-Soviet system when vestiges of Soviet social, 
extra-economic relations remain so powerful and visible here?  
 
------ 
 
Now that we have completed our review of this great Article of the Criminal Code, we are less 
likely to be astounded further on. Wherever the law is, crime can be found.  
 
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago (1974, p. 67) 
 
2.3.  Corroding Capital  
 
Gold is the least reactive known metal in the world. It does not corrode over time, in part 
contributing to its historic utility as both currency and monetary standard (Schoenberger 2011). 
However, this physical property of indelibility does not extend to the social and economic 
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relations embedded and fetishized within it and other commodities. Here I draw inspiration from 
a number of political economists to argue that capitalism has no ahistorical “golden rules” – 
beyond perhaps pursuing profit – and that Marx’s analytical categories are susceptible to a wide 
range of political, social, and cultural variations, as I illustrate in the Georgian case below: 
impurities, corrosions, and deviations that actually prove central to capital’s accumulation and 
appropriation. 
In doing so I do not mean to suggest completely jettisoning Marxist concepts like 
dispossession or appropriation of ground-rent, or ignoring Marx’s crucial revelations about 
capital’s extraction, commodification, circulation, and accumulation. Rather, I follow a range of 
scholars who demonstrate the need to acknowledge that power relations of property, territory, 
and the state are shaped by extra-economic social relations more diverse than just surplus 
exchange value under ideal forms of capitalist labor exploitation (Glassman 2006). Harvey 
himself notes at times the possible limitations that dogmatic assumptions can place upon 
analysis. For example, in a footnote from his explanation of Marx’s theory of rent, Harvey 
concedes, “The social incentives to hold land – prestige, symbolic importance, tradition, etc. – 
are also very important in practice, but we exclude them from consideration here because they 
have no direct root within a pure theory of the capitalist mode of production” (2007b: 367). 
Harvey suggests that the value/ground-rent connection functions in this clean manner in an ideal 
form of capitalism, yet outside such “pure” capitalisms other social relations and more culturally 
inflected value forms can shape politics of access to land and resources. 
The limitations of a static and “pure theory of the capitalist mode of production” may 
therefore at times restrict our analytical scope, an unfortunate constraint due to the historically 
embedded nature of economic value, rent, and property relations. Instead, viewing the 
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abstraction of labor through systems of valuation and exchange, following Marx, provides the 
tools for “understanding capitalist exploitation in process” (Elson 1979: 171). For Elson and 
others, Marx’s historic view of political economy is not one of rigid structures, but of continually 
changing processes (Elson 1979). 
Macpherson likewise illustrates how “The meaning of property is not constant. The 
actual institution, and the way people see it, and hence the meaning they give to that word, all 
change over time. We shall see that they are changing now. The changes are related to changes 
in the purposes which society or the dominant classes in society expect the institution of property 
to serve” (1978: 1). Macpherson goes on to argue that property is a right, not a material object, 
and does not necessarily mean private property. Channeling Marx (Marx and Engels 2008), both 
of these misconceptions emerge from specific historic and social contexts. Property is always a 
“bundle of rights” to benefit from resources such as land but must always be paired with socially 
contingent access, a “bundle of powers” providing “the ability to derive benefits from things” 
(Ribot and Peluso 2003: 153–4; see also Myers and Hansen 2019). Cohen argued in the 1920s 
that, due to property’s concern with rights to access or use of an object or idea, we can view 
property as power over others and that power over things always involves power relations among 
people. As such, property is directly related to sovereign power (Cohen 1927) and the manifold 
complications and variations endemic to such political relations over resources: metals, minerals, 
or otherwise. 
These scholars present just a small range of ways in which regimes of capital are far more 
complex and political than a static analysis of capitalism might allow. I expand upon these 
scholarly strands to further open the assumptions and categories that at times shape enquiries of 
the relations among people and natural resources under capitalist systems (Harris 2017; Parenti 
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2015). I do so to better understand the historically embedded geographies of contemporary 
resource extraction in post-Soviet Georgia as multiple political regimes and complex geopolitical 
assemblages shape them. In adopting this position, I do not argue whether capitalism has an 
outside or whether it is possible to imagine alternative systems and economies (Gibson-Graham 
2006). Neither do I advocate reductionist views of Marxism embraced from the 1980s onward 
that caricature Marxist analysis as having “annihilated the real living people who actually 
produced social life” (Mitchell 2004: 60), a position Don Mitchell characterizes as “willing 
distortions of the nature of Marxist geography” (2004: 63). 
Political ecologists increasingly adopt such constructive perspectives, perhaps most 
powerfully when engaging critically with our understandings of capitalism through the nature of 
value and our struggles to control it. At its most basic, value is a key analytic for assessing 
political economies of natural resources (Robertson and Wainwright 2013; Smith 2009). 
However, many political ecologists advocating for diverse understandings of value contend that 
a narrow focus on economic forces in foundational scholarship on capitalism and the 
environment such as Harvey and Smith “downplays the role of political struggle and contestation 
in actively constituting the specific trajectory of socioenvironmental change” (Ekers and 
Prudham 2017: 1372). Acknowledging value as “simultaneously context-dependent and 
universal to capitalist accumulation processes” allows analysis of “a wide array of processes and 
nature-society relations” within a “more open-ended premise of generalized capitalist 
accumulation” (Kay and Kenney-Lazar 2017: 298). 
Schlosser defines such arrangements as “regimes of value,” abstractions of value 
“mediated through historically and culturally contingent social frames” (2013: 175), or 
“conditions under which economic objects circulate” (Appadurai 2013a: 4). However, as I show 
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below, a regime of value also enrolls the conditions under which economic objects are produced 
or extracted, as Marx implores scholars to investigate the political conditions surrounding 
processes of primitive accumulation within specific modes of production and regimes of 
accumulation. Failing to adopt Marx’s analytical tools in favor of his analytical categories 
(Heinrich 2012) is “too restrictive, akin to snatching a single frame from a series of moving 
images” (Henderson 2013: x), robbing us of the opportunity to investigate value – and rent – “as 
a problem alive” (xvii). 
Huber’s research is key for framing these complications of value in relation to natural 
resources. While maintaining the essence of keeping multiple definitions of value separate for 
analyses of capital, Huber acknowledges that value relations are themselves embedded within 
systems of cultural values (Huber 2017b). Huber argues that scholars would benefit from 
employing a value analysis that combines economic and cultural valuations (2018a: 153). I draw 
inspiration from this work to investigate how economic valuation and appropriation intersect 
with the “social incentives” (Harvey 2007b: 367) for manipulating rent relations. 
Tracing the value of gold such as that extracted at the Madneuli complex since the Soviet 
era provides an excellent example of how practices of valuation and rent fluctuate across historic 
and geographic context – shaped by multiple political regimes and various governing 
technologies beyond labor’s abstraction. Ignoring these findings in our analyses risks a fetishism 
like the type Marx argued against so vehemently. 
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3.  Assembling Extraction, Extracting Rent 
 
3.1.  Complexities of Multiple Regimes   
 
As the preceding review illustrates, practices of valuation prove central to political 
economies of natural resources. However, value relations provide only one piece of the puzzle, 
as they illustrate the social connectivity joining a regime of accumulation, yet don’t necessarily 
provide all the tools necessary to understand the uneven patterns of appropriation that follow 
practices of primitive accumulation (Andreucci 2017; Andreucci et al. 2017; Purcell 2017). The 
collective work of Foucauldian political ecologists and political geographers concerned with the 
intersection of governmentality and the environment tend to draw from his methodological 
assumptions that were “not anti-power but against fixing the limits of political action to a few 
relations and actors” such as limiting analysis only to particular class relations. Instead, as 
“political ecologists, we must be open to dispersed power without losing sight of the 
epistemological, ontological, and normative commitments through which we study power” 
(Valdivia 2015: 477). 
I draw from Foucault’s understanding of power and government as comprising diverse, 
complex, and historically embedded practices and relations not isolated to any particular 
monolithic social entity (e.g., “the state” or “the capitalist class”) but rather a “general economy 
of power within which this project and structuring of space and territory is situated” (Foucault 
2007b: 30). Within any economy of power exist many different powers, or political regimes – 
including those of capital relations such as regimes of value, property, and rent. 
I therefore approach capital as an historical governing regime comprising a set of 
practices and processes, always potentially in flux and intersecting with other political regimes at 
play in a particular time and place, rather than as a totalized, global structure. The geographies 
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and histories of capitalism are diverse, and Georgia represents one chapter in the general 
development of ostensibly neoliberal governing technologies in the wake of the Soviet collapse. 
This recognition suggests the need to analyze the diverse and changing practices governing 
natural resources, including formal policy-making, their enforcement and lapses, informal 
governing technologies, and the relations among these sets of practices.  
Such a practice-oriented vision of politics and power presents opportunities to shift the 
analytical categories with which scholars approach the political economy of natural resources. 
As just one example, Foucault defined “the state,” including capitalist states, as “nothing else but 
the mobile effect of a regime of multiple governmentalities” (2008: 77). This definition provides 
a methodological directive to study “the historical constitution of different state forms in and 
through changing practices of government without assuming that the state has a universal or 
general essence” (Jessop 2007: 37). Timothy Mitchell’s Foucauldian inspired work also implores 
us to acknowledge “the powerful, apparently metaphysical effect of practices that make such 
structures appear to exist" (1999: 89). Mitchell draws from diverse cases – including 
international relations between the U.S. government and Aramco in Saudi Arabia and the role of 
disciplinary practices in shaping the government of post-revolutionary France – to demonstrate 
how the boundary between state and society is made to seem like a natural, external boundary 
separating two separate entities, while in reality it exists as an internal, porous boundary 
separating two variations within a single entity of society. Joe Painter utilizes a similar 
perspective to analyze “the state” as the product of diverse social practices “that invoke, imply, 
or depend on the idea of the state… the state is our performance” (2011: 44–5). As Beth 
Mitchneck points out, Painter’s notion of “stateness” allows for a grounded consideration of the 
state existing through the social interactions between civil society and individuals (2011: 138). 
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Jim Glassman draws together arguments by Bob Jessop (regarding the relational nature of the 
state as the product of class-based strategic struggles under capitalism) and John Agnew (who 
famously called for considering states beyond prevailing assumptions of the territorial container 
model of the state) to suggest states are increasingly internationalized as they serve the interests 
of a global corporate elite class (Agnew 1994; Glassman 1999; Jessop 1990). 
Work across political ecology and related fields provides additional texture to these 
findings, in many ways echoing the large body of work in political geography that also 
complicates classical Marxist perspectives on political economy. Gavin Bridge’s work presents 
an especially salient perspective, pointing to the contingent and socially constructed nature of the 
two related categories “resource” and “state,” both forms of social and material ordering often 
co-produced (Bridge 2014; see also: Harris 2012; Mitchell 1991b; Painter 2006) and reinforcing 
hegemonic relationships of environmental subjectivity (Birkenholtz 2008; Bridge 2014; Ekers 
2009; Li 2007). Actual practices of mineral governance reveal the contingency and variation of 
territorial extent and state sovereignty in relation to corporate power (Bridge 2014; Emel et al. 
2011; Ong 2006a). These relations become increasingly complex as practices of neoliberal 
capitalism extend into new spaces and markets throughout the post-Soviet region.  
Such complex political geographies as exist in Georgia and many other post-Soviet 
environments exist as broad “minescapes” (Ey and Sherval 2016) comprised of “moral 
landscapes,” such that the mining environment “is a technological one—but it is also a mental 
landscape, a social terrain, and an ideological map” (Bridge 2004: 241). In other words, in 
addition to their roles in shifting political economic relations and physical environmental effects, 
mines and practices of mining have the capacity to shape their own underground, transformative 
geographic imaginations, opening ground for connection to multiple forms of valuation: 
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economic, cultural, and otherwise. The wide range of possible territorial, discursive, ecological, 
and visual practices associated with such social relations are crucial for establishing political 
legitimation beyond purely economic functions of valorization (Bridge 2009; Caspersen 2015; 
Gregory 2010; Murphy 2013, 2015; Sica and Huber 2017). 
These practices articulate with a variety of other locally contingent logics including 
property regimes and market functions (Bakker 2010; Bridge 2014; Castree 2007, 2008; 
McCarthy 2005a). Recent additions to this literature only further support such a perspective, 
such as Nancy Peluso’s elucidation of the ways gold mining territories in Indonesia are not just 
the product of state power, but of property relations that emerge beyond state power (Peluso 
2018). This perspective is especially important for understanding property transitions within 
post-communist societies. For example, Kathryne Verdery (2003) uses deep ethnographic 
empirics collected in Transylvania to explore how land tenure and property regimes shifted after 
the fall of the socialist bloc. Her findings convincingly indicate that the shift from communal 
ownership to private property is not prescriptive and that neoliberal reforms play out in the 
context of previously existing social orders and often through the practices of actors beyond “the 
state” (Verdery 2003). 
As mentioned above, a key dimension of these governing regimes are rent relations. 
Some have recently called for a reinvigorated focus on rent relations within nature-society 
scholarship as central to environmental governance under capitalist regimes (Andreucci et al. 
2017; Felli 2014; Purcell 2017; Slater 2017). Andreucci et al (2017), for example, introduce the 
concept of “value grabbing” to refer to the appropriation – or redistribution – of surplus value 
through rent relations, which the authors consider significant due to the increasing global 
prevalence of rentier relations over accumulation processes. Andreucci points to Visser and 
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Spor’s (2011) study of rapid privatization in post-Soviet Russia as a case of appropriation’s 
increasing importance as enclosure and “land grabbing” have helped produce a new rentier class 
of oligarchs (Andreucci et al. 2017: 34; Visser and Spoor 2011: 310). However, this historical 
narrative ignores the social striations already existing in the Soviet Union at the time of collapse 
and the move toward capitalist privatization.  
Privatization, including in Georgia, is not an apolitical process with political economic 
outcomes; privatization is highly political itself, reinforcing the patronal power pyramids already 
existing across Eurasian political space (Hale 2014). My approach therefore diverges from 
Andreucci et al. in their analysis of rent’s “value grabbing” political implications, specifically as 
they understand the state as a reified entity serving as “the main terrain of class struggles over 
the rent it accrues” (2017: 32). This statist view assumes the ossified state is an object and space 
of economic relations. Instead, I approach the state as a semi-stable effect of multiple and 
intersecting power relations. 
The following section digs more deeply into these relations to better illustrate how 
property, value, and rent relations regarding natural resources actually emerge not just as purely 
economic features of a state system but as more culturally inflected and contingent practices of 
appropriation.  
 
3.2.  Governing Regimes, Hybrid and “Corrupt” 
 
These alternative arrangements of intersecting political regimes governing natural 
resources present examples of shifting arrangements of state, territory, commodification, 
property, and rent – what some term “hybrid neoliberalisms” par excellence and include metal 
mining economies (Bridge 2007; McCarthy 2005a). Diverse actors institute these reforms within 
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the milieu that has emerged in the Soviet wake, shaped by the patronal politics so predominant 
throughout the region (Hale 2014).  Sites of extraction such as Sakdrisi “emerge as privileged 
sites where the relationship between neoliberalism and social modernity can be reexamined” 
(Collier 2011b: 2–3), between re-regulated property and rent regimes and the social milieu which 
they in part govern. However, to understand actual practices of natural resource commodification 
and rent redistribution, scholars also need to pay attention to centers of governance which shape 
the regimes of extraction and exchange surrounding these holes in the ground, rather than only 
studying those sites of extraction themselves (Huber 2017b). Doing so can contextualize the 
complex power relations shaping these governing regimes, as well as the political contours of 
winners and losers they produce (Huber 2018a).  
Analysts and commentators often label these unequal patterns the result of “corrupt” 
systems, typically implicating related practices as illegal, deceptive, or immoral, especially when 
they emerge in “non-Western” or underdeveloped regions (Chayes 2016; Cockcroft 2014; Doshi 
and Ranganathan 2018; Karklins 2005; Lovell 2005; Schulze and Zakharov 2018; Strønen 2017; 
Transparency International 2018; Warf 2018). However, this section argues that such normative 
categorizations of “corrupt” practices obscure analytical possibilities for tracing the actual 
practices that produce such uneven political economies: the creation and maintenance of 
monopolistic rent relations, visible only through a disaggregated lens toward the political 
geographies producing and supporting these systems. 
Fernando Coronil’s The Magical State presents empirics from Venezuela that illustrate 
several implications of such a disaggregated view of capitalist natures. Coronil adopts a similar 
view as Timothy Mitchell, drawing from Foucault’s work to conceptualize the capitalist state as 
the effect of a range of disciplinary practices both legitimated and contested through natural 
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resources – especially enrolling rent regimes. As Coronil contends, "In the case of societies 
organized around the capture of rent or in which rent plays an important role, a mechanical 
transposition of Marx’s observation will not do" (1997: 35). Identifying such inversions and 
manipulations of roles and analytical categories is essential within Georgian resource 
governance. The development of new, decentralized governance policies laid out previously 
have brought parallel shifts within Georgian state institutions, as I illustrate below, mutated by 
political and social networks both within and beyond Georgia’s international borders – yet with 
distinct local effects.  
Studies of “corrupt” rent relations in other developing economies help illustrate my point. 
For example, Strønen (2017) extends Coronil’s investigations to understand how corruption of 
Venezuelan state bodies further alters such neoliberal economies. Strønen defines corruption as 
"a hybrid child of different sets of economic logics, social moralities and relationships of power" 
(2017: 284), illustrating how the practices of corruption (in local community councils, low-level 
public officials, etc.) emerge through "dark connections between political and financial elites," 
producing "quasi-legal or illegal riches in the public without shame or remorse" (288). In doing 
so, Strønen gestures to the history of anthropologists explaining corruption through various 
flavors of power relations – including patronal networks, kinship, reciprocity, gift-giving, and 
moral economies. However, such explanations always exist within a “moral terrain” (Strønen 
2017: 304) of accumulation and dispossession for Strønen, defining what is “normal” or 
“acceptable,” and what is not. 
Like Strønen I at first had only a glancing interest in these practices of corporate 
obfuscation and ownership in the Georgian mining industry. To a certain extent determining the 
real owner of these operations seemed irrelevant – the discourses circulating throughout society 
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were powerful on their own, even if in the end they were fabricated (though they are not). 
Rotating ownership of the concession license seemed to bring little change to the lives of those 
affected most directly by extractive trends in the region. However, the more I spoke with people 
living in the shadows of these mines, read financial and pollution monitoring reports, and 
witnessed Georgia’s political development unfold over the eight years of my MA and PhD 
research, the more I realized how dismissive I would be in ignoring the practices of corruption 
affecting these citizens’ lives – the new divisions and designations of state and non-state 
behavior from conjoined legal and moral perspectives. As one respondent told me about the 
mining company working in the Mashavera valley, it was as if they and the government were 
“trying all the time to legalize these illegal activities” (Interview 50). 
This respondent’s designation of “illegal” versus “legal” practices in defining corruption 
is indicative of emergent challenges when trying to analyze rentier practices that some might 
categorize as corrupt, often invoking such definitions of legality to do so. Some scholars have 
tried expanding this definition further to enroll other normative assertions in their definitions. For 
instance, the introduction to a recent edited handbook on geographies of corruption defines the 
phenomenon as the "misuse of public office for private gains, the abuse of power, and dishonest 
and fraudulent conduct," including, among other things, the "selling of licenses and permits, 
allocations of government contracts, and mining and land concessions" as a distinct “form of 
rent-seeking behavior” (Warf 2018: 2–3; see also: Karklins 2005: 5). Yet, as I explain below, 
even these definitions prove inadequate in their inability to account for the political geographies 
involved in even defining some practices as corrupt and others as not. They also isolate broader 
historical contexts as either essentially irrelevant in defining corrupt practices (Cockcroft 2014: 
2) or predictive as “path-dependent trajectories that give rise to the unique circumstances of each 
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social formation" (Warf 2018: 12). To wit, some argue that the Soviet blat system of favors has 
moved from everyday life to business circles in post-Soviet states, suggesting that post-Soviet 
states are almost destined to experience corrupt practices (Ledeneva 1998; Lovell 2005). Such 
studies offer useful empirical insights, yet they also obscure some of the functional aspects 
involved in defining and carrying out corrupt practices, especially as they relate to rent relations 
shaping Georgia’s resource regime. Corruption in Russia, for example, serves two main 
functions: "rent extraction and securing loyalty of subordinates the administrative hierarchy" 
(Schulze and Zakharov 2018: 195) yet also emerging as "a consequence of the historical 
evolution of the Russian state" (Schulze and Zakharov 2018: 197).  
Cockcroft, a founding member of global watchdog Transparency International, also 
explains the post-Soviet trend of corruption as emerging from the Soviet state’s legacies, 
drawing a connective line between Yeltsin’s “full-scale liberalization” and Gorbachev’s 
preceding “partial liberalization.” These early moves toward liberalization emerged from the late 
Soviet era, when Brezhnev instituted a system of "controlled corruption," in which "the Politburo 
effectively licensed corruption but on the basis of recognized norms and at a standard rate" 
(Cockcroft 2014: 27). Such structural, “endemic” views of post-Soviet corruption frame these 
practices as emerging from the legacy of political success not being measured “in terms of 
compliance with rules, but in terms of achieving outcomes” (Lovell 2005: 73). 
Hale illustrates the importance of such clientelist networks of patrons and personal 
relations to uphold power relations in post-Soviet states – what he terms “patronal politics” 
(2014). These patronal relation networks increasingly took root as the core of political machines 
in late- and post-communist government throughout the former Soviet Union, though they took 
somewhat different shapes depending on local and historical context (Hale 2014: 52–4). The 
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resulting fuzziness between state/non-state designations in post-Soviet countries (Holmes 2006; 
Mitchneck 2011) leads Hale to focus on what he terms patronal power pyramids as key political 
formations in post-Soviet politics, with a patron at the top of the pyramid connected to lower 
levels through clientelistic power relations regardless of designation as state or non-state (Hale 
2014): 
Even private-sector oligarchs generally achieved their rise through some kind of close 
collusion with important state actors, often using state or former Communist Party 
resources as their initial capital, and they usually remained highly dependent on state 
structures (for sustenance, protection, or license). (Hale 2014: 110) 
 
Yet while these historical contexts are crucial for shaping contemporary governing 
practices, these assessments too suffer from the dangers of Agnew’s territorial trap. These 
patronal networks importantly extend beyond institutions, partially evacuating the usefulness of 
such categories as “state” or “non-state” as oligarchs, experts, and other elites may cross such 
boundaries and back again overnight (Hale 2014: 424) as post-Soviet economic networks extend 
beyond the boundaries of state territory. At times these vague institutional boundaries foster 
economic practices often closely related to corruption, such as offshore banking, round-trip FDI, 
and more (Cooley and Heathershaw 2017; Doolot and Heathershaw 2015; Heathershaw and 
Schatz 2017; Ledyaeva et al. 2015). Such relations increasingly define central Eurasia’s politics 
and economies, corroding classic analytical categories of state, territory, property, and value as 
corruption, patronal networks, and market manipulation become the common practices of 
authoritarian capitalism.  
For example, in their recent book Dictators Without Borders (2017), Alex Cooley and 
John Heathershaw argue that Central Asian dictators function “without moral and legal limits” 
(2017) as they move money and form political networks. In this text and elsewhere, and 
paralleling work by other scholars of the region, Heathershaw et al. suggest that such disregard 
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for limitations represents a defining characteristic of state power across Central Eurasia, 
including in precious metal mining sectors, as “the hybrid and polyvalent forms of statehood 
found in post-Soviet Eurasia… remain unexplored as features of regimes (not states) or are 
dismissed as mere indicators of weakness” (Heathershaw and Schatz 2017: 7; see also: Doolot 
and Heathershaw 2015). While Georgia is by no means the most corrupt or centralized 
government in a region filled with autocratic dictators, the country’s anti-corruption moves of the 
early 2000s have produced a hybrid democratic regime still defined in many ways by governing 
practices that neglect or manipulate the rule of law and the ideals of Westphalian states and 
capitalist development – including troubling interstate practices such as the illicit trade of 
radioactive material by criminal networks across the region and other forms of organized crime 
(Kupatadze 2007, 2010, 2017). 
 Cockcroft contends that Western powers are complicit in corruption’s rise in post-Soviet 
space, such as "the role which local and multinational companies can play and using corruption 
to increase market share" (2014: 115). However, this argument relies on the framing that 
Western powers are typically only involved to the extent that they ignore or foster corruption for 
their own geopolitical needs – for instance, to acquire gas from Turkmenistan – rather than 
practicing corruption themselves. These framings thus characterize offshore banking jurisdictions 
and other governmental “grey areas” as part of a "shadow economy" beyond “Western” countries 
(Cockcroft 2014: 165–8), filled with "black holes" (168–71) producing "secrecy jurisdictions" 
(171–7). 
Such claims do real political work, framing these relations in normative terms that tend to 
mask the practices and effects of those practices deemed corrupt. For example, practices of 
institutional capture and “hidden” privatization of public institutions lead to claims of “state 
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capture,” “stealing of the state,” or “thieves of state,” (Chayes 2016; Karklins 2005), yet in 
Georgia this privatization is only partially hidden, rendering visible the process of making 
“legal” the “illegal.” Paul Robbins also characterizes corruption studies as focused on “rotten” 
and “extralegal” transactions yet highlights, through the case of Indian forest management, that 
sometimes these relationships provide the rule rather than the exception as norms of corruption 
become institutionalized and entrenched. Robbins draws from prominent institutionalists 
(Ostrom 1990) to define corruption, especially in resource governance, as “not the absence of 
state institutions, but the presence of differing institutions, which vie for legitimacy and trust 
amongst diverse players within both the state and civil society” (Robbins 2000: 426). Moving 
beyond definitions of corruption that rely on status as legal or illegal, which might stigmatize 
local, informal practices of sustainable resource governance, corruption instead becomes “the 
bending of explicitly equitable state institutions around structures of regional and local social 
capital to create unequal distributive outcomes… its structured inequity sets it apart” (Robbins 
2000: 428).  
In similar fashion, some anthropologists approach corruption with a deconstructive eye to 
question what the terms “misuse” or “public” even mean, illustrating the “grey zones” in the 
“structured inequities” of both democratic and authoritarian environments alike (Haller and 
Shore 2005: 4–6). Yet focusing instead on individual greed rather than systemic causes of 
corruption directs our focus to “the individual apples rather than the barrel that contains them,” 
while explicit attention to systemic issues often lead to societal classifications as themselves 
corrupt as the non-Western “Other” – without considering the normative and disciplinary effects 
of such “modern,” “liberal,” and “good” governance practices (Foucault 1991a; Haller and Shore 
2005: 2–4). In this way “it may well be that the concept of corruption as something necessarily 
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hidden and occult reflects the ethnocentric, puritan, rationalist bias in the Anglophone social 
sciences” (Haller and Shore 2005: 12). Corrupt practices are therefore not limited to post-
communist or developing countries but clearly exist at all scales of government in the EU, 
NATO, the United States, as well as countries throughout the developing world (Haller and 
Shore 2005; Holmes 2006). In short, neither our geopolitical imaginations nor our state borders 
limit corrupt practices, and our assessments of corruption should not be either. 
This view of corruption has recently begun to take firmer root in geographic analyses. 
Recent calls for a critical geography of corruption – identified in both “third world” development 
projects and US presidential elections – adopt anthropological views toward the socially 
constructed and contingent nature of corruption accusations as a starting point (Doshi and 
Ranganathan 2018). Doing so highlights how corruption is not an a priori fact but a political 
designation and tool. Doshi and Ranganathan define corruption as “a normative discourse about 
the abuse of entrusted power” – defined beyond simply “state” power to also enroll “symbolic,” 
“material,” and “territorial” practices and powers – and the “resulting social decay that are 
always implicitly positioned relative to a perceived normal or previously ‘uncorrupted’ state of 
affairs” (2018: 3). Crucially, Doshi and Ranganathan also question “why some highly abusive, 
extractive, and dispossessing practices undertaken by entrusted agents merely proceed as normal 
to the workings of capitalism” (2018: 3). 
Yet corruption’s symbolic power produces material results as well (Doshi and 
Ranganathan 2017, 2018), as Wedel illustrates through the former Soviet region’s informally-
based and often-fluid governance structures (2001, 2003, 2012). What passes for legitimate in 
the West is dubbed “corruption” in non-Western places, further complicated by the fuzzy borders 
of state and non-state institutions, legal and illegal, etc., an indistinction utilized in the pursuit of 
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rent accumulation. These regimes of accumulation also bear territorial power, shaping spatial 
relations and our imaginations of them. 
Such deconstructive approaches to the categories of capital accumulation may at times 
appear at complete odds with the tenets of classic Marxist analysis. However, capitalism for 
Marx is an historic mode of production, and even these foundational analytical categories are 
only useful in historic context such that “specific modes of production contains specific 
relationships” that should provide the starting point for analysis (Heinrich 2012: 32). Harvey, in 
the introduction to the updated edition of Limits to Capital, specifically frames capitalism as a 
“logic of power” that, by necessity, intersects with various territorial and state logics (2007b: 
xviii). To understand the forces driving the changes and crises of capital development, we also 
need to cut below the surface of our inherited analytical categories and normative geopolitical 
imaginations to understand the world’s spatio-temporal political reordering: territorial regimes, 
capitalist discourses, and a range of governing techniques. Analyzing practices designated as 
corrupt alongside their intersections with legitimate governance regimes is essential for moving 
toward solutions to such pervasive problems as "the privatization of public life" (Fogel 2018) in 
diverse political contexts, regardless of normative values placed on those objects of analysis.  
In summary, “corruption” is a discursive and rhetorical device used to designate certain 
practices as transgressing entrusted power (Doshi and Ranganathan 2018), analogous to labels of 
“free” or “democratic” for which concrete measurements prove continually elusive and 
pervasively problematic. Yet corrupt practices also bear material and territorial consequences 
central to capitalist governing regimes. I have therefore tried to show in the preceding review 
that political geographers concerned with emerging forms of decentralized resource governance 
should not study corruption as an a priori object of normative analysis but instead focus on the 
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uneven practices to which commentators apply that label. In the Georgian mining industry these 
involve monopolistic rent relations, which we might categorize as “structured inequities” 
(Robbins 2000). The recent re-focus on rent relations within political ecology, which some have 
termed “value-grabbing” as rent regimes primarily comprise unequal power relations (Andreucci 
et al. 2017), illustrates how these practices can powerfully shape the political geographies of 
resource governance – especially under emerging regimes of capital (Harvey 2007a).  
Commentators such as Transparency International might designate these as “corrupt” 
practices, and in fact they most likely are. However, these relations remain legal, at least partially 
visible, and codified – all hallmarks of uncorrupted practices of “good governance.” Instead, 
viewing “corrupt” practices in the disaggregated approach I propose reveals corruption as an 
unequally applied label reinforcing the geopolitical imaginations of western supremacy. Such 
designations provide cover for the broader patronal networks of rent appropriation spreading 
beyond Georgia’s borders (see Chapter 5) that might produce the greatest inequitable 
redistributions of rent in emerging economies – perhaps a more grounded vision of corruption 
and capital accumulation. These practices enroll powerful corporate and governmental actors 
across different corners of the world and require analyses moving beyond the interstate 
jurisdictional borders of the territorial trap (Agnew 1994, 2010, 2015a), as I illustrate in the 
following section.  
 
4.  Political Alchemy: Tracing “Corrupting” Relations of Rent and Government 
 
While some places throughout the former Soviet Union, such as Kyrgyzstan’s Naryn 
region, experience widespread illegal and artisanal mining practices (RFE/RL 2016a), Georgia’s 
mining regulations and broader property reforms – what Foucault terms “technologies of 
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government” (2007c) made territorial – mean that the country’s extractive industries are heavily 
re-centralized and corporatized. 
Within state territory, the Georgian government serves as the landowner, auctioning 
exploration and extraction licenses to corporate interests. However, the result of the concession 
framework at play here is that “land ceases to be part of national space and becomes instead a 
series of miniature corporate states: a modern mirror of feudal fiefdoms, with the corporate 
concession holder as sovereign” (Bridge 2013: 4–5), producing new, resource-based forms of 
graduated sovereignty (Ong 2006a: 200; see also Chapter 5). In this way, understanding the 
varying territorialities of property relations in an extractive industry can help shed light on the 
governing logics shaping emergent relationships among state, society, and corporations (Blomley 
2017). These arrangements and constellations form what Marston and Perreault term a particular 
resource regime, or the ways in which “natural resources, forms of rule, and relations of 
production are brought into alignment and given territorial form” (2017: 256), remade and 
maintained through practices of consent, social struggle, and political alliance. 
As I demonstrate here, such political social networks – defined by such somewhat 
ineffable qualities such as “loyalty,” “respect,” and “vulnerability” like many governing regimes 
throughout the post-Soviet region (Hale 2014; Taylor 2018) – are key to the Georgian mining 
sector’s emergence, shaping both the governing technologies of property and rent operating here, 
and the industrial metal extraction market’s evolution. In this way, the value of land and 
resources to capital is established not only through economic relations of ground rent and 
exploitation of labor but also through social networks, patronal politics, and elite corruption – the 
privatization of public life (Fogel 2018) neither unique to Georgia nor necessarily even illegal, 
but indicative of broader regional trends. 
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Examples of such corrosion of standard capitalist stories are rampant in Georgia. For 
instance, under amendments made to Georgia’s Law on Environmental Protection (Law of 
Georgia No 5640, Section II, Chapter XVI, Article 57) in 2012, companies are able to 
“compensate” Georgia’s state budget for environmental damage caused by their actions (Corso 
2012; The Parliament of Georgia 2012a) – as the World Bank representative tried to inform me 
in 2012. Two companies historically involved in the mining operations in the Mashavera Valley, 
Madneuli JSC and Quartzite Ltd, were the first companies to take advantage of this deal, paying 
the government US$13 million for damages caused since 1994, a figure determined by the 
Ministry of Energy as the law dictates. Critics claim this number is far less than the 
environmental damages are worth and that the unclear conditions of these agreements provide 
fully subjective measures for reparation by the government with little oversight as to how this 
process of externality valuation unfolds (Corso 2012). 
The Rich Metals Group, or RMG, is the most visible corporate entity acting in this region 
within Georgia and has tried to paint a greener image of the region’s mining operations in the 
past decade. However, results on the ground do not seem to match this projected image. 
Although company executives today deny pollution is occurring, stating that Madneuli labs 
regularly analyze the Mashavera's water and find pollution levels to be within limits, ten years 
ago the Bolnisi local government invited experts from the Davit Tatishvili Medical Center to 
examine local citizens for health issues. Of the 706 citizens examined during this period, 253 
suffered from "mammary gland fibrous mastopaths and chronic cystic mastitis" centered around 
the village of Kazreti (Gujaraidze et al. 2007: 39–40). Anecdotal evidence suggests these trends 
have only worsened, and representatives of the Center refused to speak with me when I told them 
my research interests. In addition, the UN’s third Environmental Performance Review of 
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Georgia, published in 2016, assessed there had been no progress on developing a national 
sustainable development strategy and little progress on revising environmental standards since 
2010. The report also determined that Kvemo Kartli has the second most polluted air of any 
region in the country, due to mining activities in the region, and that water pollution from these 
industrial activities are some of the most significant environmental issues facing the country 
(United Nations Economic Commission For Europe 2016). Minutes of government meetings 
from 2006 obtained by members of the NGO Green Alternative demonstrate that both corporate 
managers and  government entities alike were acutely aware of the environmental damage the 
Madneuli mine operations were already generating at the time the minimal fine was paid 
(Gujaraidze et al. 2007: 37). Investigative reporting by სტუდია მონიტორი / Studio Monitor 
revealed significant differences in heavy metal contamination measurements on cotemporaneous 
reports held by the National Environmental Agency and the mining corporation, suggesting false 
data were being used (სტუდია მონიტორი / Studio Monitor 2012). 
While the Ministry of Environment and Protection has attempted to reform this set of 
mining governance legislation for close to a decade – guided by consultation with both 
international experts and local NGOs and with the goal of aligning with both the national 
constitution and international agreements established under the Environmental Action 
Programme for Central and Eastern Europe, progress has been slow and results minimal 
(Ministry of Environment Protection of Georgia 2012). However, this alteration and delay of 
legislation have allowed for powerful, yet negligent, corporate actors to cover the negative 
externalities of their extractive practices, just one move in a series of events and relations that 
have unfolded over the last thirty years as part of Georgia’s broader political economic re-
orientation. Crucially, these practices of privatization and property regime transformation were 
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not immediate, but processual, linked to both the ongoing valuation and extraction of metal 
resources and the cultural/political dimensions shaping processes of appropriating rent.  
 
4.1.  Tracing “Corrupt” Practices and Privatization 
 
The first iteration of this process took the form of an intense wave of privatization in the 
1990s, which the government doubled down on in 2004, including in environmental sectors, 
moving toward increased de-centralization through a series of auctions often occurring after pre-
negotiations between individual corporations and government entities (Gujaraidze et al. 2007: 
32–6). The new series of legislative actions that made this new system possible indicated 
widespread shifts in relations between society and state, as well as international actors of many 
types (protestors, corporations, unions, scientists). 
The payment of $13 million described earlier was a key moment in this transition. During 
the first wave of privatization from full state ownership of property in 1994 following the Soviet 
collapse, Madneuli JSC, as suggested by its name, was originally a joint-stock company in which 
the state was a shareholder rather than a property owner. The Georgian government privatized 
Madneuli JSC at the same time Quartzite LTD was formed as a Georgian-Australian joint 
venture intended to re-process waste material from the mine to extract increasingly trace 
amounts of gold left in tailings, along with several other LLCs responsible for various elements 
of the extraction process. These included Georgian Mining Company LLC, which owned the 
mining licenses for the Bolnisi region, and Trans Georgian Resource LLC, which held the 
exploration and extraction license for the Sakdrisi deposit (Gujaraidze et al. 2007). 
Several local watchdog groups and NGOs – including Transparency International 
Georgia, the Georgian Young Lawyer’s Association (GYLA), and Green Alternative, one of 
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Georgia’s leading environmental NGOs – have undertaken the daunting task of documenting 
comprehensive histories of the mining operation’s ownership structure. These efforts provide 
insight to both the power structures shaping the mining operations and Georgia’s broader history 
of privatization. 
Madneuli JSC accumulated nearly 4.7 million GEL10 in debt in the ten years following its 
initial privatization, resulting from corrupt and inadequate management and governance 
(Gujaraidze 2013). These developments were part of broader patterns of corporate malpractice 
throughout the Georgian economy during this decade. Such mounting issues motivated Georgia’s 
National Agency for State Property Management to begin assigning supervisory boards to large 
companies following the 2003 Rose Revolution, among which Madneuli JSC and Quartziti LTD 
were two of the first (Gujaraidze 2013; Gujaraidze et al. 2007). Koba Nakopia, vice-president of 
the Russian company Promishleny Investor since 2003, was appointed the director general of the 
companies in 2004. Promishleny contained an offshore subsidiary registered in the British Virgin 
Islands named Stanton Equities Corporation, and it was Stanton that took private control of both 
Madneuli and Quartziti in 2005 (Gujaraidze 2013; Rimple 2012). 
Nakopia got his position at Promishleny through his connection with Sergei Generalov, a 
Russian oligarch. During the second major round of privatization in 2004, the Minister of 
Economy at the time, Kakha Bendukidze – the architect of Georgian neoliberal policy who, 
according to popular myth, once said he would "sell everything but Georgia’s conscience" (Jones 
2015) – called Nakopia in Moscow and offered him the role of managing Madneuli (Rimple 
2012: 89). This network of social interconnectivity is a prime example of a capitalist regime 
                                                        
10 4.7 million Georgian Lari; USD$1,901,303 in 2003, according to historic exchange rates documented at XE.com.  
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emerging beyond pure economic, capitalist forces, but rather markets shaped by social relations, 
patronal political networks, and historical context, as common throughout post-Soviet space. 
Nakopia left his position at Madneuli when he was elected to Parliament in 2008, yet he 
kept his shares in the company (Rimple 2012: 89). GeoProMining, Ltd. (GPM) owned the 
Madneuli mine operation since 2005, controlling the two separate holdings JSC Madneuli and 
Quartzite Ltd. RMG’s current general director is Dima Kalandadze, who was also 
GeoProMining’s general director before the mine was sold to RMG to recover debts and avoid 
environmental accountability. At the same time, Madneuli’s license expired in 2011, and a 
geologist who worked for GeoProMining opened an offshore company in Cyprus called the 
Caucasus Mountain Group the day before the auction was publicly announced. The company’s 
only shareholder is Pamtilon Holdings Ltd.,11 a global investment firm (Rimple 2012: 90). 
GeoProMining has other holdings throughout the Caucasus (Rimple 2012: 91) and has 
undertaken similarly environmentally damaging mining practices throughout the former Soviet 
Union, from the Mashavera Valley to Armenia and locations in Russia (Golden Dust 2017; see 
also Chapter 5). 
The government auctioned off the current exploration licenses throughout the region in 
October 2011 and February 2012, selling the licenses to the Mining Investment Co. of Russia, 
part of the Capital Group. As GPM did not acquire the licenses and had more lucrative ventures 
in Armenia and Russia, the company sold its two holdings to the Rich Metals Group (RMG) for 
$120 million, renaming them RMG Copper (JSC Madneuli) and RMG Gold (Quartzite Ltd.) 
(Safirova 2012). RMG’s owners sit on the advisory board of Mining Investment Co., which 
purchased the extraction license for Sakdrisi-Kachaghiani in 2014 before the mining activities 
                                                        
11 Some sources spell the company’s name “Pemptilon.” 
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commenced (Saladze 2014). The three individuals include Dmitri Kozhev, Dmitri Troitsky, who 
Forbes listed as one of the 100 wealthiest Russians (Rimple 2012), and Zurba Qutelia, who 
signed the original extraction license granted to TransGeorgianResource and Madneuli JSC in 
the mid-1990s on behalf of the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (Saladze 2014: 
27). In short, the market valuation of access to these resources emerged not only through the 
abstraction of labor and accumulation of surplus value (Marx 1992: 300–6; Walker 2016) but 
also through a network of social relations, patronal politics, and undermining of the rule of law, 
without strictly breaking it (Hale 2014; Muir and Gupta 2018; Strønen 2017) – a practice of 
institutionalizing norms of structural inequity that some might label as corrupt (Robbins 2000; 
Doshi and Ranganathan 2018).  
While the effects of these corrupt practices are most visceral in Georgia’s Mashavera 
valley (as explored in greater detail in the following chapters), they unfold through a distinctly 
global assemblage (Ong and Collier 2004). Both RMG and the Mining Investment Co., along 
with GeoProMining and the Caucasus Mountain Group, are also owned by Pamtilon Holdings 
and share the same leadership (Saladze 2014: 28). Extensive investigations of RMG’s corporate 
ownership structure reveal that it comprises various holdings based in the Netherlands, Cyprus, 
and Georgia (GYLA 2014; TI Georgia 2015). While RMG is ostensibly based in Georgia, 
investigators have found evidence that RMG  and Pamtilon Holdings – with the same people 
noted in the registration information for both enterprises and shared board members including 
former members of government – are most likely part of the Capital Group,12 which, if true, 
                                                        
12 The Capital Group is run by Russian billionaire Vladislav Doronin, whom Business Insider and others have referred to as “the 
Donald Trump of Russia” (DuJour 2014) and who has developed more than 75 million square feet of real estate in the Miami 
Beach area in the last decade or so (Master Brokers Forum 2017; Wooldridge 2017). Such practices oddly mirror those of other 
real estate-based money laundering undertaken by a range of wealthy actors connecting former Soviet spaces and large 
metropolitan areas around the world (Davidson 2017; Graff 2018). 
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would mean the company has solidified significant power in the region (Green Alternative 2017; 
Gujaraidze 2013; Iakobidze 2012; Safirova 2012; TI Georgia 2015). This is all legal under 
Georgian law. 
The expansion and intensification of mining operations in the Mashavera Valley over the 
past fifteen years fit widespread patterns of corporate and state corruption in the post-Soviet 
states, “making legal the illegal” in ways incredibly harmful to local ecologies, labor rights, and 
national identities and with questionable economic value to the Georgian government. In recent 
years, British investors have begun partnering with these local companies to further explore and 
expand extraction patterns in the region, intensifying capital’s influence in ways that revolve as 
much around business networks and the politics of knowledge production as they do economic 
valuation (Noricum Gold 2018).  
This right to exploration– defined under Georgian law as the ability to categorize and 
designate the value of land, territory, and resources, setting the parameters of access, extraction, 
and accumulation – belongs to the Georgian corporation JSC Georgian Copper & Gold (GCG), 
of which British enterprise Georgian Mining Corporation (GMC, formerly Noricum) has a 50% 
stake alongside the Caucasian Mining Group (CMG). GCG will “generate” ore and, through a 
formal agreement, RMG13 will mine and process the materials (Georgian Mining Corporation 
2018; Noricum Gold Limited 2016). GMC was registered in the British Virgin Islands in 2010 
(Georgian Mining Corporation 2018) while CMG was established in 2011 with a Tbilisi address 
and is affiliated with RMG as the license holder to their operational function (Bloomberg 2018; 
                                                        
13 RMG Gold also became the subject of a major tax evasion investigation by Georgia’s Finance Ministry Investigation Service 
following the new Georgian Dream government coming to power in 2012 (Burchuladze, 2015), though it appears that this 
investigation was dropped in the ensuing years. 
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Caucasian Mining Group 2018). CMG is part of the Mining Investment Co. – also owned by 
Pamtilon Holdings (HumanRights.ge 2012).  
The general pattern of privatization seen at Madneuli is indicative of much of Georgian 
industry as nearly every major privatized enterprise is owned by companies registered in 
offshore holdings (Gujaraidze 2014), and the privatization of the entire mining industry is 
defined by similar patterns of auctions negotiated among personal elite connections (Rimple 
2012). However, such ostensibly corrupt practices governing metal mining industries in the 
South Caucasus are neither unique to nor even most intense in Georgia, especially when 
compared to countries across the former Soviet region. For example, bank data revealed through 
the Panama Papers leak of internal Mossack Fonseca records documents how in recent years 
President Aliyev of Azerbaijan ordered a state-owned mining company to purchase and close 
four failing gold mines owned by his family. These operations had produced equally intense 
ecological damage and poor labor conditions to that seen in the Mashavera, yet when the mines 
shut down, workers were left without livelihoods or payment (Patrucic et al. 2016). 
 
4.2.  Multiple Forces, Contested Government 
 
In similar ways, the destruction of the ancient mine and expansion of the modern mine 
are direct results of these corruptions and mutations of relations within this particular assemblage 
of political regimes under capital yet shaped by a much wider range of social forces and political 
regimes. These forces are not united, historically struggling for power and influence as Georgia’s 
property and resource reforms unfold. For example, as the tensions over Sakdrisi came to a head 
in late 2013 and early 2014, employees at RMG Copper and RMG Gold also began a strike 
involving a majority of the mine’s laborers in February 2014, with hundreds of people rallying in 
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Kazreti (EMC 2014). At the same time a team of German and Georgian archaeologists were 
finishing documentation of nearly 10,000 stone tools excavated over almost a decade of work at 
the Sakdrisi site, revealing a history of gold mining spanning the middle until the beginning of 
the 4th millennium BC, with renewed activity exploiting the gold-bearing remnants in the 4th 
and 5th century AD (Stöllner and Gambashidze 2016). Archaeologists undertook experimental 
techniques to re-create mining practices, proving that the stone tools they documented were 
capable of such excavations. The archaeological record confirms expectations that more labor-
intensive mining practices only followed the richest veins of gold.14 
Article 40 of Georgia’s “Law on Subsoil” ensures that such "Rare (unique) geological, 
paleontological, archaeological sites, mineral formations, areas of meteorite placement, as well 
as subsoil blocks of scientific, historic, aesthetic or other cultural significance, may be granted 
the relevant category of protected areas in the manner prescribed by the legislation of Georgia." 
The law continues that "In case of detection of objects provided for by paragraph 1 of this article 
during the use of subsoil, a subsoil user is obliged to suspend works in respective areas and 
report them to the administrative body that issued the license" (The Parliament of Georgia 1996). 
This stipulation within Georgia’s subsoil property regime throws into question the government 
actions at the expansion of operations at Sakdrisi and introduces a key event in the process of 
valuation by the state as government bodies manipulated loopholes in legal processes – for 
instance, “may be granted” – to determine the economic value of a cultural heritage site.  
                                                        
14 For excellent photo documentation of all these experimental practices, see (Stöllner and Gambashidze 2016). An entire 
prehistoric society existed in the valley around the mine, concentrated around the Dzedzvebi Plateau several kilometers away. 
These places were connected by a network of ritualized extraction and manufacturing processes that drove the local economy. 
Interestingly, at least the region’s earliest mining residents during the Kura-Araxes period seemed to have a particular concept of 
wealth and value as related to gold. No gold was found in any burial ground of the time, indicating that "it went either to the very 
rich, or it was used in communal practices and was not given to single persons" (Stöllner and Gambashidze 2016: 84) – a 
fascinating moment in the history of valuing gold. 
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The Ministry of Culture revoked Sakdrisi’s cultural heritage status in early 2013 
(Agenda.ge 2014a; Burchuladze 2015), yet shortly thereafter, RMG laid off more than 180 
workers in late January 2014. This layoff led to the widespread strikes at the mining operations 
and Kazreti plant in January and February 2014 (Agenda.ge 2014a; Rimple 2014) while public 
protest regarding the region’s cultural heritage was also gaining momentum. With Georgian 
national flags flying, protestors from Tbilisi clashed with local mine employees as the activists 
tried linking arms to form a chain around the heritage site. Local police had to intervene to keep 
the pushing and shouting from turning more violent (Georgian Broadcaster 2014d). 
Protestors from the Public Committee to Save Sakdrisi began camping out on a 
neighboring hill in mid-April 2014 in response to this conflict and to the central government’s 
actions, keeping watch over RMG’s activities (DFWATCH 2014d). This group brought together 
students, scientists, and NGO members around their shared interest in protecting the cultural 
heritage site, building a temporary watchtower and tent city to track mine employee activities 
(DFWATCH 2014a; Georgian Broadcaster 2014c). Meanwhile, PM Garibashvili made public 
appearances with mine employees, with workers asking him to let them continue their jobs and 
blaming the former government for trying to protect the heritage site and stall economic 
development (DFWATCH 2015). Not everyone in the government felt this way however, with 
President Giorgi Margvelashvili calling for mining to stop until a lawsuit had reached a 
conclusion and causing RMG employees to protest at his home (DFWATCH 2014e). 
Considering the strike’s scale in Kazreti earlier in the year, these protests led some to accuse 
protestors of following RMG management’s orders. 
While the work halted at times as protestors clashed and Parliament raised questions and 
possible investigations, eventually the activities continued, destroying the archaeological site’s 
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last components and expanding extractive practices in the region (DFWATCH 2014b; GYLA 
2015). However, the decision to allow mining to begin at Sakdrisi was somewhat tumultuous, 
unfolding in the courts throughout 2014. The Minister of Culture and Monument Protection 
granted RMG the right to commence mining in the area in mid-March 2014, with Tbilisi City 
Court overturning that decision on 3 June 2014 (Agenda.ge 2014b; Civil Georgia 2014; Rimple 
2014). The mining finally moved forward after swift decisions by the government on 13 
December 2014 (Civil.ge 2014; GYLA 2015).15 
GYLA’s detailed analysis of documentation surrounding the timeline of related 
government activities reveal that RMG Gold had not obtained the proper permits from the 
government’s Technical and Construction Supervision Agency before RMG detonated the first 
explosions at Sakdrisi. Therefore, the removal of the cultural heritage status was illegal under 
Georgian law (Saladze 2015: 15). The government’s actions seem suspicious even without an 
illegal designation as the appropriate government office undertook seventeen separate actions 
and made four decisions regarding Sakdrisi in one day on December 12, 2014 (Saladze 2015). 
This series of decisions, perhaps the most blatant example of corrupt behavior in Georgia’s 
contemporary extractive history, included a number of swiftly initiated official mechanisms, 
including the Deputy Minister of the National Agency for Cultural Heritage Preservation’s 
adding his signature to RMG’s request letter within eleven minutes of its arrival at the Agency 
(Saladze 2015: 15–8). This rapid series of events culminated in the Environmental Ministry 
extending RMG Gold’s extraction license in a matter of two days from December 29-31, 2014 
(Saladze 2015). 
                                                        
15 The 14 December 2014 initiation of mining activities at Sakdrisi was captured by amateur video and shared on national 
television on 18 December 2014 by Georgian Broadcaster (Georgian Broadcaster 2014a), seen here: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yj6vrM7Pk8w; with more footage in earlier broadcasts, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DABuVYzbojU (Georgian Broadcaster 2014b). 
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Youth activists in Tbilisi undertook a number of political demonstrations following 
Sakdrisi’s destruction: marching in the capital’s streets, protesting in front of the homes of PM 
Garibashvili and former PM Bidzina Ivanishvili, hosting daily concerts outside government 
offices, and two individuals even going on hunger strike (DFWATCH 2014f). The Georgian 
Patriarch Ilia II, the most widely trusted person in Georgia (CRRC 2018a), condemned RMG 
Gold in a public prayer following the heritage site’s destruction (DFWATCH 2014c). 
Almost two years to the day after Sakdrisi was destroyed, RMG opened a museum in 
Bolnisi in collaboration with the Georgian National Museum on 15 December 2016. In addition 
to the region’s rich heritage of German settlement and early Christianity, the museum is meant to 
display artifacts from the archaeological site and to promote regional tourism based on the site’s 
cultural heritage – ironic as the denial of such heritage was the government’s prime argument for 
moving forward with the development. The company posted video of the opening celebration to 
YouTube, displaying the exhibitions’ high production value and the high-profile event’s glitzy 
tenor (RMG/არემჯი Richmetalsgroup 2017). Activists I worked with refused to even consider 
entering the museum because of what they felt it represented and what role it played in justifying 
and legitimating RMG’s activities. 
Preliminary findings by a colleague currently working in the region with the Heinrich 
Boll Foundation indicate that the expansions continue producing further divisions along a variety 
of axes as: ethnic minority groups in the region seem increasingly damaged by toxic pollution 
with fewer avenues for self-advocacy, local community members protest some of the newly 
proposed expansions that would encroach on church territory; and it is rumored that the company 
has begun to quietly investigate the possibility of dislocating families living on these territories 
(Interview 73, 10 July 2018). 
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According to an investor presentation from British company Georgian Mining Company 
(formerly Noricum Gold), “Georgia is geopolitically stable, and supportive of mining” (Noricum 
Gold 2018). Thanks in part to such perceptions, new mines are emerging throughout the region, 
including the large poly-metal Bektakaris deposit (NewPosts.ge 2017) and seventeen other 
exploratory sites within the broad Kvemo Bolnisi exploration project (Noricum Gold 2018). In 
fact, the Georgian Mining Company has well over a dozen known targets of potential new 
extraction sites, all with varying levels of interest but including some labeled “bonanza grade” 
and located near the surface, expanded in part by reviewing historical measurements in pursuit of 
more aggressive drilling work in the region (Noricum Gold 2018). Noricum Gold’s CEO Greg 
Kuenzel told the London Stock Exchange’s Share Talk that these efforts were part of his 
company’s broader effort to “westernize” mining operations in the region “without further 
environmental planning” (LSE Share Talk 2016). 
The failure of mining labor union strikes in the Mashavera Valley suggest the exceptional 
nature of these industrial arrangements. Elsewhere in the country, miners’ labor unions have 
demonstrated substantial strength to organize and demand rights, such as the coal miners of 
Tkibuli who went on a significant strike and organized protests that turned somewhat violent 
(RFE/RL 2016b), as well as a history of strikes in Chiatura’s manganese mining industry 
(Safirova 2012). The initiation of new mining projects has sparked protest in other Georgian 
regions, such as when environmental activists joined community members of the Svan village 
Ieli to contest the start of a new gold mine in their mountain home. Local environmental NGOs 
and reporters eventually determined that, despite rumors that the company was Chinese, the 
mining license’s owner – Optical Systems, Inc. – operates through an offshore account in Saint 
Kitts and Nevis, with Georgian representation and registration in Wyoming (Cagara 2016; OC 
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Media 2019) leaving the true owner unknown at this time. Labor issues in the mining sector 
continue to produce social disruption as multiple deadly tragedies stemming from unsafe 
working conditions in Georgia’s coal and manganese mines have sparked a series of protests in 
recent years (DFWATCH 2017, 2018; Pertaia 2017; RFE/RL 2017). 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
As these complex and intersecting forces demonstrate, the manipulation of rent and 
property regimes places resource extraction as a prime avenue for shaping broader social and 
political relations across a variety of governing regimes and at multiple scalar framings from “the 
state” to members of “society.” However, individual experiences in the region reveal several 
different forms of dispossession and exclusion, throwing into question many of the analytical 
assumptions often underlying more dogmatic Marxist political economic analysis (e.g., Labban 
2014, Parenti 2015). “The State,” in Georgia as in all contexts, is no monolithic entity (Painter 
2006, 2011), making simple correlations as “state=landowner” in economic relation with 
separate “capitalists” misleading and leaving scholars ill-equipped to explain such relations. 
People identify not only as laborers but also as either Georgian citizens or excluded people, part 
of a trusted social network of business associates or someone trying to get in, healthy or ill 
people – dynamics I explore further in the following chapter. These manifold tensions become 
especially important when considering the “crony capitalism” or “vulture capitalism” of many 
formerly Soviet economies, corrupting democratic norms if not outright acting as “dictators 
without borders” (Cooley & Heathershaw, 2017; Harvey, 2003). Such divisions continue to 
unfold here as international corporate interests influence shifting forms of graduated, de facto 
sovereignty in this region of Georgia (Ong 2006b; Sassen 2013b). 
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Therefore, if, as Bridge and Perreault argue, analyses of “environmental governance 
should aim to lay bare these power geometries,” (2009: 492),  then I contend that political 
geographies of extractive industries may be understood as political alchemy: capturing value 
through a set of manipulated socio-political, patronal networks that produce contingent, often 
ambiguous, territorial power geometries of extraction. Citizens living in the Mashavera Valley 
must navigate these diverse dispossessions and exclusions daily, shaping how they view and 
value their environment, homeland, and themselves, as I further explore in the following chapter. 
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Chapter IV – Mining the Homeland: Imagining Resources, Nation, and Territory 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Historic Tbilisi  
(Photo credit: Author, 2016) 
 
Kati’s fastidiously decorated home, its high walls furnished chicly with antique carpets 
and modern paintings, is located on the north side of a steep, cobble-stoned street in the heart of 
Tbilisi’s historic district. Removed from the souvenir shops, overpriced khachapuri, and Disney-
like veneers of the neighborhood’s tourist-clogged main streets, the buildings here slump with 
age, propped up as much by residential dedication as the iron beams bracing their walls against 
the cobbles. Surviving since the 1800s and earlier, the buildings of this neighborhood are 
collectively listed on the UNESCO World Heritage list and offer a connection to Tbilisi’s 
centuries-long history of political turbulence: from periods of invasion to the 70-year Soviet 
occupation to the contemporary explosion of unfettered real estate development and economic 
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renewal projects. Kati’s apartment sits halfway up one of these steep hills, and her story is but 
one recent chapter in Georgia’s broader history of cultural and political identification, memory, 
and landscape amid contentious politics.  
Kati is highly educated, a former government minister, and leader of an EU-funded NGO, 
For a Better Environment, working to preserve cultural heritage and raise environmental 
awareness in Georgia and throughout the South Caucasus. She speaks nearly perfect English, 
presents herself as distinctly cosmopolitan, and cares deeply about the relevance of the past to 
our contemporary experiences. She adopts a global perspective while working diligently to 
preserve heritage she views as distinctly Georgian.  
    
Figure 9: Archaeological findings from Sakdrisi dig site 
From left to right, a prehistoric burial site at an archaeological settlement near Sakdrisi; 
representative gold metallurgy from the early Kura-Valley System; and bone tools  
(Stöllner and Gambashidze 2015, 2016) 
 
Despite her devotion to issues of cultural heritage for both Georgians and the world, Kati 
was fired from her post as the country’s Deputy Minister of Culture in 2014 for, she believes, her 
opposition to the destruction of the Sakdrisi archaeological site. I visit her home one June 
afternoon in 2016 to hear that story. She opens the heavy metal door and leads me up a set of 
creaky stairs to her family’s renovated second-floor flat. Over cookies, cherry jam, and mint tea, 
she begins to explain the complexities of the Georgian national project for me, sharing her 
individual experiences of recent political economic events, political debates over cultural 
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heritage, and the country’s recent restructuring of environmental and cultural governance 
systems amid swirling questions of potentially “corrupt” practices. 
“The most tragic thing,” Kati explains, “is that the state policy is oriented, really, toward 
the destruction and demolition of the values and natural and cultural heritage, and to give it all 
away and protect these aggressive businesses, and all over Georgia it is the same. This is perhaps 
the most tragic case, but…” 
I had heard parts of Kati’s story the previous summer. Her position as a key public figure 
in the struggles around Sakdrisi and continued deep engagement in cultural heritage activities 
gave her an especially informed view of these relationships among the Georgian state, business 
interests, environmental governance, and collective national identity. Over the next two hours 
Kati shares with me many of the main points of the narrative surrounding Sakdrisi, but it is how 
she discusses the conflict, its generative causes and consequential effects, that interest me most 
today. She argues that the cultural heritage issues of Sakdrisi’s egregious destruction prove 
secondary for the people living there, despite the heritage site’s symbolism of collective national 
identity, because “the environmental problems are very cultural there.”   
 “It belongs to everyone,” she claims, referring to the archaeological heritage site that 
representatives of RMG Gold destroyed by detonating explosives in December 2014.  
Despite this sentiment, however, Kati feels that “the government is doing everything in 
favor of these aggressive companies,” and in doing so is leaving behind local populations, 
undermining the country’s collective interests, and, in a zero-sum trade-off among the 
international system of states, allowing “foreign” interests to benefit at Georgia’s expense:  
This company has some Russian owners and has been registered in some offshore 
[company] – in Cyprus, I think. Things have not been transparent, and the incomes do not 
come to Georgia. It’s not the kind of company that produces opportunity through chains 
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of production and end products, because then it could really create some jobs and 
stability. Instead they are shipping these untreated minerals prior to production.  
 
As Kati sees it, the Georgian state is allowing “other groups to destroy Georgia” through 
the government’s restructuring of environmental governance systems and abandonment of 
collective heritage for corporate profit. Kati feels that people living near Sakdrisi typically don’t 
care as much about the site’s specific cultural heritage value, yet cultural and political 
identifications infuse nearly every conversation I have with people about the mine’s expansion. 
Meanwhile, Kati’s definition of “other groups” reflects a long history of defining national 
identity against a shifting alterity, loosely identified as “other” groups to great political effect. 
Such views of overlapping natural resource extraction, Georgian cultural politics, and 
international relations recur again and again throughout the next two summers as I speak with 
community members living near the mining complex at Madneuli, employees of RMG Gold, 
political activists, NGO representatives, and people I meet during everyday encounters 
throughout the country. Defining the political significance of natural resources and cultural 
symbols, what it means for those socio-environmental entities to “belong” to a community, and 
who is (or is not) included in the associated collective pronouns such as “everyone” and “other 
groups” – these tensions appear repeatedly throughout my conversations. 
As we chat, Kati keeps hinting at imaginations of a greater Georgian political 
community, of who and what belongs to it – perspectives often taken for granted in political 
analyses of Georgia focusing on militarized conflict and static understandings of ethnic national 
identity (Toal 2017). However, as some scholars have argued and as I illustrate here, these 
national imaginations and relations are fluid, multidimensional, and experienced in a variety of 
informal ways. The wider Georgian national project is collective and based on individual 
attachments to place, collective heritage, and imagined communities. Localized corporate mining 
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practices disrupt and mutate these relationships in relation to events and practices at Sakdrisi. 
New narratives of identification have appeared around environmental and cultural heritage 
governance, including new understandings of both Georgian environments and nation. This 
chapter demonstrates how the taken-for-granted territorial and environmental dimensions of the 
Georgian national project are often under-analyzed, leaving out key components of the evolving 
Georgian geopolitical field (Toal 2017). Further missing from academic assessments of Georgian 
national narratives are how individual Georgians understand and experience those discourses. 
In this chapter I analyze popular political narratives, scripts, and imaginations 
surrounding the events at Sakdrisi as a critical dimension of industrial mining’s material and 
political effects taking shape in Georgia, extending my research to investigate the narratives Kati 
introduces me to. Adopting this popular geopolitics approach offers insight into how people 
contest these political scripts in the public sphere and how members of civil society experience 
the Georgian national project. I draw from scholarship in political geography and political 
ecology to investigate how emerging imaginations of a changing Georgian homeland may enter 
the national project. This includes analyzing how popular geopolitical narratives of 
environmental conflict can illuminate such often-overlooked dimensions of political change in 
contentious environments. 
I specifically show how contrasting imaginations of Georgia’s homeland, typically 
envisioned as lived territory filled with resources for a Georgian people, emerge in the local 
context of resource extraction projects that local citizens increasingly imbue with political 
significance. These imaginations vacillate between positive and negative identifications in 
complex and multi-valent ways, driven by economic factors, environmental consequences, and 
broader cultural visions of Georgian nationhood and its spatial arrangements. I show this by 
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identifying three localized alternative visions of the Georgian homeland circulating throughout 
the mining complex. In developing this argument I advance broader conversations within 
political geography related to the political construction and legitimation of territorial and 
governmental arrangements in the former Soviet Union (O’Loughlin 2001; O’Loughlin et al. 
2016; Smith et al. 1998), moving toward an understanding of how experiences and imaginations 
of resource governance shape these arrangements (Bridge and Perreault 2009; Himley 2008; 
Robertson 2015).  
These imaginations are significant because they become incorporated into specifically 
political scripts about environmental governance and reveal how citizens understand local 
territory not just in terms of spatial extent but of quality and experience. Investigating these fluid 
narratives is essential to refining our understanding of geopolitics in the Caucasus, for, as Alec 
Murphy argues, "We cannot hope to grasp the complexities underlying the pursuit of geopolitical 
objectives unless we bring squarely into the picture the circumstances that shape the territorial 
imagination" (2015: 9–10). Implementing a “thick,” localized perspective toward geopolitical 
discourses (Ó Tuathail 2010; Toal 2017) experienced in everyday life near the Madneuli mining 
complex reveals shifting relationships of sovereignty among the Georgian state, society, and 
international capital through extractive practices. Such findings bear important implications in 
Georgia, and the post-Soviet world more broadly, as rival governments increasingly turn to 
politically contentious practices of environmental governance and economic development. 
I begin the chapter by outlining a framework for analyzing those popular geopolitical 
scripts of Georgian nationhood and homeland within localized, every day, ecological practices. I 
follow this discussion with a brief review of key themes and tensions in Georgian national 
identity, both historically and today. The rest of the chapter then includes empirical analyses of 
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these scripts as they emerged during interviews with citizens living near the mines. In this 
chapter I therefore move toward an alternative consideration of resource nationalisms by 
focusing a popular, “lived” geopolitics perspective on a limited sample of Georgian citizens, 
specifically as they narrate “the homeland” and navigate political identification within Georgia’s 
shifting geopolitical landscape. In doing so I connect the geographies of extractive industries, 
nationalism, and political identification in relation to an imagined community and homeland 
(Benedict Anderson 2006; Koch and Perreault 2018). In the process I provide a more variegated 
vision of geopolitics and territorial dispute in a region most often granted scholarly attention for 
its ongoing military conflicts yet which is experiencing nascent and competing stages of 
democratic development, either of which require broader discursive regime of legitimation.  
Eventually, after hours spent discussing Kati’s role in these political conflicts, I tell her 
that I must leave for my next appointment. She and her husband Vano escort me back to the hot 
summer street below. Walking down the hill toward the metro station, I realize I have only just 
begun to scratch the surface of the diverse ways that members of Georgian society might 
imagine this resource extraction project fitting into the ongoing renegotiation of Georgian 
national identity. Kati has suggested I speak with some people who live near the mine site to see 
what they think, and this is precisely what I do. 
 
2.  National Imaginations 
As discussed in earlier chapters, the politics surrounding the simultaneous destruction of 
the Sakdrisi heritage site and initiation of a new gold mine present a complex event for 
explanatory analysis, one with significant economic facets and legislative regimes. This ongoing 
reorganization of relationships among state, society, and corporations in line with a neoliberal 
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economic vision of the country has created new social relationships and political arrangements, 
shaping new transformations in the political imaginations of local citizens – visions of a nation 
and homeland in transition. 
Classical scholars of nationalism typically consider the phenomenon more generally as 
“the modern social and political formations that draw together feelings of belonging, solidarity 
and identification between national citizens and the territory imagined as their collective national 
homeland” (G. Smith 2009: 488). From within this large body of work, however, a diversity of 
analytical positions emerges, ranging from primordial, naturalized views – often adopted by 
political firebrands and reporters alike – to socially constructed and affectual considerations of 
nationalism. These theoretical perspectives exist alongside many forms and manifestations of 
national sentiments, from “blood and soil” political movements to the formation of juridical, 
civic communities that vary both geographically and historically.  
Primordial views are historically employed by conservative nationalistic movements and 
have typically fallen from use in much scholarship, due to the often-problematic naturalizing 
assumptions about biology, genetics, race, and historically deterministic ideas of political 
community formation this perspective tends to bear (Megoran 2017; G. Smith 2009). Suny 
characterizes this view of nationality, often focused on framings of ethnicity or race, as 
“eruptions of long-repressed primordial national consciousnesses, as expressions of denied 
desires liberated by the kiss of freedom (what might be called the “Sleeping Beauty” view)” 
(1993: 3). Driven by essentialist understandings of human nature, this Sleeping Beauty notion of 
nationalism provides a powerful, and often dangerous, political narrative but little analytical 
purchase for contemporary social scientists. 
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I agree with Suny’s critique of primordialism, which also provides a foil for several other 
schools of thought. For example, from a modernist viewpoint, nations emerged in the modern era 
in spite of primordial histories, stemming from other forms of pre-existing social divisions and 
produced variously by forces such as industrialization, capitalism, or democratization (Gellner 
2009; Hobsbawm 2012; Mann 1996). While rejecting both primordial and purely modernist 
views, ethno-symbolic nationalism scholars adopt a deeply historical and contingent perspective. 
Scholars of this tradition typically analyze cultural symbols, myths, and traditions for their 
collective meanings, espousing the importance of cultural contingency against inevitability for 
the emergence of these collective identities (Smith 2005). Suny is a prominent figure of the 
ethno-symbolic school of nationalism, applying this approach to nations across Eurasia (Suny 
1993, 1994, 1996, 2000; Suny and Martin 2001). 
Scholars of post-Soviet politics therefore have historically looked to the legacies of 
Soviet ethnicity policies and the latent ethno-national axes of identification they left behind as 
key drivers of political conflict (Hirsch 2005; Slezkine 1994; Smith et al. 1998; Suny 1993; 
Tishkov 1997). These bonds often enroll religious or territorial elements in defining the 
homeland, the space of the nation (Yiftachel 2002). However, Suny’s theorization also tends 
toward essentialism of a different ethno-centric sort and in many ways holds on to many of the 
static, primordial perspectives of a “civilizational” approach to culture and identity (Agnew 
2003; Huntington 1993). In the decades since the early 1990s, critical social scientists have 
demonstrated this perspective as flawed for its over-simplicity and blindness toward a variety of 
intersectional forces and practices that also work to form and shape national identities and 
movements (Bassin 2007; Said 2001). The weaknesses of this ethno-symbolist perspective 
demonstrate the need for flexibility in analyses of nationalism, especially when trying to 
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investigate more complex cases with less clear-cut forms of ethno-nationalism and outside the 
restrictive analytical boundaries of isomorphic nation-state-territory ideals. 
However, scholars from across the social sciences have demonstrated that ethnic tensions 
represent only one constituent dimension of broader political identification, including within a 
national homeland, but also within the broader complexity of political life and subjectivity within 
the “post-Soviet social” (Brubaker 1996; Collier 2011b; Painter and Jeffrey 2009). Perhaps most 
significant among these shifts is a turn toward investigating practices of nationalism and political 
identification, offering more complex, grounded, and “thick” perspectives on the lived 
experiences of contingent political geographies (Benedict Anderson 2006; Billig 1995; Brubaker 
2011; Dodds 2016; Toal 2017). Within this broader, practice-oriented approach, nationalism is 
just one type among a broader set of social and political identifications and strategies (Painter 
and Jeffrey 2009), studied by asking questions such as “how do individuals become national in 
everyday contexts?” (Megoran 2017: 16).  
Megoran’s question follows a broad heuristic put forth by Brubaker in his influential text 
Ethnicity Without Groups, in which he argues for studying practices of identification rather than 
simply identity as a pre-formed object in the world. Instead of seeking to understand an 
individual’s identity claims that “I am…,” Brubaker contends that scholars should investigate 
how individuals practice identification, claiming that “I am… and this is HOW I am.” (see also 
Foucault 2011b). In this seemingly simplistic move, Brubaker argues for a study of 
categorization and identification rather than categories or identities such as ethnicity, in an 
attempt to avoid the problem of reifying the “groupism” which post-structural scholarship has 
sought to dismantle (Csergo 2008; Ozkirimli 2017). For Brubaker, groupism is “the tendency to 
take discrete, bounded groups as basic constituents of social life, chief protagonists of social 
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conflicts, and fundamental units of social analysis” (2004: 8). Brubaker’s broader analytical 
project views narrative claims of belonging as “eminently flexible and adaptable” (Brubaker 
2017: 9), instrumental for a number of legitimizing or challenging political practices. These 
forms of political belonging include nationhood, peoplehood, and citizenship that may all 
intertwine and constitute one another in social life (Brubaker 2017; Tilly 2002). As such, this 
group of scholars illustrates the importance of assessing modern forms of political belonging 
along more expansive lines of analysis to generate more complete explanations for contemporary 
social formations. 
Billig demonstrates how national identity is produced at the level of the individual, in 
banal, everyday practices such as hoisting a flag that produces a collective, mental “jingling in 
the ears of citizens” (1995: 93). Anderson (2006) explains how such national communities form 
through equally banal practices and in the geopolitical imaginations of people. Anderson’s 
“imagined communities” are not just ephemeral inventions but rather the mechanisms of socially 
and politically constructed communities that themselves produce an idea of nationhood 
(Benedict Anderson 2006; G. Smith 2009). Nationalism from this perspective exists as neither 
simply theoretical nor the “assertion of an inner psychological identity,” but rather as 
imaginations are "enhabited in common sense... embedded in habits of thought and life" (Billig 
1995: 63). Such practices work in part to legitimate state formations as national imaginations 
overlap with state territories and suppress other conflicting geographic imaginations, often 
driving political conflict or contestation as a result (Dijkink 1997; Gregory 1995, 2010; 
Guibernau 2008). 
Yet successful national scripts tend to obscure the diversity of multiple, simultaneously 
existing national visions. As Delanty and O’Mahony contend, “Much can be lost by always 
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speaking of nationalism as a single phenomenon, for in fact it has many different forms” (2002: 
120). Among these forms of identification are even more general qualities emerging from how 
these nationalisms are imagined, including nationalism as affirmative of an identity (“state 
patriotism,” “integral nationalism,” “ethnic nationalism,” or “civic nationalism”) or in opposition 
to and destabilizing of a pre-existing order (historic “liberal nationalism,” “secessionist 
nationalism,” or “reconstructive nationalism”) (Delanty and O’Mahony 2002). While such a 
typology of nationalist forms may limit efforts to identify other forms not included in the ten 
these scholars explicate, such an analysis demonstrates the possibility of a plurality of 
nationalisms, allowing analysts to show cases where these may overlap and change over time. 
Relevant examples are surprisingly common throughout the contemporary global geopolitical 
landscape, including the overlapping histories of reconstructive and secessionist nationalisms 
manifest in separatist movements from Catalonia to Tibet. The primary political drivers of such 
conflicts include a diversity of identifications with groups, and the resulting expectations of 
rights/obligations (effects) of those group memberships  (Brubaker 2004, 2017; Delanty and 
O’Mahony 2002; Guibernau 2008). 
Recent interventions within nationalism scholarship support this understanding of 
multiple, simultaneous, and overlapping national imaginations and illustrate its significance in 
shaping contemporary political contests. For example, in an interview on the twentieth 
anniversary of his text Banal Nationalism, Billig admits that his analysis of nationalism was 
perhaps too simplistic and that accounts of nationalism may need to take better account of both 
complicated, overlapping national narratives and the diverse political agents, such as 
corporations, that partake in their circulation (Dodds 2016). While expansive, Billig’s sentiment 
is in line with the original text, stating that 
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Nations often do not typically have a single history, but there are competing tales 
to be told... Different factions, whether classes, religions, regions, genders or 
ethnicities, always struggle for the power to speak for the nation, and to present 
their particular voice as the voice of the national whole, defining the history of 
other sub-sections accordingly. ‘The voice of the nation’ is a fiction; it tends to 
overlook the factional struggles and the deaths of unsuccessful nations, which 
make such a fiction possible. Thus, national histories are continually being re-
written, and the re-writing reflects current balances of hegemony. (1995: 71) 
As with all nationalisms, contests over various visions of a nation depend upon competing 
definitions of the polity or “the people,” as well as demarcating who is not included in these 
identifications, and where (Billig 1995; Koch 2016b; Megoran 2017). 
If scholars embrace a post-structural and historicized view of politics, we might then 
study nationalism by “treating nationhood as a political claim rather than a cultural or 
demographic fact, by emphasizing the performative enactment of claims to nationhood, and by 
highlighting the importance of recognition by powerful external audiences” (Brubaker 2010: 
376–7; Passy 2009; Tarrow 2008; Tilly 2002, 2008). These geopolitical stories also enable 
political identification through everyday political practices, allowing for a localized, 
disaggregated, “lived” geopolitics of national identification and belonging: potentially banal and 
comprising a diversity of actors and spaces (Billig 1995; Koch 2013c; Megoran 2017; Ó Tuathail 
2010). As Toal argues, “nationalism works itself out in everyday life in local places” (2010: 
257), suggesting we consider the ways actors on the ground imagine and narrate political 
communities in “everyday” discourse.  
Scholars demonstrate how this perspective manifests empirically in the post-Soviet world 
by studying how nationalism unfolds through such diverse everyday practices as sport, food, 
photography, and education (Akiner 1997; Foxall 2013; Goode 2016; Koch 2015a; Megoran 
2017). These national imaginations work in part to legitimate state institutions as they overlap 
with state territories and homelands, suppressing other conflicting geographic imaginations and 
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at times driving political contestation. Investigating geopolitical scripts of nations and homelands 
as people circulate and contest them in everyday life therefore requires considering kitchen-table 
conversations as seriously as narratives from media outlets and official state documents. The 
case of competing popular nationalisms in Georgia following the Soviet Union’s collapse 
demonstrates how these multiple scripts of national identification exist in tension with one 
another, producing dominant but contested understandings of particular nationalisms and their 
related homelands. 
In short, nationalism is not just about states and state projects or static categories and 
essential identities, but rather about how people see themselves belonging to broader 
communities, connecting to particular geographies, and emerging from historically embedded 
social practices and relations. I next consider how these national imaginations may enroll visions 
of a national homeland, territory, and the resources they hold. 
                                                                                                                                                    
3.  Resource Nationalisms and Lived Homelands 
Political geographers demonstrate how geopolitical cultures and opinions within the 
former Soviet Union’s conflict zones are shaped not just by militaristic intervention but also by a 
range of political economic factors: the provision or lack of localized governmental subsidies 
(Holland et al. 2018), broader economic disappointment or fear (Bakke et al. 2018; Kolossov and 
O’Loughlin 2011; O’Loughlin et al. 2007), and identification with more generalized geopolitical 
storylines (Ó Tuathail and O’Loughlin 2013; O’Loughlin et al. 2016). In less violent yet equally 
relevant post-Soviet contexts, Collier (2011) shows how the organization and provision of 
mundane necessities like heat, delivered by the government to citizens’ homes via pipes and 
wires, work to produce and maintain socio-political order in Russian cities.  
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This ever-expanding literature highlights the importance of everyday political 
identifications, opinions, and discursive practices for legitimating territorial arrangements and 
geopolitical constructs (Flint 2016; Toal 2017). Related work addresses a variety of Georgian 
cases from oil pipelines (Barry 2013) to transnational logistical networks (Gambino 2018) to 
suggest the importance of technological, infrastructural, and material relations to political 
formations, specifically in the South Caucasus. Such moves reveal the significance of looking 
beyond distinctly state-oriented actors and practices for understanding cases of political 
identification and resource governance. This is especially so in post-Soviet contexts like Georgia, 
where territory-transforming resource extraction continues intensifying (Josephson 2013) while 
Georgians widely hold territorial integrity and economic development as the most important 
issues facing the country (CRRC 2016a), with environmental issues also bearing increased 
significance (CRRC 2016b). 
Georgia’s Mashavera case, as I argue here, reveals the significance of resource extraction 
projects to political identifications (Koch and Perreault 2018; Perreault 2018; Perreault and 
Valdivia 2010), including shifting views of the Georgian nation and homeland in localized 
contexts. Such relations between nation and homeland provide crucial links in forming modern 
political geographies. For example, Jewish nationals returning to Germany in the decades after 
WWII identified less with any religious or ethnic notion of identity and more with the political 
sense of attachment and belonging to the homeland of the German landscape, or Heimat. These 
identifications emerge from individual investment of political sensibility within memories of 
“ploughed furrows and blossoming orchards,” “pine forests,” and “learning to swim in the local 
river” in the German homeland (Einhorn 2000: 110). More broadly, political identifications are 
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empirically linked to territorial imaginations and national myths, including in the formerly Soviet 
region (Diener 2006; Kaiser 2002; Tolz 1998).  
While images and imaginations of places and spaces are always political and contested 
over time, recent scholarship on open pit mining reveals the manifold ways these developments 
specifically and profoundly alter landscapes, ecosystems, and the socio-political fabric of nearby 
communities (Bridge 2004; Hecht 2018; Peluso 2018; Perreault 2013a, 2018; Vela-Almeida 
2018). Such documentations of environmental politics’ multi-scalar nature align with arguments 
by political ecologists who emphasize the importance of everyday acts and subjectivities to the 
political economy of the environment (Huber 2013; Loftus 2012; Robbins 2007; Rocheleau et al. 
2013). These works illustrate that banal practices often lie at the heart of environmental politics – 
revelations congruent with cognate bodies of political research, such as popular and feminist 
geopolitics, that consider the complexity of multi- and cross-scalar power relations (Dittmer 
2005; Dowler and Sharp 2001; Hyndman 2004).  
What specifically interests me in this chapter is the possibility that seemingly banal 
practices and imaginations of everyday resource governance may contribute to broader 
geopolitical and territorial arrangements. From this vantage, Georgian citizens in the Mashavera 
region carry contested imaginations of the Georgian homeland as this mining complex rapidly 
introduces new political tensions, opportunities, and material conditions. 
Material, territorial, and environmental elements of a national homeland often prove 
central to these various national imaginations relating state, society, and territory, as is the case 
in Georgia along with many other national identifications globally. Despite the rich literature on 
nationalism and national identification, existing scholarship of resource nationalism often 
considers these links between resources and nations as much flatter and more static than 
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suggested by broader scholarship. While moves within political ecology to “bring the state back 
in” to analytical focus provide crucial framings for contemporary resource extraction policies in 
a globalized world (Harris 2017; Robbins 2008; Robertson 2015; Robertson and Wainwright 
2013), this state focus must always be contextualized within broader social experiences and 
multi-scalar political relationships. As the Georgian case demonstrates, new arrangements of 
resource governance may (and, as I show here, sometimes do) generate new or different forms of 
territorial relations and practices, in turn producing new identifications of a national homeland as 
a result. Adopting a constructivist approach allows us to see these alternative forms of 
nationhood and homeland and how resource governance practices may affect the localized 
contours of national identification. 
 Scholars often identify resource nationalism as a move by rent-seeking states – typically 
conflated with “the nation” – to control the natural resources within their national territories, 
regulating their flow into global markets as a means to capitalize on resource extraction and 
ostensibly for the good of citizens (Bebbington 2012; Bremmer and Johnston 2009; Myadar and 
Jackson 2018; Perreault 2013b; Schurman 1998; Vivoda 2009). Scholars have considered a 
range of resources in relation to various nationalisms: hydrocarbons, valuable metals, land, and 
biotic resources such as fish stocks (Andreasson 2015; Doolot and Heathershaw 2015; Ganbold 
and Ali 2017; Kohl and Farthing 2012; Schurman 1998; Stead 2015). Childs places the work of 
political ecologists further in conversation with state practices, observing that extraction is “at 
the core of modern economic and social development” (2016: 539) and justifying scholarly focus 
on the state as a key unit of analysis. Yet this state-centric perspective ignores the influence that 
popular geopolitical scripts about such resources and extractive industries have on shaping 
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national identifications, the evolution of political/environmental imaginaries, and the force that 
these imaginations carry for legitimating geopolitical arrangements such as in Georgia.  
The state-centric narrative of resource nationalism is continually thrown into question by 
the empirics emerging from this scholarship, showing the importance of everyday landscapes 
and imaginations to connecting resources and national homelands. More productive frameworks 
for understanding resource nationalisms point to studying these claims as diverse sets of 
practices and imaginations, used to draw together and legitimate arrangements of state, territory, 
and society (Perreault 2013b; Perreault and Green 2013). Examples of diverse national 
identifications as they relate to resources and visions of the national homeland abound, including 
from across post-communist Eurasia, and demonstrate that banal practices often lie at the heart 
of environmental politics (Cheterian 2009; Davidov 2015; Doolot and Heathershaw 2015; 
Graybill 2013, 2017; Jackson 2015a).  
In this chapter I therefore compare everyday environmental discourses of the Georgian 
national homeland against the typically statist frameworks and heuristics of much (though not 
all) of the resource nationalism literature. In doing so I move not just toward a more embodied 
understanding of resource nationalism than scholars often adopt, but also a more tangible, 
“thick” way of understanding the lived experiences of extraction as they shape political 
environmental imaginations. Putting a human face on the environmental geopolitics of new 
extractive practices in the post-Soviet world, I analyze scripts of Georgia’s homeland – and the 
imaginations of state, society, and territory they bear – as expressed to me by the Georgian 
citizens and communities most directly affected by the Sakdrisi-Madneuli mining complex. In 
doing so I elaborate how these extractive practices contribute to shaping the geopolitical field 
surrounding the mine, located within the broader geopolitical culture of the South Caucasus, and 
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offer an economic and environmental complement to the military and international affairs interest 
of much mainstream Anglophone geopolitics scholarship of the Caucasus. 
To analyze nationalistic imaginations appearing in geopolitical scripts of mining 
governance in Georgia, the most fruitful research trajectories of the resource nationalism 
literature supply models for conceptualizing how such resource governance projects may 
produce new political identifications in relation to the environment. Additionally, examples from 
throughout the Caucasus suggest that environmental movements in the region since the Soviet 
Union’s collapse have contributed to national projects (Cheterian 2009) and, as with all national 
projects, conflicting discourses of national identity have long competed for dominance in 
shaping Georgia’s future geopolitical course (Jones 2013; Toal 2017). 
In the following sections I move toward a more tangible, “thick” way of understanding 
the lived experiences of extraction and the politics of environmental imaginations. I do so by first 
briefly outlining some of the primary tensions in Georgian national identification. Putting a 
human face on the environmental geopolitics of new extractive practices in the post-Soviet 
world, I then analyze relevant resource imaginaries – and the narratives of state, society, and 
territory that they bear – as expressed to me during field research. Individual experiences of 
Georgian citizens drive these imaginaries, imbricated with geopolitical “scripts” of the always-
emerging Georgian nation.  
 
4.  Blood and Soil, Modern and Civic: Standard Scripts of Homeland and Nation in 
Georgia 
 
The Mashavera Valley presents a rich landscape for such an investigation. The 
surrounding hills’ soil is especially rich and fertile, and the recent expansion of geological 
surveys and development of metal mining sites in the region further illustrate the wealth of this 
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land. At the same time, the landscape is culturally diverse, with a Georgian majority and 
significant ethnic minority communities – primarily Armenian and Azeri, with all three 
languages spoken in different contexts. Ethnic conflicts have not significantly shaped the area as 
in other regions of the South Caucasus, yet political identification remains complex, as in 
communities across Georgia. 
Contemporary scholars identify Georgian nationalism as a hybrid of primordial ethnic 
impulses and civic identification (Cheterian 2011; Chkhartishvili 2013; Metreveli 2016; Nodia 
2009). This impulse emerged in part due to Soviet ethnicity policies (Hirsch 2005; Suny 1994) 
but also from a strong tradition of national identification that emerged among Tbilisi’s 
intelligentsia of the mid-1800s, many of whom were educated in Russian universities and 
influenced by European ideals of modern nationalism (Cheterian 2011; Jones 2005; Nodia 2009). 
This intellectual elite was multiethnic and multidenominational prior to the nineteenth century, 
creating autonomous societies and charities focused on cultural, explicitly nationalist, 
engagements (Jones 2005).  
The most prominent among these early Georgian nationalists was Ilia Chavchavadze, 
often known today as the “father of the Georgian nation” (Chkhartishvili 2013; Jones 2005). 
Chavchavadze’s writings have become highly influential in Georgian national thought, and 
scholars typically characterize the author’s notion of Georgian identity as comprising “(1) 
territory, which Chavchavadze conceptualized as mamuli (i.e. legacy left from fathers), (2) 
language, which, according to him, was the expression of the national spirit, and (3) Christian 
faith to which, he believed, Georgians’ devotion was unprecedented” (Chkhartishvili 2013: 198). 
However, among these three primary components, scholars decipher complexity, especially 
considering the territorial and political dimensions of Chavchavadze’s national imagination. For 
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example, mamuli [მამული], alternatively translated to English as “territory” or “fatherland” and 
widely held as the most vital component of Chavchavadze’s national triad, is not simply empty 
space for the Georgian people to occupy. Instead, mamuli carries a vision of the nation’s location 
in history, encapsulating “the idea of nation as territorial but also active. It is about doing, 
pursuing some project, rather than just being there” (Nodia 2009: 89). Such territoriality of a 
cultural landscape requires active production (Agnew 2015c; Paasi 1998a; Raffestin 2012; Sack 
1986; Sassen 2013b), including identification practices, and emerges alongside more complex 
visions of a national homeland beyond primordial ethnic blood ties (Chkhartishvili 2013). As 
Chkhartishvili argues,  
Eri [ერი, nation] in Chavchavadze’s perceptions was a large-scale fraternity 
exercising ethnic majority rules. The addressees of Chavchavadze’s nationalist 
appeals were exclusively ethnic Georgians. On the other hand, Chavchavadze 
viewed in-groups based on kin identity less powerful than the entities bound by 
political ties. He tried to cultivate the ideals of civic nationality. He also 
underlined that law, liberty, and individuality are organizing principles of the 
nationhood. He longed to make the Georgian identity inclusive and overcome the 
closeness of ethno-cultural conceptualization of Georgian community. Thus, the 
matrix chosen by Chavchavadze for conceptualization of the Georgian eri was not 
strictly ethnic; some principal features of it were indisputably civic. (2013: 202) 
This notion of national territories produced through active cultural identification, framed 
by a balance of both ethnic (blood and soil) and civic (modern and juridical) visions of the 
Georgian homeland, exist throughout broader scripts of Georgian nationalism from this period 
(Ozkirimli 2017). Examples abound, for instance, in the works of artist Niko Pirosmani, a 
national artist whose paintings of Georgian natural landscapes, animals, and rural life spanned 
the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. Pirosmani inscribed scenes of lived landscapes 
in his works, territories filled with traditional symbols of Georgian national identity: great 
collective supra feasts with a variety of foods served, traditional Georgian wines and flowers, 
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rugged wild land that inhabitants have partially tamed, animals both wild and domesticated, 
multiple ethnic dresses and dancers, and more (Figure 10). 
 
Figure 10: “Mule Bridge,” Niko Pirosmani, pre-1919  
(Source: Wikimedia Commons) 
 
Present in the works of these early Georgian nationalists were multiple components of 
national identification, used by various political actors to present an emerging Georgian national 
identity and geopolitical field, balanced between a powerful primordial narrative of ethnic 
identity and a modern understanding of civic openness (Billig 1995; Ozkirimli 2017). This 
balance was particularly important for maintaining national identities as the Soviet government 
implemented its unprecedented nationalities policies in the twentieth century. 
Among Soviet republics, Georgia was somewhat unique in that, unlike many, it had a 
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pre-existing national identity based on the long history of the Georgian kingdom developed by 
the pre-Soviet Georgian intelligentsia. Yet Georgia at that time was also a diverse, multi-ethnic 
society, containing divisions within the Georgian nation itself (Goble 2015). Through its vast 
nationalities policies, the Soviet state tried to create a “great break” with the past, simultaneously 
attempting to combat Nazi race theories through practice. Within this history, the Georgian 
political elite attempted resisting the Soviet system’s hierarchy, insisting on determination as an 
already-developed nation (natsional’nost’) rather than a people aspiring toward nationhood 
(narodnost’) during the early Soviet years (Hirsch 2005).  
Some scholars contend that nationalism was benign and latent during the Soviet period, 
as Georgian citizens lacked the ability or motivation for mass protests. Georgian nationalism at 
this time tended to center primarily around identification through language rather than territory 
or ethnicity (Jones 2013). Although ethno-nationalist tensions, violence, and territorial wars were 
hallmarks of the early years following the Soviet empire’s dissolution, the immediate narratives 
driving Georgian protest, demonstration, and resistance to the Soviet regime in the late 1980s 
centered not on ethnicity, but rather on Georgian independence from the Soviet system 
(Cheterian 2011; Goble 2015; Jones 2013). In a way, during the move for independence from the 
Soviet Union, “for Georgians, the ‘other’ was Moscow itself” (Waal 2010: 131). Indeed as Suny 
argues, in the late Soviet years, “it may be that nationalist expression was an outlet for a variety 
of discontents—political, economic, intellectual, and cultural—a kind of political sublimation for 
activity and expression that was otherwise too dangerous to articulate” (1994: 314). 
Among these tensions in-group ethnic divisions did exist, and ethnicity was a driving 
rhetoric of President Gamsakhurdia’s government that led to the South Ossetian War, as well as 
a significant factor, alongside economic motivating factors, in catalyzing the Abkhaz war (Jones 
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2013; Suny 1994; Waal 2010). Jones argues that resistance to Abkhaz separatism was nationally 
based at least in part but that these tensions were also “generated from above for reasons of 
strategy or gain rather than ‘ethnicity’” (2013: 219). In short, Georgia’s political elites used 
ethno-nationalism as a tool for pursuing broader political and economic goals in the post-Soviet 
period (Jones 2013; Suny 1994; Waal 2010). 
Today, ethno-national scripts remain powerful within the Caucasus, and serve as tools for 
legitimating political claims in a variety of geopolitical scenarios, including in Georgia, and 
especially by elites and powerful institutions (Areshidze 2007; Geukjian 2011; Goble 2015; 
Nodia 2009; see also: Koch 2015a). Georgian nationalism takes many forms today, commonly 
identified both in the resurgence of right-wing political groups (often drawing from the ethnic, 
blood and soil tradition of Georgian nationalism) and in response to foreign relations in political 
processes and dimensions of citizenship (following Georgian nationalism’s modern and civic 
dimensions) (Ó Beacháin and Coene 2014; Svanidze 2018). Yet these complex axes of 
identification allow for a diversity of imaginations concerning relationships among society, state, 
and mamuli – land, territory, and cultural landscape imbued with collective memory, individual 
experience, and historical claims – often given only minimal attention and taken for granted in 
most assessments of broader Georgian national identifications. Analysts often approach non-
militaristic considerations of Georgian territories within national identifications as static or 
trivial, either as part of aesthetic claims – that “Georgia is located in a compelling physical 
environment that features scenic mountains and beaches, temperate climate, hospitable people, 
and fine cuisine” (Toal 2017: 102–3) – or international “branding” projects “linked to hospitality, 
seaside resorts, delectable wines, healing mineral waters, and a genuinely unique cuisine” 
(Saunders 2017: 235).  
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Scholars have given surprisingly little attention to these wider political identifications in 
relation to the territorial dimensions of resources, resource governance, and broader national 
projects. As Dijkink notes, geopolitical imaginations or “visions of order are derived from a 
community and from experiencing an environment (be it city, country, wilderness or island)” 
(1997: 16). While some scholars have explored these imaginary political dimensions of resource 
extraction projects, especially from economic perspectives, environmental imaginaries remain 
relatively under-studied regarding political identification and the emergence of competing 
national identifications (yet see Graybill 2017, Koch and Perreault 2018). 
This relative lacuna in the literature is especially surprising considering the dramatic 
effects open-pit mining, such as that carried out at the Sakdrisi-Madneuli mining complex, has 
on surrounding landscapes – environmentally and socially. Widespread use of cyanide in 
leaching pits, dangerously constructed tailings dams, explosions that send toxic dust into the air, 
the release of heavy metals into surrounding environments, abusive labor conditions – all these 
and more are documented results of open-pit mining, especially in locations with weak 
regulatory systems (Bridge 2004; Peluso 2018; Perreault 2013a; Schoenberger 2016). RMG has 
adopted all these practices, with serious effects for local populations, as I illustrate below. While 
RMG employs approximately three thousand people, most of whom are local residents (Rich 
Metals Group 2014), the surrounding municipalities’ population totaled approximately 75,000 in 
2016 (55,000 in the Bolnisi municipality and 20,000 in the Dmanisi municipality) (GeoStat.Ge 
2018). These populations bear the effects of mining practices in the region, environmentally, 
economically, and in terms of their political imaginations. 
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5.   Imagining the Mine, Scripting the Homeland  
 
Mari is an artist, activist, and scholar. Like Kati, she lost her job due to involvement at 
Sakdrisi. She was trained in art history and museum studies and used to teach sketching and art 
history at an arts university in Tbilisi. Mari has devoted much of her life to supporting efforts 
toward preserving cultural heritage. She first became involved with the Sakdrisi movement as a 
political organizer, staying at the protest encampment for weeks on end and serving as a liaison 
of sorts with the local police. Because of this vocal involvement, Mari was unable to return to 
her job at the university, fired for fear of the institution becoming associated with opposition 
politics. Finding a natural ally in Kati, Mari joined forces with the ex-deputy minister in creating 
For A Better Environment and has worked with a variety of different local groups to help foster 
cultural and environmental awareness among communities found near the mine. 
One afternoon in July, Mari takes me to meet the staff of the local Bolnisi museum. A 
small nondescript building along the main street, the museum holds a collection of local artifacts, 
some dating back to the early Christian settlements in the area from 5th-6th century AD. Entering 
the dark museum, it takes our eyes a few seconds to adjust from the bright afternoon sun. Dusty 
glass cases filled with manuscripts, traditional attire, old farm implements and musical 
instruments, all labeled with yellowing signs, greet us alongside the museum curator’s smiling 
face. The woman appears professional and friendly, and clearly knows Mari from the several 
projects on which they have collaborated. I am excited to meet the curator and learn from her 
expansive local history knowledge. Mari begins explaining the focus of my project and what I 
am investigating. 
When Mari relays that my research is related to the region’s mining operations 
themselves, however, the smile suddenly vanishes from the curator’s face. As quickly as we are 
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welcomed in to the museum, we are shooed out, told that they did not want to speak with us and 
that I was not welcome. 
Tight-lipped and flushed, Mari is hurt, confused, and angry by what has just occurred. 
She explains that RMG had agreed to house the museum’s collection in the brand new Sakdrisi 
museum the company is constructing on the outskirts of town. These funds will provide the 
aging museum with funding, job security, and the promise of modern new facilities. Yet Mari 
feels cheated after spending considerable time cultivating working relationships with these 
individuals, supplying grant funding for projects, and forming personal connections. This 
background/context helps me understand the curator’s response, but I feel terrible for serving as 
an impetus for this degradation of relationships, even if it ends up as only temporary (as I 
wishfully continue to tell myself it will be). We both feel uncomfortable as we silently get in the 
car, realizing that a potentially fruitful alliance in our investigation and Mari’s broader political 
activism has evaporated. 
While uncomfortable, this was one of my first direct involvements with the potentially 
divisive political power the recent expansion of mining practices carries here – shifting political 
relations, dissolving old alliances, and forming new ones. By tracing the contours of these new 
political alliances and imaginations, we can discern how they in turn shape the geopolitical fields 
and possible futures for this place.  
Across the meetings and conversations I had in Georgia, the most common themes that 
emerge are scripts of political identification in relation to the resource extraction activities 
occurring in the region. These scripts revolve around labeling divisions among society along 
lines of us and them: Georgians vs. foreigners, locals vs. company, and so forth. They also 
involve identifying the meanings of places: churches, heritage sites, rutted roads, a polluted river. 
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Finally, they require defining which practices are acceptable to occur in these places and which 
are not. 
Territorial integrity is important to hegemonic understandings of Georgian nationalism, 
especially among scholars, yet they do not necessarily consider mamuli – Georgian territory 
viewed as a lived and inhabited homeland – in its active form, filled with practices and the lives 
of Georgians. If “belonging is defined in terms of territory, the homeland” in such a way that is 
“active… about doing, pursuing some project, rather than just being there” (Nodia 2009: 89), 
then the various ways that citizens experience and imagine mamuli bears important implications 
for the development of diverse Georgian nationalisms: not just who is included in this national 
grouping but where, how, and by whom. This differentiation proves important because different 
scripts of territorial practices and experiences are bound to produce alternative imaginations of 
the Georgian nation. Of these, I discerned three primary alternative narratives of Georgian 
nationalisms woven into the discursive and material practices of resource governance, 
specifically in relation to practices and events surrounding the Madneuli mining complex: (1) 
increasingly complicated understandings of ethnicity, kin, and proximity; (2) corporate 
governance of local populations and territory; and (3) degraded environmental and personal 
health. 
Primarily unfolding during Summers 2016 and 2017, the majority of the conversations I 
include in this analysis are drawn from more than 25 interviews and informal conversations 
initiated via classic “snowball sampling” (Biernacki and Waldorf 1981) and conducted in the 
communities surrounding the mining complex (Bolnisi, Kazreti, and Balichebi). Interviews were 
sporadic and often secretive, which I expected in part, as members of these mining communities 
regularly feared prolonged interactions with outsiders. People in the region have lost jobs for 
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speaking to reporters, and securing a steady livelihood is often challenging. For many this fear 
manifests toward journalists and NGO representatives as much as scholars. In short, these 
conversations were often fraught and only existed through informants’ generosity . Respondents 
were both male and female, ranged in age from early twenties to late seventies, and held a 
variety of occupations (miner, fruit vendor, lab technician, taxi driver, nurse, etc.). At times our 
discussions took place in the presence of other community members, occasionally becoming 
group conversations or informal focus groups. I further contextualized this interview analysis 
with my own ongoing experiences undertaking research in Georgia, including more than 50 other 
related interviews, participant observation with political activists, and a database of over one 
thousand associated documents I collected in an Evernote library (news reports, legislation, 
social media posts, photographs, etc.). 
Analysis included transcribing interviews and qualitative coding (codes applied to 
transcripts, then organized into themes and overarching scripts), using the NVIVO software 
package. These steps helped me identify the development and complication of standard stories of 
Georgian national identification as I saw them unfold in the communities surrounding the 
Madneuli mining complex. Here my focus was not on distinct, constructed, and inherited 
heuristics of ethnic/civic divides but on the “shared social metaphors” (Allina-Pisano 2009: 69) 
circulating through informal political life in this region. My purpose was to categorize discursive 
practices along various axes of political identification. I isolate the most prevalent categories of 
political identification that emerged from these interviews – all in some way revolving around 
imaginations of the Georgian homeland – and represent them here. 
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5.1.  Complicating Standard Stories 
 
And it’s like a name that is tied with Balichebi. Since 1821, so we are first to cut 
forest and to make settlement there. I am very proud of this because there is a 
church that was built by my ancestors, and it is also a cultural heritage monument 
now and I have this feeling… I wish with my hands to protect my land and to 
survive the environment of my village, and so I am fighting for it. (Interview 34, 
Labor organizer, Woman, in Georgian) 
In opposition to our museum hosts, Dali’s initial warmth only grows when she finds out 
that we wish to discuss mining operations in the region. Dali has been a vocal organizer against 
the mining company’s activities, helping lead a large strike of mine employees around the same 
time as the protests against the destruction of the Sakdrisi archaeological site. These protests 
achieved only moderate success in pursuit of their demands for better working conditions and 
pay, and RMG disbanded the local union as a result. 
We meet Dali this afternoon in the one open restaurant in downtown Kazreti. She offers 
to order khinkali for us, and we say no thank you, just coffee… but in line with Georgian 
hospitality norms she goes ahead and orders mountains of food for us anyway: salad, bread, 
cheese, pickles, fried potatoes, khachapuri, khinkali… She is making a statement of generosity, 
welcoming us to her community as guests. Dali continued: 
I love everything here, each stone, because it is connected to my history, to my 
family. My great grandmothers lived here and established the settlement, and I 
know there’s a terrible ecological situation here but I do not want to relocate 
anywhere. (Interview 34) 
Dali expresses her attachment to this place as emerging from her familial history and 
community heritage. She is also a member of the Patriotic Alliance party, the recently ascendant 
nationalistic right-wing party in the Georgian political landscape, and others I have spoken with 
who know her suspect she is preparing to run for local office. This feels right to us as she speaks 
and gestures like a politician – looking everyone directly in the eye, stressing her points with 
emphatic and deliberate hand motions. Running alongside Dali’s narrative of local heritage and 
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personal emotions driving her history of resistance to the mining company are brief references to 
her nationalistic party affiliations and how the party has helped support the local people in their 
efforts to understand the impacts of mining practices on the lives of Georgian populations. 
Drawing from the stories of Dali and others, the first localized and contested imagination 
of the Georgian homeland I identify circulating throughout the Mashavera is that of complicated 
standard stories of Georgian nationalism. These connect kin-like relations of community to 
more complicated, abstract forms of ethnic identification and with the physical territory itself. 
For example, Dali expresses her attachment to this place as emerging from her familial history 
and community heritage. She is also a locally prominent member of the Patriotic Alliance party, 
which to an extent has helped support local efforts to deal with the impacts of mining. Dali’s 
political positioning, which draws together personal and local narratives of familial, 
environmental, and “patriotic” connectivity, are indicative of the ways scripts of Georgian 
nationalism are complicated here by local experience. These interlaced scripts do not exist 
outside or separate from ethnic versus civic distinctions but reveal the complexity of the political 
identifications that connect belonging and place. These imaginations emerge not only from 
vague ideas of ancient blood ties but also from personal experiences of kin and kin-like 
connectivity among individuals and with the land and territory itself. 
Connections of cultural heritage are felt along different lines with different places, 
although narratives of cultural heritage tend to be much more personally oriented in the 
communities surrounding these sites (Herb 1999). In line with standard stories of primordial, 
ethnically-tinged national identity, one informant stated that “Bolnisi is very rich with cultural 
heritage. We have a church from the fifth century called Sioni, and at Dmanisi there is this 
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finding of the ancient people. And we take care of the people there” (Interview 30, Retired 
hydroelectric engineer, Man, in Georgian). 
Yet more often, the narratives of cultural heritage invoked run along lines of personal 
connection. Another informant found connection to this collective history through his sons’ 
experiences: “Sakdrisi was a monument for future generations. My sons were working on an 
archaeological project there… for mining it did not need to be blown up, and I was very fond of 
this place” (Interview 38, Former mine employee and natural gas specialist, Man, in Georgian). 
As seen here, vague primordial or prehistoric imaginations are at times personalized through 
more specific, tangible connections of burial and ancient ceremony, present in residents’ lives in 
ways that are still vague, but more personal. Another informant shared his personal imagination 
of what had occurred at the destruction of Sakdrisi, saying “Who are gone by this huge 
machinery and the bones of my ancestors, and I feel saddened that I’m separated… we cannot 
forget these people who made this act against culture” (Interview 37, Taxi driver, Man, in 
Georgian). These scripts connecting individuals with wrongs committed against ancient 
ancestors suggest that some local residents view both the state and mining company alike as 
producing cultural violence against the Georgian nation, turning such personal connections as 
Dali’s attachment to “each stone” into more collective and general forms of belonging to 
Georgian national identity.  
This tension between individual and collective also emerges in the imaginations of 
activist leaders of the Davatiani youth group of the Georgian Orthodox church, who also helped 
spearhead much of the civic protest against RMG Gold’s destructive actions of at the Sakdrisi 
site. For example, the group’s leader contended in an interview that “Sakdrisi was like already a 
cultural heritage not only in Georgia, but a world cultural heritage” (Interview 57). The 
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imagination expressed here is that Sakdrisi’s cultural heritage belongs to the entire world, but 
specifically to members of the Christian faith and especially to Georgians as the keepers of this 
heritage 
it had a really huge and really deep history, it’s a big working culture that you 
have in Georgia and the big tradition. It was kind of a civilization you know, the 
beginning of. It’s a big plus for a country if you have such big, deep roots in 
history and cultural history… the issue is like a message to the entire world, that 
Georgia had a really deep roots in the culture, and civilization.  
In this expression, the youth organization of the most influential institution in Georgia 
implements this positioning of Georgia as an ancient Christian nation as an instrument for 
legitimating an ethno-religious primordial nationalism and, as a result, supporting an ethno-
national view of Georgian territory while performing a contemporary Georgian “branding 
imagination” (see [Saunders 2017] for expansion of this concept in other political contexts). As 
the leader stated, “you have to prove your history. And the history of the country helps. To make 
strong kind of promotion for your country” such that “you became proud and you would like to 
keep that story and to tell it for generations in the future, ancestors” (Interview 57).  
Such sentiments of ancient ancestral and ethnic connections to the Georgian homeland 
prove common in the Mashavera Valley but become even more personalized, experienced as 
connections with specific family members and locations via more complex, kin-like relations. 
Individual respondents disclosed feeling “quite attached to this land” (Interview 34), or that this 
area “is my blood and my body, and I love it very much. It’s everything here for me, it’s my life” 
(Interview 37). As another informant said, “I love Bolnisi because I was born here; it’s my land. 
I never want to live someplace [else]” (Interview 32, Local resident, Woman, in Georgian). This 
connection to the land and territory emerges from broader Georgian national narratives, 
simultaneously joining ideas of belonging and territory across scales throughout these mining 
communities: from the Georgian national body to the bodies of individuals, their families, and 
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the land itself. Residents feel these national connections personally such that locals express that 
“I love my homeland, it’s like a Georgian tradition to be attached to your land… My ancestors 
are here” (Interview 42, RMG Machinist, Man, in Georgian) and that “It is painful for me what is 
painful for my country. And I am glad for what is good for my country” (Interview 31, Engineer, 
Man, in Georgian). This embodied scaling of identity works in other directions as well, at times 
expanding out to global humanity as “Sakdrisi was already a cultural heritage not only in 
Georgia, but a world cultural heritage” (Interview 57, Youth Patriarchate leader, Man, in 
English).  
Such ethno-cultural and nationalist political identifications, implementing ambiguities 
among local, personal and vague, collective imaginations, emerge as divisions and complications 
of the standard ethno-national and civic scripts of Georgian national identity. Respondents also 
identified the importance of “foreigners” in the mining company’s structure and profits. Local 
respondents commonly express uncertainty about the mining company’s ownership, cycling 
among claims that Russian, Georgian, and European interests control the operations. They claim 
that there are some secret connections between the ruling Georgian Dream party and see other 
countries as profiting from the destruction of Georgian territory. These narratives of foreign 
connection often stand in for other geopolitical scripts as these nationalistic, oppositional 
identifications are deployed to criticize the mine. As one local informant expressed: 
Yeah a lot of people outside of Georgia benefited, mainly Russia benefited from it, and 
everything that is mined here goes outside, but [there is] no benefit for us, just the name. 
We live in this rich area but [there is] no benefit for people. (Interview 17/18, RMG miner 
and retired miner, Men, in Georgian) 
In line with such sentiments, a scholar in Tbilisi said that “Yes, I know, the Russians blew it up. 
Along with many other things” (Interview 7, Independent scholar, Man, in English), while a 
political activist claimed, “The Russians blew it up!... I am for nationalization of mines, and all 
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of these factories and companies who are working on mines and resources, I think so, but only 
democratic nationalization, not governmental” (Interview 9, Environmental activist, Man, in 
English). Such imaginations of the mining activities as attributable to Russians enroll claims 
about Georgia as the victim of contemporary Russian imperialism (Jones 2013; Toal 2017), 
extracting value from the Georgian people not just through territorial occupation but also through 
environmental degradation and the destruction of cultural heritage.  
Some residents support mining activities, thanks to the jobs provided, as evidenced in 
some interviews and through the existence of counter-protests when supporters of cultural 
heritage tried to block the expansion of mining operations at Sakdrisi. One respondent shared 
that he supported the mining because it supplied jobs and that environmental activists “like to 
exaggerate the situation” (Interview 31). Another respondent agreed, at least to an extent:  
that what should we do if there is no mining, working? What [should] each family [do] if 
there is no mining, there is no income at all? They should not stop but they somehow 
should think about improving ecological conditions. If there is any other possibility to 
work, yes, of course, we should stop working here, the mining. But there is nothing in 
Georgia, only production. (Interview 37) 
 
These various identifications are not necessarily running against other ethnic and civic 
definitions of national identity but are productive of new iterations of them. This occurs through 
an injection of new tensions intersecting with previously existing ethnic tensions and definitions 
of who “we Georgians” are. These relations are not always antagonistic: many actually envision 
ethnic groups as living peacefully side by side, presenting diversity and close community in a 
multicultural society as a positive, civic national value (Interview 13, Engineer/construction 
worker, Man, in Georgian; Interview 30). Political imaginations of the Georgian homeland as 
related to resource extraction produce a diversity of new tensions connected to national 
identification as an axis of belonging and difference alongside economic development. As Nino 
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showed, Georgian national identification does not simply manifest as either primordial and 
ethnic or modern and civic but rather in complicated arrangements of these geopolitical 
imaginations: sometimes as historically complex visions of an ancient identity existing in a 
globalized world and in varying degrees of social proximity from the personal to the collective to 
the global. 
 
5.2.  Political Alienation in a Neoliberal Homeland 
There are not many kids here, and they are not employed because there are not 
many possibilities. For example, I have three kids, and this one [Dato gestures 
toward his teenage son who is sitting quietly in the opposite corner of the room] 
he sings really well, he has all the awards and everything, but I cannot send him to 
Tbilisi or a company because I can’t afford… and the pension is like… it’s a 
misery what the government gives you for pension…  
As he always does when discussing these topics, Dato becomes increasingly animated as 
he makes his points, getting red in the face, hitting his knee with a rolled-up paper, and waving 
his arms above his head. Although he is mostly retired, Dato is a construction engineer by trade, 
specializing in designing civil buildings, but his sun-burnt face and rough hands betray that he is 
no office-bound engineer or designer.  
I have a small company for doing projects, but there’s so many problems always 
that my nerves are not in a good condition. If you’re educated you have less 
possibilities than if you’re not really educated. Before, in the Soviet times, we 
lived in the developed socialist society, and now we live in the undeveloped 
slavery. A lot of industry doesn’t work, people are not employed, and instead of 
giving and helping people financially, giving money and loans, everything is sold. 
It is very hard to find a job, everything is sold, everything belongs to somebody. 
That’s the big problem, that people do not have the employment. It doesn’t matter 
to the government. I don’t care who comes, they make the whole country like 
beggars. (Interview 13) 
When I first met Dato a year ago in 2016, we had a brief conversation about the need for 
international NGOs to leave alone what he termed the “traditional cultural values” of “the 
Georgian people.” On this afternoon, however, he was particularly animated about the influence 
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and changes that the mining company had brought to his community. Seeing such patterns as 
part of a broader trend in the country and nostalgic for the structure and security he experienced 
under the Soviet regime, Dato expressed what became an important theme of my conversations: 
that the neoliberal shift toward corporate-oriented governance across nearly all sectors of 
Georgian society and economy produced new views of Georgia as a nation of “beggars” and 
“slaves” living on degraded territory and left to the whims of international capital (see Figure 
11). Therefore, the second localized imagination of the homeland expressed here is of political 
alienation in a neoliberal homeland. 
 
Figure 11: Labor organizing poster, “Kazreti – you don’t deserve the bad reality!”  
(Source: Invisible Labor Center, 2017) 
 
These scripts of political identification contain economic dimensions beyond class and 
emerge from experiences of neoliberal corporate activities in the region. They more clearly align 
with ideas of shifting territorial control and a national imagined identity defined and bounded by 
experiences of degraded rights exchanged for national economic development. Capital 
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development trends here have changed individual experiences of citizenship and civic 
nationalism, with many, like Dato, feeling left behind in terms of economic security and personal 
fulfillment in their homeland and, as a result, alienated from their collective national 
identifications. As Dato nostalgically explained, 
We have everything like land, air, sea, lake, but nothing is for us. So not for us, 
but for who? I do not know for whom it is, but not for me. My concern is that it is 
very difficult to live here, quite complicated even if you are working a lot. If you 
make agricultural work, if you grow products and you don’t have a proper 
irrigation system, it’s not a good product. Besides if you even have a good 
product there’s no market you can sell it. The only possibility you have is either to 
work as a farmer and to have wine, you drink and then you become an alcoholic 
because you don’t have any other possibility to work, and we should have work! 
It’s not honorable to work anymore because we feel degraded, disrespected. I am 
like an animal, like a cow who is fed by the patron, trying to eat and nothing 
more. I am not a realized person here. (Interview 13) 
Dato is not alone in his feelings. Respondents throughout the Valley persistently echoed 
his sentiment of abandonment and alienation. These reactions surfaced as RMG essentially 
gained de facto sovereignty over much of the region, as the local government holds diminishing 
influence over all aspects of local governance – from budget expenditures to party politics – and 
the central government continues transferring autonomy to specific corporate interests. This 
power shift proves especially problematic for local citizens, whose only real opportunities for 
employment relate to the mining industry. As another informant explained, “the main problem is 
that the whole economy of Bolnisi is in Kazreti [the mine]. And it’s a good source of income, but 
the state does not interfere in the correct manner” (Interview 32).  
One outcome of this corporate-controlled political reality is that individuals feel they are 
not provided for, separated from their homeland’s environment and left behind by collective 
institutions: the Georgian state, local government, and the mining company alike. The same 
informant argued that “we have gold here. And there’s no effect of this gold on us, except high 
prices for electricity, and dust, no health insurance, nothing” (Interview 32). Other respondents 
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echoed these sentiments, with statements like “These people should have a lot of services for 
free, and they should get like everything possible, but for people there’s nothing really” 
(Interview 15/16, Retired HR worker at mine/Homemaker, Women, in Georgian). Residents 
specifically spoke of unmet needs such as trash collection, stable electricity and heat, and the 
provision of health services for a sickening population. Still others saw the source of this neglect 
as stemming from the government’s relinquishing control to the company, such that “Now it’s 
some sort of clan groups or gathering, some group containing several people that are kind of 
ruling. They have the power, and they don’t take any care of the local population or local 
community at all” (Interview 34). As a result, there are widespread feelings that “we are slaves 
here” (Interview 32). 
A key part of this narrative is a general perception that Georgian society has been left 
behind and impoverished by the state (Interview 6, International NGO leader, Man, in English). 
This imagination emerges clearly in scripts circulating through communities near the Madneuli 
complex, as well as in certain elite circles in Tbilisi. These scripts include how “we have no 
government” and “democracy, here and now, is slavery” (Interview 38); that “there are no 
measures by the state side to improve the environmental situation, only the tendencies to hide 
everything” (Interview 1, NGO leader and former Culture Minister, Woman, in English); and 
that “the state should take responsibility, somehow, to regulate the situation here.  I blame 
mainly the state, not the company. We are dying here because of dust and because of being just 
left alone, against our problems” (Interview 37). 
Here we see the political effects appearing from the institutional de-coupling of the 
Georgian state and homeland. The decentralization of power from the government toward the 
mining company means that many services for which citizens hope are never provided, 
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producing feelings of isolation and alienation within this territory. These scripts of abandonment 
by the central government exist alongside feelings of attachment to the national homeland yet 
produce negative visions of corporations controlling both Georgian society and territory: a nation 
of “beggars” and “slaves” living in a poisoned homeland controlled by “foreigners.” 
 
5.3.  Imagining a Poisoned Homeland and People  
 
I have a personal example, the vineyards which actually just completely died, 
everything, and I had to cut it all off. And my family had peach plantations, huge 
territories. My grandfather worked in the peach plantations, and I remember they 
were beautiful. It’s nonexistent now. I spoke with environmentalists who actually 
said that the peaches and the vineyards [died] because this situation when the soil 
is polluted, the air is polluted, because the grapes get the minerals and everything 
essential to be able to grow from the soil, and these peaches, this kind of [stone] 
fruit, are the most affected. And there is also a big thing about potatoes from 
Bolnisi, they were famous before, the good potatoes should grow here, but now it 
is not healthy! For example, they took the tests from the river, and all the potato 
plantations where their irrigation is from the river water, so all this dirty water 
gets in to the soil, and then where potatoes grow, so... 
And do people still eat the potatoes? 
Of course, of course! Yeah, there is no other way, I mean, I have some way of 
handling, where I leave the potatoes in the water for a long period of time, but… 
when you are in hell, what do you do? You have to close your eyes!  
(Interview 12, Local NGO coordinator, Woman, in English) 
 
Eka sits in the Bolnisi office where she works part time as an environmental coordinator 
and journalist, relaying stories of her family’s experiences with pollution from the mines. She 
speaks softly, becoming especially quiet when speaking of the potential harms they might 
encounter – she has known too many people that have suffered and died from cancer and 
pulmonary diseases, and fears for her loved ones. The trend of feeling alienated and left behind 
detailed above is especially acute in relation to health care and exposure to dangerous pollution, 
toxic dust, and other environmental hazards, yet there is also a powerful sense of loss that 
permeates these conversations of environmental health. This loss is not just of residents’ bodily 
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health but of a component of collective heritage, replaced with a sense of belonging to a 
population increasingly identifying as poisoned, endangered, and devalued – just how Eka and 
her community view the territory in which they live. 
 
 
Figure 12: “okros pasi (the price of gold),” Bolnisi graffiti  
(Photo credit: Author, 2017) 
 
If citizens like Eka experience (1) complications of common stories about ethno-
nationalism and territory, as well as (2) alienation in the face of political economic arrangements, 
then a third and final imagination of the Georgian homeland connects experiences of toxicity to 
(3) new national imaginations of environment and territory. Here, new definitions of 
belonging appear alongside new forms of environmental governance, shaping local political 
economies and ecosystems in the Mashavera Valley. These emergent environmental 
imaginations draw from notions of civic belonging, stemming not just from the health of 
residents’ bodies but from the quality of territory and the shifting spatialities of society, state, 
and territory as citizens express love for a “poisoned country” (see Figure 12). As noted, the 
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country’s natural and agricultural wealth is an important component of the Georgian national 
project (Toal 2017), as part of mamuli, the lived national territory and Georgian homeland 
(Nodia 2009). However, popular geopolitical scripts among local populations refer to this 
homeland as destroyed, tarnished, or “poisoned,” fueling narratives of loss and alienation from 
national identity.  
 
 
Figure 13: Children and fruit map at Georgian Independence Day celebration, Rustaveli 
Avenue, Tbilisi, Georgia  
(Photo credit: Author, 2017) 
 
This connection between environmental health and national identity is often taken for 
granted in everyday discussions of Georgian nationalism, providing a crucial component of 
national identifications in common discourse. Georgian pride and love of the country’s beautiful 
rugged landscape is typically only surpassed by similar feelings for traditions of high-quality 
agricultural products, wine, hunting, and fishing. I witnessed a prime example of the inculcation 
of these national performances when, during Independence Day celebrations on Tbilisi’s main 
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avenue in May 2017, I stumbled across a display of a Georgian map – including occupied 
territories – with each region presented in emblematic agricultural products and surrounded by 
children eager to have their photograph taken (see Figure 13). 
In line with sentiments expressed by Eka, residents of Madneuli’s mining communities 
widely believe the region’s extractive industries severely damage fruit and other agricultural 
products — a fear confirmed by a number of soil and agricultural analyses by various 
international affiliations (Avkopashvili et al. 2017; CENN 2014; Felix-Henningsen and 
Urushadze 2012; Matchavariani and Kalandadze 2012; Tchelidze et al. 2003). The toxins found 
in produce, water, and dust generate a variety of regional public health concerns, including 
increased rates of cancer, cardiovascular disease, pregnancy loss, and others (which I explore 
further in Chapter 5). For example, fruit irrigated with water from the Mashavera River, which 
flows past the two mines currently working in the region, contain dangerously high heavy metal 
levels. As one informant concisely stated, regretting the area’s gradual erosion of environmental, 
agricultural, and public health, “everything was wonderful until they started to dig for gold” 
(Interview 45, Farmer and fruit vendor, Woman, in Georgian). 
Local citizens expressed alternating feelings of nostalgic pride and sadness at the 
degradation of produce quality, fish populations, and poisoned fields in nearly every 
conversation I had, almost always linked to mining activities in the region. One key finding from 
interviews and conversations with regional inhabitants is that, while local generally view the 
destruction of cultural heritage sites as problematic, they seem to care far more about the 
pressures and often-frightening effects of a deteriorating material environment typically relied 
upon for livelihoods. For example, one individual told me that: 
Yeah it’s very rich with cultural heritage. But the company purchased a bigger 
amount of land here, so they decide whatever they want to do. And, of course, it is 
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better to work in mining in a way that does not damage environment and culture, 
but to consider that our economic situation is in very bad conditions and that we 
have bigger import than export and it’s very important that the company operate. 
And the main thing is that it’s really damaging environment, it’s hell, and they’re 
making it an open carrier and it’s better to use different methods. (Interview 30) 
Another stated she was against the mining practices “because even during the communist 
times…, the nature was degrading. It has to be closed and protected, and it cannot be like this, 
where people keep dying” (Interview 13). 
However, respondents quite often narrated these deteriorating environments in terms of 
lost heritage, reflecting ideas of national and cultural identity due to the strong discursive 
connection between Georgian nationalisms and land, territory, and mamuli, generating a new 
collective identity around these visions of deteriorating components of a national homeland. 
Points of local pride – ranging from delicious produce (cherries, grapes, potatoes, etc.) and 
hearty fish to clean water and fresh air – cropped up in nearly every conversation I had with local 
inhabitants over the span of several summers. However, this pride was often expressed in terms 
of nostalgia and loss, frequently linked to mining activities in the region: “the ore makes 
everything worse” (Interview 54, Kazreti market owner, Man, in Georgian) and “everything is 
poisoned… now I am not using this land anymore” (Interview 31). Citizens throughout the 
region shared perceptions of the local territory and agricultural produce as poisoned, affecting 
local livelihoods and changing this region’s place within national imaginations. For example, one 
informant, repeating a common local story, told me: 
there’s already this problem that when you sell goods from Bolnisi, Dmanisi, even 
Madneuli in the city [Tbilisi] and in different municipalities, they don’t buy these 
products anymore. They already have problems selling their products because it’s 
contaminated. Yes, potatoes, cucumbers, anything that is watered, it is already 
becoming dangerous and people don’t like to buy it much (Interview 32) 
When such rumors characterize a place, residents can experience tangible effects on their 
livelihoods, especially as these rumors emerge from observations made by residents, visitors, and 
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specialists alike. Residents shared many anecdotes involving links between polluted water 
quality and the loss of iconic local products that, when scaled up, contribute to narratives of 
national identification. One woman explained that:  
we have this mining, this gold mining, but it’s worse, I mean, we suffer. The 
vineyards are dead. The harvests… You can see this one day when they put it in 
the river. You have to see the color of the river, and it’s not worth anything, I 
mean you cannot water plants here. Sometimes it’s red color. Some days it’s like 
kind of black, or it’s yellow color. So you cannot use it for the agriculture, for 
irrigation, so what is the use of that? I remember before there was very good fish. 
But OK, forget about it, there are no frogs now, even frogs die. And we had such 
good fish, very tasty. (Interview 17) 
Citizens like this woman and many others felt disappointment at such environmental changes 
that produced feelings of identification and a loss of something loved, but they were also 
experienced bodily as people fell ill (Interview 17; Interview 12). 
It is crucial to understand that these environmental damages produced public health 
problems for the population. The connections among poisoned territories, poisoned foods and 
environments, and poisoned people drove emerging dimensions of national political 
identification through visions of the Georgian homeland today: 
The products that they have here, everything is intoxicated and it affects our lives. 
There’s already even a very high level of oncological diseases. I am not using 
these products, and it’s quite difficult to eat, because the local is not good. 
(Interview 32) 
As Nino explained, “the situation is very bad. Only yesterday there were five people 
dead, five burial ceremonies, and this is mainly [due to] heart and breast cancer. And all children 
have this thyroid problem” (Interview 34). One key informant, knowledgeable of the village in 
which other specialists had conducted research on the poisoning of local water and agricultural 
stocks, stated that “In Bolnisi there are many birth defects. There is no proper data or research, 
but people think it is because they drink the water and live close to the [mining] area” (Interview 
3, NGO Mining researcher, Woman, in English). As Kati explained, these occurrences stem from 
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the fact that “there is really just no management of environmental issues,” which the state is “just 
ignoring,” “just invisible” (Interview 1). 
Many people throughout the region shared these perceptions of local territory and 
produce as poisoned, affecting local livelihoods and changing this region’s location within 
national imaginations. These complex environmental scripts revealed that local citizens 
considered territory not just in terms of spatial extent but of quality and experience. Such visions 
shaped how local residents navigated understanding the mining complex at Madneuli, the 
Georgian national homeland, and the relationships among them.  
 
6.  Conclusion: Mining the homeland 
 
As I have shown in this chapter, political scripts circulating through communities 
affected by mining practices at Madneuli and Sakdrisi demonstrate how people here imagined 
and narrated the Georgian state, society, corporations, and qualities of the homeland, as well as 
how these various political entities related to one another and to the local environment.  
Through this analysis, I identify three primary alternative political visions of these 
relationships woven into the practices of resource governance: (1) increasingly complicated 
understandings of ethnicity, kin, and proximity; (2) corporate governance of local populations 
and territory producing alienation from the homeland; and (3) the deterioration of that homeland 
through degraded environmental and personal health. These imaginations emerge as especially 
significant as people incorporate them into specifically political scripts about environmental 
governance, showing how citizens understand local territory not just in terms of spatial extent, 
but of quality and experience. I define these scripts by implementing a thick, localized 
perspective toward geopolitical discourse as experienced in everyday life near mining 
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complexes. Doing so reveals contrasting visions of Georgia’s homeland, envisioned as lived 
territory and cultural landscape, or mamuli. Within these visions, the Georgian homeland is filled 
with resources – gold and copper in the Mashavera, but also a variety of others including water 
and forests (Quinn 2017) – increasingly imbued with political significance, both in terms of 
uneven economic development and related to diminished visions of Georgian nationhood and its 
spatial arrangements.  
My analysis finds shifting relationships of sovereignty among the Georgian state, society, 
and de facto corporate enclaves as experienced by political actors in this small region. The 
findings I present here illustrate several ways in which the expansion of international capital 
through a significant resource extraction project alters the political imaginations of citizens living 
in close proximity. Some community members benefit from these incursions while others suffer, 
meaning that people experience these shifts unevenly. These inequalities emerge in the context 
of previously existing political alliances, divisions, and dynamic ecological realities, creating 
new contours of a localized geopolitical field. The varying narratives of resources, nation, and 
territory I heard along the Mashavera River suggest that scholars of resource nationalism might 
productively broaden the analytical scope of their research further to allow even more space for 
competing visions of various national homelands to crystallize. 
In this way, documenting the political effects of mining the Georgian homeland reveals 
one facet of how the country’s territorial arrangements are simultaneously contested and 
legitimated outside military conflicts, shaping localized political geographies and how people 
imagine their national identification and relations to the Georgian state, civil society, and the 
territory of their homeland. These findings are particularly consequential in Georgia as the 
government’s market orientation, including toward the environment, continues to expand while 
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consolidating power in recent elections. In the next chapter I investigate the material and 
political effects of these transformations, within Georgia’s state borders and beyond. 
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Chapter V – Extractive Archipelagos: Embedded borderings of the Georgian mining 
industry 
 
 
The Universe has as many different centers as there are living beings in it.  
 
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago (1974, p. 3) 
 
 
1.  Introduction: Political Borders in the Mashavera 
 
The sounds of strumming guitars and traditional vocal harmonies echoed through the 
small, shabby tent community under gray April skies. Those huddled around the edge of the 
group shared anxious and somewhat excited glances as television cameras interviewed some of 
the more vocal members: students, archaeologists, ex-officials, religious youth, journalists, self-
proclaimed patriots. Meanwhile, Mari worked with other protestors to build a crude watch tower, 
flying the flags of Georgia and the Georgian Orthodox Church and sitting atop the hill to keep an 
eye on the archaeological site across the road even after the television cameras left (Georgian 
Broadcaster 2014b, 2014c; see Figure 14). The hills in sight would no longer exist several years 
later, deconstructed by dynamite, heavy machinery, and chemical solutions – but for now Mari, 
Kati, Niko, George, and the others remained hopeful they could block the formation of a new 
mine, save this piece of Georgian and world heritage, and help stem the pollution flowing 
through the valley. Their vigilance and unity in 2014 functioned as a boundary of accountability 
for the Rich Metals Group (RMG), yet their position was not unchallenged. 
Earlier, a film crew secretly broached the border of RMG’s territory with a television 
camera, until the company’s security guards found them filming the archaeological site at the top 
of the hill. The reporter refused to leave, precipitating a scuffle. Other guards arrived at the 
protest camp in large, black SUVs trying to intimidate the protestors. Four large men approached 
George, himself a tall and rather imposing figure, asking for his first and last name before 
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leaving as quickly as they arrived, offering no further explanation for their actions (Interview 
57). Other guards came to know Mari by name and constantly tried to pressure her into 
disbanding the group (personal communication, Interview 36).  
 
 
Figure 14: Protestors construct and use watch tower over mining company near Sakdrisi 
(Source: Georgian Broadcaster 2014) 
 
These moments of conflict stemmed from interactions along the territorial edges under 
RMG’s control, shaping and defining its borders in the process. Yet disputes related to the 
proposed mine extended beyond encounters between corporate authority and protestors. Tense 
political divisions and borders of multiple types scored the Mashavera Valley in the months 
before RMG blew up the Sakdrisi archaeological site at the end of 2014 – edges still forming and 
re-forming today. 
For example, the local labor union organized a full-scale strike against RMG in February 
2014, demanding improved labor conditions, increased wages, and reliable health care and 
grinding mining operations to a halt throughout RMG’s territory. Mine laborers clashed with 
people protesting RMG’s expansion to the Sakdrisi site, forcing police officers and security 
guards to intervene and prevent a descent into further violence (Georgian Broadcaster 2014d; 
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სტუდია მონიტორი / Studio Monitor 2014; see Figure 15). Protestors joined hands to form a 
human barrier symbolizing their efforts to protect the ancient mine’s cultural heritage (Georgian 
Broadcaster 2014d; see Figure 16). 
 
 
Figure 15: Supporters, protestors, and police (პოლიცია) officers clash near Sakdrisi 
(Source: Georgian Broadcaster 2014) 
 
These diverse conflicts produced a local political geography of shifting and temporary 
spatial borders as different social groups made distinct claims on these spaces, striving to define 
and control territory, people, and resources: who could go where, do what, and under whose 
authority. Yet how do these isolated events and disputes connect to broader and ongoing socio-
material trends in the Mashavera Valley, across Georgia, and throughout the South Caucasus? 
In the preceding chapters (4 and 5) I have illustrated two primary ways in which metal 
mining produces new social and material geographies – through the uneven political geographies 
of rent extraction and through shifting imaginations of a political homeland. In this penultimate 
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chapter, I illustrate how practices, experiences, and imaginations of mining develop at and across 
multiple scales. This assemblage of dividing and bordering forces together produce new political 
geographies of boundedness and connectivity. As I develop here, analyzing environmental 
politics through a lens of borderings – practices that produce borders – allows us to consider 
diverse events – cultural heritage protests, ongoing environmental damages, and uneven 
economic developments – within one framework of spatial powers. 
 
 
Figure 16: Protestors form human barrier around Sakdrisi 
(Source: Georgian Broadcaster 2014) 
 
As outlined previously, the Georgian government auctions off territorially delimited 
extraction licenses to the highest bidder, defining this resource governance regime’s extent and 
granting the winners effective autonomy over the designation and use of all resources found 
inside those territorial boundaries. I argue here that, while the country’s border disputes with 
Russia are dynamic, militaristic, and highly visible, this system of licenses – rarely marked on 
maps or the landscape, granted little government oversight, and imbued with corrupt 
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relationships – presents one component of a series of sub-state bordering practices in Georgia. In 
this way Georgia’s Sakdrisi-Madneuli gold and copper mining complex provides an opportunity 
to advance recent work on the political territoriality of mining practices and their effects on 
ecosystems and human bodies (Emel et al. 2011; Hecht 2018; Peluso 2017; Perreault 2013b; 
Vela-Almeida 2018). In this chapter I show how the socio-political and material forces of these 
mining practices produce their own unique borderings and political geographies, both internal to 
and across state borders. In doing so these mining practices reshape multi-scalar connections 
(and disconnections) among disparate localities. Such developments produce what I term an 
extractive archipelago, re-shaping the contours of state power, territorial control, and 
dispossessed peoples’ claims to citizenship – visible in the post-Soviet South Caucasus but also 
extending to and producing new spaces throughout the former Soviet Union. 
To make this argument, I examine the work that sub-state socio-material boundaries do in 
the world as they produce this particular resource regime at and across local, regional, and 
international scales. This analysis explains localized events in relation to the complex political, 
economic, and territorial networks of environmental and mining governance here. My focus on 
sub-state borders in their historical and geographic context seeks to “unflatten” views of 
environmental governance (Bridge and Perreault 2009) in two ways. First, it offers scholars the 
opportunity to refine the analytical categories we use in our frameworks without sacrificing their 
explanatory power (e.g. government, capital, etc.). Second, this perspective illustrates the diverse 
and intersecting ways in which socio-material relations produce environmental injustice, 
dispossession, and disenfranchisement. I hope this focus may also help reshape geopolitical 
imaginations of the region, often still exoticized and caricatured by western powers and scholars 
alike, and illuminate the lived experiences of political contestation producing these spaces. 
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The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. First, I review key findings from 
related literatures of environmental governance, border studies, and a broadly defined political 
geography. Together, this scholarship affords the tools necessary to analyze the series of sub-
state borders sustaining Georgia’s metal mining resource regime and constituting broader 
extractive archipelagos across the region. I next offer three examples of sub-state borders 
produced in the Mashavera Valley, each operating through a different dimension of power and 
directly related to the political imaginations I explored in the previous chapter: (1) digital divides 
and environmental access (geoeconomic relations); (2) toxic frontiers (biopolitical relations); and 
(3) contours of citizenship (geopolitical relations). Together these borders produce one political 
“island” within a particular post-Soviet extractive archipelago: varyingly bound from and 
connected to their surrounding socio-material environments through multiple dimensions yet also 
linked with other similar corporate-owned extractive jurisdictions across disparate contexts. In 
the concluding section, I reflect on some implications of my findings for understanding political 
geographies of the environment across the post-Soviet region. 
 
 
2.  Toward Extractive Archipelagos  
 
Mining practices supply economic foundations for many societies around the world yet 
also have long and well-documented histories of negative political, environmental, and social 
effects. Open-cast gold and copper mining can produce particularly contentious outcomes, 
especially when under-regulated, as in Georgia (and as I illustrate through this dissertation). 
However, these effects also produce diverse types of divisions on the landscape and in people’s 
everyday experiences of the Mashavera Valley as: people live in toxic environments, quietly 
coming into contact with heavy metals in the water supply, agricultural products, or poisonous 
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dust; federal, local, and company law enforcement officials ambiguously share official authority 
and jurisdiction; and the mining company compensates laborers inequitably after disbanding the 
local labor union. Stakeholders experience the effects of such socio-spatial divisions in highly 
uneven ways, establishing a range of shifting spatial exclusions as actors and institutions struggle 
for control over, and governance of, environmental resources (Holterman 2014; Nixon 2011; 
Sandlos and Keeling 2016).  
As explored earlier (Chapter 4), political ecologists have granted special attention to such 
contested spatial divisions of environmental governance. Drawing from a range of intellectual 
traditions including Marxist and post-structural approaches, political ecologists have dealt with 
these issues of authority and divisive environmental governance by analyzing power relations 
through environmental knowledges, property relations, and social divisions along lines of 
political subjectivity – including class, race, gender, citizenship, and others (Bebbington 2012; 
Birkenholtz 2008; Bulkeley 2005; Himley 2008; McCarthy 2005b; Perreault and Valdivia 2010; 
Reed and Bruyneel 2010; Robbins 2006; Robertson 2015; Valdivia 2008, 2015). However, the 
concept of borders remains under-examined within political ecology and environmental 
governance traditions. 
In this section I explain what an analytical focus on borders and practices of bordering 
contributes to the way we understand extractive political ecologies, especially the political 
geographies of metal mining in Georgia. As I outline below, “disaggregating” the units of 
political analysis (Bridge et al. 2015; Kotsadam et al. 2017; Ó Tuathail 2010) allows us to study 
spatial divisions of all sorts as they shape our diverse political ecologies across various scales. I 
follow contemporary political geographers in focusing on political practices of exclusion and 
inclusion beyond static visions of “state,” “territory,” and “society” to better assess the 
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networked, yet profoundly uneven, geographies of extractive corporations’ expanding power 
throughout the former Soviet Union. I do so by theorizing the emergence of extractive 
archipelagos produced through socio-material networks of embedded borderings, allowing me to 
analyze three distinct sets of bordering practices that render a large swath of the Mashavera 
Valley a metaphorical island within one of these networked chains. 
My approach provides expanded opportunities to investigate how cross-scalar boundaries 
produce political geographies of the environment that connect and bound “operational spaces” 
(Sassen 2018) of resource extraction. Such boundaries might otherwise remain invisible from 
any single scalar focus, yet it is these operational borderings which define and produce extractive 
archipelagos. Studying networks of bordered extractive spaces – metaphorical islands in an 
extractive archipelago – moves toward what Huber calls an “ecology of politics” by expanding 
the terms of analysis beyond those objects typically flagged as “natural” or of “the state” within a 
particular resource regime (2015; Marston and Perreault 2017). While I illuminate this 
perspective’s utility in post-Soviet space, corollary bordering patterns occur across the planet, 
taking different forms in different geohistorical contexts. 
 
2.1.  Environmental Governance, Territory, and Borders 
 
In a way, environmental governance is all about the formation of borders and boundaries 
as it encompasses “the production of social order via the administration of nature” (Bridge and 
Perreault 2009: 477). Environmental governance functions through the production of socio-
material divisions, boundaries of power, and authority at a variety of scales as people relate to 
environments and resources in diverse ways. Environmental governance therefore necessitates 
contests over where, who, and what actors produce and locate political authority. The emergent 
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nature of environmental governance leads Gavin Bridge (2014) to highlight the contingent and 
socially constructed nature of the two related categories “resource” and “state” as central to 
environmental governance analyses. These categories often emerge together (Bridge 2014; see 
also: Harris 2012; Mitchell 1991b; Painter 2006), reinforcing hegemonic relationships of 
environmental subjectivity while simultaneously opening room for resistance and contestation, 
and producing a variety of shifting socio-material boundaries (Birkenholtz 2008; Bridge 2014; 
Ekers 2009; Li 2007).  
However, environmental governance practices are as much about divisions of authority 
and control “between subnational jurisdictions, between stakeholder groups in decision-making 
processes and wider society” as they are “between nations” and states, as many “realist” scholars 
in international relations and political science often assume (Reed and Bruyneel 2010: 651). 
Valdivia’s investigation of political mobilizations around oil production in Ecuador presents just 
one example of the complexity such social divisions carry within environmental governance 
regimes. She demonstrates how actors experience – and, perhaps just as importantly, imagine — 
the diverse ways petroleum extraction has become a key vector for mediating and defining 
citizenship for many in Ecuador (Valdivia 2008). Yet citizenship, as a marker of inclusion, 
rights, and responsibilities, always involves defining an “out” group in opposition to those “in” 
the umbrella of citizenship, producing political borders within societies rather than just between 
them. Such divisions profoundly shape the lives and experiences of those bounded within 
definitions of citizenship (Balibar 2015; Barnett and Low 2004; Ehrkamp and Jacobsen 2015; 
Marston and Mitchell 2004; Ong 2006a; Staeheli 2011), an especially fraught tension when 
linking valuable resources and vulnerable societies. 
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A lack of explicit attention to such diverse borderings in environmental governance is 
even more surprising, considering how many distinct forms of socio-spatial divisions political 
ecologists and related nature-society scholars do consider. For example, political ecologists have 
granted significant analytical attention to property relations as political-economic divisions of 
space, controlling who has access to resources and can extract surplus value from them (see Ch. 
4; see also: Agrawal 2001; Blomley 2008; Mansfield 2004; Parenti 2015; Peluso 2018; Prudham 
2015; Ribot and Peluso 2003; Robertson and Wainwright 2013; Sikor and Lund 2009). Yet 
property is only one form of bordering practice involved in environmental governance.  
Related to yet distinct from property relations, territoriality has gained prominence as a 
key analytic within environmental governance scholarship, especially as it shapes resource 
extraction regimes – though these analyses often maintain a statist focus (Rasmussen and Lund 
2018; Vela-Almeida 2018; Watts 2018). This broader resource territory literature has granted 
increased attention to metal mining in recent years, including for gold and copper (Allen 2017; 
Côte and Korf 2018; D’Angelo and Pijpers 2018; Peluso 2018; Perreault 2018; Schoenberger 
2016; Spiegel 2014; Wooden 2017). This work demonstrates how narratives surrounding mining 
activities reinforce spatial imaginaries of state territory, such as in neo-extractive political 
economies like Ecuador and Bolivia, serving as a tool for enforcing state dominance (Marston 
and Perreault 2017; Vela-Almeida 2018). Similar socio-spatial formulations of mining 
governance seek to deal with the mining industry’s complexity of physical space, social relations 
of state and sovereignty, and various political formations emerging in relation to the 
“minescapes” of extractive projects (Brown and Spiegel 2017; Ey and Sherval 2016; Spiegel 
2014). Poncian, for example, argues that such narratives connecting resources and national 
identity can prove useful for enhancing political divisions within Tanzanian society, revealing 
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the socio-spatial fractures that may emerge in extractive regimes (2019). Nationalistic narratives 
and territorial partitions facilitate the circulation and accumulation of capital within these 
political complexities from the colonial period to the present, as capital simultaneously bolsters 
relations of citizenship and the sovereign state system (Emel et al. 2011).  
Actual mineral governance practices around the world therefore reveal the contingency 
and variation of territorial extent, state sovereignty, and socio-spatial division in relation to 
corporate and other powerful actors engaged in resource governance and extraction (Bridge 
2014; Emel et al. 2011; Ong 2006a). These governance practices demonstrate that “other 
institutions and territorial forms – the clan or community, for example – co-exist with those of 
the state” (Bridge 2014: 7). Therefore, the multi-scalar analyses I undertake here might better 
capture the complexity of environmental governance in “neoliberal environments” or otherwise 
(Castree 2007; Himley 2008). The literature especially supports such a perspective, given recent 
trends in political ecology toward increasingly “disaggregating and denaturalizing analytical 
units” (Bridge et al. 2015). These efforts include the expansion of broader feminist political 
ecologies (Rocheleau et al. 2013; Sundberg 2015b) and widespread agreement that 
environmental governance extends across scales and networks to enroll a variety of political 
actors through different means and capacities (Bridge and Perreault 2009; Bulkeley 2005; Huber 
2015; Le Billon 2015; Neumann 2009; Robbins 2008; Sayre 2005, 2015; Swyngedouw and 
Heynen 2003; Zimmerer and Bassett 2003). 
Like Georgia, extractive regimes in the former Soviet Union and other formerly socialist 
spaces increasingly exhibit such diverse and multi-scalar political ecological dynamics. For 
example, state actors, members of civil society, and corporate interests in Kyrgyzstan compete 
for access to and control of gold mining territory through protests, government repression, and 
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either investing capital or not (Doolot and Heathershaw 2015; Wooden 2017). Jackson and 
Myadar draw from research surrounding Mongolia’s Oyu Tolgoi mining complex to demonstrate 
how mining practices – explosive, dust-producing, and bound to infrastructural networks of 
transportation, energy generation, etc. – produce varying socio-material distances and borders 
between people, newly enclosed territories, and shifting relations between the Mongolian state, 
nation, and foreign capital (Jackson 2015a; Myadar and Jackson 2018). Koch and Perreault 
illustrate how mineral resources serve as prime vectors for shifting state power and patterns of 
de-/re-centralization in Kazakhstan since the Soviet Union’s collapse, while also fueling popular 
imaginations of Kazakh nationalism (2018). Together, this global set of case studies 
demonstrates how mining practices are profoundly and recursively bound up with broader socio-
political and material forces, producing their own unique borders and political geographies 
internal to and across state territories – despite the continued prevalence of statist analytical 
frameworks within prominent political ecology and environmental governance research projects 
(Harris 2012, 2017; Parenti 2015; Robertson 2015; Robertson and Wainwright 2013). 
Political geographers have long argued for more grounded documentation and analysis of 
the complexity, ephemerality, and transformation of such boundaries beyond the state (including 
more-than-human boundaries both capillary and material, e.g. watershed boundaries) beyond 
mere identification and critique (Newman and Paasi 1998; Robbins 2008). In the following 
section I undertake a closer examination of this scholarship and the analytical directions its 
proponents may suggest. 
 
2.2.  Multi-scalar Borders Beyond the State 
 
As noted already, Georgia’s Mashavera Valley is filled with various political dividing 
and bordering practices related to mining, re-shaping power relations throughout the local region. 
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If borders are under-examined and theorized within environmental governance studies, what 
insights might political geographers offer for richer visions of socio-spatial divisions and 
frameworks for analyzing political contours in the environment? 
Findings from the literature on mining and territory in island contexts over the past two 
decades are especially pertinent to my argument. For example, Anna Tsing illustrates how the 
practices of “wild miners” consume both state and Indigenous land in Indonesia (Tsing 2003). 
Nancy Peluso reveals how small-scale gold mining there produces new territorial formations 
outside the state’s purview, “making the above- and-underground spaces into territories within 
resource frontiers” (2018: 401). Allen explains how mining practices in Melanesia generate 
militaristic violence and produce “ungovernable” landscapes, as new territorial formations 
crystalize power relations in extractive industries (2017). Georgia’s gold and copper industry 
relies on extraction from a valley rather than an island, yet the territorial issues of boundedness 
and connectivity necessary to understand these extractive island contexts illuminate the political 
dimensions of bordering produced by mining practices. 
Post-structural approaches to political geographies of borders and boundaries often draw 
inspiration from Foucault’s analyses of power and spatiality, proving especially fruitful here. 
Key to Foucault’s broader project is a focus on political practices over pre-defined categories 
like “the state” and “territory” (Foucault 2008: 79, 2009: 277; Lemke 2007). This move from 
studying predefined analytical categories to the practices that produce state and territorial effects 
represents a key contribution of political geography scholarship over the past three decades 
(Allen 2003, 2004; Koch 2015b; Mitchell 1990, 1991b, 1991a, 1999, 2002, 2009; Murphy 2013; 
Paasi 1997, 1998a, 2009; Painter 2006, 2010). Political geographers today consider political 
borders in a similar manner, as most scholars have long abandoned traditional approaches 
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toward borders as static and discrete phenomena to focus on the “dynamism of borders and 
bordering practices” (Parker and Vaughan-Williams 2009: 586). 
Border scholars have long dealt with the complexity of border-making processes, 
convincingly illustrating how practices that construct and legitimate state territorial borders are 
crucial to global and regional geopolitics (Agnew 2015c; Jones 2009; Megoran 2017; Murphy 
2013, 2015; Newman 2006; Newman and Paasi 1998; Sassen 2013b, 2018). Border research in 
political geography argues explicitly for borders’ continued centrality to political geographies of 
both exclusion and inclusion, despite widespread critiques that the world is now functionally 
“borderless,” empirics demonstrating the profound importance of transnational socio-spatial 
connection to the global economy, and the much maligned “end of history” (Koch 2014; 
Newman 2006; Newman and Paasi 1998; Paasi 2009; see also: Fukuyama 1989, 2018). 
This perspective has given rise to a rich body of work in geography and political science 
scholarship on the former Soviet Union. Numerous important findings regarding the political 
work of borders emerge from within these sprawling and interrelated literatures considering 
borders and territories, critical geopolitics, and dissident IR, including the central role identity 
narratives and performances play in constructing, legitimating, and reinforcing such exclusive 
borders (Dalby and Ó Tuathail 1998; Herb 2004; Jones 2009; Kaiser 2012; Sharp 2007). Borders 
and the territories they bound bear rich political histories, shaped over time by contingent social 
forces that simultaneously structure the spaces in which they exist – dynamics readily apparent 
across the borders of former Soviet space from Ukraine (Brown 2005) to Central Asia’s 
Ferghana Valley (Megoran 2017) and Finland (Paasi 1998b). 
Paasi’s work is especially emblematic of this perspective, illustrating the work such 
political borders do in the world. Paasi uses his ongoing historical research of the Finnish-
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Russian border to conceptualize borders as social processes produced through political practices 
and given material form: knowledges, narratives, discourses, and institutions (1998b). In short, 
for Paasi, “Boundaries are expressions of power relations” (1998b: 82), regardless of the scale at 
which they unfold. Pointing to examples beyond explicit state borders – including gated 
communities, green belts inside cities, and property relations more broadly – Paasi argues that 
“Boundedness and territory are thus important processes embedded in the production and 
reproduction of social relations on various scales” (2009: 215). Understanding the way socio-
material and spatial divisions (e.g., the state or state territory as political effects) emerge and 
become both institutionalized and reproduced requires investigating the everyday practices and 
spatial imaginaries that shape social life – what Paasi calls “spatial socialization” (Koch 2015b; 
Neep 2017; Paasi 1997, 2009: 226). This socio-spatial consciousness “is reproduced in everyday 
life, but it cannot be reduced to that alone” (Paasi 2009: 228), “existing on various spatial scales” 
(229) as bordering practices class and mark diverse people, things, ideas, and spaces from 
international borders to urban contexts and beyond (Koch 2014). 
Crucially, these spatial imaginations are not just “mental acts and discourses as identity is 
often understood” (Paasi 2010a: 15) but also occur through material practices both economic and 
political. Koch illustrates the simultaneously mental and material nature of spatial imaginations 
through a brief analysis of the Soviet nationalities policies, implemented in part through passport 
designations and Central Asian political subjects’ adoption of multiple identities (Kazakh, 
Soviet, etc.), in part due to the material benefits afforded by such designations (2015b). 
Discursive and institutional practices produce borders at multiple distinct yet interacting 
scales, bearing material effects in the world and shaping future socio-material political 
formations (Agnew 2008; Laine 2016). Viewing borders from this disaggregated perspective 
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does not mean that larger-scale phenomenon such as state borders lack importance or relevance. 
Too many profound examples exist to argue for such a “borderless” perspective in any 
convincing way, especially given the multiple migration, security, and human vulnerability crises 
these relations produce along so many of the world’s interstate borders (Boyce 2016; Foxall 
2018; Johnson and Jones 2018; Jones 2012; Mahanty 2017; Vaughan-Williams 2015). Instead, 
"a state boundary or a municipal boundary is designed to separate the space controlled by 
members of a social group or a territorial community and to limit the rights to this territory of 
those who do not belong to the group" (Kolossov 2005: 618). Border scholars illustrate that these 
disparate forms of bordering work through fundamentally similar mechanisms of differentiation, 
division, and control. Such diverse and disaggregated perspectives allow us to explore the lived 
experiences and effects of “the global roundaboutness of power” (Allen 2004: 19), 
acknowledging power’s capillary nature as well as its uneven concentration and extension 
through certain territorial actors and institutions – corporations, governments, celebrities – over 
others (Allen 2011; Koch 2016a; Massey 2004). 
In short, states or governments are not the only entities to produce borders, but rather 
ordinary people do as well through their everyday practices living within borderlands and 
territories. Investigating these “localized,” “embodied,” and “lived” geopolitics (Dowler and 
Sharp 2001: 2001; Hyndman 2004; Megoran 2006, 2017; Ó Tuathail 2010; Secor 2001; Sharp 
2007) requires a “spatially curious account of the whereabouts of power” (Allen 2004: 25) that 
considers representational practices, popular spatial imaginaries, and practices of resource 
extraction simultaneously material and rhetorical. According to Etienne Balibar, these bordering 
practices may represent the space of politics and power itself (1998), such that “borders are 
perhaps even constitutive of political life” (Vaughan-Williams 2009: 1). My analysis traces 
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where the Mashavera Valley’s sub-state boundaries lie, how they are produced, and what effects 
they generate.  
Yet if borders generate power’s spatiality, as Balibar contends, and if both bordering 
practices and environmental governance enroll a diverse actors doing many things in many 
places beyond “state space” (Brenner 1999, 2004; Brenner et al. 2003; Brenner and Elden 2009; 
Moisio and Paasi 2013a), what kinds of practices and spaces might be included in these 
disaggregated political geographies of extraction? It is to this question I turn next. 
 
 
2.3.  Toward Extractive Archipelagos: Uneven networks of Embedded Borderings 
 
Bordering practices exist as central to political geographies, especially in the former 
Soviet Union, where histories of contested territory still shape political struggles today. Yet in 
their recent book Dictators Without Borders (2017), Alex Cooley and John Heathershaw contend 
that Central Asian autocracies and wealthy elites consolidate power in part by operating sans 
frontiers, both “across” and “beyond” borders (2017). Heathershaw et al. suggest that this 
expansion of power through practices extending beyond the typical Westphalian state-container 
view of sovereignty increasingly represents a defining characteristic of state power across 
Central Eurasia – including through gold, copper, and other metal mining operations across the 
broad region (Cooley and Heathershaw 2017; Doolot and Heathershaw 2015; Heathershaw and 
Schatz 2017). However, scholars have undertaken little work connecting these global networks 
of bordering practices to localized, material experiences beyond those of local political elites, 
representatives of global capital, or other powerful actors. 
As the borders literature informs us – and as seen at Sakdrisi in 2014 – a range of actors 
including state and local governments, members of civil society, corporations, and religious 
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officials demarcate and control space in complicated and overlapping ways. Aihwa Ong and 
Saskia Sassen use a range of market reform case studies across southeast Asian (Ong) and 
broader globalized markets (Sassen) to show how such manifold political practices and relations 
draw internal borders within states, producing “structural holes” or gradations in state 
sovereignty and citizenship. These borders often exist unmarked on the landscape and often lack 
the territorial trappings or visible markers that typically reinforce and legitimate state borders 
(Ong 2006a, 2007; Sassen 2013b; Sassen and Ong 2014; see also: Ong 1999, 2011; Sassen 2008, 
2013a, 2018). Resource governance regimes have their own socio-spatial organizations within 
these complex political geographies, including similar structural holes (Bridge 2014; Emel et al. 
2011; Marston and Perreault 2017; Robertson 2015; Valdivia 2008, 2015), suggesting important 
avenues for resource political geography scholarship which I expand upon in the remainder of 
this chapter.  
Following political geography’s long history of engaging such questions and phenomena 
(Agnew 1994, 2005; Brenner 2004; Elden 2009: 201; Murphy 2013; Paasi 1997; Painter 2010; 
Raffestin 2012; Sack 1986), Saskia Sassen has made important contributions to recent efforts to 
theorize territory and globalization (2008, 2013b, 2018). Sassen defines territory as “a capability 
with embedded logics of power and of claim-making,” including informal jurisdictions “beyond 
that of the national territorial state” (2013b: 23). These “operational spaces” emerge from 
“embedded borderings,” divisions enforced by non-state actors and internal to – yet separate 
from – Westphalian state space (Sassen 2018). Sassen engages a wide range of cases to 
demonstrate how these embedded borderings increasingly shape the international political order, 
including through WTO trade agreements, the ICC, Fairtrade designations, informal movements 
of forced migrants, private “dark pool” trading networks, commodity chain development, land 
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grabs, and debt systems (2008, 2009, 2013b, 2013a, 2018; Sassen and Aneesh 2017; Sassen and 
Ong 2014; Sassen and Torino 2017). In short, these borderings bear significance because they do 
real work in the world, producing spaces beyond what scholars might typically consider as either 
individual imaginary space or the highly institutionalized space of the “territorial trap” (Agnew 
1994, 2015a; Glassman 1999). Yet, importantly, these embedded borderings do not erase or 
make irrelevant the state space in which they exist.  
Sassen rather argues the opposite, that “For today’s globalizing dynamics to have the 
transformative capacities they evince entails far deeper imbrications with the national—whether 
governments, firms, legal systems, or citizens—than prevailing analyses allow us to recognize” 
(2008: 1). While parallel spaces exist through systems of illegality such as blatant fraud and 
organized crime, these legally recognized operational spaces present new relations of state power 
in the interstate system (Sassen 2013b), re-shaping the contours of global economic relations 
through local political practices. Such networks posit mining pits as wormholes of deep time 
(Bridge 2013), but also of space (Neep 2017), suggesting the possibility of connecting “global 
assemblages” within and across regional formations (Ong 2011; Ong and Collier 2004; Tsing 
2005). As Sassen explains: 
The overall outcome is a multiplication of systemic edges that encompass operational 
spaces inside national sovereign territories yet connecting across multiple such territories. 
Neither those enclosed operational spaces nor the geographies that connect them across 
the world are part of traditional national borders or the formal interstate system. They can 
benefit from the deregulations and privatizations that underlie the global system, but they 
are not necessarily marked or made visible by these familiar innovations of the global 
system. They operate through other channels and construct their own geographies. (2018: 
13) 
 
Sassen’s disaggregated, practice-oriented perspective offers a flexible analytical tool, yet 
in many ways this approach only presents a general approach to territoriality, borderings, and 
spatial politics. In the rest of this chapter, I develop and extend an analytical metaphor for 
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distinguishing and investigating such spaces as they relate to specific political practices of 
environmental governance and resource extraction: an extractive archipelago. 
The “archipelago” metaphor is perhaps most widely associated with Aleksandr 
Solzhenitsyn’s powerful publication of The Gulag Archipelago referenced in this chapter’s 
epigraph (Solzhenitsyn 1974). Though typically used to describe an island chain’s physical 
geography, human geographers in recent years have adopted this metaphor to varying effect 
while considering urban contexts and environments (Bakker 2003; Meeteren and Bassens 2016), 
detention spaces (Mountz 2011, 2015; Vaughan-Williams 2009) and political island 
environments (Kirsch 2016; Pugh 2013; Stratford et al. 2011; Wilford 2010), among others. 
However, in each of these uses, the metaphor specifically classifies multiple related areas 
as simultaneously bounded and distinct, yet geographically distant. For example, some political 
geographers conceptualize Russia’s “near abroad” of periphery states, including several de facto 
states and occupied territories, as a “geopolitical archipelago of dependencies” (Toal 2017; see 
also: Suslov 2018b), mirroring similar and characteristic center-periphery political relations 
across each unique polity. Scholars have even used the archipelagic vision of bounded, 
connected spaces to analyze mining sectors (Jackson 2016). These include questioning the gulag 
system’s archipelagic nature (distinctly bordered from the rest of society, as some define it) by 
studying the historically fluid social dynamics of an Arctic coal mining town originally 
established as a prison camp complex (Barenberg 2014). Yet, in these cases and others, political 
geographers’ use of the archipelago metaphor, while powerful, often relies on flattened views of 
boundedness and borders.  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Foucault again provides useful guidance for this metaphor, 
drawing inspiration from Solzhenitsyn’s revelations to shape his own analyses of incarceration 
 
 203 
(1977a, 2007a; Plamper 2002). Foucault points toward the diverse political technologies that 
shape society, in similar fashion to the way intersecting geophysical forces produce island 
archipelagos. In Foucault’s assessment of governing technologies, “Society is an archipelago of 
powers” (2007c: 156) comprising more than one “family of technologies of power” (2007c: 160) 
overlapping, intersecting, and shaping one another into a “mesh of the net” (2007c: 158). These 
political networks of interconnected technologies and spaces rest upon relations of boundedness, 
defining who and what is governed, how, and by whom. Even in Solzhenitsyn’s iconic narrative, 
we see not just the formation of the Soviet gulag’s political spaces but that these essentially 
comprise various forms of divisive borderings (border practices), embedded within Soviet state 
space yet separate from it (Sassen 2018). These include defining who is brought into the legal 
system, how people are restricted and transported to these spaces, and so on (Solzhenitsyn 1974). 
Borders scholars similarly demonstrate how the boundaries of state territories 
increasingly unite multiple intersecting forces and political technologies – for example of 
geopower and biopower or, as some define these terms, securing territories while governing 
populations and individual bodies (Dillon 2007; Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2008; Johnson and 
Jones 2018; Makarychev 2018; Makarychev and Yatsyk 2017, 2018; Vaughan-Williams 2009, 
2015). Drawing from his analysis of a “global archipelago” of military camps, Vaughan-
Williams contends that this analytical move “unties an analysis of the operation of sovereign 
power from the territorial confines of the state and relocates such an analysis in the context of a 
global terrain that spans ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ space” (2009: 117). 
Recent scholarship of Central Asia and the Caucasus reveals and explores the intimate 
role such complex political borderings play within the region’s geopolitics, highlighting how 
stories, narratives, and informal practices shape and legitimate these multi-scalar political 
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boundaries (Cooley and Heathershaw 2017; Megoran 2017), including those of local and 
informal varieties (Hoffmann 2017; Smolnik and Weiss 2017). The region also has a long history 
of mining and resource extraction that to date remains relatively under-studied outside a few 
large projects such as Kyrgyzstan’s Kumtor gold mine (Doolot and Heathershaw 2015; 
Varshalomidze 2014; Wooden 2017). This lacuna is especially surprising, as mining provided a 
key economic and ideological driver of the Soviet Union, building large-scale industries 
throughout Soviet controlled territory and causing widespread environmental degradation in the 
name of building the Soviet body politic (Josephson 2002, 2013; Kotkin 1997). However, mines 
also served as biopolitical technologies within Stalin’s state-sponsored archipelago of death and 
suffering as targets of gulag camp labor (Applebaum 2004; Barenberg 2014; Plamper 2002; 
Prozorov 2013, 2014). These diverse relations suggest the contemporary resource extraction 
archipelagos in the former Soviet Union are not merely flat networks of equal actants (Latour 
1987; see also Lave 2015) but rather contoured networks of uneven capital accumulation, 
environmental violence, and political control. 
Viewing metal mining as an intersecting archipelago of divisive and embedded 
borderings is especially productive as it allows us to trace the actual socio-material practices 
producing the everyday territories of mining governance. In doing so I do not intend to minimize 
or counter the significance of global, transnational political networks of finance and crime. In 
fact, the same types of secretive, off-shore, transnational financial networks Doolot and 
Heathershaw demonstrate as foundational to gold mining industries in Kyrgyzstan and 
throughout the region (2015) fuel the extractive regime in Georgia (see Chapter 3). I instead 
develop and extend Heathershaw et al.’s call “to get beyond the perceived binary division 
between domestic affairs and foreign affairs” (Cooley and Heathershaw 2017: 25). Local 
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political practices crucially operate to uphold these transnational political assemblages (Ong and 
Collier 2004; Sassen 2008, 2018; Sassen and Ong 2014), binding together “hybrid and 
polyvalent forms of statehood” (Heathershaw and Schatz 2017: 7) in Central Eurasia with global 
political and economic networks. Analyzing mining from this perspective expands and refines 
scholars’ ability to assess and explain the production of environmental injustices – not just in the 
formerly Soviet world, but in any context where extractive practices produce new political 
geographies of inequality, boundedness, and connectivity. Doing so reveals the extractive 
industries’ significance for understanding the cross-scalar nature of contemporary Central 
Eurasian power geometries, moving political ecologists and political geographers alike toward a 
more flexible “ecology of politics” (Huber 2015). I now analyze several such embedded 
borderings within the Mashavera Valley. 
 
3.  Bordering the Mine 
 
Each of the three categories of mining practices I analyzed here correspond to different 
forms of power relations in the region: geoeconomic, biopolitical, and geopolitical. However, I 
also recognize that these powers and practices hardly ever work in isolation and in fact often rely 
upon another to exist. I instead use the above categories as heuristic guides based on the 
dominant role each plays within a set of bordering practices, acknowledging these relations’ 
potential heterogeneity and contingency within society’s archipelago of powers. In doing so I 
analyze how different bordering practices in the Mashavera Valley re-shape the political 
contours of state, society, and territory as they converge in the mining industry there.  
My analysis explores diverse socio-material divisions as identified through interviews 
and contextualized with broader public opinion polls, ecological data, and economic statistics to 
consider how these localized effects fit within broader political patterns of bounding and 
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connectivity. In doing so I aim to limit the influence of scalar analytical assumptions (local vs. 
national vs. global), instead looking at specific practices that may connect phenomena across 
disparate spaces and scales – or not.  
This extractive regime emerges from a history of socio-political networks and the 
political imaginations of diverse actors, as I develop in Chapters 3 and 4. I presently argue that 
such political relations produce a range of socio-material, sub-state borders shaping 
environmental governance throughout the region and in extractive “archipelagos” reaching 
across the former Soviet Union, enrolling the Mashavera Valley as one such “island.” As I 
illustrate here, these extractive islands are bound from their surrounding socio-material 
environments in multiple ways. Yet in other ways these sub-state regions stay connected to other 
“external” spaces – from the rest of the Kvemo Kartli district to foreign mines, offshore financial 
institutions and beyond. The mining practices of actors related to the GeoProMining corporation 
and its affiliates (including RMG and other corporations identified in Chapter 3) connect these 
political islands via the history of corporate ownership, access, and control in the region (see 
Figure 17). While my research has not yet extended to other sites within this archipelago, my 
analysis here offers an important window into how these islands may develop while building a 
model for my future research. 
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Figure 17: GeoProMining archipelago 
(Map credit: Author; Sources: USGS, MiningAtlas, Esri, NOAA) 
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These diverse bordering practices (and general forms of power) produce exclusive forms of 
environmental injustice and inequity, which I outline in the following sub-sections: (1) unequal 
levels of socio-economic access (geoeconomic), (2) exposure to toxic plumes (biopolitical), and 
(3) contours of degraded political citizenship (geopolitical). 
 
3.1.  Digital Divides and Economic Access 
  
Relations of economic access and exclusion provide a primary dimension of political 
bordering in environmental governance. Scholars often view these relations in terms of property, 
as a bundle of rights and access to resources (Ribot and Peluso 2003). Yet property relations also 
intersect with other political forces such as shifting political imaginaries, policy histories, and 
international relations (as illustrated in the previous two chapters). Social scientists sometimes 
refer to this intersection of geographic and political economic division as geoeconomic power. 
Some “realist” scholars view geoeconomics as a set of instruments states either utilize or 
don’t, leveraging economic policies like sanctions or energy provision as political tools within 
international relations (Luttwak 1990; Vihma 2018a, 2018b). Yet others see geoeconomics as a 
more discursive set of political practices also embedded within everyday life (Casolo and Doshi 
2013; Lee et al. 2018, 2018; Moisio 2018; Moisio and Paasi 2013b; Sparke 2018a, 2018b; 
Williams and Massaro 2013), including virtual and cyber practices (Jessop and Sum 2018). A 
geoeconomics perspective often considers commerce and trade within national security and 
foreign policy frameworks, yet adopting a more critical lens toward these relations reveals the 
economic imaginaries’ importance for shaping political spaces and borderings (Moisio 2018), 
including the territoriality of state space to include market relations and control (Cowen and 
Smith 2009; Moisio and Paasi 2013b). Moisio and Paasi use the Finnish welfare state’s historic 
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evolution to illustrate how scholars can fruitfully investigate such developments by tracing shifts 
in political rationalities and governmental techniques as the Finnish government considered 
economic markets in relation to the state’s populations and territories (2013b). Importantly, these 
rationalities and techniques operate both within and beyond Finnish state space, suggesting that 
geoeconomic borderings can exist across scales and spaces, both transnationally and locally. 
Sub-state, embedded geoeconomic shifts are clearly evident in recent reforms of the 
Georgian mining industry (see Chapter 4). Driven by calls to open markets and decrease 
regulation, the Georgian government sells off long-term extraction licenses to the highest bidder. 
A leading official at the Georgian National Environmental Agency (NEA) told me that anyone 
can purchase these licenses, as long as you have money to pay for them: “this is transparent, and 
everyone can bid… everyone can submit their starting point… you can bid also! [referring to me 
and laughing] You have to register, it’s a very simple procedure… anyone can register” 
(Interview 60). Such claims prove interesting because of  Georgia’s broader attitudes toward 
foreign land ownership – recently producing a moratorium on the sale of agricultural land to 
foreign individuals or companies (TI Georgia 2017) as part of a broader regional trend 
(Mustafayev 2018) – but also because the geoeconomic situation unfolding here is somewhat 
more complex than this official suggests. 
Under the Law of Georgia on License and Permit Fees, the minimum cost for a mineral 
extraction license is 200 GEL, or about USD$84 (The Parliament of Georgia 2005), but they of 
course sell for significantly more. However, not only are figures and maps illustrating the license 
areas’ territorial divisions not accessible, and financially out of reach for most entities other than 
corporate investors, but access to these auctions and the entire resource license portal are kept 
behind the simplest of digital-age borders: a username and password bottleneck that the agency 
 
 210 
must grant (see Figure 18). The agency demarcates licenses via mapping software, but keeps 
these spatial data sequestered behind both digital lock and key. Monopolistic tendencies enhance 
these exclusive divisions as the momentum of Georgia’s libertarian market forces allow powerful 
actors to entrench their relative economic positions at the expense of others. Walters identifies 
such digital borders (specifically internet firewalls) as non-linear, non-geographical, and non-
territorial borderings (2006), suggesting that such digital divisions can exist as powerful social 
boundaries. 
 
Figure 18: Screen shot of web portal access page 
(Source: Georgian National Environmental Agency 2018) 
 
Yet these digital divides do not exist merely in flat, de-territorialized cyberspace. Once 
issued, these extraction licenses confer de facto territorial sovereignty to the license winners, 
almost exclusively corporate, as they essentially self-regulate their exploration, development, 
and extraction of natural resources (Interviews 3, 20, 27, 50). The license for the region around 
the Sakdrisi-Madneuli mine complex is set for 30 years, but the NEA may grant these licenses 
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for up to 100 years, and companies can typically extend them under the same conditions when 
the leasing term ends (Interviews 20, 50, 60). Crucially, this governance system is also set up so 
that the licensee assesses and defines what resources are present in that territory and then has the 
authority to develop those resources as long as the operations remain aligned with their proposed 
extraction plan (RMG Gold Ltd. 2013). These plans bear little government scrutiny and are 
infrequently rejected, meaning that extractive corporations have effective sovereignty over a 
portion of state territory – a textbook example of a “structural hole” in state sovereignty and a 
radical shift in territorial governance as these borderings become embedded in and shift “state 
space” (Ong 2006a, 2007; Sassen 2013b, 2018).  
The mines themselves are strikingly visible, as are the many practices that produce the 
smaller borders of everyday life around them – enormous holes in the earth, explosions, armed 
guard houses. Yet it is often unclear exactly where RMG (the current owners of GeoProMining’s 
original license; see Chapter 3) and other corporations like it in Georgia, often at least partly 
foreign-owned, possess the right to explore, designate, and extract resources as these borders are 
rarely marked on maps or landscapes. For example, I was only able to recreate the borders of this 
exploration and extraction license by photographing a map on the wall of a PR representative for 
the company during an interview in his office (with their permission, Interview 21). I then had to 
georeference my image and compare it to a map found in a British investor promotional 
presentation just to determine the mining company’s jurisdictional borders (Noricum Gold 
2018). While this investor map is freely available online, it neither supplies detailed spatial 
information nor allows any access or control to citizens even if they could access these data. The 
power to define these geoeconomic borderings within the Mashavera Valley lies squarely with 
corporate interests. These variably visible and invisible borders deny locals the capacity to 
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compete and defend their individual interests while the government relinquishes a portion of 
territorial sovereignty in exchange for resource rents – especially compelling as RMG accrues 
nationally significant profits. 
These fiscal and digital elements together create a system of embedded borderings 
constructed as inherently exclusive – a digital division shaping economic access to the material 
world. Access is crucial to any property regime, and as Georgia’s system of extraction licenses 
emerges from the country’s post-Soviet property reforms (USAID 2010), this new political 
regime establishes a distinct “bundle of rights” for the owners of global capital. This regime does 
so at local populations’ exclusion, who have no method or means to access either rights or data 
related to these spaces (Blomley 2015; Peluso 2018; Ribot and Peluso 2003). Such de jure and 
de facto borderings produce highly uneven state-society relations indicative of post-Soviet 
political space, with capital accumulating to state-connected actors, often to the detriment of 
local livelihoods and resilience. 
Meanwhile, the geoeconomic effects of this governance system on the ground are 
striking. Local citizens experience these exclusive divisions in various everyday forms. For 
example, mining’s local dominance in the valley erases alternative economic opportunities and 
other livelihood options (Interviews 14, 30, 48, 54), such that “these people are afraid that they 
will lose jobs” (Interview 14). While most people in the region work either in the mines or as 
farmers, grazing lands are converted to open pits (Interview 37/38) and a local man who 
previously worked as a state veterinarian estimates “there were approximately seven hundred 
livestock [here], but only seventy left in town now because we lost all the fields… I had eight to 
ten livestock but now only keep one because there are no more fields” (Interview 38). 
Meanwhile, poverty remains widespread (Interviews 12, 14, 34, 39); as a local labor organizer 
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claims, "it is just impossible to live here, totally impossible... and the company did not take any 
care" (Interview 34). These geoeconomic borderings produce diverse socio-spatial effects in 
people’s lives, often with ambiguity and uncertainty. For example, unless citizens possess 
intimate (and accurate) knowledge of corporate activities, you can (and I have) walk toward the 
edge of corporate territory and have no way of knowing when you have entered this new political 
space by passing within the boundary of the extractive license territory.  
Importantly, however, these geoeconomic borderings stemming from mining’s effects 
also intersect with other social divisions, shaping broader geoeconomic contours within the 
country and across the region. Some of the most reliable data on these broader social borders 
come from recurring surveys issued by the Caucasus Research Resource Center (CRRC).16 For 
example, and as might be expected, higher education levels tend to produce more secure 
household economic situations in Georgia.17 Yet rural Georgian populations as in the Mashavera 
Valley are two to three times less likely than urban populations to have achieved any education 
beyond secondary school,18 patterns exacerbated in communities lacking diverse economic 
opportunities such as Kazreti and Balichebi . 
                                                        
16 The Caucasus Barometer is an opinion survey used widely by scholars of the South Caucasus. While CRRC administers forms 
of the survey in all three countries of the South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia), I only analyze findings from the 
Georgia survey here. The Caucasus Research Resource Center (CRRC) typically administers the Barometer once a year, though 
this is not perfectly regular due to the country’s often-unpredictable political circumstances. The survey population includes 
adults 18 years and older living throughout the country but excludes populations living in territories affected by military conflict 
(South Ossetia and Abkhazia). Sample sizes average between 2,000-2,500 respondents selected via multi-stage cluster sampling 
with preliminary stratification. The 2017 survey achieved a sample size of 2,379 respondents during fieldwork conducted from 
September 22 to October 10, 2017, with a 58% response rate. Researchers conducted interviews in Armenian, Azerbaijani, and 
Georgian. The principal investigator was Dr. Tinatin Zurabisihvili, who serves as the Caucasus Barometer Project Coordinator. 
All errors of analysis and interpretation are the author’s sole responsibility. 
17 Caucasus Barometer 2017: When asked “Which of the following statements best describes the current economic situation of 
your household?” (ECONSTN), potential responses include: (1) Money is not enough for food; (2) Money is enough for food 
only, but not for clothes; (3) Money is enough for food and clothes, but not enough for expensive durables like a refrigerator or 
washing machine; (4) We can afford to buy some expensive durables like a refrigerator or washing machine; (5) We can afford to 
buy anything we need; or (6) DK/RA. 
18 Caucasus Barometer 2017: (RESPEDU * SETTYPE) 
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Resulting from these uneven patterns of development, education, security, and 
opportunity, respondents across all regions in Georgia overwhelmingly found unemployment the 
country’s most pressing issue (51-60%), with poverty second (13-14%) and Georgia’s unsolved 
territorial conflicts, often discussed by foreign policy analysts as the most dire situation facing 
the country, in third (4-8%).19 This finding aligns with other public opinion surveys, including 
one by the National Democratic Institute (NDI Georgia).20 “Jobs” consistently rank as the most 
important national issue over time, with rising prices/inflation, poverty, territorial integrity, and 
affordable healthcare all vying for second place (from May 2009 to April 2015) andwith most 
respondents thinking all these issues have either remained static or gotten worse since October 
2012. In 2014 and 2015, during a turbulent time in Georgian politics when the Sakdrisi protests 
were unfolding amid rapid political turnover in the government, the NDI poll saw the number of 
Georgians who thought the country was going in the right direction slip below those who thought 
it was not changing at all or going in the wrong direction – the first time such a shift occurred 
since May 2009, the year after Russia invaded South Ossetia. Yet those living in more 
economically secure households were increasingly likely to find problems beyond economic 
development more significant for the country.21  
These links among uneven economic development, dispossession, and political 
imaginations resulting from them establish the divisive socio-spatialization of geoeconomic 
borderings that bound this mining “island.” For instance, Tbilisi is clearly the country’s primate 
economic powerhouse, perennially adding close to half the country’s gross value added since 
                                                        
19 Caucasus Barometer 2017: (IMPISS1 * SETTYPE) 
20 The CRRC administers the NDI public attitude surveys several times each year and is also accessible via 
caucasusbarometer.org. 
21 Caucasus Barometer 2017: (IMPISS1 * ECONSTN) 
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2006 (GeoStat.Ge 2018). However, Kvemo Kartli (the region where the Mashavera Valley is 
located, along with the industrial center of Rustavi) is in the top half of Georgia’s other regions 
by the same metric. It is second only to Tbilisi in production value of industry, providing 
approximately a third of the region’s aggregate value produced, more than twice the next closest 
sector (agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fishing combined) – the most industry dominant 
economy in Georgia (GeoStat.Ge 2018). 
The mining industry’s dominance in surrounding districts provides a key force within 
these geoeconomic borderings, both regionally and in local communities. For example, among 
Georgia’s rural populations those working for state or medium to large private companies like 
RMG comprise a small minority of the population.22 These employed rural respondents tend to 
be more economically secure, though not by much.23 At the same time, the region has 
historically had the second highest or highest monthly salaries among industrial employees in the 
country, along with high levels of fixed asset investment (GeoStat.Ge 2018). While 
unemployment levels in Kvemo Kartli are lower than in most other regions, national 
unemployment levels slowly decrease across the country as these benefits are distributed 
unevenly, with Kvemo Kartli generally missing out on such developments (GeoStat.Ge 2018). In 
short, the region around the Sakdrisi-Madneuli mining complex is particularly vulnerable 
economically, though those getting employment in the mines are among Georgia’s more secure 
populations, exacerbating the uneven effects of uneven economic development in this region. 
                                                        
22 While rural areas experience higher rates of poverty and economic need, divisions of economic security actually appear 
relatively similar across the country. Survey results generally show similar trends in class divisions among settlement types, with 
relatively similar numbers of households struggling to afford food and/or clothing across rural (57%), urban (51%), and capital 
regions (46%) (ECONSTN * SETTYPE). However, rural populations do suffer greater rates of poverty with nearly half (44%) of 
households relying on self-employment or subsistence farming (compared to 13-19% in urban and capital districts) (WORKTYP 
* SETTYPE). 
23 Caucasus Barometer 2017: (WORKTYP * ECONSTN) 
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Analysts at CRRC have determined that such economic deprivations (along with 
corollary trends along divisions of age, education, and settlement type) in Georgia tend to elicit 
nostalgia for the Soviet Union (CRRC 2017), a trend I experienced directly in the Mashavera. 
Such nostalgia connects to political opinions of how Georgia should align itself internationally – 
for instance toward the Russian-dominated Eurasian Union or the European Union and NATO – 
in part shaping one of the most significant ongoing political debates in the country and South 
Caucasus region. At the same time, the Georgian government’s ongoing balancing act to allow 
under-regulated foreign corporations to control increasingly large areas of state territory at the 
expense of Georgian well-being suggests that the government continues to flag itself as “open for 
business” to foreign capital, undertaking significant “realist” geoeconomic signaling within a 
broader geopolitical condition (Toal 2017: 13). 
While none of these findings offer a clear, singular reality in Georgian political 
geographies, they do suggest several important dynamics underlying and driving the region’s 
geoeconomic divisions. Uneven economic development nationally, with sputtering and uneven 
industrial expansion in Kvemo Kartli focused primarily in the Mashavera Valley and Rustavi, 
has left much of the region’s population behind, especially in its rural industrial districts, as 
briefly illustrated in the preceding pages. Such economic divisions and borders produce similar 
divisions in political imaginations, at least in part driving political opinion in this hybrid 
democracy within a tumultuous region. Some of these effects manifest as new relations between 
society and state, which I explore further in the closing section of this analysis. 
Uneven economic access levels in the Mashavera Valley produce diverse socio-
economic, spatial, and territorial divisions – or more simply, geoeconomic borderings – all 
filtered through a digital bottleneck and producing real effects on residents’ livelihoods and well-
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being. These geoeconomic borders often bear great political weight despite their often-diffuse 
effects. As a result, their socio-spatial effects might seem subtle – until, that is, people 
experience these economic dispossessions directly in everyday life or view them in the context of 
the pollution obviously visible in streams leading from the mine. This intersection leads to the 
second set of bordering practices I highlight in the Mashavera Valley: the creation of toxic 
frontiers. 
 
3.2.  Toxic Frontiers: Poisoned Lands, Poisoned Bodies 
 
Geoeconomic relations do not supply the only political bordering forces in extractive 
landscapes like the Mashavera Valley. Socio-spatial divisions also emerge from the intimate 
connections and embodied experiences of such extractive environments. These sites of extraction 
exist as “portals, worm-holes between two worlds in which time and space work differently. 
Underground lies a world of ‘natural production,’ the deep-time processes beyond human 
control” that create the resources we value, while “Above-ground and freed from geological 
fixity” these resources become “thrown into a tumultuous world of ‘social production,’ a surface 
world of mobility and change” (Bridge 2013: 43). Bridge argues that our surface world of social 
relations is not merely distinct from the underground and the biophysical but intrinsically 
connected as mining practices turn portions of the earth inside-out. In many ways the two worlds 
of under- and above-ground become one and the same as extractive industries produce new 
ecologies in the social world humans bring them into. These ecologies affect not only the 
biophysical environment independent of human experience but also our bodies and health, often 
in uneven and politically contentious ways (Brubaker 2017). 
Illness and healthcare provision therefore provide a crucial nexus between geopolitical 
and biopolitical governing logics by extending the state’s territorial reach and providing care for 
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citizens as embodied political subjects – profoundly demonstrating how territories and 
populations become intimately entwined as “vital” objects of liberal democratic government 
(Collier and Lakoff 2015; Foucault 2008, 2009; Kearns 2014; Kivelä and Moisio 2017; Legg 
2005; Lemke 2018; Rabinow and Rose 2006). Such biopolitical borderings enroll diverse bodies 
and environments, both embodied and material, and emerge from experiences of health at scales 
both personal and public (Smith et al. 2016). For example, Braun analyzes global security issues 
related to the emergence and spread of infectious diseases to illustrate how our molecularized 
understanding of life reveals governmentality and sovereignty as intimately entwined, as 
“biopolitics has merged with geopolitics” and “the government of ‘life’ has revealed itself to be 
intimately related to the exercise and extension of sovereign power” (2011: 390). These powerful 
imbrications resonate with mining-affected communities around the world, as memories and 
imaginations of health and sickness shape contemporary visions of extractive landscapes and the 
authorities governing them (Auyero and Swistun 2009; Legg 2007; Perreault 2018). 
Divisions in environmental health experiences generate the most visceral form of 
political bordering in the Mashavera valley – its ongoing poisoning. These biopolitical relations 
produce crucial borders between potentials for health or illness, in the process offering powerful 
vectors of socio-spatialization defining this political island. 
As with the geoeconomic borderings outlined above, the Mashavera’s localized 
biopolitical divisions exist within broader socio-spatial borders throughout Georgia. Regardless 
of region, about half the country’s population rates their health as “fair,” with the capital region 
the healthiest (37% responding “Good” or “Very good” versus 27% in rural regions) and rural 
areas the least (24% responding “Poor” or “Very poor” versus 15% in the capital).24 Perhaps 
                                                        
24 Caucasus Barometer 2017: (HLTHRAT * SETTYPE) 
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unsurprisingly, those who live in rural areas and are self-employed, run their own business 
without employees, or work in household production or farming a land plot – like the majority of 
people living in the Mashavera, aside from those working in the mines – are the least healthy in 
the country.25 As suggested by scholars investigating intersections of biopolitics and 
geoeconomics through healthcare (Kivelä and Moisio 2017), boundaries of economic access as 
explored above also align with public health divisions in Georgia. For example, household 
economic security seems most directly related to experiences of health among all variables I 
consider. 43% of respondents who say money is not enough for food report their health as “poor” 
or “very poor,” while only 6% of those who can afford to buy anything they need report the same 
(with negligible numbers reporting “very poor”).26 
 
 
Figure 19: Soviet archival footage of original Madneuli copper processing  
(Source: Georgian National Archives) 
 
                                                        
25 Caucasus Barometer 2017: (HLTHRAT * WORKTYP) 
26 Caucasus Barometer 2017: (HLTHRAT * ECONSTN) 
 
 220 
These biopolitical borderings intensify in the context of environmental degradation due to 
existing and expanding mining practices in the region. While mining has taken place here since 
the Soviet regime first opened the Madneuli mine in the 1970s (see Figure 19), the introduction 
and intensification of foreign investment in the venture have produced a rapid operational 
expansion in the region, with a number of economically promising deposits under exploration 
within the license area (see Figure 20). Open-pit mining as RMG practices here uses a cyanide 
solution to leach gold and copper out of crushed rock for further processing and extraction 
(Interview 21). However, the geologic origins of such deposits mean other metals often exist 
alongside these valuable commodities, considered waste within the political economy of a 
project. At the Sakdrisi-Madneuli complex, these toxic heavy metals include zinc, cadmium, and 
mercury, all of which come out of the rock along with gold and copper as the cyanide solution 
washes over them (Interview 26; see also: Avkopashvili et al. 2017; Felix-Henningsen and 
Urushadze 2012; Matchavariani and Kalandadze 2012).  
 
Figure 20: Noricum license expansion map 
(Source: Noricum Gold, Fair Use) 
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These heavy metals and other poisons leak into the valley’s water supplies, where 
irrigation pipes distribute the poisonous materials – what some call mining’s “residues” (Hecht 
2018) or “excrement” (Perreault 2013a) – over farm fields throughout this valley, part of 
Georgia’s agricultural heartland (see Chapter 4). There is little monitoring of these residual 
leaks, and RMG typically does not share what information does exist with local residents. As a 
result, the constantly shifting toxic frontier of polluted space is powerfully invisible – often 
undetectable without specialized equipment yet particularly dangerous and divisive (Rasmussen 
and Lund 2018; Tsing 2003; Watts 2018). 
Under certain conditions water can dissolve the heavy metals released by mining, 
leaching into groundwater, taken up by vegetation and in turn absorbed by animals – including 
humans – when consuming those plants (Felix-Henningsen et al. 2010; Matchavariani and 
Kalandadze 2012; Melikadze et al. 2006). For instance, tiered mountains of flotation residues 
have accumulated in the decades since the mine first opened. The metal sulfides they contain 
oxidize when exposed to the atmosphere, forming sulfuric acid and causing further dissolution of 
heavy metals. These acidic materials inhibit plant growth, promoting instability and erosion of 
wastes into the Kazretula river, which flows into the Mashavera. This water flows throughout the 
valley in a system of irrigation pipes and ditches, supplying both nourishment and toxins to 
living things throughout the valley. The humus-rich soils typically found throughout the 
Mashavera Valley are thick and fertile,27 having prominent levels of clay and organic matter. 
This soil is ideal for promoting the storage of those dissolved heavy metals, as well as their 
uptake into plant material (Felix-Henningsen et al. 2010; Felix-Henningsen and Urushadze 2012; 
                                                        
27 The most common soil types in the valley include these Chernozem and Kastanozem deposits (Avkopashvili et al. 2017; Felix-
Henningsen and Urushadze 2012). 
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Kaplan et al. 2014; Matchavariani et al. 2015). Several teams of soil scientists, including joint 
Georgian and German efforts, have surveyed the valley and determined that nearly all tested 
plots of irrigated land exceeded EU standards for precautionary values of copper, zinc, and 
cadmium, with 21-82% of different agricultural land types (grazing land, vineyards, etc.) 
requiring immediate action. Field experiments confirm that leafy vegetables efficiently absorb 
these heavy metals and only become further poisoned when washed in water from the Mashavera 
River. Livestock also exhibit this pattern as they drink from irrigation channels and eat irrigated 
grass, accumulating heavy metals in their meat and milk. Such forms of direct exposure also 
occur frequently as people drink and wash clothes in the river water (Felix-Henningsen and 
Urushadze 2012; Matchavariani and Kalandadze 2012). 
 
 
Figure 21: Toxic heavy metal pollution downstream from Sakdrisi 
(Photo credit: Martha Swann-Quinn, 2017) 
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These slow leaks occasionally become spectacular, such as when a tailings dam broke in 
the midst of a labor dispute when employees at RMG Copper and RMG Gold went on strike in 
February 2014, with hundreds of people rallying in Kazreti (EMC 2014). The dam released 
unknown volumes of waste into the river, turning the Mashavera River various shades of orange 
and wreaking havoc on the local ecology (see Figure 21 for a smaller scale example). Corporate 
responses to these alternatively fast and slow toxic leaks are themselves bordered, as the mining 
company tries to keep away journalists and other inquisitive people (including me and my 
research assistants).  
RMG’s legally dubious waste management system provides the most obvious source for 
such exclusions. Article 47 of the Law of Georgia “On Subsoil” ensures the “security of life and 
health of the population” over corporate activities in the country (The Parliament of Georgia 
1996), while article 14 clearly states, "The right to use subsoil may be recognised as void:... if 
life and health of people working or residing in the area where works related to the use of subsoil 
are carried out are endangered as a result of the use of subsoil" (The Parliament of Georgia 
1996). However, such promises of environmental governance clearly go unfulfilled and produce 
dangerous biopolitical borderings within the region.  
As these toxins accumulate throughout local lands (see [Perreault 2013a] for an example 
of similar effects in Bolivian mining communities), fields become unproductive, fruits and 
vegetables have drastically increased levels of toxins, and people do not know whether or not 
they are consuming dangerous foods (Interviews 12, 14, 24, 31, 47, 56). Families often have 
little opportunity for alternative forms of subsistence as they rely on farming for both income and 
sustenance. Heavy metal toxins collect in bodies through agriculture and consumption, 
respiration of poisoned dust blown throughout the valley (see Figure 22), and exposure of people 
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working in the mines (ASTDR 2004; Järup 2003). These various exposures cause significantly 
higher rates of cardiovascular disease and cancer in the Mashavera’s surrounding communities 
than experienced by people across the rest of Kvemo Kartli (see Figures 23a/b & 24a/b below). 
These unequal health experiences generate widespread imaginations of a poisoned population 
(see Chapter 4).  
 
Figure 22: Dust in Kazreti 
(Photo credit: Martha Swann-Quinn, 2017) 
Scholars should always consider such health data in the context of their own limitations,28 
yet these rates come from government monitoring organizations and align with Georgia’s annual 
CDC reports. According to official data from the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resource  
 
                                                        
28 Here specifically as they relate to the timing of the national health care system’s establishment and different statistical 
monitoring techniques, as explained to me by a consultant at the Georgian National Center for Disease Control (Interview 51). 
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Figures 23a and 23b: Malignant tumors in Bolnisi compared to rest of administrative region 
(Kvemo Kartli), First time diagnoses and total ill  
(Sources: National Centre for Disease Control and Public Health of Georgia; Caucasus 
Environmental NGO Network (CENN)) 
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Figures 24a and 24b: Cardiovascular diseases in Bolnisi compared to rest of administrative 
region (Kvemo Kartli), First time diagnoses and total ill  
(Sources: National Centre for Disease Control and Public Health of Georgia; Caucasus 
Environmental NGO Network (CENN)) 
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Protection, Kvemo Kartli has Georgia’s highest rate of air pollution stemming from the region’s 
industrial development (GeoStat.Ge 2018). Per capita, related cardiovascular diseases in Bolnisi 
are more commonly diagnosed and widespread than in the rest of Kvemo Kartli, and malignant 
tumors follow similar patterns, also killing more people. 
Meanwhile, these toxins accumulate in bodies unevenly, as heavy metals like those found 
in the ecosystems surrounding the Sakdrisi and Madneuli mining sites – including cadmium, 
copper, zinc, mercury, and lead – tend to collect in the soft tissues of women and children’s 
bodies in higher concentrations (Jaishankar et al. 2014; Järup 2003; National Research Council 
2000; Rzymski et al. 2015), reinforcing gendered divisions in Georgian society. Scientists and 
public health experts increasingly link these toxic materials to a range of reproductive health  
issues in women globally, including breast cancer, endometriosis, and miscarriage (Rzymski et 
al. 2015). Respondents anecdotally report rampant cases of miscarriage throughout the 
Mashavera Valley, as well as stories of women electing to abort pregnancies rather than deal 
with the potential health consequences (Interviews 34, 37/38, 43, 44, 50, 51)29 – a stark example 
of biopolitical government stemming from uneven and divisive borderings of environmental 
health. These uneven experiences divide the Valley’s inhabitants from the rest of the country, re-
shaping their opportunities, political imaginations, bodies, and lives. 
As just one example of the effects brought to these communities by their toxic 
environments and inadequate healthcare provisioning, a man living just south of the Soviet-era 
pit in Balichebi had worked in the mine during the Soviet period and told me that “When my 
daughter-in-law became pregnant, we were worried about her health and made them leave” 
                                                        
29 Statistics related to pregnancy loss and other related afflictions in the region are minimal and unreliable due to socio-cultural 
factors marking these topics as relatively taboo. 
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(Interview 38). Several other local respondents expressed similar fears or experiences as they 
became comfortable during our conversations. For example, an elderly woman in Bolnisi has a 
grandson who married someone from Kazreti, and she “had a miscarriage, and it was proved that 
it was caused by high radiation [sic – toxic exposure]. But finally, she got pregnant and… she 
made it up to eight-nine months. And then the child was born dead, and she survives” (Interview 
18).  
The same man who made his pregnant daughter leave home also told my research 
assistants and myself his wife’s story. The man’s wife was present as he spoke, quietly preparing 
and sharing a lunch of fried trout with us and their friends in their cool living room, silently 
nodding throughout the story. Though he had worked in the mine, the man trained as a 
veterinarian and rarely looked up from his hands while quietly speaking of his inability to help 
treat his wife’s health conditions: “She is fifty-five, has cancer of the breast and uterus, and had 
three surgeries in one day. They removed her uterus, cut her breast, and removed part going 
down to the back. Nobody knows in the world how cancer appears… but I blame the ecological 
condition here in Balichebi” (Interview 38). This man’s parents also worked at the mine, and 
both suffered from illnesses attributed to toxic dust exposure, sacrifices only acknowledged by 
the company with a medal for years of service.  
Looking ahead from a past and present imagined as increasingly poisoned and deadly, 
such sentiments carry imaginations of a dire future (Auyero and Swistun 2009). Community 
members throughout the valley share such losses – often ambiguously diagnosed, unevenly 
treated, and unfamiliar to people from outside this political island – leaving many feeling 
helpless, frightened, or angry. Yet, as one respondent steadfastly expressed, “If you lose hope for 
the future, then there is no means for life, so I hope for a better future” (Interview 37). 
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Meanwhile, access to healthcare and screenings that might help move local communities 
toward “a better future” remain limited. Few doctors work locally, and healthcare often remains 
prohibitively expensive, even if employment at the mine supplies a family member with health 
insurance. RMG only offers free clinics sporadically, if at all, as confirmed by discussions with 
multiple individuals, including a local nurse (Interview 43) and a doctor at the Alexsandre 
Aladashvili Clinic in Tbilisi, which ran one of these infrequent clinics (Interview 44) (and who 
quickly hurried us out of the office after realizing what I hoped to discuss).  
In addition to these toxins’ visceral and embodied consequences, farmers often hope to 
sell their harvested products throughout the country, yet the poisoned goods have garnered a bad 
reputation and prove less desirable and more difficult to sell at regional markets (Interviews 3, 
12, 14, 68; Felix-Henningsen and Urushadze 2012). Many feel the company’s owners “get the 
maximum profit to get people on the minimum” (Interview 12) as “the vegetables and products 
are not clean, not ecologically clean” (Interview 14). Again, these local biopolitical borderings of 
poisoned and healthy environments appear from the context of broader health disparities across 
Georgia, exacerbating the effects of geoeconomic borders diffused throughout the Valley. Rural 
populations mirror country-wide patterns that those employed by corporations or the state report 
better health on average. For example, roughly 32% of rural inhabitants who are self-employed 
or run their own business without employees report “poor” or “very poor” health while those 
employed by a company or the state experience poor health rates of 8%-20%.30 Health 
experiences are generally poorer in Georgia’s rural regions, with economic divides driving even 
starker inequities. For example, 59% of those rural populations surveyed who said they did not 
have enough money to purchase food reported their health as poor or very poor, while only 9% 
                                                        
30 Caucasus Barometer 2017: (HLTHRAT * WORKTYP) 
 
 230 
of those who could afford to buy anything they needed reported the same.31 This pattern is 
mirrored along educational levels, with those having less than a secondary education 
experiencing rates of 45%-58% “poor”/“very poor” health and those with some higher education 
less than 25%.32 As the geoeconomic borders in the Mashavera Valley shift, so too do the lived 
biopolitical borders in relation to the rest of Georgia. 
In these ways, the Mashavera Valley presents a textbook case of a structural hole in state 
space as human bodies variably cross toxic frontiers, dispossessed of health through the 
accumulation of toxins (Nixon 2011; Perreault 2013a). Such uncertain biopolitical borderings 
have immense consequences for individual lives, livelihoods, health, and political subjectivity. 
Scholars find such changes in political subjectivity throughout post-Soviet spaces poisoned by 
nuclear radioactivity (Brown 2013; Petryna 2013; Stawkowski 2016), Latin American extractive 
environments facing “toxic uncertainty” (Auyero and Swistun 2009: 144), and others, further 
illustrating the potential significance of environmental shifts for political identification trends. 
Yet these divisions of political subjectivity extend beyond the geoeconomic and biopolitical to 
include broader geopolitical relations of sovereignty and citizenship among state, society, 
corporations, and related entities across formerly Soviet space. Such bordering practices lead me 
to a third form of political bordering via mining practices in the Valley, the region’s shifting 
contours of citizenship. 
 
3.3.  Contours of Citizenship  
 
Drawing together the biopolitical and geoeconomic borders present in this case, health 
services ideally illustrate the multiple ways citizens experience and imagine their relations to 
                                                        
31 Caucasus Barometer 2017: (HLTHRAT * ECONSTN) 
32 Caucasus Barometer 2017: (HLTHRAT * RESPEDU) 
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state institutions. For instance, a “popular, lived citizenship” (Staeheli 2011: 397) can emerge 
through experiences of illness and healthcare as state policies intersect with non-state spaces of 
local health provisions. These relations contribute to connective geopolitical imaginations of how 
individuals fit within broader political bodies. Yet myriad other lived relations between state 
actors and society may also exhibit such citizenship dimensions. In this final section, I consider 
the contoured experiences of citizenship in the Mashavera Valley as inhabitants navigate 
borderings of service provision, health care, participation in local elections, and broader relations 
among corporate interests, the Georgian government, and the Georgian body politic. 
Political geographers typically characterize citizenship as a particular political 
subjectivity based on relations of rights and responsibilities between individuals and states that 
also underpin modern geopolitical imaginations (Vaughan-Williams 2009). Citizenship therefore 
comprises both a political status and a membership relation within geopolitical imaginations, 
each defined by multi-scalar borders – social, physical, and contested in diverse sites and places, 
including beyond state spaces (Staeheli 2011). People may enroll many diverse factors in 
relations of citizenship, including economic resource development (Valdivia 2008) and 
biological experience (Petryna 2013).  
Lynn Staeheli explains how citizenship develops through the construction of various 
political borders, leaving diverse, fractured, and at times conflicting relationships as some people 
gain access to certain opportunities over others, and others do not:  
it is important to explore the ways in which institutions and a broad range of agents 
function in terms of the resources and barriers they construct. Political opportunity 
structures are an amalgam of many different institutions, only some of which are part of 
the state apparatus. Importantly, political opportunity structures are networked, in that 
they intersect and overlap with structures in multiple locations or that have developed 
with respect to a variety of issues, 
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at times producing “multiple citizenships… that mean citizenship is always a fragmented status” 
(2011: 396–7).  
Many scholars adopt this disaggregated view of citizenship to explain how mutations of 
citizenship and sovereignty emerge as contingent (Elden 2006; Mahanty 2017), graduated (Ong 
2006a), fractured (Quinn 2017), and fragmented (Lund 2011) through diverse and often mundane 
experiences of political inclusion and exclusion (Ong 2006a; Staeheli et al. 2012) – including in 
relation to mining practices (Vogel 2018). Citizenship, like all bordering practices, exists not 
only in the sphere of formal politics but also within “ordinary” and banal spaces beyond state 
purview (Barnett and Scott 2007; Ehrkamp and Jacobsen 2015; Secor 2004; Staeheli et al. 2012), 
including through environmental practices, systems, and subjectivities (Barnett and Scott 2007; 
Latta 2014; Nagel and Staeheli 2016; Valdivia 2008). 
The presumed geographic isomorphisms between democratic states and the extension of 
rights underlying many classic definitions of citizenship (Barnett and Low 2004) therefore prove 
unstable and contradictory as visible in the subs-state political borderings within the Mashavera 
Valley. Political actors, especially those citizens living amid intensifying patterns of 
globalization and capital expansion, actively construct citizenship in different places and periods 
through contingent interactions among institutions, embodied practices, and broader socio-spatial 
relations (Koch 2016b; Marston and Mitchell 2004). Some scholars have even introduced the 
possibility of “post-national citizenship” through transnational networks of commerce and 
communication (Balibar 2015; Sassen 2008) – especially when citizens feel enough dispossessed 
of rights and security to claim “we have no government,” as one respondent in the Mashavera 
succinctly told me (Interview 38). 
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Rather than the rights and security citizenship is often presumed to afford, such re-
workings of citizenship regimes can produce feelings of fear and insecurity, structured through 
exclusive relationships among state, civil society, and market forces (Staeheli 2018). These 
varying formations of exclusion and inclusion can cause direct violence in individual’s lives, 
such that Balibar defines citizenship as the explicit and spatial “political regulation of this 
violence” by those political actors in positions of power (Balibar 2015: 73; Foucault 1986; Koch 
2015c). As evident in the Mashavera Valley, citizens experience these manifold political 
violences in diverse ways as people lose livelihoods and access to voting rights or feel left 
behind by the government because they don’t speak Georgian as an ethnic minority. The region’s 
shifting political economy, altered by the introduction and expansion of global capital, produces 
a range of shifting political subjectivities and identifications beyond the state (see Chapter 4). 
However, these political imaginations and experiences also entail diminished citizenship forms, 
producing a range of exclusive borderings connected to both material needs and feelings of fear: 
the provision of social welfare, safe environments, governmental representation, and others. 
Borderings of citizenship in the Mashavera Valley vary with experience, yet several key 
dimensions surface from my analysis. First, feelings of abandonment by the government (like 
those I describe below) can emerge from seemingly banal interactions with state actors and 
objects such as through infrastructure and service provision (Kelly-Richards and Banister 2017; 
Secor 2007). For example, struggles to access consistent trash collection and water provision, 
taxes and utilities perceived as prohibitively expensive, crumbling transportation infrastructure, 
and other restrictive challenges lead some citizens living in the mining territory to feel excluded 
from rights to government assistance (Interviews 16, 32, 33, 34, 37). Such experiences leave 
some citizens asking, “I mean, how should people survive?” (Interview 16), or stating that “the 
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state should take responsibility, somehow, to regulate the situation here. I blame mainly the state 
not the company. We are dying here because of dust and being just left alone, against our 
problems” (Interview 37). Others feel that the mining company also bears responsibility for 
meeting these needs and dealing with the mines’ toxic effects, saying, “they have a lot of money 
and they should do something to protect the ecological situation here” (Interview 32). However, 
the company often does little to help these communities, focusing on their publicly visible image 
instead.  
Second, expectations of and disappointments in state actors also manifest in citizens’ 
support for one party over another in moments of crisis. For example, referencing a major 
mining labor strike (before RMG disbanded the local union), a former mine employee shared 
that: 
we actually had hope when we started the strike because the new [Georgian Dream] 
government came, and we did a lot to support them in making that change… So, we were 
thinking they would support us. But even the newly chosen human rights ombudsmen 
was not allowed to attend the mediation sessions during the strike. (Interview 42)  
 
These hopes and expectations of rights and political support are not isolated, and people 
often expressed these alongside disappointment when those expectations went unmet: “people 
suffer. We live with the hope… If government changes, we wish for better changes, but they’ve 
never been very good changes, so…” (Interview 18). These expectations stemmed in part from 
experiences with Georgia’s regressive flat tax system, implemented and sustained by powerful 
libertarian-leaning politicians (Invest in Georgia 2018; Japaridze 2017; The Parliament of 
Georgia 2012b). In this system the central government controls revenue flows and distributes 
funds to the local government, though citizens feel they are consistently paying more than the 
benefits they receive are worth. These geoeconomic inequities dictate that “the local government 
is not deciding anything, everything is dependent on the central government – they decide and 
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take the side of the company” (Interview 33), leaving local government officials and citizens 
effectively removed from state space on this extractive “island.” 
Third, RMG financially supports some community development by occasionally 
supplying materials and renovations for local schools and partially supporting local sports teams 
(Interviews 3, 14, 33). However, the company seems more focused on international image 
management in Tbilisi and abroad, contributing sponsorship to large concert festivals; the 2011 
production of a Hollywood film about the 2008 Russo-Georgian War (5 Days of War [5 Days in 
August] starring Andy Garcia, Heather Graham, and Val Kilmer); and the Georgian national 
rugby and football teams while battling local government over partially funding local sports 
teams (Interview 14). As one citizen succinctly said, “They do their best to improve their public 
image, because lots of people complain about them, but still, they do less, and they damage 
more, much more” (Interview 3). Such relations show the corporate practices’ powerful effects, 
leaving local citizens feeling abandoned by the company and failing to provide minimal public 
services in search of a profit margin – part of the Georgian government’s “open for business” 
mentality. This geopolitical messaging draws corporate and state interests closer together, 
partially bolstering expectations of alternative local and corporate citizenships while abandoning 
local populations. As illustrated above, citizens also feel their national government has done the 
same, undercutting their own citizenship in exchange for meager geopolitical branding, 
geoeconomic strength for some institutions over others, and the health of many living in the 
valley. 
These divisive and exclusive political borderings do not just exist in citizens’ subjective 
experiences of security or geopolitical imaginations of how Georgian society relates to the 
government and corporations. Rather, these power relations intersect with the other biopolitical 
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and geoeconomic borders developing in the region, taking territorial form through processes of 
socio-spatialization. As one retired mine employee explained:  
It’s like a fear strategy… Because there’s no work and a lot of people are not employed, 
they manipulate people and then, because every second family has someone who is ill 
with cancer, still the family member has to beg and their connections to go and work in 
this damn mine to be able to get a little bit of pay to help the sick family member. 
Imagine how tragic that is, it’s still happening… they’re manipulating people saying, 
like, See, if we close down you will not have a job and you will die. (Interview 18) 
 
As explained earlier, neither the local government nor the mining company typically 
supplies medical aid or health care to mine employees, despite providing some medical insurance 
(Interview 34). Any free health clinics offered on occasion almost always take place in Tbilisi, 
outside the Valley’s communities, often unannounced and in extremely limited numbers 
(Interview 42/43), such that “four years ago, they made a medical check, checking for cancer for 
the local population, but they did not give us any kind of results” (Interview 42). Some residents 
acknowledge society’s need to take responsibility for local environmental troubles as “the people 
have responsibility to take care of their environment” (Interview 32), but many citizens feel 
helpless and dispossessed of the ability to act on their own behalf. Some feel this especially 
strongly as their families remain threatened by illness, leaving ambiguous what rights or 
obligations might exist to either fix the underlying problems or cope with the realities of disease 
and death.  
These fluctuations in citizenship relations appear within broader geopolitical trends, as 
with the other bordering processes outlined above, including how Georgians imagine their 
relationship to the state, what kind of democracy Georgia is and should be, and how and what 
these changes might mean for Georgia’s position within networks of global international 
relations. For example, and as outlined above, rural areas of Georgia tend to experience higher 
poverty rates, with less secure employment and inferior experiences of health. However, rural 
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populations also express greater support for Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union over the 
EU and NATO and have much different views of Georgia’s contemporary political discourse 
than those living in more urban areas. Rural populations like those surrounding the Sakdrisi-
Madneuli mining complex are somewhat more likely to feel ambivalent about whether “good 
citizenship” involves supporting the government on every occasion33 while significantly less 
likely to feel it is important for good citizens to be critical toward the government (48% stating it 
is either “somewhat” or “extremely important”) versus in the capital, Tbilisi (71%).34 At the 
same time, during my research I encountered rumors that one of Georgia’s political parties had 
manipulated the borders of voting districts in the Mashavera to block certain anti-mining leaders 
from running for Parliament (Interviews 32, 34, 72). Even more recently, election observer 
groups documented multiple cases of vote buying in the district during the 2018 presidential 
election (Transparency International Georgia 2018). These corrosions of the democratic process 
suggest that such borderings and experiences of citizenship might shape formal politics at both 
local and national scales. 
Eroding democratic institutions in this way resonates with views expressed in public 
opinion polls regarding whether Georgia is even a democracy today and citizens’ imagination of 
their place within that democracy. Urban populations are much more likely to think the country 
is either not a democracy or a democracy with major problems (66% and 61% in capital and 
urban regions, respectively, vs 50% in rural), while those outside the capital are more likely not 
to take a position on the question (13% and 16% in urban and rural regions, respectively, vs 3% 
                                                        
33 Caucasus Barometer 2017: (ICITGOV * SETTYPE) 
34 Caucasus Barometer 2017: (ICITOPP * SETTYPE) 
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in capital).35 This finding suggests increased political distance between citizens and the 
government in rural regions such as the Mashavera Valley. 
NDI public opinion polls support these findings, with responses suggesting a majority of 
Georgian citizens feel “Georgia is a democracy already but there is still room for improvement” 
(CRRC 2018b). At the same time, a separate CRRC survey conducted in 2017 investigated 
public perceptions of Georgia’s aspirations to EU integration and related values.36 It found that 
Tbilisi residents are much less likely to support Russia or membership to the Eurasian Union 
(14% strongly / 24% somewhat) than other urban (21% / 29%) or rural (25% / 34%) regions,37 
with less variation in support for NATO and the EU across the regions.38  
While these geopolitical imaginations of Georgia’s place in the global order might seem 
removed from localized relations of citizenship, they in fact relate closely. For example, a 
detailed plan for implementing the EU-Georgia Association Agreement as it relates to 
environmental governance and actions to combat climate change drives many related decisions 
by the Georgian government. “Waste Management” has seen some of the slowest movement 
among the Agreement’s nine different action categories, with approximately half the activities 
either not yet begun or jettisoned completely. Central activities of this effort have stalled, 
including development of a draft law on mining waste, intended to begin in 2017 (Gogaladze and 
Jülich 2016). While foreign security analysts offer endless speculation about Georgia’s 
geopolitical positioning and state of allegiance to either the EU or the Eurasian Economic Union 
                                                        
35 Caucasus Barometer 2017: (CNTRDEM * SETTYPE) 
36 The Knowledge of and attitudes toward the EU in Georgia survey followed a similar methodology to the Caucasus Barometer 
survey. The 2017 survey achieved a sample size of 2,258 respondents during fieldwork conducted from May 9 to May 31, 2017 
with a 61% response rate. Researchers conducted interviews in Armenian, Azerbaijani, and Georgian. 
37 CRRC EU Survey 2017: (EUHELPBST * SETTYPE) 
38 Responses range from 68% / 72% in urban regions to 71% / 76% in rural and 75% / 78% in the capital (CRRC EU Survey 
2017: NATOMEMV * SETTYPE). 
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(EEU) and the country’s seemingly futile attempts to join NATO, these lapses and shortcomings 
in implementing the Agreement establish roadblocks to increased integration. Therefore, what 
might appear to some as a relatively insignificant lapse of environmental waste management at 
the local level becomes a harmful bordering practice that both drives distance between citizens 
and the state and contributes to broader shifts in geopolitical scripts regarding Georgia’s position 
and strength within international relations. 
Localized mutations in the imaginations and experiences of citizenship are in no way 
responsible for Georgia’s rapid transitions of government control in recent years, but they do 
contribute one important piece of that puzzle and indicate broader political-economic changes in 
Georgia. This transition presents a key component of the move toward corporate interests and 
informal governance over classic liberal democratic notions of state/society relations, shifts that 
are only speeding up in Georgia today (Collier and Way 2004; Japaridze 2017; Lebanidze and 
Kakachia 2017; Schueth 2012). These trends contribute to broader geopolitical shifts in how 
Georgia orients itself regionally and globally, yet at the local level this is all only possible 
through diverse geoeconomic, biopolitical, and geopolitical borderings, as capital investment 
produces new forms of popular, lived citizenships within this political archipelagic island. As I 
have laid out here, people’s experiences with citizenship near the Sakdrisi-Madneuli mining 
complex produce a final political dimension of bordering in the valley. Shifting experiences and 
imaginations of state-society relations not only leave people feeling abandoned by powerful 
actors here but also shift how they see Georgia vis-a-vis contemporary geopolitical landscape. 
Together these entwined and contingent bordering practices produce the political island of the 
Mashavera Valley within the broader corporate archipelago of GeoProMining. 
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4.  Conclusion: Extractive Archipelagos 
 
Cases from around the world illustrate how territorial control remains key to resource 
governance (Alatout 2006; Emel et al. 2011; Peluso 2018; Uitermark 2018), not least within the 
mining sector. These scholars illustrate how resource governance is profoundly geopolitical as 
controlling extractive territories requires imagining, scripting, and struggling over space (Dalby 
2014; Le Billon 2004, 2013; O’Lear 2018). Yet many environmental governance scholars have 
yet to widely adopt advances in theorizing territory, territoriality, and political geography more 
broadly – a missed opportunity considering spatial practices’ centrality in controlling resources, 
as visible in the Mashavera Valley. 
For example, visions of a coherent, a priori state permeate many analyses of extractive 
territories (Harris 2017; Parenti 2015). For instance, numerous scholars have examined resource 
“frontiers,” often framing their findings in binary terms: state vs. non-state, formal vs. informal, 
legal vs. illegal, states and “shadow” states, and so forth (Cons and Eilenberg 2019; Côte and 
Korf 2018; Peluso 2018; Rasmussen and Lund 2018; Tsing 2003; Watts 2018), leaving little 
room to consider the diverse socio-material relations that may produce the resource “frontiers” I 
see more productively as fluid borderings.  
As just one example, in the most recent iteration of his long-standing work on insurgency 
groups and mineral extraction in Nigeria, Michael Watts theorizes these social spaces as 
“frontiers” of state authority and capitalism, rather than in relation to more general bordering 
practices as I propose here. However, while citing prominent political geographers’ work on 
frontier spaces, his analysis considers that "the border is an international boundary on a map" 
(Watts 2018: 479) while contending that "frontiers must be defined precisely in relation to the 
presence, capabilities and interests of the state” (Watts 2018: 480). Opposing borders and 
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frontiers as Watts does obscures more than it reveals by presupposing that non-state areas lack 
authority, despite his acknowledgement that other forms of authority beyond the state 
(“customary institutions, religion, civic” [Watts 2018: 480]) may also exist. 
Diverse bordering practices in the Mashavera Valley produce an equal diversity of 
political borders and boundaries of inclusion and exclusion, coexisting in ways not mutually 
exclusive and as part of larger global “land grabbing” patterns (Sassen 2009, 2013a). Examples 
of such divisive mining practices prevail in the Mashavera Valley, instituting and reinforcing 
sub-state borders internal to state territory, including explosions, large plumes of dust, precarious 
labor conditions, and the erosion of infrastructure such as roads and other utilities, to name just a 
few. Recognizing the generative bordering practices of these dispossessive exclusions can help 
reveal less obvious forms of political violence related to metal mining. 
Of course, government actors in the Ministry of Environment and Natural Protection may 
have different capacities to influence and control spaces than a subsistence farmer living 
downstream from a mine – a difficult argument to contest from even the most radically flattened 
view of political geography (Leitner and Miller 2007; Marston et al. 2005; Meehan et al. 2013; 
Shaw et al. 2010; Woodward et al. 2010). Yet scholars surrender revealing opportunities to 
understand how Georgian citizens experience the threat and authority to use violence by 
considering sovereign power – the right to “take life or let live” (Foucault 2003: 241) – as 
embodied in soldiers navigating Georgian tanks toward the border of South Ossetia (Toal 2017), 
yet not in RMG guards holding machine guns along a dusty road outside Kazreti. Analysts risk 
ignoring the political complexity central to many environmental injustices of capitalist 
development when they identify biopower – the right to “make live and let die” (Foucault 2003: 
241) – in the Georgian government’s “welfare regimes,” the fluctuating efforts to provide 
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utilities and education to citizens (Collier and Way 2004), yet not in local Bolnisi politicians’ and 
RMG officials alike in potential complicity obscuring important ecological health monitoring 
data from local populations. Investigating political subjectivity within the standard “territorial 
trap” framings (Agnew 1994, 2015a) – such as nation, state, and territory (Suny 1993, 1994, 
2000) – overlooks alternative dimensions and experiences, like health and global economic 
connectivity, manifest as central to identification within the Mashavera Valley. 
In this chapter I have illustrated how a series of embedded borderings produces the fluid, 
shifting socio-material boundaries of one island in an extractive archipelago, each operating via 
different forms of power relations. This constellation of powers shifts relations among state, 
society, and corporate interests through experiences that exist across scales. I therefore extend 
arguments in both political ecology and political geography research by illustrating how 
powerful actors in the Georgian mining industry build and preserve authority through borders – 
not necessarily of the Westphalian national variety, but at sub-state scales and through informal 
practices both symbolic and material. As I argue, a series of exclusions and dispossessions 
produce these localized borders, which draw together material extractive practices, localized 
ecologies, and a multi-scalar politics of uneven access to resources within Georgia’s specific 
historic and geographic context. These dispossessive localized borders evolve along several 
related power axes: (1) unequal levels of socio-economic access (geoeconomic), (2) exposure to 
toxic plumes (biopolitical), and (3) contours of degraded political citizenship (geopolitical). I use 
the Georgian gold and copper mining industry to illustrate the importance of local politics to 
both supporting and contesting these international, trans-boundary political assemblages, 
revealing how the Mashavera Valley has become an island within a broader political 
archipelago. The sub-state borders instituted through these local power relations form power 
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geometries that only exist in relation to other places and global spaces -- both offshore and on – 
as boundedness, dis/connection, and scale remain key to understanding the archipelago 
metaphor. 
Governing life and territory in relation to gold mining illuminates how lived experience 
shapes both local political orders and broader geopolitical relations. The uneven borderings 
citizens experience produce new divisions among both local and foreign elites, yet also, and at 
times even more importantly, among unevenly dispossessed laborers, localized political 
subjectivities, and degraded local environments. Such divisions stem from pre-existing social 
and political differentiation and continue to unfold in new, contingent ways. These patterns 
evolve as international corporate interests influence shifting forms of graduated, de facto 
sovereignty in this Georgian region – but always in the context of the region’s complex, 
historicized political geographies. Such governmental complexities produce diverse borders 
across scales. In turn, citizens living here experience various forms of dispossession unevenly, 
shaping the lives of, and power relations among, those in the region.  
In some ways my findings mirror Foucault’s historical analysis of city planning and 
security, demonstrating how disciplinary and sovereignty regimes may exist within a polity 
simultaneously (2009) and produce a meshed “topology” as powers are arranged, connected, and 
combined (Collier 2009: 89; Lemke 2011: 31). Biopolitics (or other powers) often operate as just 
one power within a broader political apparatus or assemblage of various technologies governing 
environments (Braun 2014; Foucault 2009; Legg 2011; Massumi 2009). Therefore, territory is 
neither just a geopolitical object (Falah et al. 2006; Lee et al. 2018; Novak 2011; O’Loughlin et 
al. 1998) nor an area or boundary where geopower and biopower intersect, as several political 
geographers recently argue (Johnson and Jones 2018; Makarychev 2018; Vaughan-Williams 
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2009, 2015). Instead, territory is power’s object generally – geopolitics, biopolitics, 
necropolitics, geoeconomics, truth power, and so forth, working in different contingent 
combinations in different contexts. 
I address the combined powers at a particular time and place as centrally important, along 
with how people narrate and imagine them, and what effect they have on the people and things 
they govern. I thus argue that governing mineral resources enrolls territory within a broader 
government of people and things (“men and things” in Foucault’s original formulation [2009: 
96]), a resource regime comprising multiple intersecting powers. The Sakdrisi case presents an 
opportunity to analyze how diverse powers and forces converge in a specific post-Soviet geo-
historic context to shape new resource geographies. 
I therefore view territory as a malleable resource, an effect of diverse power relations. 
Yet the people and resources located within distinct territories may also share malleable 
properties. Understanding the way diverse elements interact to shape new political geographies 
remains central to understanding how the planet’s material environments become enrolled in our 
collective experiences and socio-spatial struggles. 
While distinct from the militaristic borders and violence scholars might typically focus on 
in other Georgian and Central Eurasian contexts, these embedded, sub-state borders within 
extractive industries actually present crucial mechanisms for shaping contemporary power 
geometries in Central Eurasia: from the Aliyev family’s domination of the gold mining sector in 
Azerbaijan to trends toward resource nationalism in countries throughout Central Asia, and 
including the other sites in the GeoProMining extractive archipelago.39 These manifold tensions 
                                                        
39 Analyses of these other spaces is beyond the scope of my dissertation yet offer new research tracks I plan to pursue in the 
future. 
 
 245 
become especially important when considering the “crony capitalism” or “vulture capitalism” of 
many formerly Soviet economies, eroding democratic systems if not outright acting as “dictators 
without borders” (Cooley & Heathershaw, 2017; Harvey, 2003). Such divisions continue 
unfolding here as international corporate interests influence shifting forms of graduated, de facto 
citizenship and sovereignty in southern Georgia (Ong 2006a; Sassen 2013b). 
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Chapter VI – Malleable Territories: The Politics and Effects of Mining Governance 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
A teenage boy quietly watches us while also keeping an eye on his sheep grazing among 
the low scrub. He clearly appears unsurprised at our presence, yet neither does he seem fully 
comfortable with us. He looks on as I skirt an overgrown rock pile whose orientation appears 
not-quite-natural. We have a sweeping river valley view while walking back toward Thomas’s 
SUV, and I realize this may be the final time I will see the Sakdrisi and Madneuli mines in 
person this trip. I began my research several years earlier, reading about the protests just down 
the valley as various groups disputed the Mashavera landscape’s meaning and its future. Yet 
these lonely stones in a shaggy field are the closest I will ever get to the ancient practices 
discovered at Sakdrisi that started the whole political conflict. 
My guide, Thomas, is a German archaeologist who has worked on the grassy plateau for 
years. Thomas heads the research department at the Deutsches Bergbau-Museum in Bochum, 
Germany and, as an expert on the history of settlement and mineral extraction in the region, was 
a key player in the debate over Sakdrisi’s significance. I play devil’s advocate as we approach 
the car, asking why he still cares so much about the place even though its central site is now 
gone. He pauses, hands in pockets, and stares at the sandy rutted truck tracks crossing our path. 
Thomas’ words echo in my ears again: “If you do not research the past, the future is 
already lost.” 
I have shadowed Thomas and the collaborative Georgian and German archaeology team 
he works with here during these final days of my latest research trip to Georgia, hoping to learn 
more about their research and how they view the region’s ongoing political dynamics. I have 
spent several days speaking with them in offices at the Georgian National Museum, traveling to 
 
 247 
their field site as new friends, and touring the settlement excavation here on the Dzedvebi 
Plateau. Thomas explains the rocks I had just walked past were part of a small burial site on the 
prehistoric town’s edge, found on this raised outcrop above intersecting rivers and a series of rich 
volcanic metal deposits. Pre-modern people built the small settlement almost six thousand years 
earlier, yet it was just one location in a network extending across the valley, the greater 
Caucasus, and millennia.  
The Sakdrisi site was known by Soviet geologists, yet more recent archaeological efforts 
following the Soviet collapse have revealed the site’s significance in the global history of social 
differentiation and stratification. The small prehistoric society’s history echoes contemporary 
social divisions. Specialized labor practices appeared as settlers discovered the deposits and 
developed technology to extract the materials more intensively. Gold accumulated meaning for 
the people living here, and a system of social relations appeared alongside gold’s potential 
significance. 
While Georgian national identity discourses claim deep roots to the Kura-Araxes society 
that settled here as an “ancient people,” the archaeological record supports alternate human 
histories, connections, turmoil, and territory. Yet these mining sites do carry significance for 
human history as the archaeological record reveals how the Kura people were located within 
broader networks and potentially represent a key node in the earliest gold markets. Thomas and 
his colleagues continue finding evidence of smelting in nearby settlements that are more than a 
thousand years older than the Sakdrisi mine, yet Sakdrisi re-oriented this society’s place in their 
broader social relations. Chemical testing finds gold from Sakdrisi in jewelry hoards from 
western Azerbaijan and suggests trade potentially expanding to modern Turkey, Bulgaria, and 
beyond. 
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As we step up into Thomas’s SUV, he shares that today he sees the mine as a monument 
to political struggles and alliances among locals, elites, and foreign interests on multiple sides. 
He and his colleagues seek to understand how an ancient people began working with materials 
for a commercial interest and how that socio-natural relationship shaped the region’s history – 
dynamics still unfolding on the landscape today as the boy and his sheep wander down the hill, 
toward the Madneuli mining pit and their evening work. 
------ 
In this dissertation I have analyzed the contemporary political geographies surrounding 
industrial metal extraction in the former Soviet Republic of Georgia. Struggles over the 
Mashavera Valley’s future took new and unexpected directions when Thomas, Irene, and their 
team members began excavating the Sakdrisi site years ago, alerting the world to gold’s presence 
and offering a new material resource over which people would again struggle to ascribe 
meaning. In tracing the region’s geographies, I follow post-structural scholars of power and the 
environment to understand the practices governing natural resources here and their uneven 
spatial and socio-material effects. In doing so I illustrate how resource governance geographies 
emerge from broad and uneven networks joining people, practices, places, and historically 
embedded meaning systems – enrolling the imaginations of archaeologists, herders, miners, 
ecologists, politicians, reporters, students, farmers, and scholars. The varied governing powers 
operating here produce new geographies that rely on competing geopolitical imaginations, 
experiences of environmental health and economic development, and the territorial effects 
produced by these intersecting powers. 
Following my introduction to the case in Chapter 1, the ensuing chapters progress 
through my argument’s various dimensions. Chapter 2 develops my focus on events and political 
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assemblages, while Chapter 3 presents my argument concerning regimes of valuation and rent 
through Sakdrisi’s recent post-Soviet history and unique resource regime. Chapter 4 argues that 
Georgia’s resource governance system is changing local populations’ geopolitical imaginations 
by employing a popular, lived geopolitics framing toward discourses circulating through the 
Mashavera Valley. Chapter 5 investigates the diverse sub-state borderings unfolding in southern 
Georgia, revealing the new territory effect of an extractive archipelago reaching across the 
former Soviet Union’s different corners. 
I conclude here by briefly outlining two primary intellectual areas to which my 
dissertation research contributes: (1) a renewed and revised consideration of tracing socio-
environmental events, and (2) the diverse ways localized geopolitics of the environment re-shape 
post-Soviet territories.  
 
2.  event-Ful Ecologies 
 
Some nature-society scholars view what others term “event ecology” in a negative light 
(Robbins 2004). These critiques often emerge in response to Andrew Vayda and Bradley 
Walters’ work, which claims that focusing on events in ecological research allows researchers to 
consider political factors through what they term “progressive contextualization” (Vayda 1983). 
Vayda and Walters frame political ecology as a field committed to a priori assumptions and 
explanations of political economic inequality and injustice, rather than true intellectual and 
ecological curiosity. Their analytical approach essentially involves following “common sense” 
and “logic” to consider power relations in ecologies “whenever they are seen in the course of 
research to be interesting and relevant to explaining particular environmental events” (Vayda and 
Walters 1999: 177; see also: Ocampo-Raeder 2010; Vayda 2011; Walters and Vayda 2009). 
Vayda and Walters’s critics primarily focus on their ad hoc and apolitical claims, emphasizing 
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that all contemporary ecologies and scholars’ investigations of them are inevitably political, at 
least to some degree (Robbins 2004: 205–7, 2012; Watts and Peet 2004). 
Through my dissertation I offer an alternative vision of event ecologies, or what I term 
here event-ful ecologies. I follow the work of several human geographers, such as Derek 
Gregory’s analysis of war-torn Baghdad as an “event-ful” city (2010), to analyze resource 
extraction’s political geographies in southern Georgia as a series of (small “e”) events that bear 
traceable genealogies. Their contemporary histories and geographies do not simply follow my 
own “common sense” as an omniscient researcher but rather the discourses, imaginations, and 
material flows relating people to natural resources and to one another. 
Acknowledging the diverse powers driving event-ful ecologies allows explanation and 
connection of events without sacrificing notions of responsibility or agency (Lave 2015). In the 
three empirical chapters, I specifically illustrate how my approach might help overcome what I 
and others hold as a major shortcoming in political ecology’s classic “chains of explanation” 
thesis: its distinct scalar assumptions with minimal theorization regarding the connections across 
and between scales (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987; see also Robbins 2004: 212). This view, which 
Donna Haraway similarly describes as “tentacular thinking” (2016) or Dianne Rocheleau might 
categorize as “webs of relation” (2008), allows us to sidestep the rigid scalar assumptions often 
infusing nature-society scholarship and identify “scale effects” in geographic research.  
My approach has thus led me to address a series of spatio-temporal events striated by 
uneven socio-material geographies to answer my dissertation’s broader research questions. These 
include:  
1. How do protesters and supporters of the Sakdrisi gold mine and other mining projects in 
Georgia develop their claims in the debate over the territories’ futures, including their 
particular geopolitical and ecological narratives, imaginations, and identities?  
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2. In what ways do non-state actors shape geopolitical narratives and practices at the site 
of conflict?  
3. How do non-state actors’ perspectives compare to broader political attitudes about 
territory, political identity, and natural resources in Georgia’s transitioning society?  
4. What does the Sakdrisi mining project mean for people living here, and how has its 
expansion transpired? 
 
These initial research questions thus led me to ask secondary questions as well, directly 
related to the events surrounding Sakdrisi: 
1. How did Sakdrisi’s destruction unfold in relation to the complex political, economic, 
and environmental dimensions existing throughout Georgian territory?  
2. Why did prolonged protests fail in this emerging democracy?  
 
In addressing these questions, I have developed an event-ful ecology perspective that is readily 
applicable to other cases and embraces the political nature of ecologies, as well as our research 
of them. In this approach I advocate for analyzing an ecological event’s generative politics and 
resultant effects, identifying and interrogating the practices producing that phenomena.  
For example, the murky tangle of responsibility for Russian actors’ interference in the 
2016 US election, a political event the scale of which is not yet fully known, has led to increased 
imposition of sanctions on Russian actors by the US government. One clear example of the 
cross-scalar connections resulting from this practice presents itself in the Russian governments’ 
gold hoarding from 2014 until the present day – tripling its reserves in recent years 
(Syrmopoulos 2018) – to move away from the US dollar and counter sanction effects alongside 
global economic uncertainty (Burden 2018; Critchlow 2014; Doff 2018; Frost 2018; Gulf-Times 
2017; Holmes 2018; Korsunskaya 2018; Kottasová 2018; Marsh 2016; Martin 2018; RT 
International 2018). Russia’s centralized demand for gold has also generated gold mining 
expansions throughout Russian territory and the entire former Soviet Union. These moves occur 
alongside increased related economic activity (states purchasing mining company shares, large-
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scale joint investments, corporate consolidation, etc.) to best capitalize on metal extraction’s 
regional intensification (Bloomberg 2017; Reuters 2017b, 2017a, 2018). Some report that 
Russian gold mining companies plan to double production in coming years, putting the Russian 
government on pace to hold the world’s second largest gold reserves (ZeroHedge 2018). Tracing 
post-Soviet mining industries’ tentacular, relational webs – putting mining events in geographic 
and historic context – may improve scholars’ ability to connect practical and formal geopolitical 
practices to the lived and popular geopolitics emerging as local ecologies and economies alike 
weather sanctions and their secondary effects. 
Political geographies of the environment therefore exist as “event-ful,” not just because 
they have histories like that leading to Sakdrisi’s destruction, but because socio-spatial relations 
drive those histories and can help explain their forms. The political geographies of mining sites 
extend beyond the “hole in the ground” (Bridge 2009; Huber 2017a) to encompass contested 
spaces, places, and socio-material networks. Unraveling their diverse relations requires assessing 
discursive socio-material power relations that surround and produce natural resources. The 
various political technologies involved with the complex geographies unfolding across the region 
in relation to sanctions – military intervention, adoption denials, economic sanctions, media 
manipulation, implementation of global legal structures – all appear from intersecting political 
technologies: geopolitical, geoeconomic, biopolitical, truth power, etc. Through my research I 
illustrate one way to investigate environmental governing technologies by adopting Paul Veyne’s 
view that “What is made, the object, is explained by what went into its making at each moment 
of history” (1997: 160–1). 
Doreen Massey argued that scholars should not give particular scales analytical privilege 
over others in a particular context, as doing so might unfairly or unnecessarily place blame on 
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various actors and groups (1991, 2005). As I have illustrated in this dissertation, smaller-scale 
events can have as much significance as more massive and obvious ones, including within the 
Georgian metal mining industry’s event-ful ecologies. Tracing these connections can prove 
difficult without viewing events at all scales through similarly flexible framings. Rather than 
trying to divine an event’s significance and focus only on that single moment – a highly political 
act in itself (Badiou 2013; Colwell 1997; McWhorter 1994; Shaw 2012; Wagner-Pacifici 2017; 
Žižek 2014) – I demonstrate how focusing on relational webs and the series of events comprising 
the Mashavera’s political geographies may work toward better deciphering their causes. Doing 
so, I hope, may help generate solutions toward naming, knowing, and remedying manifold 
political injustices.  
My dissertation offers one example of how scholars might undertake such an event-
oriented research focus. This lens allows me to address territorial issues beyond the most 
explosive and apparent events of the Westphalian international order, presenting a fuller picture 
of spatial struggles throughout Georgia’s post-Soviet spaces. My dissertation has therefore 
examined political geographies related to the Sakdrisi-Madneuli mining complex to develop 
alternative understandings of Eurasian territory and geopolitics – not just in terms of bombs 
dropped or borders marked, as in projects of state militarism, but also as spaces of cultural 
heritage, economic opportunities, and changing environments. This revised vision leads me to 
see territory as profoundly malleable, which I address more deeply in the following section. 
------ 
 
Early the next morning, Thomas and I awake at 3:30 to drive back to Tbilisi so he can 
catch a return flight to Germany. The short trip has revealed much about how the region’s 
archaeology fits within the political events surrounding Sakdrisi and mining in the region more 
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generally, yet I have trouble sorting through my thoughts and findings during the following week 
after returning from the Dzedvebi Plateau. I returned to my apartment in Tbilisi, made a cup of 
coffee, turned on the shower, and listened to the news on my phone to catch up on the weekend’s 
events. It is the first time I hear about the now infamous Trump Tower meeting back in the US, 
and though this provides a media obsession for years, my attention is quickly diverted by a 
notification on my phone. My grandfather is not doing well, and a week later he will have passed 
away before I can return home. 
Sorting through diverse events is never easy or straightforward. Doing so involves 
personal commitments and emotions, social relations and economic trends, frustrations, dead-
ends, and false moments of clarity. It is a process simultaneously personal, political, relational, 
and processual. Yet tracing life’s event-ful, geographic threads offers a unique opportunity – to 
follow potential paths along which we may walk with research partners, connecting over the 
experiences we share and learning from those we don’t.  
 
3.  Malleable Territories: The Politics and Effects of Mining Governance 
 
I titled my dissertation Malleable Territories to highlight territory’s flexible and 
governable nature, especially as it relates to mineral governance and mining – the government of 
people and things. Territories exist as effects of diverse power relations, both intentional and 
unexpected. The “territory effect” proves key to territory’s nature, emerging not as preformed 
objects but from the intersecting powers that govern resource regimes (Brenner and Elden 2009; 
Fletcher 2017; Marston and Perreault 2017) like Georgia’s concession system and its manifold 
effects. 
Such political effects may appear from intentional use of governing technologies, yet 
they may also exist free from human intentionality and in turn shape new and unexpected 
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practices, power relations, and effects. Through my dissertation’s findings I view territory as 
foundationally malleable: pliable to an extent, yet also bearing diverse spatial effects beyond any 
potential intentionality. However, I see these effects as indicative not just of new experiences for 
those living in territories under shifting powers but also of broader changes unfolding in both 
Georgia’s political milieu and that of the former Soviet Union more broadly.  
Territorial disputes present geopolitical challenges to many former Soviet states, 
especially in the South Caucasus. Georgia, for example, is well known among scholars and 
foreign policy experts for its contested territories, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. However, in 
focusing on these sites of armed conflict following the Soviet Union’s collapse, international 
analysts tend to overlook smaller, more diffuse territorial conflicts over a range of political issues 
such as those unfolding around Sakdrisi. My dissertation investigates the case of resource 
extraction in Georgia to illuminate how these smaller-scale conflicts become increasingly 
relevant to the everyday lives of Georgians, broader political-economic stability, and 
governmental transformations in the South Caucasus. More broadly, my research advances the 
political geography literature by probing specific interactions among territory, sovereignty, and 
the environment in an emerging democracy of global geopolitical significance – a lived and 
localized geopolitics (Ó Tuathail 2010; Toal 2017) of the diverse ways people engage and 
govern material resources they deem valuable. 
As Georgia pursues further European integration and transitions to a market-oriented 
economy, struggles over natural resources produce diverse territorial conflicts, of which Sakdrisi 
is a prime example. The Mashavera Valley now exists as one of many sites throughout post-
Soviet space where citizens increasingly protest resource extraction practices that profoundly 
alter both the borders and internal qualities of state territories. My analysis of territorial struggle 
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here illustrates how the cultural politics of identification and subject formation serve as key 
drivers of territorial claims, environmental geopolitics, and resource governance geographies at 
the sub-national scale. This perspective allows scholars to better understand how non-state actors 
– protesters, corporations, local communities, regions, international economic alliances – shape 
global political processes in diverse ways. Such distinctions allow scholars to examine sub-
national territorial conflicts from a multi-scalar perspective and to understand how new forms of 
governance emerge across the former Soviet Union; not necessarily fueling dramatic political 
violence but producing other forms of embodied violence while contributing to shifting cultural 
politics in formerly Soviet environments.  
In my dissertation I have specifically analyzed how resource and mining governance in 
Georgia has evolved through new practices simultaneously governing people, territory, and 
resources. These new practices manifest through changing regimes of property and rent, not as 
necessarily corrupt practices but as a movement of patronal relations from centralized 
government networks to de- and re-centralized corporate networks (Chapter 3). The new 
resource governance regime of laws, norms, and practices here has begun profoundly changing 
the experiences and political imaginations of those living in or close to the territories controlled 
by those corporate networks. Such practices clearly shift relations among state, society, and 
corporate interests in the process, generating new political spaces of historically embedded 
identification, alienation, and illness of both people and ecosystems (Chapter 4). These political 
imaginations, practices, and experiences produce new sub-state borderings internal to yet distinct 
from Georgian “state space.” Such borderings define a metaphorical political island within an 
archipelago of related extraction sites throughout the former Soviet Union (Chapter 5).  
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The broader politics and effects of mining governance unfolding in Georgia unite these 
findings as libertarian policies re-regulate economic relations. Such shifts allow re-consolidation 
of power not just in a semi-democratic government, but in partnership with corporate entities. I 
see this less as a corruption of democratic or capitalist practices and more as a re-formation of 
authoritarian power regimes within post-Soviet space. Together these findings illustrate how 
environmental struggles and practices of resource governance may contribute to shifting power 
geometries beyond merely flattened narratives of state territory, global capitalism, or post-Soviet 
corruption omni-present in standard international relations analyses. 
Some scholars define similar de- and re-centralized forms of power as distinctly 
neoliberal (Castree 2008; Harvey 2007a; Heynen et al. 2007a; McCarthy 2005a; Ribot et al. 
2006). However, my research cracks open these analytical perspectives to illustrate how 
Georgia’s resource governance system is distinctly illiberal despite the government’s positioning 
as free market and friendly to business. Specifically, decentralized and free-market governing 
practices typically designated neoliberal exist alongside “illiberal practices” that present 
“primarily a human rights problem" (Glasius 2018b: 517) in Georgia. At times these illiberal 
practices also exist alongside "authoritarian practices” which “primarily constitute a threat to 
democratic processes” (Glasius 2018b: 517). As I have illustrated, the Georgian metal mining 
industry relies on authoritarian practices of centralizing power and limiting citizens’ democratic 
involvement. Such practices produce illiberal consequences as corporate interests erode human 
rights for some within this political island while benefitting others through embodied 
experiences, structural exclusions, and “slow violences” (Nixon 2011).  
Scholars such as Ian Bruff have defined these relations as “authoritarian neoliberalism,” a 
set of practices through which “neoliberalism’s authoritarian tendencies… have come to the fore 
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through the shift toward constitutional and legal mechanisms and the move away from seeking 
consent for hegemonic projects” (2014: 116). The spectrum of practices involved in the relations 
he describes relate to both authoritarian government institutions and the transformations of life 
under such regimes, from homes to workplaces to urban public spaces and beyond (Bruff and 
Tansel 2019). Bruff’s analysis aligns with other efforts to move beyond categorizations of post-
Soviet countries in different states of “transition” to democracy, instead focusing on the forms 
that emerge outside a binary between “authoritarian” and “democratic” – leaving “diminished” 
or “competitive authoritarianism” (Goode 2019; Levitsky and Way 2002, 2010). My dissertation 
diverges from Bruff’s perspective to focus less on their definition as neoliberal and more on the 
emergence of centralized power relations and patronal networks that cross borders and scales to 
form such new governing arrangements. I have not focused explicitly on such authoritarian 
practices in this research, yet in the future I hope to address more directly how such re-
centralizations might change our collective notions of corporate activity and representative 
democracy in hybrid regimes such as Georgia.  
The Mashavera Valley has emerged as a central node in the political economy and 
localized geopolitics of Georgian resource governance. People enrolled in these networks of 
relations experience the politics and effects of new governing regimes in visceral, embodied 
ways, joining broader regional geopolitical relations with the lived experiences of this landscape 
– a lived geopolitics of people, resources, and malleable territories. 
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Figure 25: Selling roadside produce in the Mashavera Valley 
(Photo credit: Martha Swann-Quinn, 2017) 
 
------ 
 
 
A butcher uses his small handheld mop to shoo flies from the pig’s head resting on his 
open-air wooden display block. The market smells of coriander, dill, and other traditional herbs 
and spices familiar to anyone who has spent time in Georgia. Vendors pile the seasonings high in 
barrels between cheese wheels and drying churchkhela fruit and nut strings. I have just crossed 
Queen Tamar Avenue from my apartment to Tbilisi’s largest open-air market, commonly just 
called The Bazaar, and begin looking for the perfect small gifts to bring home to my family 
before flying out later that night. This is my fifth trip to Georgia in six years, and, despite feeling 
like a second home, my senses still invariably carry me away every time I come to this sprawling 
corner of the neighborhood. 
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Amid the many distractions, I realize my hand is inadvertently tapping out a rhythm on 
my bag strap. I can’t identify the melody until the car, weaving slowly through the crowded 
market and emitting a familiar bass line, is close enough for me to hear the song’s jangly, 
percussive piano I hadn’t even been aware of recognizing – Kendrick Lamar’s “Humble.” The 
album was released just a few months earlier, but the song’s mix of American social commentary 
and manufactured cool is unescapable even in Tbilisi’s traditional commerce hub. 
The taxis parked in the main square typically blare more traditional, polyphonic Georgian 
music, yet such small, surprising reminders of the relations among local lives and global 
connections are everywhere in my research – banal yet “humbling” reminders that even after six 
years my assumptions regarding people I care about and respect deeply never remain immune 
from essentialization or prejudicial assumption. Such cues inspire me to keep pushing my 
research to look beyond the local and to identify important connections that might exist beyond 
what I find immediately present in the local environments and events surrounding the 
communities in the Mashavera River Valley: Kazreti, Bolnisi, Balichebi, and the rest – to try to 
move past what Divya Tolia-Kelly might call “surface geographies” (2013) toward better and 
more enlivened explanations of our lived political geographies, both embodied and corporate. 
I hand the herb salesman several coins, say “didi madloba” with a smile, and return home 
to return home. The people and things I encounter today might be my last in Georgia for this 
year, but I pack my bags and look forward to returning someday soon – promising myself I will 
do everything I can to stay below the surface, moving forward through our shared territories. 
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Appendix i – IRB Approved Interview Module 
 
 
Research Question Modules for Interviews* 
*Please note: The order of these questions is preliminary, but the  
modules will remain consistent 
 
Demographic Identifiers 
 
Gender. 
Age. 
Nationality. 
List education history. Indicate type of school, secondary school, and university you 
attended as applicable. 
Occupation (or former occupation if retired/pensioner) 
Where were you born? 
Where do you currently reside? For how long? 
 
Research Question 1  
 
How do protesters and supporters of [Sakdrisi / NYCO] and other mining projects develop their 
claims in the debate over those territory’s futures, including their particular geopolitical and 
ecological narratives, imaginations, and identities? 
 
Interview Questions What I Hope to Learn 
Who are the the important groups or individuals 
involved in mining governance in [Georgia / New 
York], and why are they important? 
A rough social map of key players 
involved in these conflicts 
 
What do you see as [insert respondent’s 
institution]’s role in mining governance? 
An ‘insider’ perspective on actions of 
the institution 
What policies or regulations does [insert institution] 
operate under? 
An ‘insider’ perspective on the de jure / 
de facto legal framework in  which the 
institution operates 
What arguments do supporters of the [RMG / 
NYCO] project make in defense of its development? 
What arguments do those in opposition make against 
it? 
A purposive sampling of the narratives 
and imaginations mobilized in these 
conflicts 
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How would you characterize the perspectives and 
activities of local actors in relation to [the license 
auction / ‘land swap’] issue? 
Based on the purposive sampling of the 
previous question, I would also like to 
understand how the respondent 
imagines those activities connect with 
the broader dynamics of the issue 
Who is more influential in this debate, state or non-
state actors? Why? 
Similar to the previous question, but 
trying to ascertain how the respondent 
might think about this in the framing of 
state power 
Do you support or oppose the mining activities 
happening near near [Bolnisi / Lewis]? Why? 
Personal / individual perspective to 
deepen and humanize this conflict 
What would constitute environmental or social 
damage in this region of [Georgia / New York]? 
Trying to ascertain how the respondent 
conceptualizes the environmental 
and/or social stakes of this conflict 
In your own words, what does heritage, cultural or 
otherwise, look like in [Georgia / New York]? 
Trying to ascertain how the respondent 
conceptualizes the idea of collective 
heritage in context 
In what ways might this project be an international 
one (or why not)? How? 
Individual participants will likely have 
various understandings of how these 
local conflicts connect to broader 
international processes that will be 
important to dissect 
 
 
Research Question 2   
 
In what ways do state and non-state actors shape these narratives at the site of conflict? 
 
Interview Questions What I Hope to Learn 
How has the expansion of mining activity through 
[the license auction / ‘land swap’] progressed? 
A rough historical mapping of key 
events in these conflicts 
What has resistance to the [RMG / NYCO] project 
consisted of? Support? 
Same as the question above but focused 
on piecing together the various 
political perspectives involved 
What projects or initiatives related to mining does 
[insert institution] work with? How were they 
developed, and how are they implemented? 
An ‘insider’ perspective on history of 
the institution’s activities as they relate 
to mining issues at the research site 
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What is [RMG’s / NYCO’s] role in the local 
community? 
In the context of actions and political 
narratives, trying to unravel political 
dynamics among non-state actors 
What would the ‘success’ of either side in this 
conflict look like? How would I know that they had 
achieved their goals? 
Trying to ascertain how the respondent 
conceptualizes the idea of success in 
these conflicts 
 
 
Research Question 3 
 
How do these actors’ perspectives compare to broader political attitudes about territory, 
political identity, and natural resources in [the Republic of Georgia’s / New York State’s] 
transitioning political situation and across their respective social settings?  
 
Interview Questions What I Hope to Learn 
Is this debate indicative of any broader political shifts in 
[the Republic of Georgia / New York State]? If so, what 
are they, and if not, why is that? 
An understanding of how the 
respondent might imagine this local 
conflict connected to broader 
geopolitical dynamics 
How would you define the concept ‘territory’? 
Trying to ascertain how the 
respondent conceptualizes the idea 
of territory in social context 
In your own words, what is the difference between 
private and public land, and why (or why not) is this 
important to you? 
Trying to ascertain how the 
respondent conceptualizes the idea 
of territory in social context 
What do you see as the political outcomes of this 
conflict for [the Republic of Georgia / New York State]? 
An understanding of how the 
respondent might imagine the local 
outcomes of this conflict  
What do you expect to see happen at this mining site in 
the next ten years? 
A different take on ascertaining 
how the respondent imagines 
individual action fitting in to 
broader, historical trends 
What do you think I am missing in my questions here? 
What else should I know about this? Help keep my scope of inquiry fresh 
 
 
  
 
 264 
References 
 
Adler, Patricia and Peter Adler (2002), ‘The Reluctant Respondent’, in J. Gubrium and J. 
Holstein (eds), Handbook of Interview Research: Context and Method, Thousand Oaks: 
SAGE, pp. 515–36. 
Agenda.ge (2014a), ‘International experts investigate Sakdrisi gold mine issues’, accessed 23 
September 2018 at http://agenda.ge/en/news/2014/1010. 
Agenda.ge (2014b), ‘Tbilisi Civil Court suspends mining at Sakdrisi Gold Mine’, accessed 23 
September 2018 at http://agenda.ge/en/news/2014/1344. 
Aglietta, M. (1979), A Theory of Capitalist Regulation: The US Experience, 1st edition, London: 
New Left Books. 
Agnew, J. (1994), ‘The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of International 
Relations Theory’, Review of International Political Economy, 1 (1), 53–80. 
Agnew, J. (2003), Geopolitics: Re-Visioning World Politics, 2 edition, London ; New York: 
Routledge. 
Agnew, J. (2005), ‘Sovereignty Regimes: Territoriality and State Authority in Contemporary 
World Politics’, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 95 (2), 437–61. 
Agnew, J. (2008), ‘Borders on the mind: re-framing border thinking’, Ethics & Global Politics, 1 
(4), 175–91. 
Agnew, J. (2010), ‘Still Trapped in Territory?’, Geopolitics, 15 (4), 779–84. 
Agnew, J. (2015a), ‘Revisiting the territorial trap’, Nordia Geographical Publications, 44 (4), 
43–8. 
Agnew, J. (2015b), ‘Unbundled territoriality and regional politics’, Territory, Politics, 
Governance, 3 (2), 119–23. 
Agnew, J. (2015c), ‘Unbundled territoriality and regional politics’, Territory, Politics, 
Governance, 3 (2), 119–23. 
Agrawal, A. (2001), ‘Common property, forest management and the Indian Himalaya’, 
Contributions to Indian Sociology, 35 (2), 181–212. 
Agyeman, J. and Y. Ogneva-Himmelberger (eds.) (2009), Environmental Justice and 
Sustainability in the Former Soviet Union, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Akiner, S. (1997), ‘Melting pot, salad bowl ‐ cauldron? Manipulation and mobilization of ethnic 
and religious identities in Central Asia’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 20 (2), 362–98. 
Alatout, S. (2006), ‘Towards a bio-territorial conception of power: Territory, population, and 
environmental narratives in Palestine and Israel’, Political Geography, 25 (6), 601–21. 
Alexievich, S. (2017), Secondhand Time: The Last of the Soviets, Reprint edition, New York, 
N.Y: Random House Trade Paperbacks. 
Allen, J. (2003), Lost Geographies of Power, Wiley. 
Allen, J. (2004), ‘The Whereabouts of Power: Politics, Government and Space’, Geografiska 
Annaler. Series B, Human Geography, 86 (1), 19–32. 
Allen, J. (2011), ‘Topological twists Power’s shifting geographies’, Dialogues in Human 
Geography, 1 (3), 283–98. 
Allen, M. G. (2017), ‘Islands, extraction and violence: Mining and the politics of scale in Island 
Melanesia’, Political Geography, 57, 81–90. 
Allina-Pisano, J. (2009), ‘How to Tell an Axe Murderer: An Essay on Ethnography, Truth, and 
Lies’, in E. Schatz (ed), Political Ethnography: What Immersion Contributes to the Study 
of Power, 1 edition, Chicago ; London: University Of Chicago Press. 
 
 265 
Anderson, Ben (2006), ‘Becoming and Being Hopeful: Towards a Theory of Affect’, 
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 24 (5), 733–52. 
Anderson, Benedict (2006), Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism, Revised Edition, Revised edition, London ; New York: Verso. 
Anderson, K. and D. Jack (1991), ‘Learning to Listen: Interview Techniques and Analyses’, in S. 
B. Gluck and D. Patas (eds), Women’s Words: The Feminist Practice of Oral History, 
New York: Routledge, pp. 11–26. 
Andreasson, S. (2015), ‘Varieties of resource nationalism in sub-Saharan Africa’s energy and 
minerals markets’, The Extractive Industries and Society, 2 (2), 310–9. 
Andreucci, D. (2017), ‘Resources, regulation and the state: Struggles over gas extraction and 
passive revolution in Evo Morales’s Bolivia’, Political Geography, 61, 170–80. 
Andreucci, D., M. García-Lamarca, J. Wedekind and E. Swyngedouw (2017), ‘“Value 
Grabbing”: A Political Ecology of Rent’, Capitalism Nature Socialism, 28 (3), 28–47. 
Appadurai, A. (2013a), ‘Introduction: commodities and the politics of value’, in A. Appadurai 
(ed), The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective, Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 3–63. 
Appadurai, A. (2013b), The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective, 
Cambridge University Press. 
Applebaum, A. (2004), Gulag: A History, Place of publication not identified: Anchor Books. 
Areshidze, I. (ed.) (2007), Democracy and Autocracy in Eurasia: Georgia in Transition, East 
Lansing: Michigan State University Press. 
ASTDR (2004), Public Health Statement: Copper, Agency for Toxic Substances & Disease 
Registry, Center for Disease Control, accessed 25 June 2018 at 
https://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/phs/phs.asp?id=204&tid=37. 
Auyero, J. and D. A. Swistun (2009), Flammable : Environmental Suffering in an Argentine 
Shantytown, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Avkopashvili, G., M. Avkopashvili, A. Gongadze, M. Tsulukidze and E. Shengelia (2017), 
‘Determination of Cu, Zn and Cd in soil, water and food products in the vicinity of RMG 
gold and copper mine, Kazreti, Georgia’, Annals of Agrarian Science, 15 (2), 269–72. 
Ayres, L. (2008), ‘Thematic Coding and Analysis’, in L. M. Given (ed), The SAGE Encyclopedia 
of Qualitative Research Methods, Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc, p. 868. 
Badiou, A. (2013), Philosophy and the Event, 1 edition, Polity. 
Bakke, K. M., A. M. Linke, J. O’Loughlin and G. Toal (2018), ‘Dynamics of state-building after 
war: External-internal relations in Eurasian de facto states’, Political Geography, 63, 
159–73. 
Bakker, K. (2003), ‘Archipelagos and networks: urbanization and water privatization in the 
South’, The Geographical Journal, 169 (4), 328–41. 
Bakker, K. (2009), ‘Neoliberal nature, ecological fixes, and the pitfalls of comparative research’, 
Environment and Planning A, 41 (8), 1781 – 1787. 
Bakker, K. (2010), ‘The limits of “neoliberal natures”: Debating green neoliberalism’, Progress 
in Human Geography, 34 (6), 715–35. 
Bakker, K. and G. Bridge (2006), ‘Material worlds? Resource geographies and the `matter of 
nature’’, Progress in Human Geography, 30 (1), 5–27. 
Balibar, E. (1998), ‘The Borders of Europe’, in P. Cheah and B. Robbins (eds), Cosmopolitics: 
Thinking and Feeling Beyond the Nation, First edition edition, Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, pp. 216–33. 
 
 266 
Balibar, É. (2015), Citizenship, 1 edition, Malden, MA: Polity. 
Bankwatch (2018), ‘Indigenous Svan communities unite to block hydro development in Svaneti’, 
accessed 25 February 2019 at https://bankwatch.org/blog/svan-communities-block-hydro-
development-in-svanetia. 
Barenberg, A. (2014), Gulag Town, Company Town : Forced Labor and Its Legacy in Vorkuta, 
New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Barnes, T. J. (2009a), ‘Explanation’, in D. Gregory, R. Johnston, G. Pratt, M. J. Watts, and S. 
Whatmore (eds), The Dictionary of Human Geography, 5th ed., Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 
229–30. 
Barnes, T. J. (2009b), ‘“Not Only … But Also”: Quantitative and Critical Geography’, The 
Professional Geographer, 61 (3), 292–300. 
Barnes, T. J. and J. S. Duncan (1992), Writing Worlds: Discourse, Text, and Metaphor in the 
Representation of Landscape, Routledge. 
Barnes, T. J. and M. Farish (2006), ‘Between Regions: Science, Militarism, and American 
Geography from World War to Cold War’, Annals of the Association of American 
Geographers, 96 (4), 807–26. 
Barnes, T. J. and M. Hannah (2001), ‘The Place of Numbers: Histories, Geographies, and 
Theories of Quantification’, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 19 (4), 
379–83. 
Barnett, C. and M. Low (2004), Spaces of Democracy : Geographical Perspectives on 
Citizenship, Participation and Representation, London: SAGE Publications Ltd. 
Barnett, C. and D. Scott (2007), ‘The Reach of Citizenship: Locating the Politics of Industrial 
Air Pollution in Durban and Beyond’, Urban Forum, 18 (4), 289–309. 
Barry, A. (2001), Political Machines: Governing a Technological Society, 1 edition, London: 
Bloomsbury Academic. 
Barry, A. (2010), ‘Materialist Politics: Metallurgy’, in B. Braun and S. J. Whatmore (eds), 
Political Matter: Technoscience, Democracy, and Public Life, Minneapolis: Univ Of 
Minnesota Press, pp. 89–117. 
Barry, A. (2013), Material Politics: Disputes along the Pipeline, Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley 
Blackwell. 
Barry, A., G. Born and G. Weszkalnys (2008), ‘Logics of interdisciplinarity’, Economy and 
Society, 37 (1), 20–49. 
Bassett, K. (2008), ‘Thinking the Event: Badiou’s Philosophy of the Event and the Example of 
the Paris Commune’, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 26 (5), 895–910. 
Bassin, M. (2007), ‘Civilisations and Their Discontents: Political Geography and Geopolitics in 
the Huntington Thesis’, Geopolitics, 12 (3), 351–74. 
Bauer, C. J. (1998), ‘Slippery Property Rights: Multiple Water Uses and the Neoliberal Model in 
Chile, 1981-1995’, Natural Resources Journal, 38, 109. 
Bebbington, A. (2012), ‘Underground political ecologies: The second Annual Lecture of the 
Cultural and Political Ecology Specialty Group of the Association of American 
Geographers’, Geoforum, 43 (6), 1152–62. 
Bennett, J. (2010), Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things, Durham: Duke University 
Press Books. 
Benwell, M. C. and K. Dodds (2011), ‘Argentine territorial nationalism revisited: The 
Malvinas/Falklands dispute and geographies of everyday nationalism’, Political 
Geography, 30 (8), 441–9. 
 
 267 
Bernard, H. R. (2011), ‘Interviewing I: Unstructured and Semistructured’, in Research Methods 
in Anthropology: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches, Rowman Altamira, pp. 156–
86. 
Biernacki, P. and D. Waldorf (1981), ‘Snowball Sampling: Problems and Techniques of Chain 
Referral Sampling’, Sociological Methods & Research, 10 (2), 141–63. 
Billig, M. (1995), Banal Nationalism, 1 edition, London ; Thousand Oaks, Calif: SAGE 
Publications Ltd. 
Billig, M. (2013), Learn to Write Badly: How to Succeed in the Social Sciences, Cambridge ; 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Birkenholtz, T. (2008), ‘Contesting expertise: The politics of environmental knowledge in 
northern Indian groundwater practices’, Geoforum, 39 (1), 466–82. 
Blaikie, P. M. (1985), Political Economy of Soil Erosion in Developing Countries, The, London ; 
New York: Routledge. 
Blaikie, P. M. and H. Brookfield (1987), Land Degradation and Society, Methuen. 
Blomley, N. K. (2008), ‘Simplification is complicated: Property, nature, and the rivers of law’, 
Environment & Planning A, 40, 1825–42. 
Blomley, N. (2015), ‘The territory of property’, Progress in Human Geography, 
0309132515596380. 
Blomley, N. (2017), ‘The territorialization of property in land: space, power and practice’, 
Territory, Politics, Governance, 0 (0), 1–17. 
Bloomberg (2017), ‘Russian fund plans a $1bn mining venture with China Gold’, accessed 3 
February 2019 at http://www.mining.com/web/russian-fund-plans-1bn-mining-venture-
china-gold/. 
Bloomberg (2018), Caucasian Mining Group Ltd.: Private Company Information, accessed 23 
September 2018 at 
https://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=323660475. 
Bond, A. R. (1994), ‘The Non-Energy Mineral Industries of Post-Soviet Russia’, Post-Soviet 
Geography, 35 (9), 543–55. 
Borer, M. I. and A. Fontana (2012), ‘Postmodern Trends: Expanding the Horizons of 
Interviewing Practices and Epistemologies’, in J. F. Gubrium, J. A. Holstein, A. 
Marvasti, and K. D. McKinney (eds), The SAGE Handbook of Interview Research: The 
Complexity of the Craft, Second edition, Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, Inc, pp. 
45–60. 
Boyce, G. A. (2016), ‘The rugged border: Surveillance, policing and the dynamic materiality of 
the US/Mexico frontier’, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 34 (2), 245–
62. 
Braun, B. (2000), ‘Producing vertical territory: geology and governmentality in late Victorian 
Canada’, Cultural Geographies, 7 (1), 7–46. 
Braun, B. (2002), The Intemperate Rainforest: Nature, Culture, and Power on Canada’s West 
Coast, 1 edition, Minneapolis: Univ Of Minnesota Press. 
Braun, B. (2006), ‘Environmental issues: global natures in the space of assemblage’, Progress in 
Human Geography; London, 30 (5), 644–54. 
Braun, B. (2011), ‘Governing disorder: biopolitics and the molecularization of life’, in R. Peet, 
P. Robbins, and M. J. Watts (eds), Global Political Ecology, New York: Routledge, p. 
23. 
 
 268 
Braun, B. P. (2014), ‘A New Urban Dispositif? Governing Life in an Age of Climate Change’, 
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 32 (1), 49–64. 
Braun, V. and V. Clarke (2006), ‘Using thematic analysis in psychology’, Qualitative Research 
in Psychology, 3 (2), 77–101. 
Braun, B. and S. J. Whatmore (eds.) (2010), Political Matter: Technoscience, Democracy, and 
Public Life, Minneapolis: Univ Of Minnesota Press. 
Bremmer, I. and R. Johnston (2009), ‘The Rise and Fall of Resource Nationalism’, Survival, 51 
(2), 149–58. 
Brenner, N. (1999), ‘Beyond state-centrism? Space, territoriality, and geographical scale in 
globalization studies’, Theory and Society, 28 (1), 39–78. 
Brenner, N. (2004), New State Spaces: Urban Governance and the Rescaling of Statehood, 1 
edition, Oxford New York: Oxford University Press. 
Brenner, N. and S. Elden (2009), ‘Henri Lefebvre on State, Space, Territory’, International 
Political Sociology, 3 (4), 353–77. 
Brenner, N., B. Jessop, M. Jones and G. MacLeod (2003), ‘Introduction: State Space in 
Question’, in N. Brenner, B. Jessop,  rtin Jones, and GordoncLeod (eds), State/Space, 
Blackwell Publishing, pp. 1–26. 
Breyfogle, N. (ed.) (2018), Eurasian Environments: Nature and Ecology in Imperial Russian and 
Soviet History, 1 edition, Pittsburgh, Pa: University of Pittsburgh Press. 
Bridge, G. (2004), ‘CONTESTED TERRAIN: Mining and the Environment’, Annual Review of 
Environment and Resources, 29 (1), 205–59. 
Bridge, G. (2007), ‘Acts of Enclosure: Claim staking and land conversion in Guyana’s gold 
fields’, in N. Heynen, J. McCarthy, S. Prudham, and P. Robbins (eds), Neoliberal 
Environments: False Promises and Unnatural Consequences, New York: Routledge, pp. 
74–86. 
Bridge, G. (2009), ‘Material Worlds: Natural Resources, Resource Geography and the Material 
Economy’, Geography Compass, 3 (3), 1217–44. 
Bridge, G. (2013), ‘The Hole World: scales and spaces of extraction’, New Geographies, 2, 43–
8. 
Bridge, G. (2014), ‘Resource geographies II The resource-state nexus’, Progress in Human 
Geography, 0309132513493379. 
Bridge, G. and A. E. G. Jonas (2002), ‘Governing nature: the reregulation of resource access, 
production, and consumption’, Environment and Planning A, 34 (5), 759 – 766. 
Bridge, G., J. McCarthy and T. Perreault (2015), ‘Editors’ Conclusion’, in T. Perreault, G. 
Bridge, and J. McCarthy (eds), The Routledge Handbook of Political Ecology, Abingdon, 
Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge. 
Bridge, G. and T. Perreault (2009), ‘Environmental Governance’, in N. Castree, D. Demeritt, D. 
Liverman, and B. Rhoads (eds), A Companion to Environmental Geography, John Wiley 
& Sons, pp. 475–97. 
Brown, K. (2005), A Biography of No Place: From Ethnic Borderland to Soviet Heartland, 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
Brown, K. (2013), Plutopia: Nuclear Families, Atomic Cities, and the Great Soviet and 
American Plutonium Disasters, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Brown, B. and S. J. Spiegel (2017), ‘Resisting coal: Hydrocarbon politics and assemblages of 
protest in the UK and Indonesia’, Geoforum, 85, 101–11. 
 
 269 
Browning, C. S. (2018), ‘Geostrategies, geopolitics and ontological security in the Eastern 
neighbourhood: The European Union and the “new Cold War”’, Political Geography, 62, 
106–15. 
Brubaker, R. (1996), Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New 
Europe, Cambridge England ; New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Brubaker, R. (2004), Ethnicity without Groups, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. 
Brubaker, R. (2006), Ethnicity without Groups, New Ed edition, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press. 
Brubaker, R. (2010), ‘Charles Tilly as a Theorist of Nationalism’, The American Sociologist, 41 
(4), 375–81. 
Brubaker, R. (2011), ‘Nationalizing States Revisited: Projects and Processes of Nationalization 
in Post-Soviet States’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 34 (11), 1785–814. 
Brubaker, R. (2017), Grounds for Difference, Reprint edition, Cambridge, Massachusetts 
London: Harvard University Press. 
Bruff, I. (2014), ‘The Rise of Authoritarian Neoliberalism’, Rethinking Marxism, 26 (1), 113–29. 
Bruff, I. and C. B. Tansel (2019), ‘Authoritarian neoliberalism: trajectories of knowledge 
production and praxis’, Globalizations, 16 (3), 233–44. 
Bryan, J. and J. D. Wainwright (2009), Letter to the Association of American Geographers, 
accessed 3 January 2015 at 
http://academic.evergreen.edu/g/grossmaz/HerlihyLetterSign.pdf. 
Bulkeley, H. (2005), ‘Reconfiguring environmental governance: Towards a politics of scales and 
networks’, Political Geography, 24 (8), 875–902. 
Burawoy, M. (2000), ‘Reaching for the Global’, in Michæl Burawoy, J. A. Blum, S. George, M. 
Thayer, Z. Gille, T. Gowan, L. Haney, M. Klawiter, S. H. Lopez, and S. Riain (eds), 
Global Ethnography: Forces, Connections, and Imaginations in a Postmodern World, 
First edition, Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 1–40. 
Burchuladze, N. (2015), ‘Sakdrisi Gold Fever’, accessed 23 September 2018 at 
https://www.georgianjournal.ge/society/29855-sakdrisi-gold-fever.html. 
Burden, E. (2018), ‘Russian Central Bank Buys More Gold in Face of Tougher Sanctions’, 
Bloomberg, 22 August, accessed 3 February 2019 at 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-22/russian-central-bank-buys-more-
gold-in-face-of-tougher-sanctions. 
Cagara, D. K. (2016), ‘Svaneti gold rush from Saint Kitts and Nevis’, accessed 18 September 
2018 at http://dfwatch.net/svaneti-gold-rush-from-saint-kitts-and-nevis-42544. 
Caretta, M. A. and F. J. Cheptum (2017), ‘Leaving the field: (de-)linked lives of the researcher 
and research assistant’, Area, 49 (4), 415–20. 
Casolo, J. and S. Doshi (2013), ‘Domesticated Dispossessions? Towards a Transnational 
Feminist Geopolitics of Development’, Geopolitics, 18 (4), 800–34. 
Caspersen, N. (2015), ‘Degrees of legitimacy: Ensuring internal and external support in the 
absence of recognition’, Geoforum, 66, 184–92. 
Castree, N. (2001), ‘Socializing nature: Theory, practice, and politics.’, in N. Castree and B. 
Braun (eds), Social Nature: Theory, Practice, and Politics, Malden, MA: Blackwell. 
Castree, N. (2003), ‘The Geopolitics of Nature’, in J. Agnew, K. Mitchell, and G. Toal (eds), A 
Companion to Political Geography, 1 edition, Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, pp. 
423–39. 
Castree, N. (2005), Nature, New Ed edition, London ; New York: Routledge. 
 
 270 
Castree, N. (2007), ‘Neoliberal Ecologies’, in N. Heynen, J. McCarthy, S. Prudham, and P. 
Robbins (eds), Neoliberal Environments: False Promises and Unnatural Consequences, 
New York: Routledge - Taylor & Francis Group, pp. 281–6. 
Castree, N. (2008), ‘Neoliberalising nature: the logics of deregulation and reregulation’, 
Environment and Planning A, 40 (1), 131 – 152. 
Castree, N. (2015), ‘Capitalism and the Marxist Critique of Political Ecology’, in T. Perreault, G. 
Bridge, and J. McCarthy (eds), The Routledge Handbook of Political Ecology, Abingdon, 
Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge. 
Castree, N. and G. Henderson (2014), ‘The capitalist mode of conservation, neoliberalism and 
the ecology of value’, New Proposals: Journal of Marxism and Interdisciplinary Inquiry, 
7 (1), 16–37. 
Caucasian Mining Group (2018), Caucasian Mining Group - Home, accessed 23 September 
2018 at http://www.cmg.ge/index.php?Id_leng=eng&Id_pg=01&id_corep=0&pgS=1. 
CENN (2014), CENN Statement on the Commencement of Mining Activities at the Sakdrisi 
Deposit, accessed 5 January 2015 at http://newsday.ge/en/index.php?newsid=1122. 
Chayes, S. (2016), Thieves of State: Why Corruption Threatens Global Security, 1 edition, W. 
W. Norton & Company. 
Cheterian, V. (2009), ‘Politics of Environment in the Caucasus Conflict Zone: From 
Nationalizing Politics to Conflict Resolution’, in H. G. Brauch, Ú. O. Spring, J. Grin, C. 
Mesjasz, P. Kameri-Mbote, N. C. Behera, B. Chourou, and H. Krummenacher (eds), 
Facing Global Environmental Change, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, pp. 925–38. 
Cheterian, V. (2011), War and Peace in the Caucasus: Russia’s Troubled Frontier, London: 
Hurst. 
Childs, J. (2016), ‘Geography and resource nationalism: A critical review and reframing’, The 
Extractive Industries and Society, 3 (2), 539–46. 
Chkhartishvili, M. (2013), ‘GEORGIAN NATIONALISM AND THE IDEA OF GEORGIAN 
NATION’, Codrul Cosminului, XIX (2), 189–206. 
Civil Georgia (2014), ‘Civil.Ge | RMG Given Go-Ahead to Dig Gold at Sakdrisi’, accessed 23 
September 2018 at https://old.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=27035. 
Civil.ge (2014), ‘Outcry as RMG Launches Gold Mining at Sakdrisi’, accessed at 
http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=27909. 
Civil.Ge (2014), ‘Strike-Hit Gold Mine Spills Polluted Water into River’, accessed 26 January 
2019 at https://old.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=26986. 
Clark, N. (2011), Inhuman Nature : Sociable Life on a Dynamic Planet, Los Angeles: SAGE 
Publications Ltd. 
Clifford, J. (1997), ‘Spatial Practices: Fieldwork, Travel, and the Disciplining of Anthropology’, 
in A. Gupta and J. Ferguson (eds), Anthropological Locations: Boundaries and Grounds 
of a Field Science, Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 185–222. 
Cockcroft, L. (2014), Global Corruption: Money, Power, and Ethics in the Modern World, S.l.: 
University of Pennsylvania Press. 
Cohen, M. (1927), ‘Property and Sovereignty’, Cornell Law Review, 13 (1), 8–30. 
Collier, S. J. (2009), ‘Topologies of Power Foucault’s Analysis of Political Government beyond 
“Governmentality”’, Theory, Culture & Society, 26 (6), 78–108. 
Collier, S. J. (2011a), Post-Soviet Social : Neoliberalism, Social Modernity, Biopolitics, 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
 
 271 
Collier, S. J. (2011b), Post-Soviet Social: Neoliberalism, Social Modernity, Biopolitics, 
Princeton University Press. 
Collier, S. J. and A. Lakoff (2015), ‘Vital Systems Security: Reflexive Biopolitics and the 
Government of Emergency’, Theory, Culture & Society, 32 (2), 19–51. 
Collier, S. J. and L. Way (2004), ‘Beyond the Deficit Model: Social Welfare in Post-Soviet 
Georgia’, Post-Soviet Affairs, 20 (3), 258–84. 
Colwell, C. (1997), ‘Deleuze and Foucault: Series, Event, Genealogy’, Theory & Event, 1 (2), 
accessed at https://doi.org/10.1353/tae.1997.0004. 
Comaroff, Jean and John Comaroff (2003), ‘Ethnography on an Awkward Scale Postcolonial 
Anthropology and the Violence of Abstraction’, Ethnography, 4 (2), 147–79. 
Cons, J. and M. Eilenberg (eds.) (2019), Frontier Assemblages: The Emergent Politics of 
Resource Frontiers in Asia, 1 edition, Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. 
Cooley, A. and J. Heathershaw (2017), Dictators without Borders: Power and Money in Central 
Asia, New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Cope, M. (2000), ‘Coding Qualitative Data’, in I. Hay (ed), Qualitative Research Methods in 
Human Geography, Melbourne, Vic. : Oxford University Press, pp. 281–94. 
Coronil, F. (1997), The Magical State: Nature, Money, and Modernity in Venezuela, 1 edition, 
Chicago: University Of Chicago Press. 
Corso, M. (2012), ‘Georgia: Tbilisi Offers Companies Forgiveness for Environmental Sins | 
Eurasianet’, accessed 18 September 2018 at https://eurasianet.org/georgia-tbilisi-offers-
companies-forgiveness-for-environmental-sins. 
Côte, M. and B. Korf (2018), ‘Making Concessions: Extractive Enclaves, Entangled Capitalism 
and Regulative Pluralism at the Gold Mining Frontier in Burkina Faso’, World 
Development, 101, 466–76. 
Coumel, L. and M. Elie (2013), ‘A Belated and Tragic Ecological Revolution: Nature, Disasters, 
and Green Activists in the Soviet Union and the Post-Soviet States, 1960s-2010s*’, The 
Soviet and Post-Soviet Review, 40 (2), 157–65. 
Cowen, D. and N. Smith (2009), ‘After Geopolitics? From the Geopolitical Social to 
Geoeconomics’, Antipode, 41 (1), 22–48. 
Cox, K. R. (2013), ‘Territory, Scale, and Why Capitalism Matters’, Territory, Politics, 
Governance, 1 (1), 46–61. 
Crang, M. (2010), ‘Visual Methods and Methodologies’, in D. DeLyser, S. Herbert, S. Aitken, 
M. Crang, and L. McDowell (eds), The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Geography, 
SAGE Publications, pp. 208–24. 
Cresswell, T. (2012), Geographic Thought: A Critical Introduction, John Wiley & Sons. 
Cresswell, T. and D. P. Dixon (2017), ‘GeoHumanities’, in D. B. Richardson (ed), The 
International Encyclopedia of Geography : People, the Earth, Environment, and 
Technology, Chichester, West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, pp. 2810–8. 
Creswell, J. W. (2007), ‘Designing a Qualitative Study’, in Qualitative Inquiry and Research 
Design: Choosing among Five Approaches, 2nd ed., Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Creswell, J. W. (2009), Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods 
Approaches, 3rd edition, Thousand Oaks, Calif: SAGE Publications, Inc. 
Creswell, J. W. (2010), ‘Controversies in Mixed Methods Research’, in D. DeLyser, S. Herbert, 
S. Aitken, M. Crang, and L. McDowell (eds), The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative 
Geography, SAGE Publications, pp. 269–83. 
 
 272 
Critchlow, A. (2014), ‘Putin stockpiles gold as Russia prepares for economic war’, accessed 17 
January 2019 at https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/commodities/11226240/Putin-
stockpiles-gold-as-Russia-prepares-for-economic-war.html. 
CRRC (2016a), ‘Changing issue salience in Georgia after 2008’, accessed 22 May 2018 at 
http://crrc-caucasus.blogspot.com/2016/03/changing-issue-saliency-in-georgia.html. 
CRRC (2016b), ‘Environmental issues in Georgia: a concern for all?’, accessed 22 May 2018 at 
http://crrc-caucasus.blogspot.com/2016/07/environmental-issues-in-georgia-
concern.html. 
CRRC (2017), ‘Back to the USSR? How poverty makes people nostalgic for the Soviet Union’, 
accessed 23 September 2018 at http://crrc-caucasus.blogspot.com/2017/06/back-to-ussr-
how-poverty-makes-people.html. 
CRRC (2018a), ‘Caucasus Barometer Time-Series Dataset, Georgia - Online Data Analysis’, e, 
accessed at caucasusbarometer.org. 
CRRC (2018b), ‘NDI: Public attitudes in Georgia’, e, accessed at caucasusbarometer.org. 
Csergo, Z. (2008), ‘Review Essay: Do we need a language shift in the study of nationalism and 
ethnicity? Reflections on Rogers Brubaker’s critical scholarly agenda’, Nations and 
Nationalism, 14 (2), 393–8. 
Dalby, S. (2008), ‘Imperialism, Domination, Culture: The Continued Relevance of Critical 
Geopolitics’, Geopolitics, 13 (3), 413–36. 
Dalby, S. (2014), ‘Environmental Geopolitics in the Twenty-first Century’, Alternatives: Global, 
Local, Political, 39 (1), 3–16. 
Dalby, S. and G. Ó Tuathail (eds.) (1998), Rethinking Geopolitics, 1 edition, New York: 
Routledge. 
Dalmasso, E., A. Del Sordi, M. Glasius, N. Hirt, M. Michaelsen, A. S. Mohammad and D. Moss 
(2018), ‘Intervention: Extraterritorial authoritarian power’, Political Geography, 64, 95–
104. 
D’Angelo, L. and R. J. Pijpers (2018), ‘Mining Temporalities: An Overview’, The Extractive 
Industries and Society, 5 (2), 215–22. 
Davidov, V. (2013), ‘Soviet and post-Soviet inequalities through the lens of political ecology: a 
Foundation for further inquiry’, Journal of Globalization Studies, 4 (1), accessed 30 July 
2018 at https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/soviet-and-post-soviet-inequalities-through-the-
lens-of-political-ecology-a-foundation-for-further-inquiry. 
Davidov, V. (2015), ‘Beyond Formal Environmentalism: Eco-Nationalism and the “Ringing 
Cedars” of Russia’, Culture, Agriculture, Food and Environment, 37 (1), 2–13. 
Davidson, A. (2017), ‘Donald Trump’s Worst Deal’, The New Yorker, 6 March, accessed 18 
September 2018 at https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/03/13/donald-trumps-
worst-deal. 
Davies, T. (2018), ‘Toxic Space and Time: Slow Violence, Necropolitics, and Petrochemical 
Pollution’, Annals of the American Association of Geographers, accessed 31 July 2018 at 
https://www.academia.edu/36862252/Toxic_Space_and_Time_Slow_Violence_Necropol
itics_and_Petrochemical_Pollution. 
Dawson, J. I. (1996), Eco-Nationalism: Anti-Nuclear Activism and National Identity in Russia, 
Lithuania, and Ukraine, Duke University Press. 
Dawson, J. I. (2000), ‘The two faces of environmental justice: Lessons from the eco‐nationalist 
phenomenon’, Environmental Politics, 9 (2), 22–60. 
 
 273 
De Angelis, M. (2001), ‘Marx and primitive accumulation: The continuous character of capital’s 
“enclosures”’, The Commoner, 2. 
DeLanda, M. (2008), ‘Deleuze, Materialism and Politics’, in N. Thoburn and I. Buchanan (eds), 
Deleuze and Politics, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 160–77. 
Delanty, G. and P. O’Mahony (2002), Nationalism and Social Theory: Modernity and the 
Recalcitrance of the Nation, 1st edition, SAGE Publications Ltd. 
Deleuze, G. and F. Guattari (1987), A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
DeLyser, D. (2010), ‘Writing Qualitative Geography’, in D. DeLyser, S. Herbert, S. Aitken, M. 
Crang, and L. McDowell (eds), The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Geography, SAGE 
Publications, pp. 341–58. 
Demytrie, R. (2014), ‘Georgia’s gold mine dilemma’, accessed 16 December 2014 at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-27499882. 
DFWATCH (2014a), ‘Campaigners launch protest camp to defend ancient Georgian site’, 
accessed 23 September 2018 at http://dfwatch.net/campaigners-launch-protest-camp-to-
defend-ancient-georgian-site-44732-27871. 
DFWATCH (2014b), ‘Georgian parliament halts work in prehistoric mine, orders investigation’, 
accessed 23 September 2018 at http://dfwatch.net/georgian-parliament-halts-work-in-
prehistoric-mine-orders-investigation-16833-32822. 
DFWATCH (2014c), ‘Georgian patriarch deplores destruction of ancient mine’, accessed 23 
September 2018 at http://dfwatch.net/georgian-patriarch-deplores-destruction-of-ancient-
mine-26734-32658. 
DFWATCH (2014d), ‘Protest intensifies as RMG starts digging at ancient mine’, accessed 23 
September 2018 at http://dfwatch.net/protest-intensifies-as-rmg-starts-digging-at-ancient-
mine-90773-28028. 
DFWATCH (2014e), ‘Tbilisi “invaded” by workers from Russian mining company’, accessed 23 
September 2018 at http://dfwatch.net/tbilisi-invaded-by-workers-from-russian-mining-
company-98018-32797. 
DFWATCH (2014f), ‘Youth activists rally outside PM’s residence’, accessed 23 September 
2018 at http://dfwatch.net/youth-activists-rally-outside-pms-residence-97765-32775. 
DFWATCH (2015), ‘Georgian PM campaigning for mining in ancient gold mine’, accessed 23 
September 2018 at http://dfwatch.net/georgian-pm-campaigning-for-mining-in-ancient-
gold-mine-34911. 
DFWATCH (2017), ‘Protesters demand safer workplaces after four die in coal mine’, accessed 
23 September 2018 at http://dfwatch.net/protesters-demand-safer-workplaces-four-die-
coal-mine-48417. 
DFWATCH (2018), ‘Six killed as coal mine collapses in Tkibuli, Georgia’, accessed 23 
September 2018 at http://dfwatch.net/six-killed-coal-mine-collapses-tkibuli-georgia-
50209. 
Diener, A. (2006), ‘Homeland as social construct: Territorialization among Kazakhstan’s 
Germans and Koreans’, Nationalities Papers, 34 (2), 201–35. 
Dijkink, G. (1997), National Identity and Geopolitical Visions: Maps of Pride and Pain, 
London ; New York: Routledge. 
Dillon, M. (2007), ‘Governing through contingency: The security of biopolitical governance’, 
Political Geography, 26 (1), 41–7. 
 
 274 
Dillon, M. and L. Lobo-Guerrero (2008), ‘Biopolitics of security in the 21st century: an 
introduction’, Review of International Studies; London, 34 (2), 265–92. 
Dittmer, J. (2005), ‘Captain America’s Empire: Reflections on Identity, Popular Culture, and 
Post-9/11 Geopolitics’, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 95 (3), 626–
43. 
Dittmer, J. (2010a), Popular Culture, Geopolitics, and Identity, Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers. 
Dittmer, J. (2010b), ‘Textual and Discourse Analysis’, in D. DeLyser, S. Herbert, S. Aitken, M. 
Crang, and L. McDowell (eds), The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Geography, SAGE 
Publications, pp. 274–86. 
Dittmer, J. (2014), ‘Geopolitical assemblages and complexity’, Progress in Human Geography, 
38 (3), 385–401. 
Dittmer, J. (2017), Diplomatic Material: Affect, Assemblage, and Foreign Policy, Durham: Duke 
University Press Books. 
Dittmer, J. and K. Dodds (2008), ‘Popular Geopolitics Past and Future: Fandom, Identities and 
Audiences’, Geopolitics, 13 (3), 437–57. 
Dittmer, J. and N. Gray (2010), ‘Popular Geopolitics 2.0: Towards New Methodologies of the 
Everyday: Popular geopolitics 2.0’, Geography Compass, 4 (11), 1664–77. 
Dodds, K. (2001), ‘Political Geography III: Critical Geopolitics After 10 Years’, Progress in 
Human Geography, 25, 469–84. 
Dodds, K. (2016), ‘An interview with Professor Michael Billig’, Political Geography, 54, 73–5. 
Dodds, K., R. Hughes and F. MacDonald (2010), Observant States : Geopolitics and Visual 
Culture, London: I.B.Tauris. 
Dodds, K., M. Kuus and J. Sharp (2013), The Ashgate Research Companion to Critical 
Geopolitics, Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. 
Doff, N. (2018), ‘Russia Dumps Treasuries for Gold’, Bloomberg, 20 June, accessed 17 January 
2019 at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-20/russia-dumps-treasuries-
for-gold-in-pivot-after-sanctions-scare. 
Doolittle, A. A. (2010), ‘Stories and Maps, Images and Archives: Multimethod Approach to the 
Political Ecology of Native Property Rights and Natural Resource Management in Sabah, 
Malaysia’, Environmental Management, 45 (1), 67–81. 
Doolittle, A. (2015), ‘The best of many worlds: methodological pluralism in political ecology’, 
in R. L. Bryant (ed), The International Handbook of Political Ecology, Edward Elgar 
Publishing. 
Doolot, A. and J. Heathershaw (2015), ‘State as resource, mediator and performer: understanding 
the local and global politics of gold mining in Kyrgyzstan’, Central Asian Survey, 34 (1), 
93–109. 
Doshi, S. and M. Ranganathan (2017), ‘Contesting the Unethical City: Land Dispossession and 
Corruption Narratives in Urban India’, Annals of the American Association of 
Geographers, 107 (1), 183–99. 
Doshi, S. and M. Ranganathan (2018), ‘Towards a critical geography of corruption and power in 
late capitalism’, Progress in Human Geography, 0309132517753070. 
Dowler, L. and J. Sharp (2001), ‘A Feminist Geopolitics?’, Space and Polity, 5 (3), 165–76. 
DuJour, P. F. (2014), ‘8 Of The Richest, Most Powerful Russians In The US’, accessed 18 
September 2018 at https://www.businessinsider.com/the-wealthiest-russians-in-the-us-
2014-3. 
 
 275 
Ebanoidze, J. (2003), Current Land Policy Issues in Georgia, 2003/3, Rome, Italy: FAO, 
accessed 11 October 2018 at 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/006/y5026e/y5026e00.htm#Contents. 
Ehrkamp, P. and M. H. Jacobsen (2015), ‘Citizenship’, in J. A. Agnew, V. Mamadouh, A. Secor, 
and J. Sharp (eds), The Wiley Blackwell Companion to Political Geography, 1 edition, 
Wiley-Blackwell. 
Einhorn, B. (2000), ‘Gender, nation, landscape and identity in narratives of exile and return’, 
Women’s Studies International Forum, 23 (6), 701–13. 
Ekers, M. (2009), ‘The political ecology of hegemony in depression-era British Columbia, 
Canada: Masculinities, work and the production of the forestscape’, Geoforum, 40 (3), 
303–15. 
Ekers, M. (2015), ‘On the Concreteness of Labor and Class in Political Ecology’, in T. Perreault, 
G. Bridge, and J. McCarthy (eds), The Routledge Handbook of Political Ecology, 
Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge. 
Ekers, M. and S. Prudham (2017), ‘The Metabolism of Socioecological Fixes: Capital Switching, 
Spatial Fixes, and the Production of Nature’, Annals of the American Association of 
Geographers, 107 (6), 1370–88. 
Elden, S. (2001), Mapping the Present: Heidegger, Foucault and the Project of a Spatial 
History., New York: Continuum. 
Elden, S. (2006), ‘Contingent Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity and the Sanctity of Borders’, 
SAIS Review of International Affairs, 26 (1), 11–24. 
Elden, S. (2009), Terror and Territory: The Spatial Extent of Sovereignty, Minneapolis: Univ Of 
Minnesota Press. 
Elmhirst, R. (2011), ‘Introducing new feminist political ecologies’, Geoforum, 42 (2), 129–32. 
Elson, D. (1979), Value: The Representation of Labour in Capitalism, CSE Books. 
Elwood, S. (2007), ‘Negotiating Participatory Ethics in the Midst of Institutional Ethics’, ACME, 
6 (3), 329–38. 
Elwood, S. (2010), ‘Mixed Methods: Thinking, Doing, and Asking in Multiple Ways’, in D. 
DeLyser, S. Herbert, S. Aitken, M. Crang, and L. McDowell (eds), The SAGE Handbook 
of Qualitative Geography, SAGE Publications, pp. 94–113. 
Elwood, S. A. and D. G. Martin (2000), ‘“Placing” Interviews: Location and Scales of Power in 
Qualitative Research’, The Professional Geographer, 52 (4), 649–57. 
EMC (2014), ‘Worker’s Strike Kazreti’, accessed 18 September 2018 at https://emc.org.ge/en. 
Emel, J., M. Huber and M. H. Makene (2011), ‘Extracting sovereignty: Capital, territory, and 
gold mining in Tanzania’, Political Geography, 30 (2), 70–9. 
Emerson, R. M., R. I. Fretz and L. L. Shaw (2011), Writing Ethnographic Fieldnotes, Second 
Edition, Second Edition edition, Chicago: University Of Chicago Press. 
England, K. V. L. (1994), ‘Getting Personal: Reflexivity, Positionality, and Feminist Research*’, 
The Professional Geographer, 46 (1), 80–9. 
England, K. V. L. (2002), ‘Interviewing Elites: Cautionary Tales about Researching Women 
Managers in Canada’s Banking Industry’, in P. J. Moss (ed), Feminist Geography in 
Practice: Research and Methods, 1 edition, Oxford, UK ; Malden, Mass: Wiley-
Blackwell, pp. 200–13. 
Erickson, F. (2011), ‘A History of Qualitative Inquiry in Social and Educational Research’, in N. 
K. Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln (eds), The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research, Los 
Angeles ; London: Sage Publications, Inc, pp. 43–60. 
 
 276 
Escobar, A. (2010), ‘Postconstructivist political ecologies’, in M. R. Redclift and G. Woodgate 
(eds), The International Handbook of Environmental Sociology, Edward Elgar 
Publishing, pp. 91–105. 
Evered, K. T. and E. Ö. Evered (2012), ‘State, peasant, mosquito: The biopolitics of public 
health education and malaria in early republican Turkey’, Political Geography, 31 (5), 
311–23. 
Ey, M. and M. Sherval (2016), ‘Exploring the minescape: engaging with the complexity of the 
extractive sector’, Area, n/a-n/a. 
Faier, L. and L. Rofel (2014), ‘Ethnographies of Encounter’, Annual Review of Anthropology, 43 
(1), 363–77. 
Falah, G.-W., C. Flint and V. Mamadouh (2006), ‘Just War and Extraterritoriality: The Popular 
Geopolitics of the United States’ War on Iraq as Reflected in Newspapers of the Arab 
World’, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 96 (1), 142–64. 
Federici, S. (2004), Caliban and the Witch: Women, the Body and Primitive Accumulation, 1st 
edition, New York, NY: Autonomedia. 
Felix-Henningsen, P. and T. Urushadze (2012), Heavy Metal Pollution of Irrigated Soils Due to 
Mining near Bolnisi in the Mashavera Valley in Southeast Georgia -- Reasons, 
Consequences, Countermeasures, accessed at http://www.sciencemovies.de. 
Felix-Henningsen, P., T. Urushadze, D. Steffens, B. Kalandadze and E. Narimanidze (2010), 
‘Uptake of heavy metals by food crops from highly-polluted Chernozem-like soils in an 
irrigation district south of Tbilisi, eastern Georgia’, Agronomy Research, 8 (1), 781–95. 
Felli, R. (2014), ‘On Climate Rent’, Historical Materialism, 22 (3–4), 251–80. 
Ferbrache, F. (2013), ‘Le Tour de France: a cultural geography of a mega-event’, Geography, 98 
(3), 144–51. 
Finn, J. L. (1998), Tracing the Veins: Of Copper, Culture, and Community from Butte to 
Chuquicamata, Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Fischer, M. M. J., G. E. Marcus and J. D. Faubion (2009), Fieldwork Is Not What It Used to Be : 
Learning Anthropology’s Method in a Time of Transition, Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press. 
Fletcher, R. (2017), ‘Environmentality unbound: Multiple governmentalities in environmental 
politics’, Geoforum, 85, 311–5. 
Flint, C. (2016), Geopolitical Constructs: The Mulberry Harbours, World War Two, and the 
Making of a Militarized Transatlantic, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 
Fogel, B. (2018), ‘Against “Anti-Corruption”’, accessed 11 October 2018 at 
http://jacobinmag.com/2018/10/corruption-bolsonaro-pt-populism-democracy-
development. 
Forbes, D. (2000), ‘Reading Texts and Writing Geography’, in I. Hay (ed), Qualitative Research 
Methods in Human Geography, Melbourne, Vic.: Oxford University Press, pp. 122–43. 
Foster, J. B., R. York and B. Clark (2010), The Ecological Rift : Capitalism’s War on the Earth, 
New York: Monthly Review Press. 
Foucault, M. (1977a), Discipline and Punish the Birth of the Prison, New York: Random House. 
Foucault, M. (1977b), ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’, in G. Burchell, C. Gordon, and P. Miller 
(eds), Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews, Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, pp. 139–64. 
Foucault, M. (1980), Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977, 
First American Edition, Stained, Vintage. 
 
 277 
Foucault, M. (1981), ‘The Order of Discourse - Inaugural Lecture at the Collège de France, 
given 2 December 1970’, in R. Young (ed), Untying the Text: A Post-Structuralist 
Anthology, Boston: Law Book Co of Australasia, pp. 48–78. 
Foucault, M. (1986), ‘Of Other Spaces’, Diacritics, 16 (1), 22–7. 
Foucault, M. (1988), Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason, 1 
edition, New York: Vintage. 
Foucault, M. (1990), The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1: An Introduction, Reissue edition, New 
York: Vintage. 
Foucault, M. (1991a), ‘Govermentality’, in G. Burchell, C. Gordon, and P. Miller (eds), The 
Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Foucault, M. (1991b), ‘Questions of Method’, in G. Burchell, C. Gordon, and P. Miller (eds), 
The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
pp. 73–86. 
Foucault, M. (2003), ‘Society Must Be Defended’: Lectures at the Collège de France 1975-1976, 
New York: Picador. 
Foucault, M. (2007a), ‘Questions on Geography’, in J. W. Crampton and S. Elden (eds), Space, 
Knowledge and Power: Foucault and Geography, Ashgate Publishing, pp. 173–82. 
Foucault, M. (2007b), ‘Security, Territory, Population’ - Lectures at the Collège de France 
1977-1978, Macmillan. 
Foucault, M. (2007c), ‘The Meshes of Power, lecture at the University of Bahia, Brazil, 1st 
November 1976’, in J. W. Crampton and S. Elden (eds), Space, Knowledge and Power: 
Foucault and Geography, Ashgate Publishing, pp. 153–62. 
Foucault, M. (2008), The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France 1978-1979, 
New York: Picador. 
Foucault, M. (2009), Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977-
1978, New York: Picador. 
Foucault, M. (2011a), Madness: The Invention of an Idea, New York: Harper Perennial. 
Foucault, M. (2011b), The Government of Self and Others: Lectures at the Collège de France 
1982-1983, New York: Picador. 
Foucault, M. (2012), The Courage of Truth: The Government of Self and Others II: Lectures at 
the Collège de France 1983-1984, Reprint edition, New York; Palgrave Macmillan: 
Picador. 
Foucault, M. (2016), On the Government of the Living: Lectures at the Collège de Franc, 1979-
1980, New York: Picador. 
Foxall, A. (2013), ‘Photographing Vladimir Putin: Masculinity, Nationalism and Visuality in 
Russian Political Culture’, Geopolitics, 18 (1), 132–56. 
Foxall, A. (2018), ‘Borders, Boundaries, and Central Asia Geopolitics’, Geopolitics, 23 (3), 743–
6. 
Freedom House (2018), ‘Freedom in the World 2018: Democracy in Crisis’, accessed 31 January 
2019 at https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2018. 
Frost, N. (2018), ‘Gold is good. Gold is strong. Populist governments in Eastern Europe are 
stockpiling gold’, accessed 3 February 2019 at https://qz.com/1425717/central-banks-in-
hungary-poland-and-russia-are-buying-gold/. 
Fukuyama, F. (1989), ‘The End of History?’, The National Interest, (16), 3–18. 
Fukuyama, F. (2018), Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment, 1st 
Edition edition, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 
 
 278 
Fuller, D. (2008), ‘Public geographies: taking stock’:, Progress in Human Geography, 32 (6), 
834–44. 
Gaffney, C. (2010), ‘Mega-events and socio-spatial dynamics in Rio de Janeiro, 1919-2016’, 
Journal of Latin American Geography, 9 (1), 7–29. 
Gambino, E. (2018), ‘The New Silk Road and Logistical Geopolitics’, accessed 15 May 2018 at 
http://societyandspace.org/2018/03/27/the-new-silk-road-and-logistical-geopolitics/. 
Ganbold, M. and S. H. Ali (2017), ‘The peril and promise of resource nationalism: A case 
analysis of Mongolia’s mining development’, Resources Policy, 53, 1–11. 
Garrett, B. L. (2011), ‘Videographic Geographies: Using Digital Video for Geographic 
Research’, Progress in Human Geography, 35 (4), 521–41. 
Garrett, B. L. and K. Brickell (2015), ‘Participatory politics of partnership: video workshops on 
domestic violence in Cambodia’, Area, n/a-n/a. 
Geenen, S. and J. Verweijen (2017), ‘Explaining fragmented and fluid mobilization in gold 
mining concessions in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo’, The Extractive 
Industries and Society, 4 (4), 758–65. 
Gellner, E. (2009), Nations and Nationalism, Second Edition, 2 edition, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell 
University Press. 
Gel’man, V. and O. Marganiya (eds.) (2010), Resource Curse and Post-Soviet Eurasia: Oil, Gas, 
and Modernization, Lanham: Lexington Books. 
Georgian Broadcaster (2014a), რეალური სივრცე - საყდრისის აფეთქება. ექსკლუზიური 
კადრები, 18 December, accessed 23 September 2018 at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yj6vrM7Pk8w. 
Georgian Broadcaster (2014b), საყდრისის მცველები - ‘არ ემ ჯი-მ’ ისტორიული საბადო 
ააფეთქა, 13 December, accessed 23 September 2018 at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DABuVYzbojU. 
Georgian Broadcaster (2014c), საყდრისის საბადო - პროტესტის მე-14 დღე BBC-ის 
ობიექტივში, 27 April, accessed 23 September 2018 at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e4EsAl83Qf4. 
Georgian Broadcaster (2014d), საყდრისი-ყაჩაღიანის საბადოს ტერიტორიაზე ხმაურიანი 
საპროტესტო აქცია დილიდან მიმდინარეობდა, 22 March, accessed 23 September 
2018 at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GdWEvjY7Itc. 
Georgian Mining Corporation (2018), Home | Georgian Mining Corporation, accessed 15 June 
2018 at http://www.georgianmining.com/home/. 
GeoStat.Ge (2018), ‘GeoStat.Ge - National Statistics Office of Georgia’, accessed 13 October 
2018 at http://www.geostat.ge/index.php?action=0&lang=eng. 
Geukjian, O. (2011), Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in the South Caucasus: Nagorno-
Karabakh and the Legacy of Soviet Nationalities Policy, Burlington, VT: Ashgate. 
Gibson-Graham, J. K. (2004), ‘Area Studies after Poststructuralism’, Environment and Planning 
A, 36 (3), 405–19. 
Gibson-Graham, J. K. (2006), The End Of Capitalism (As We Knew It): A Feminist Critique of 
Political Economy, 1 edition, Minneapolis: Univ Of Minnesota Press. 
Glasius, M. (2018a), ‘Extraterritorial authoritarian practices: a framework’, Globalizations, 15 
(2), 179–97. 
Glasius, M. (2018b), ‘What authoritarianism is … and is not: a practice perspective’, 
International Affairs, 94 (3), 515–33. 
 
 279 
Glasius, M., M. de Lange, J. Bartman, E. Dalmasso, A. Lv, A. D. Sordi, M. Michaelsen and K. 
Ruijgrok (2018), Research, Ethics and Risk in the Authoritarian Field, Palgrave 
Macmillan, Cham. 
Glassman, J. (1999), ‘State power beyond the `territorial trap’: the internationalization of the 
state’, Political Geography, 18 (6), 669–96. 
Glassman, J. (2006), ‘Primitive accumulation, accumulation by dispossession, accumulation by 
“extra-economic” means’, Progress in Human Geography, 30 (5), 608–25. 
Goble, P. (2015), ‘Identity recovered vs identity redefined: three post-Soviet cases’, in M. Ayoob 
and M. Ismayilov (eds), Identity and Politics in Central Asia and the Caucasus, London: 
Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group. 
Gogaladze, K. and R. Jülich (2016), Implementation Report on Environmental Roadmaps 2015, 
EU Delegation / Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources Protection of Georgia 
(MENRP), June. 
Golden Dust (2017), ‘Gold mining produces golden pollution’, accessed 24 September 2018 at 
http://oc-media.org/gold-mining-produces-golden-pollution/. 
Goode, J. P. (2010), ‘Redefining Russia: Hybrid Regimes, Fieldwork, and Russian Politics’, 
Perspectives on Politics, 8 (4), 1055–75. 
Goode, J. P. (2016), ‘Love for the Motherland’, Russian Politics, 1 (4), 418–49. 
Goode, J. P. (2019), ‘Russia’s ministry of ambivalence: the failure of civic nation-building in 
post-Soviet Russia’, Post-Soviet Affairs, 35 (2), 140–60. 
Graff, G. M. (2018), ‘If Trump Is Laundering Russian Money, Here’s How It Works’, Wired, 11 
May, accessed 18 September 2018 at https://www.wired.com/story/if-trump-is-
laundering-russian-money-heres-how-it-works/. 
Graybill, J. K. (2007), ‘Continuity and change: (re)constructing environmental geographies in 
late Soviet and post-Soviet Russia’, Area, 39 (1), 6–19. 
Graybill, J. K. (2013), ‘Imagining resilience: situating perceptions and emotions about climate 
change on Kamchatka, Russia’, GeoJournal, 78 (5), 817–32. 
Graybill, J. K. (2017), ‘Geographical pivots and 21st century Eurasian energy flows: an energy 
heartland from the Arctic to Central Asia’, in S. Bouzarovski, M. J. Pasqualetti, and V. C. 
Broto (eds), The Routledge Research Companion to Energy Geographies, 1st ed., 
London: Routledge. 
Green Alternative (2017), RMG - Company Profile, Tbilisi, Georgia: Green Alternative, p. 8. 
Gregory, D. (1995), ‘Imaginative geographies’, Progress in Human Geography, 19 (4), 447–85. 
Gregory, D. (2010), ‘Seeing Red: Baghdad and the event-ful city’, Political Geography, 29 (5), 
266–79. 
Grove, K. and J. Pugh (2015), ‘Assemblage Thinking and Participatory Development: 
Potentiality, Ethics, Biopolitics’, Geography Compass, 9 (1), 1–13. 
Gubrium, J. F. and J. A. Holstein (2012), ‘Narrative Practice and the Transformation of 
Interview Subjectivity’, in J. F. Gubrium, J. A. Holstein, A. Marvasti, and K. D. 
McKinney (eds), The SAGE Handbook of Interview Research: The Complexity of the 
Craft, Second edition, Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, Inc, pp. 27–43. 
Guibernau, M. (2008), The Identity of Nations, 1 edition, Cambridge: Polity. 
Gujaraidze, N. (2013), Madneuli Above the Law, Tbilisi, Georgia: Green Alternative, p. 21. 
Gujaraidze, N. (2014), Hidden Costs of Privatization, Tbilisi, Georgia: Green Alternative, p. 25. 
 
 280 
Gujaraidze, N., M. Barbakadze, K. Gujaraidze, R. Mchedlishvili and K. Kakhaberi (2007), 
Aggressive State Property Privatization Policy, or, ‘Georgian-Style Privatization’, 
Tbilisi, Georgia: Green Alternative, p. 44. 
Gulf-Times (2017), ‘Russia’s 10-year gold itch sends hoard to highest of Putin’s era’, accessed 3 
February 2019 at https://gulf-times.com/story/565791. 
Gupta, A. and J. Ferguson (1997), ‘Discipline and Practice: “The FIeld” as Site, Method, and 
Location in Anthropology’, in Anthropological Locations: Boundaries and Grounds of a 
Field Science, Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 1–46. 
GYLA (2014), ‘GYLA held presentation of the research about Sakhdrisi-Khachaghiani’, 
accessed 18 September 2018 at https://gyla.ge/en/post/gyla-held-presentation-of-the-
research-about-sakhdrisi-khachaghiani-976581. 
GYLA (2015), ‘Many questions remain unanswered a year after the explosion of Sakdrisi-
Kachagiani’, accessed 23 September 2018 at https://gyla.ge/en/post/saia-saydrisi-
yachaghianis-afetqebidan-erti-tslis-shemdeg-bevri-kitkhva-kvlavac-pasukhgaucemelia. 
Hage, G. (2005), ‘A not so multi-sited ethnography of a not so imagined community’, 
Anthropological Theory, 5, 463–75. 
Hale, H. E. (2014), Patronal Politics, Cambridge University Press. 
Hall, D. (2013), ‘Primitive Accumulation, Accumulation by Dispossession and the Global Land 
Grab’, Third World Quarterly, 34 (9), 1582–604. 
Haller, D. and C. Shore (2005), ‘Introduction - Sharp Practice: Anthropology and the Study of 
Corruption’, in D. Haller and C. Shore (eds), Corruption: Anthropological Perspectives, 
London ; Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto, pp. 1–26. 
Hanson, S. and G. Pratt (1995), Gender, Work, and Space, Psychology Press. 
Haraway, D. (1988), ‘Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege 
of Partial Perspective’, Feminist Studies, 14 (3), 575–99. 
Haraway, D. J. (2003), The Companion Species Manifesto: Dogs, People, and Significant 
Otherness, Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press. 
Haraway, D. J. (2016), Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene, Durham: Duke 
University Press Books. 
Harding, S. (1993), ‘Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology: What Is “Strong Objectivity”?’, in L. 
Alcoff and E. Potter (eds), Feminist Epistemologies, New York: Routledge, pp. 49–82. 
Harlow, B. (2012), ‘“The Geography and the Event”’, Interventions, 14 (1), 13–23. 
Harris, L. M. (2012), ‘State as Socionatural Effect: Variable and Emergent Geographies of the 
State in Southeastern Turkey’, Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle 
East, 32 (1), 25–39. 
Harris, L. M. (2017), ‘Political ecologies of the state: Recent interventions and questions going 
forward’, Political Geography, 58, 90–2. 
Harvey, D. (1969), Explanation in Geography, New York: St. Martin’s Press. 
Harvey, D. (2003), The New Imperialism, Oxford University Press. 
Harvey, D. (2007a), A Brief History of Neoliberalism, 1st, First Edition edition ed., Oxford; New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Harvey, D. (2007b), Limits to Capital, New and Fully Updated Ed edition, London ; New York: 
Verso Books. 
Harvey, D. (2017), Marx, Capital, and the Madness of Economic Reason, 1 edition, New York, 
NY: Oxford University Press. 
 
 281 
Hauptmann, D. A., J. Moritz and D. T. Stollner (2013), The Gold Mine of Sakdrissi: Results and 
Analyses and a Calculation of the Prehistoric Gold-Exploitation, Institute of 
Archaeological Studies - Ruhr-University of Bochum. 
Heathershaw, J. and E. Schatz (eds.) (2017), Paradox of Power: The Logics of State Weakness in 
Eurasia, 1 edition, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. 
Hebert, J. S. (2011), Event Ecology: An Ecological Analysis of Discourses Surrounding the 
Disappearance of the Kah Shakes Cove Herring (Clupea Pallasi), M.A., United States -- 
Oregon: Portland State University, accessed 6 December 2016 at 
http://search.proquest.com.libezproxy2.syr.edu/docview/864743215/abstract/162E91D7B
19A4637PQ/1. 
Hecht, S. B. (1985), ‘Environment, development and politics: Capital accumulation and the 
livestock sector in Eastern Amazonia’, World Development, 13 (6), 663–84. 
Hecht, G. (2018), ‘Residue’, accessed 27 January 2018 at 
http://somatosphere.net/2018/01/residue.html. 
Hecht, S. B. and A. Cockburn (1989), The Fate of the Forest: Developers, Destroyers, and 
Defenders of the Amazon, Updated Edition, University of Chicago Press. 
Heinrich, M. (2012), An Introduction to the Three Volumes of Karl Marx’s Capital, New York: 
Monthly Review Press. 
Henderson, G. (2013), Value in Marx: The Persistence of Value in a More-Than-Capitalist 
World, Minneapolis: Univ Of Minnesota Press. 
Henry, L. A. (2010), Red to Green: Environmental Activism in Post-Soviet Russia, Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press. 
Herb, G. H. (1999), Nested Identities: Nationalism, Territory, and Scale, Rowman & Littlefield. 
Herb, G. H. (2004), ‘Double Vision: Territorial Strategies in the Construction of National 
Identities in Germany, 1949-1979’, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 
94 (1), 140–64. 
Herod, A. (2010), Scale, New Ed edition, London ; New York: Routledge. 
Heynen, N., J. McCarthy, S. Prudham and P. Robbins (2007a), ‘Introduction: False Promises’, in 
N. Heynen, J. McCarthy, S. Prudham, and P. Robbins (eds), Neoliberal Environments: 
False Promises and Unnatural Consequences, New York: Routledge, pp. 1–21. 
Heynen, N., J. McCarthy, S. Prudham and P. Robbins (2007b), Neoliberal Environments: False 
Promises and Unnatural Consequences, 1 edition, London ; New York: Routledge. 
Himley, M. (2008), ‘Geographies of Environmental Governance: The Nexus of Nature and 
Neoliberalism’, Geography Compass, 2 (2), 433–51. 
Hirsch, F. (2005), Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the Soviet 
Union, 1 edition, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Hobsbawm, E. J. (2012), Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality, 2 
edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Hoffmann, K. (2017), ‘Local government reforms in Georgia and their impact on state-society 
relations’, Eurasian Geography and Economics, 58 (5), 481–501. 
Holland, E. C., F. D. W. Witmer and J. O’Loughlin (2018), ‘The decline and shifting geography 
of violence in Russia’s North Caucasus, 2010-2016’, Eurasian Geography and 
Economics, 0 (0), 1–29. 
Holmes, L. (2006), Rotten States? Corruption, Post-Communism, and Neoliberalism, Durham: 
Duke University Press. 
 
 282 
Holmes, F. (2018), ‘Top 10 Countries With Largest Gold Reserves’, 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2018/07/05/top-10-countries-with-
largest-gold-reserves/#68250d4d5334, accessed 17 January 2019 at 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2018/07/05/top-10-countries-with-
largest-gold-reserves/#68250d4d5334. 
Holterman, D. (2014), ‘Slow violence, extraction and human rights defence in Tanzania: Notes 
from the field’, Resources Policy, 40, 59–65. 
Huber, M. (2013), Lifeblood: Oil, Freedom, and the Forces of Capital, Minneapolis: Univ Of 
Minnesota Press. 
Huber, M. (2015), ‘Energy and Social Power: From political ecology to the ecology of politics’, 
in T. Perreault, G. Bridge, and J. McCarthy (eds), The Routledge Handbook of Political 
Ecology, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge, pp. 213–23. 
Huber, M. (2017a), ‘Hidden Abodes: Industrializing Political Ecology’, Annals of the American 
Association of Geographers, 107 (1), 151–66. 
Huber, M. (2017b), ‘Value, Nature, and Labor: A Defense of Marx’, Capitalism Nature 
Socialism, 28 (1), 39–52. 
Huber, M. (2018a), ‘Resource geographies I: Valuing nature (or not)’, Progress in Human 
Geography, 42 (1), 148–59. 
Huber, M. (2018b), ‘Resource geography II: What makes resources political?’, Progress in 
Human Geography, 0309132518768604. 
Hughes, R. (2013), ‘Geopolitics and Visual Culture’, in K. Dodds, M. Kuus, and J. Sharp (eds), 
The Ashgate Research Companion to Critical Geopolitics, Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., pp. 
69–88. 
HumanRights.ge (2012), ‘Mining License Sold for GEL 110.5m’, accessed 23 September 2018 
at http://www.humanrights.ge/index.php?a=main&pid=14537&lang=eng. 
Huntington, S. P. (1993), ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’, in S. Dalby, P. Routledge, and G. Ó 
Tuathail (eds), The Geopolitics Reader, 1St Edition edition, London; New York: 
Routledge, pp. 159–69. 
Hyndman, J. (2004), ‘Mind the gap: bridging feminist and political geography through 
geopolitics’, Political Geography, 23 (3), 307–22. 
Iakobidze, T. (2012), ‘State Property Sold for 1 Lari in 2012 (part 2)’, accessed 23 September 
2018 at https://opendatablog.wordpress.com/tag/pamtilon-holdings-limited/. 
Ingold, T. (2007), Lines: A Brief History, London ; New York: Routledge. 
Invest in Georgia (2018), ‘Taxation’, accessed 26 June 2018 at 
https://investingeorgia.org/en/georgia/taxation. 
Inwood, J. and D. G. Martin (2008), ‘Whitewash: white privilege and racialized landscapes at the 
University of Georgia’, Social & Cultural Geography, 9 (4), 373–95. 
Jackson, S. L. (2015a), ‘Dusty roads and disconnections: Perceptions of dust from unpaved 
mining roads in Mongolia’s South Gobi province’, Geoforum, 66, 94–105. 
Jackson, S. L. (2015b), ‘Imagining the mineral nation: contested nation-building in Mongolia’, 
Nationalities Papers, 43 (3), 437–56. 
Jackson, S. (2016), ‘The phosphate archipelago: Imperial mining and global agriculture in 
French North Africa’, Jahrbuch Für Wirtschaftsgeschichte / Economic History Yearbook, 
57 (1), 187–214. 
 
 283 
Jaishankar, M., T. Tseten, N. Anbalagan, B. B. Mathew and K. N. Beeregowda (2014), 
‘Toxicity, mechanism and health effects of some heavy metals’, Interdisciplinary 
Toxicology, 7 (2), 60–72. 
Japaridze, S. (2017), ‘The Oligarchs’ Constitution’, accessed 13 June 2017 at 
http://jacobinmag.com/2017/06/georgia-constitution-georgian-dream-taxes-article-94. 
Järup, L. (2003), ‘Hazards of heavy metal contamination’, British Medical Bulletin, 68, 167–82. 
Jeffrey, A., F. McConnell and A. Wilson (2015), ‘Understanding legitimacy: Perspectives from 
anomalous geopolitical spaces’, Geoforum, 66, 177–83. 
Jessop, B. (1990), State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in Its Place, Cambridge, U.K: Polity 
Press. 
Jessop, B. (2007), ‘From micro-powers to governmentality: Foucault’s work on statehood, state 
formation, statecraft and state power’, Political Geography, 26 (1), 34–40. 
Jessop, B., N. Brenner and M. Jones (2008), ‘Theorizing Sociospatial Relations’, Environment 
and Planning D: Society and Space, 26 (3), 389–401. 
Jessop, B. and N.-L. Sum (2018), ‘Geopolitics: Putting geopolitics in its place in cultural 
political economy’, Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space, 50 (2), 474–8. 
Johnson, C. and R. Jones (2018), ‘The biopolitics and geopolitics of border enforcement in 
Melilla’, Territory, Politics, Governance, 6 (1), 61–80. 
Jones, S. F. (2005), Socialism in Georgian Colors: The European Road to Social Democracy, 
1883-1917, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. 
Jones, R. (2009), ‘Geopolitical boundary narratives, the global war on terror and border fencing 
in India’, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 34 (3), 290–304. 
Jones, R. (2012), Border Walls: Security and the War on Terror in the United States, India, and 
Israel, Zed Books Ltd. 
Jones, S. F. (2013), Georgia: A Political History since Independence, I. B. Tauris. 
Jones, S. (2015), ‘Kakha Bendukidze and Georgia’s failed experiment’, accessed 23 September 
2018 at http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/stephen-f-jones/kakha-bendukidze-and-
georgia%E2%80%99s-failed-experiment. 
Jones, A. and J. T. Murphy (2011), ‘Theorizing practice in economic geography: Foundations, 
challenges, and possibilities’, Progress in Human Geography, 35 (3), 366–92. 
Josephson, P. (2002), Industrialized Nature: Brute Force Technology and the Transformation of 
the Natural World, Washington, DC: Island Press. 
Josephson, P. (2013), An Environmental History of Russia, Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Josephson, P. (2013), ‘War on Nature as Part of the Cold War - The Strategic and Ideological 
Roots of Environmental Degradation in the Soviet Union’, in J. R. Mcneill and C. R. 
Unger (eds), Environmental Histories of the Cold War, Reissue edition, Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 21–49. 
Josephson, P., N. Dronin, R. Mnatsakanian, A. Cherp, D. Efremenko and V. Larin (2013), 
‘Gorbachev’s Reforms, Glasnost, and Econationalism’, in An Environmental History of 
Russia, Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Kaiser, R. J. (2002), ‘Homeland Making and the Territorialization of National Identity’, in D. 
Conversi (ed), Ethnonationalism in the Contemporary World: Walker Connor and the 
Study of Nationalism, London ; New York: Routledge. 
 
 284 
Kaiser, R. J. (2012), ‘Performativity and the Eventfulness of Bordering Practices’, in T. M. 
Wilson and H. Donnan (eds), A Companion to Border Studies, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 
pp. 522–37. 
Kaiser, R. J. and E. Nikiforova (2006), ‘Borderland spaces of identification and dis/location: 
Multiscalar narratives and enactments of Seto identity and place in the Estonian-Russian 
borderlands’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 29 (5), 928–58. 
Kaplan, H., S. Ratering, T. Hanauer, P. Felix-Henningsen and S. Schnell (2014), ‘Impact of trace 
metal contamination and in situ remediation on microbial diversity and respiratory 
activity of heavily polluted Kastanozems’, Biology and Fertility of Soils, 50 (5), 735–44. 
Karklins, R. (2005), The System Made Me Do It: Corruption in Post-Communist Societies, 
Armonk, N.Y: M.E. Sharpe. 
Katz, C. (1994), ‘Playing the Field: Questions of Fieldwork in Geography’, The Professional 
Geographer, 46 (1), 67–72. 
Kay, K. and M. Kenney-Lazar (2017), ‘Value in capitalist natures: An emerging framework’, 
Dialogues in Human Geography, 7 (3), 295–309. 
Kearns, G. (2014), ‘Governing Vitalities and the Security State’, Environment and Planning D: 
Society and Space, 32 (5), 762–78. 
Kelly-Richards, S. H. and J. M. Banister (2017), ‘A state of suspended animation: Urban 
sanitation and water access in Nogales, Sonora’, Political Geography, 58, 104–13. 
Kindon, S. (2003), ‘Participatory video in geographic research: a feminist practice of looking?’, 
Area, 35 (2), 142–53. 
Kindon, S. (2016), ‘Participatory video as a feminist practice of looking: “take two!”’, Area, 48 
(4), 496–503. 
King, C. (2009), The Ghost of Freedom: A History of the Caucasus, 1 edition, Oxford; New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Kirsch, S. (2016), ‘Insular territories: US colonial science, geopolitics, and the (re)mapping of 
the Philippines’, The Geographical Journal, 182 (1), 2–14. 
Kivelä, S. and S. Moisio (2017), ‘The state as a space of health: on the geopolitics and 
biopolitics of health-care systems’, Territory, Politics, Governance, 5 (1), 28–46. 
Knigge, L. and M. Cope (2006), ‘Grounded visualization: integrating the analysis of qualitative 
and quantitative data through grounded theory and visualization’, Environment and 
Planning A, 38 (11), 2021 – 2037. 
Koch, N. (2013a), ‘Introduction – Field methods in “closed contexts”: undertaking research in 
authoritarian states and places’, Area, 45 (4), 390–5. 
Koch, N. (2013b), ‘Kazakhstan’s changing geopolitics: the resource economy and popular 
attitudes about China’s growing regional influence’, Eurasian Geography and 
Economics, 54 (1), 110–33. 
Koch, N. (2013c), ‘Sport and soft authoritarian nation-building’, Political Geography, 32, 42–51. 
Koch, N. (2014), ‘Bordering on the modern: power, practice and exclusion in Astana’, 
Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 39 (3), 432–43. 
Koch, N. (2015a), ‘Domesticating elite education: Raising patriots and educating Kazakhstan’s 
future’, in M. Ayoob and M. Ismayilov (eds), Identity and Politics in Central Asia and 
the Caucasus, London: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group. 
Koch, N. (2015b), ‘“Spatial socialization”: Understanding the state effect geographically’, 
Nordia Geographical Publications, 44 (4), 29–35. 
 
 285 
Koch, N. (2015c), ‘The violence of spectacle: Statist schemes to green the desert and 
constructing Astana and Ashgabat as urban oases’, Social & Cultural Geography, 16 (6), 
675–97. 
Koch, N. (2016a), ‘Is a “critical” area studies possible?’, Environment and Planning D: Society 
and Space, 34 (5), 807–14. 
Koch, N. (2016b), ‘Is nationalism just for nationals? Civic nationalism for noncitizens and 
celebrating National Day in Qatar and the UAE’, Political Geography, 54, 43–53. 
Koch, N. (2019), ‘Deep listening: Practicing intellectual humility in geographic fieldwork’, 
Geographical Review, 0 (0), 19. 
Koch, N. and A. Paasi (2016), ‘Banal Nationalism 20 years on: Re-thinking, re-formulating and 
re-contextualizing the concept’, Political Geography, 54, 1–6. 
Koch, N. and T. Perreault (2018), ‘Resource Nationalism’, Progress in Human Geography, 0 (0), 
1–21. 
Koch, N. and A. Valiyev (2015), ‘Urban boosterism in closed contexts: spectacular urbanization 
and second-tier mega-events in three Caspian capitals’, Eurasian Geography and 
Economics, 56 (5), 575–98. 
Kohl, B. and L. Farthing (2012), ‘Material constraints to popular imaginaries: The extractive 
economy and resource nationalism in Bolivia’, Political Geography, 31, 225–35. 
Kolossov, V. (2005), Border Studies: Changing Perspectives and Theoretical Approaches, Text, 
accessed at https://doi.org/info:doi/10.1080/14650040500318415. 
Kolossov, V. and J. O’Loughlin (2011), ‘After the Wars in the South Caucasus State of Georgia: 
Economic Insecurities and Migration in the De Facto States of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia’, Eurasian Geography and Economics, 52 (5), 631–54. 
Korsunskaya, D. (2018), ‘Russia, wary of U.S. sanctions, puts saving before growth’, Reuters, 31 
October, accessed 17 January 2019 at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-
economy-budget-analysis-idUSKCN1N51B9. 
Kotkin, S. (1997), Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization, First edition, Berkeley, 
Calif.: University of California Press. 
Kotsadam, A., G. Østby and S. A. Rustad (2017), ‘Structural change and wife abuse: A 
disaggregated study of mineral mining and domestic violence in sub-Saharan Africa, 
1999–2013’, Political Geography, 56, 53–65. 
Kottasová, I. (2018), ‘Russia is buying lots of gold to shield it from sanctions’, accessed 17 
January 2019 at https://money.cnn.com/2018/08/22/news/economy/russia-gold-us-
sanctions/index.html. 
Kupatadze, A. (2007), ‘Radiological Smuggling and Uncontrolled Territories: The Case Of 
Georgia’, Global Crime, 8 (1), 40–57. 
Kupatadze, A. (2010), ‘Transitions after Transitions’ : Coloured Revolutions and Organized 
Crime in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, Thesis, accessed 20 February 2012 at 
http://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/handle/10023/1320. 
Kupatadze, A. (2017), ‘Accounting for diverging paths in most similar cases: corruption in 
Baltics and Caucasus’, Crime, Law and Social Change; Dordrecht, 67 (2), 187–208. 
Kwan, M.-P. (2002), ‘Quantitative Methods and Feminist Geographic Research’, in P. J. Moss 
(ed), Feminist Geography in Practice: Research and Methods, 1 edition, Oxford, UK ; 
Malden, Mass: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 160–73. 
Labban, M. (2014), ‘Against Value: Accumulation in the Oil Industry and the Biopolitics of 
Labour Under Finance’, Antipode, 46 (2), 477–96. 
 
 286 
Laine, J. P. (2016), ‘The Multiscalar Production of Borders’, Geopolitics, 21 (3), 465–82. 
Latour, B. (1987), Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers Through Society, 
Harvard University Press. 
Latta, A. (2014), ‘Matter, politics and the sacred: insurgent ecologies of citizenship’, Cultural 
Geographies, 21 (3), 323–41. 
Lave, R. (2015), ‘Reassembling the Structural - Political ecology and Actor-Network Theory’, in 
T. Perreault, G. Bridge, and J. McCarthy (eds), The Routledge Handbook of Political 
Ecology, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge, pp. 213–23. 
Law, J. (1994), Organizing Modernity: Social Ordering and Social Theory, 1 edition, Oxford: 
Wiley-Blackwell. 
Le Billon, P. (2004), ‘The Geopolitical economy of “resource wars”’, Geopolitics, 9 (1), 1–28. 
Le Billon, P. (2013), ‘Resources’, in K. Dodds, M. Kuus, and J. Sharp (eds), The Ashgate 
Research Companion to Critical Geopolitics, Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. 
Le Billon, P. (2015), ‘Environmental Conflict’, in T. Perreault, G. Bridge, and J. McCarthy (eds), 
The Routledge Handbook of Political Ecology, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: 
Routledge, pp. 213–23. 
Lebanidze, B. and K. Kakachia (2017), ‘Informal Governance & Electorate Perceptions in 
Hybrid Regimes: The 2016 Parliamentary Elections in Georgia’, Demokratizatsiya; 
Washington, 25 (4), 529–49. 
Ledeneva, A. V. (1998), Russia’s Economy of Favours: Blat, Networking and Informal 
Exchange, Cambridge University Press. 
Ledyaeva, S., P. Karhunen, R. Kosonen and J. Whalley (2015), ‘Offshore Foreign Direct 
Investment, Capital Round-Tripping, and Corruption: Empirical Analysis of Russian 
Regions’, Economic Geography, 91 (3), 305–41. 
Lee, S.-O., J. Wainwright and J. Glassman (2018), ‘Geopolitical economy and the production of 
territory: The case of US–China geopolitical-economic competition in Asia’, 
Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space, 50 (2), 416–36. 
Lefebvre, H. (1991), The Production of Space, Oxford, OX, UK ; Cambridge, Mass., USA: 
Blackwell. 
Legg, S. (2005), ‘Foucault’s population geographies: classifications, biopolitics and 
governmental spaces’, Population, Space and Place, 11 (3), 137–56. 
Legg, S. (2007), ‘Reviewing Geographies of Memory/Forgetting’, Environment and Planning A: 
Economy and Space, 39 (2), 456–66. 
Legg, S. (2009), ‘Of Scales, Networks and Assemblages: The League of Nations Apparatus and 
the Scalar Sovereignty of the Government of India’, Transactions of the Institute of 
British Geographers, 34 (2), 234–53. 
Legg, S. (2011), ‘Assemblage/apparatus: using Deleuze and Foucault’, Area, 43 (2), 128–33. 
Legg, S. (2016), ‘Subject to truth: Before and after governmentality in Foucault’s 1970s’, 
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 34 (5), 858–76. 
Leitner, H. and B. Miller (2007), ‘Scale and the limitations of ontological debate: a commentary 
on Marston, Jones and Woodward’, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 
32 (1), 116–125. 
Lemke, T. (2007), ‘An indigestible meal? Foucault, governmentality and state theory’, 
Distinktion: Journal of Social Theory, 8 (2), 43–64. 
Lemke, T. (2011), Biopolitics: An Advanced Introduction, 1 edition, New York: NYU Press. 
 
 287 
Lemke, T. (2012), Foucault, Governmentality, and Critique, Boulder, Colo.: Paradigm 
Publishers. 
Lemke, T. (2018), ‘An Alternative Model of Politics? Prospects and Problems of Jane Bennett’s 
Vital Materialism’, Theory, Culture & Society, 35 (6), 31–54. 
Levitsky, S. and L. Way (2002), ‘The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism’, Journal of 
Democracy, 13 (2), 51–65. 
Levitsky, S. and L. Way (2010), Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold 
War, New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Li, T. M. (2007), The Will to Improve: Governmentality, Development, and the Practice of 
Politics, Duke University Press. 
Loftus, A. (2012), Everyday Environmentalism: Creating an Urban Political Ecology, 
Minneapolis: Univ Of Minnesota Press. 
Lovell, D. W. (2005), ‘Corruption as a Transitional Phenomenon: Understanding Endemic 
Corruption in Postcommunist States’, in D. Haller and C. Shore (eds), Corruption: 
Anthropological Perspectives, London ; Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto, pp. 65–82. 
LSE Share Talk (2016), Noricum Gold Limited  Greg Kuenzel - AIM:NMG, 4 March, accessed 
13 October 2018 at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KNt16Ck7GRw. 
Lund, C. (2011), ‘Fragmented sovereignty: land reform and dispossession in Laos’, The Journal 
of Peasant Studies, 38 (4), 885–905. 
Lundborg, T. (2009), ‘The Becoming of the “Event”: A Deleuzian Approach to Understanding 
the Production of Social and Political “Events”’, Theory & Event, 12 (1), accessed at 
https://doi.org/10.1353/tae.0.0042. 
Luttwak, E. N. (1990), ‘From Geopolitics to Geo-Economics: Logic of Conflict, Grammar of 
Commerce’, The National Interest, (20), 17–23. 
Macpherson, C. B. (1978), ‘The meaning of property’, in C. B. Macpherson (ed), Property: 
Mainstream and Critical Positions, 2nd ed., Toronto: University of Toronto Press, pp. 1–
13. 
Mahanty, S. (2017), ‘Contingent Sovereignty: Cross-Border Rentals in the Cambodia–Vietnam 
Borderland’, Annals of the American Association of Geographers, 0 (0), 1–16. 
Makarychev, A. (2018), ‘Beyond Geopolitics: Russian Soft Power, Conservatism, and 
Biopolitics’, Russian Politics, 3 (1), 135–50. 
Makarychev, A. and A. Yatsyk (2017), ‘Biopower and geopolitics as Russia’s neighborhood 
strategies: reconnecting people or reaggregating lands?’, Nationalities Papers, 45 (1), 
25–40. 
Makarychev, A. and A. Yatsyk (2018), ‘Illiberal geographies: popular geopolitics and Russian 
biopolitical regionalism’, Eurasian Geography and Economics, 0 (0), 1–22. 
Malinowski, B. (1922), Argonauts of the Western Pacific: An Account of Native Enterprise and 
Adventure in the Archipelagoes of Melanesian New Guinea. With a Pref. by Sir James 
George Frazer., Dutton. 
Mann, M. (1996), ‘Nation-states in Europe and Other Continents: Diversifying, Developing, Not 
Dying’, in G. Balakrishnan (ed), Mapping the Nation, 1 edition, London ; New York: 
Verso, pp. 295–316. 
Mansfield, B. (2004), ‘Neoliberalism in the oceans: “rationalization,” property rights, and the 
commons question’, Geoforum, 35 (3), 313–26. 
Manson, S. M. (2008), ‘Does scale exist? An epistemological scale continuum for complex 
human–environment systems’, Geoforum, 39 (2), 776–88. 
 
 288 
Marcus, G. E. (1995), ‘Ethnography in/of the World System: The Emergence of Multi-Sited 
Ethnography’, Annual Review of Anthropology, 24 (1), 95–117. 
Marcus, G. E. (2007), ‘“How short can fieldwork be?”’, Social Anthropology, 15 (3), 353–7. 
Markowitz, L. P. (2013), State Erosion : Unlootable Resources and Unruly Elites in Central 
Asia, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Marsh, D. (2016), ‘Why China and Russia are buying so much gold’, accessed 3 February 2019 
at https://www.marketwatch.com/story/why-china-and-russia-are-buying-so-much-gold-
2016-08-01. 
Marston, S. A. (2000), ‘The social construction of scale’, Progress in Human Geography, 24 (2), 
219–42. 
Marston, S. A. (2004), ‘Space, culture, state: uneven developments in political geography’, 
Political Geography, 23 (1), 1–16. 
Marston, S. A., J. P. Jones and K. Woodward (2005), ‘Human geography without scale’, 
Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 30 (4), 416–32. 
Marston, S. and K. Mitchell (2004), ‘Citizens and the State: Citizenship Formations in Space and 
Time’, in C. Barnett and M. Low (eds), Spaces of Democracy : Geographical 
Perspectives on Citizenship, Participation and Representation, London: SAGE 
Publications Ltd, accessed 23 June 2018 at 
http://libezproxy.syr.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&d
b=e000xna&AN=251162&site=ehost-live. 
Marston, A. and T. Perreault (2017), ‘Consent, coercion and cooperativismo: Mining 
cooperatives and resource regimes in Bolivia’, Environment and Planning A: Economy 
and Space, 49 (2), 252–72. 
Martin, W. (2018), ‘Russia is stockpiling gold as fresh US sanctions loom’, accessed 3 February 
2019 at https://www.businessinsider.co.za/russia-increases-gold-purchases-in-july-2018-
8. 
Marx, K. (1992), Capital: Volume 1: A Critique of Political Economy, Reprint edition, London ; 
New York, N.Y: Penguin Classics. 
Marx, K. (1993), Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Vol. 3, Reissue edition, New York, 
N.Y., U.S.A: Penguin Classics. 
Marx, K. and F. Engels (2008), The Communist Manifesto, 3rd edition, New York: Pathfinder 
Press. 
Massey, D. (1991), ‘A Global Sense of Place’, Marxism Today, 35 (6), 315–23. 
Massey, D. (2004), ‘Geographies of Responsibility’, Geografiska Annaler. Series B, Human 
Geography, 86 (1), 5–18. 
Massey, D. B. (2005), For Space, 1 edition, London ; Thousand Oaks, Calif: SAGE Publications 
Ltd. 
Massumi, B. (2009), ‘National Enterprise Emergency Steps Toward an Ecology of Powers’, 
Theory, Culture & Society, 26 (6), 153–85. 
Master Brokers Forum (2017), ‘South Florida by the numbers: Miami-Russia real estate 
connection’, accessed 18 September 2018 at 
https://therealdeal.com/miami/2017/02/10/south-florida-by-the-numbers-miami-russia-
real-estate-connection/. 
Matchavariani, L. and B. Kalandadze (2012), ‘Pollution of Soils by Heavy Metals from 
Irrigation near Mining Region of Georgia’, Forum Geografic, XI (2), 127–36. 
 
 289 
Matchavariani, L., B. Kalandadze, L. Lagidze, N. Gokhelashvili, N. Sulkhanishvili, N. Paichadze 
and G. Dvalashvili (2015), ‘Soil quality changes in response to their pollution by heavy 
metals, Georgia’, Journal of Environmental Biology, 36, 85–90. 
McCarthy, J. (2005a), ‘Devolution in the woods: community forestry as hybrid neoliberalism’, 
Environment and Planning A, 37 (6), 995 – 1014. 
McCarthy, J. (2005b), ‘Scale, Sovereignty, and Strategy in Environmental Governance’, 
Antipode, 37 (4), 731–53. 
McCarthy, J. (2007), ‘States of nature: Theorizing the state in environmental governance’, 
Review of International Political Economy, 14 (1), 176–94. 
Mccarthy, J. (2012), ‘The Financial Crisis and Environmental Governance “after” 
Neoliberalism’, Tijdschrift Voor Economische En Sociale Geografie, 103 (2), 180–95. 
McCormack, D. P. (2003), ‘An Event of Geographical Ethics in Spaces of Affect’, Transactions 
of the Institute of British Geographers, 28 (4), 488–507. 
McCormack, D. P. (2004), ‘Drawing out the lines of the event’, Cultural Geographies, 11 (2), 
211–20. 
McDowell, L. (2010), ‘Interviewing: Fear and Liking in the Field’, in D. DeLyser, S. Herbert, S. 
Aitken, M. Crang, and L. McDowell (eds), The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative 
Geography, SAGE Publications, pp. 156–71. 
McPhee, J. (2017), Draft No. 4: On the Writing Process, First Edition edition, New York: Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux. 
McWhorter, L. (1994), ‘The event of truth: Foucault’s response to structuralism’, Philosophy 
Today, 38 (2), 159. 
Meehan, K., I. G. R. Shaw and S. A. Marston (2013), ‘Political geographies of the object’, 
Political Geography, 33, 1–10. 
Meeteren, M. V. and D. Bassens (2016), ‘World Cities and the Uneven Geographies of 
Financialization: Unveiling Stratification and Hierarchy in the World City Archipelago’, 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 40 (1), 62–81. 
Megoran, N. (2004), ‘The critical geopolitics of the Uzbekistan–Kyrgyzstan Ferghana Valley 
boundary dispute, 1999–2000’, Political Geography, 23 (6), 731–64. 
Megoran, N. (2006), ‘For ethnography in political geography: Experiencing and re-imagining 
Ferghana Valley boundary closures’, Political Geography, 25 (6), 622–40. 
Megoran, N. (2017), Nationalism in Central Asia: A Biography of the Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan 
Boundary, Pittsburgh, Pa: University of Pittsburgh Press. 
Melikadze, G., T. Chelidze and J. Leveinen (2006), ‘Modeling of heavy metal contamination 
within an irrigated area’, in A. Baba, K. W. F. Howard, and O. Gunduz (eds), 
Groundwater and Ecosystems, Springer Netherlands, pp. 243–53. 
Metreveli, T. (2016), ‘An undisclosed story of roses: church, state, and nation in contemporary 
Georgia’, Nationalities Papers, 44 (5), 694–712. 
Militz, E. and C. Schurr (2016), ‘Affective nationalism: Banalities of belonging in Azerbaijan’, 
Political Geography, 54, 54–63. 
Milne, P. D., C. Mitchell and N. de Lange (2012), Handbook of Participatory Video, AltaMira 
Press. 
Ministry of Environment Protection of Georgia (2012), National Environmental Action 
Programme of Georgia 2012 – 2016, Resolution of the Government #127, Tbilisi: 
Ministry of Environment Protection of Georgia, p. 89. 
Mitchell, T. (1990), ‘Everyday metaphors of power’, Theory and Society, 19 (5), 545–77. 
 
 290 
Mitchell, T. (1991a), Colonising Egypt, Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Mitchell, T. (1991b), ‘The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics’, The 
American Political Science Review, 85 (1), 77. 
Mitchell, T. (1999), ‘Society, Economy, and the State Effect’, in G. Steinmetz (ed), 
State/Culture: State Formation after the Cultrual Turn, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press. 
Mitchell, T. (2002), Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity, Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
Mitchell, D. (2004), ‘Historical Materialism and Marxism’, in J. Duncan, N. C. Johnson, and R. 
H. Schein (eds), A Companion to Cultural Geography, 1 edition, Malden, MA: Wiley-
Blackwell, pp. 51–65. 
Mitchell, T. (2009), ‘Carbon democracy’, Economy and Society, 38 (3), 399–432. 
Mitchneck, B. A. (2011), State, Society and Transformation, Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson 
International Center for Scholars. 
Moisio, S. (2018), ‘Towards Geopolitical Analysis of Geoeconomic Processes’, Geopolitics, 23 
(1), 22–9. 
Moisio, S. and A. Paasi (2013a), ‘Beyond State-Centricity: Geopolitics of Changing State 
Spaces’, Geopolitics, 18 (2), 255–66. 
Moisio, S. and A. Paasi (2013b), ‘From Geopolitical to Geoeconomic? The Changing Political 
Rationalities of State Space’, Geopolitics, 18 (2), 267–83. 
Mollett, S. and C. Faria (2013), ‘Messing with gender in feminist political ecology’, Geoforum, 
45, 116–25. 
Moore, D. S. (2005), Suffering for Territory: Race, Place, and Power in Zimbabwe, Durham: 
Duke University Press Books. 
Moore, J. W. (2011), ‘Transcending the metabolic rift: a theory of crises in the capitalist world-
ecology’, The Journal of Peasant Studies, 38 (1), 1–46. 
Moser, S. (2008), ‘Personality: A New Positionality?’, Area, 40 (3), 383–92. 
Mountz, A. (2011), ‘The enforcement archipelago: Detention, haunting, and asylum on islands’, 
Political Geography, 30 (3), 118–28. 
Mountz, A. (2015), ‘Political geography II: Islands and archipelagos’, Progress in Human 
Geography, 39 (5), 636–46. 
Mountz, A., I. M. Miyares, R. Wright and A. J. Bailey (2003), ‘Methodologically Becoming: 
Power, knowledge and team research’, Gender, Place & Culture, 10 (1), 29–46. 
Muir, S. and A. Gupta (2018), ‘Rethinking the Anthropology of Corruption’, Current 
Anthropology, 59 (18), S4–15. 
Müller, M. (2017), ‘How mega-events capture their hosts: event seizure and the World Cup 2018 
in Russia’, Urban Geography, 38 (8), 1113–32. 
Müller, M. and C. Schurr (2016), ‘Assemblage thinking and actor-network theory: conjunctions, 
disjunctions, cross-fertilisations’, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 41 
(3), 217–29. 
Mullings, B. (1999), ‘Insider or outsider, both or neither: some dilemmas of interviewing in a 
cross-cultural setting’, Geoforum, 30 (4), 337–50. 
Murphy, A. B. (2010), ‘Identity and Territory’, Geopolitics, 15 (4), 769–72. 
Murphy, A. B. (2013), ‘Territory’s Continuing Allure’, Annals of the Association of American 
Geographers, 103 (5), 1212–26. 
 
 291 
Murphy, A. B. (2015), ‘“Regimes of territorial legitimation” in a fast-changing world: why they 
matter and how they change’, Nordia Geographical Publications, 44 (4), 5–11. 
Murphy, A. B. and J. O’Loughlin (2009), ‘New Horizons for Regional Geography’, Eurasian 
Geography and Economics, 50 (3), 241–51. 
Mustafayev, A. (2018), ‘Kazakhstan bans foreigners to obtain, rent agircultural land plots’, 
accessed 9 January 2019 at https://www.farmlandgrab.org/post/view/28595-kazakhstan-
bans-foreigners-to-obtain-rent-agricultural-land-plots. 
Myadar, O. and S. Jackson (2018), ‘Contradictions of Populism and Resource Extraction: 
Examining the Intersection of Resource Nationalism and Accumulation by Dispossession 
in Mongolia’, Annals of the American Association of Geographers, accessed 9 January 
2019 at https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/24694452.2018.1500233. 
Myers, R. and C. P. Hansen (2019), ‘Revisiting A Theory of Access: A review’, Society & 
Natural Resources, 0 (0), 1–21. 
Nagel, C. and L. Staeheli (2016), ‘Nature, environmentalism, and the politics of citizenship in 
post-civil war Lebanon’, Cultural Geographies, 23 (2), 247–63. 
National Research Council (2000), ‘Health Effects of Excess Copper’, in Copper in Drinking 
Water, National Academy Press, pp. 78–126. 
Neely, A. H. and T. Nguse (2015), ‘Relationship and Research Methods: entanglements, intra-
actions, and diffraction’, in T. Perreault, G. Bridge, and J. McCarthy (eds), The Routledge 
Handbook of Political Ecology, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge, pp. 213–
23. 
Neep, D. (2017), ‘State-Space beyond Territory: Wormholes, Gravitational Fields, and 
Entanglement’, Journal of Historical Sociology, 30 (3), 466–95. 
Neumann, R. P. (2009), ‘Political ecology: theorizing scale’, Progress in Human Geography, 33 
(3), 398–406. 
Newman, D. (2006), ‘The lines that continue to separate us: borders in our `borderless’ world’, 
Progress in Human Geography, 30 (2), 143–61. 
Newman, D. and A. Paasi (1998), ‘Fences and Neighbours in the Postmodern World: Boundary 
Narratives in Political Geography’, Progress in Human Geography, 22 (2), 186–207. 
NewPosts.ge (2017), ‘ბექთაქარის საბადოდან 12 ათასი კილო ოქროს მოპოვება იგეგმება 
/ 12 thousand kilograms of gold from Bektakaris mine are planned’, accessed 23 
September 2018 at http://www.newposts.ge/?l=G&id=143658-
%E1%83%91%E1%83%94%E1%83%A5%E1%83%97%E1%83%90%E1%83%A5%E
1%83%90%E1%83%A0%E1%83%98,+%E1%83%A1%E1%83%90%E1%83%91%E1
%83%90%E1%83%93%E1%83%9D,+%E1%83%9D%E1%83%A5%E1%83%A0%E1
%83%9D. 
Nietzsche, F. W., M. Clark and A. J. Swensen (1998), On the Genealogy of Morality: A Polemic, 
Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Pub. Co. 
Nightingale, A. (2003), ‘A Feminist in the Forest: Situated Knowledges and Mixing Methods in 
Natural Resource Management’, ACME: An International Journal for Critical 
Geographies, 2 (1), 77–90. 
Nightingale, A. J. (2011), ‘Bounding difference: Intersectionality and the material production of 
gender, caste, class and environment in Nepal’, Geoforum, 42 (2), 153–62. 
Nightingale, A. J. (2016), ‘Adaptive scholarship and situated knowledges? Hybrid 
methodologies and plural epistemologies in climate change adaptation research’, Area, 48 
(1), 41–7. 
 
 292 
Nixon, R. (2011), Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor, Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press. 
Nodia, G. (2009), ‘Components of the Georgian National Idea: an Outline’, Identity Studies, 1 
(1), 84–101. 
Noricum Gold (2018), Georgian Mining Corporation: Building a Copper-Gold Company on the 
Tethyan Belt, May 2018, accessed 22 June 2018 at 
http://www.georgianmining.com/home/. 
Noricum Gold Limited (2016), Noricum Gold Limited (‘Noricum Gold’’ or ‘the Company’) 
Significant Increase in Size of Gold & Copper Target in Georgia and Agreement for 
Future Mining and Processing’, Noricum Gold Limited, p. 9, 11 August. 
Novak, P. (2011), ‘The Flexible Territoriality of Borders’, Geopolitics, 16 (4), 741–67. 
Ó Beacháin, D. and F. Coene (2014), ‘Go West: Georgia’s European identity and its role in 
domestic politics and foreign policy objectives’, Nationalities Papers: The Journal of 
Nationalism and Ethnicity, 42 (6), 923–41. 
Ó Tuathail, G. (1996), Critical Geopolitics, London: University of Minnesota Press 1996-08. 
Ó Tuathail, G. (2010), ‘Localizing geopolitics: Disaggregating violence and return in conflict 
regions’, Political Geography - POLIT GEOGR, 29 (5), 256–65. 
Ó Tuathail, G. and J. O’Loughlin (2013), ‘Inside South Ossetia: a survey of attitudes in a de 
facto state’, Post-Soviet Affairs, 29 (2), 136–72. 
OC Media (2019), ‘Svans “swear on icons” to oppose gold mine’, accessed 26 February 2019 at 
https://oc-media.org/svans-swear-on-icons-to-oppose-gold-mine/. 
Ocampo-Raeder, V. C. (2010), ‘Walters, Bradley B., with Bonnie J. McCay, Paige West, and 
Susan Lees (eds): Against the Grain: The Vayda Tradition in Human Ecology and 
Ecological Anthropology’, Human Ecology, 38 (3), 467–9. 
O’Lear, S. (2018), Environmental Geopolitics, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 
O’Lear, S. and S. Dalby (eds.) (2015), Reframing Climate Change: Constructing Ecological 
Geopolitics, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge. 
O’loughlin, J. (2001), ‘Geopolitical fantasies, national strategies and ordinary Russians in the 
post‐communist Era’, Geopolitics, 6 (3), 17–48. 
O’Loughlin, J., G. Ó. Gearóid and V. Kolossov (2005), ‘Russian geopolitical culture and public 
opinion: the masks of Proteus revisited’, Transactions of the Institute of British 
Geographers, 30 (3), 322–35. 
O’Loughlin, J. and V. Kolosov (2017), ‘Building identities in post-Soviet “de facto states”: 
cultural and political icons in Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, Transdniestria, and 
Abkhazia’, Eurasian Geography and Economics, 58 (6), 691–715. 
O’Loughlin, J., V. Kolossov and J. Radvanyi (2007), ‘The Caucasus in a Time of Conflict, 
Demographic Transition, and Economic Change’, Eurasian Geography and Economics, 
48 (2), 135–56. 
O’Loughlin, J., V. Kolossov and A. Tchepalyga (1998), ‘National Construction, Territorial 
Separatism, and Post-Soviet Geopolitics in the Transdniester Moldovan Republic’, Post-
Soviet Geography and Economics, 39 (6), 332–58. 
O’Loughlin, J., G. Ó Tuathail and V. Kolossov (2004), ‘Russian geopolitical storylines and 
public opinion in the wake of 9–11: a critical geopolitical analysis and national survey’, 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 37 (3), 281–318. 
 
 293 
O’Loughlin, J., G. Toal and V. Kolosov (2016), ‘Who identifies with the “Russian World”? 
Geopolitical attitudes in southeastern Ukraine, Crimea, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and 
Transnistria’, Eurasian Geography and Economics, 57 (6), 745–78. 
Ong, A. (1999), Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality, 2nd printing, 
edition, Durham: Duke University Press Books. 
Ong, A. (2006a), Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty, First 
Edition edition, Durham N.C.: Duke University Press Books. 
Ong, A. (2006b), Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty, Duke 
University Press. 
Ong, A. (2007), ‘Neoliberalism as a mobile technology’, Transactions of the Institute of British 
Geographers, 32 (1), 3–8. 
Ong, A. (2011), ‘Introduction: Worlding Cities, or the Art of being Global’, in A. Roy and A. 
Ong (eds), Worlding Cities: Asian Experiments and the Art of Being Global, 1 edition, 
Chichester, West Sussex ; Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 1–26. 
Ong, A. and S. J. Collier (eds.) (2004), Global Assemblages: Technology, Politics, and Ethics as 
Anthropological Problems, 1 edition, Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Ostrom, E. (1990), Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, 
1st edition, Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Ozkirimli, U. (2017), Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction, 3rd ed. 2017 edition, 
London: Palgrave. 
Paasi, A. (1997), Territories, Boundaries and Consciousness: The Changing Geographies of the 
Finnish-Russian Border, 1 edition, Chichester, England ; New York: Wiley. 
Paasi, A. (1998a), ‘Boundaries as social processes: Territoriality in the world of flows’, 
Geopolitics, 3 (1), 69–88. 
Paasi, A. (1998b), ‘Boundaries as social processes: Territoriality in the world of flows’, 
Geopolitics, 3 (1), 69–88. 
Paasi, A. (2008), ‘Is the World More Complex Than Our Theories of it? TPSN and the Perpetual 
Challenge of Conceptualization’, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 26 
(3), 405–10. 
Paasi, A. (2009), ‘Bounded spaces in a “borderless world”: border studies, power and the 
anatomy of territory’, Journal of Power, 2 (2), 213–34. 
Paasi, A. (2010a), ‘A Border Theory: An Unattainable Dream or a Realistic Aim for Border 
Scholars?’, in D. Wastl-Walter (ed), The Ashgate Research Companion to Border 
Studies, Burlington: Ashgate, pp. 11–31. 
Paasi, A. (2010b), ‘Regions are social constructs, but who or what “constructs” them? Agency in 
question’, Environment and Planning A, 42 (10), 2296 – 2301. 
Paasi, A. (2016), ‘Dancing on the graves: Independence, hot/banal nationalism and the 
mobilization of memory’, Political Geography, 54, 21–31. 
Pain, R. and S. Kindon (2007), ‘Guest Editorial: Participatory geographies’, Environment and 
Planning A, 39 (12), 2807 – 2812. 
Painter, J. (2006), ‘Prosaic geographies of stateness’, Political Geography, 25, 752–74. 
Painter, J. (2010), ‘Rethinking Territory’, Antipode, 42 (5), 1090–118. 
Painter, J. (2011), ‘Conceptualizing “Society” and “State”’, in B. Mitchneck (ed), State, Society 
and Transformation, Washington  DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for 
Scholars - Kennan Institute, pp. 20–49. 
Painter, J. and A. Jeffrey (2009), ‘Nationalism and Regionalism’, in Political Geography, SAGE. 
 
 294 
Parenti, C. (2015), ‘The 2013 ANTIPODE AAG Lecture The Environment Making State: 
Territory, Nature, and Value’, Antipode, 47 (4), 829–48. 
Parker, N. and N. Vaughan-Williams (2009), ‘Lines in the Sand? Towards an Agenda for Critical 
Border Studies’, Geopolitics, 14 (3), 582–7. 
Passy, F. (2009), ‘Charles Tilly’s Understanding of Contentious Politics: A Social Interactive 
Perspective for Social Science’, Swiss Political Science Review, 15 (2), 351–9. 
Patrucic, M., K. Ismayilova and RFE/RL (2016), ‘People of Azerbaijan Bail out Failed Aliyev 
Mining Empire - The Panama Papers’, accessed 18 September 2018 at 
https://www.occrp.org/en/panamapapers/people-of-azerbaijan-bail-out-failed-aliyev-
mining-empire/. 
Patton, P. (1997), ‘The World Seen From Within: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Events’, 
Theory & Event, 1 (1), accessed at https://doi.org/10.1353/tae.1991.0006. 
Peck, J. (2013), ‘Explaining (with) Neoliberalism’, Territory, Politics, Governance, 1 (1), 1–26. 
Peet, R., P. Robbins and M. J. Watts (2011), ‘Global Nature’, in R. Peet, P. Robbins, and M. J. 
Watts (eds), Global Political Ecology, New York: Routledge, pp. 1–47. 
Peet, R. and M. J. Watts (2004), Liberation Ecologies: Environment, Development and Social 
Movements, Routledge. 
Peluso, N. L. (1992), Rich Forests, Poor People: Resource Control and Resistance in Java, 
University of California Press. 
Peluso, N. L. (2007), ‘Enclosure and privatization of neoliberal environments’, in N. Heynen, J. 
McCarthy, S. Prudham, and P. Robbins (eds), Neoliberal Environments: False Promises 
and Unnatural Consequences, New York: Routledge - Taylor & Francis Group, pp. 281–
6. 
Peluso, N. L. (2012), ‘What’s Nature Got To Do With It? A Situated Historical Perspective on 
Socio-natural Commodities’, Development and Change, 43 (1), 79–104. 
Peluso, N. L. (2017), ‘Entangled Territories in Small-Scale Gold Mining Frontiers: Labor 
Practices, Property, and Secrets in Indonesian Gold Country’, World Development, 
accessed at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2016.11.003. 
Peluso, N. L. (2018), ‘Entangled Territories in Small-Scale Gold Mining Frontiers: Labor 
Practices, Property, and Secrets in Indonesian Gold Country’, World Development, 101, 
400–16. 
Peluso, N. L. and M. J. Watts (2001), Violent Environments, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Perelman, M. (2000), The Invention of Capitalism: Classical Political Economy and the Secret 
History of Primitive Accumulation, Durham, N.C: Duke University Press Books. 
Perreault, T. (2013a), ‘Dispossession by Accumulation? Mining, Water and the Nature of 
Enclosure on the Bolivian Altiplano’, Antipode, 45 (5), 1050–69. 
Perreault, T. (2013b), ‘Nature and nation: Hydrocarbons governance and the territorial logics 
“resource nationalism” in Bolivia’, in A. Bebbington and J. Bury (eds), Subterranean 
Struggles: New Dynamics of Mining, Oil, and Gas in Latin America, Reprint edition, 
Austin: University of Texas Press. 
Perreault, T. (2018), ‘Mining, meaning and memory in the Andes’, The Geographical Journal, 
184 (3), 229–41. 
Perreault, T. and B. Green (2013), ‘Reworking the Spaces of Indigeneity: The Bolivian Ayllu 
and Lowland Autonomy Movements Compared’, Environment and Planning D: Society 
and Space, 31 (1), 43–60. 
 
 295 
Perreault, T. and G. Valdivia (2010), ‘Hydrocarbons, popular protest and national imaginaries: 
Ecuador and Bolivia in comparative context’, Geoforum, 41 (5), 689–99. 
Pertaia, L. (2017), ‘Fatal workplace accidents show “need for labour inspection reform”’, 
accessed 23 September 2018 at http://oc-media.org/fatal-workplace-accidents-show-
need-for-labour-inspection-reform/. 
Petryna, A. (2013), Life Exposed: Biological Citizens after Chernobyl, With a New introduction 
by the author edition, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Philo, C. P. (2007), ‘“Bellicose History” and “Local Discursivities”: An Archaeological Reading 
of Michel Foucault’s Society Must be Defended’, in J. W. Crampton and S. Elden (eds), 
Space, Knowledge and Power: Foucault and Geography, Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., pp. 
341–68. 
Philo, C. (2012), ‘A “new Foucault” with lively implications – or “the crawfish advances 
sideways”’, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 37 (4), 496–514. 
Plamper, J. (2002), ‘Foucault’s Gulag’, Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History, 3 
(2), 255–80. 
Platt, J. (2012), ‘The History of the Interview’, in J. F. Gubrium, J. A. Holstein, A. Marvasti, and 
K. D. McKinney (eds), The SAGE Handbook of Interview Research: The Complexity of 
the Craft, Second edition, Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, Inc, pp. 9–26. 
Plumwood, V. (1994), Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, London: Routledge. 
Polanyi, K. (2001), The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our 
Time, 2 edition, Boston, MA: Beacon Press. 
Policante, A. (2010), ‘War against Biopower - Timely Reflections on an Historicist Foucault’, 
Theory & Event, 13 (1), accessed at https://doi.org/10.1353/tae.0.0123. 
Poncian, J. (2019), ‘Galvanising political support through resource nationalism: A case of 
Tanzania’s 2017 extractive sector reforms’, Political Geography, 69, 77–88. 
Poon, J. P. H. and P. Cheong (2009), ‘Objectivity, Subjectivity, and Intersubjectivity in 
Economic Geography: Evidence from the Internet and Blogosphere’, Annals of the 
Association of American Geographers, 99 (3), 590–603. 
Pratt, G. (2010), ‘Collaboration as feminist strategy’, Gender, Place and Culture, 17 (1), 43–8. 
Prozorov, S. (2013), ‘Living Ideas and Dead Bodies: The Biopolitics of Stalinism’, Alternatives, 
38 (3), 208–27. 
Prozorov, S. (2014), ‘Foucault and Soviet biopolitics’, History of the Human Sciences, 27 (5), 6–
25. 
Prudham, S. (2004), Knock on Wood: Nature as Commodity in Douglas-Fir Country, New York: 
Routledge. 
Prudham, S. (2015), ‘Property and Commodification’, in T. Perreault, G. Bridge, and J. 
McCarthy (eds), The Routledge Handbook of Political Ecology, Abingdon, Oxon ; New 
York, NY: Routledge. 
Pugh, J. (2013), ‘Island Movements: Thinking with the Archipelago’, Island Studies Journal; 
Charlottetown, 8 (1), 9–24. 
Purcell, T. F. (2017), ‘The political economy of rentier capitalism and the limits to agrarian 
transformation in Venezuela’, Journal of Agrarian Change, 17 (2), 296–312. 
Quinn, J. (2017), ‘Gatekhili Mountains, gatekhili State: Fractured Alpine Forest Governance and 
Post-Soviet Development in the Republic of Georgia’, Journal of Alpine Research | 
Revue de Géographie Alpine, (105–1), 1–14. 
 
 296 
Rabinow, P. (2003), Anthropos Today: Reflections on Modern Equipment, Princeton, N.J. ; 
Oxford: Princeton University Press. 
Rabinow, P. and G. E. Marcus (2008), Designs for an Anthropology of the Contemporary, 
Durham: Duke University Press. 
Rabinow, P. and N. Rose (2006), ‘Biopower Today’, BioSocieties, 1 (2), 195–217. 
Raffestin, C. (2012), ‘Space, Territory, and Territoriality’, Environment and Planning D: Society 
and Space, 30 (1), 121–41. 
Rangan, H. and C. A. Kull (2009), ‘What makes ecology `political’?: rethinking `scale’ in 
political ecology’, Progress in Human Geography, 33 (1), 28–45. 
Rasmussen, M. B. and C. Lund (2018), ‘Reconfiguring Frontier Spaces: The territorialization of 
resource control’, World Development, 101, 388–99. 
Reed, M. G. and S. Bruyneel (2010), ‘Rescaling environmental governance, rethinking the state: 
A three-dimensional review’, Progress in Human Geography, 34 (5), 646–53. 
Reuters (2017a), ‘Renova sells its stake in Russian gold miner Petropavlovsk’, accessed 3 
February 2019 at http://www.mining.com/web/renova-sells-stake-russian-gold-miner-
petropavlovsk/. 
Reuters (2017b), ‘Russia’s Otkritie bank gets stake in Polymetal’, accessed 3 February 2019 at 
http://www.mining.com/web/russias-otkritie-bank-gets-stake-polymetal/. 
Reuters (2018), ‘Russia’s watchdog allows GV Gold to buy Vekselberg’s gold assets’, accessed 
3 February 2019 at http://www.mining.com/web/russias-watchdog-allows-gv-gold-buy-
vekselbergs-gold-assets/. 
RFE/RL (2016a), A Dangerous Gold Rush In The Kyrgyz Mountains, accessed 18 September 
2018 at https://www.rferl.org/a/kyrgyzstan-gold-mine/27644550.html. 
RFE/RL (2016b), Miners Strike In Georgia Turns Violent, accessed 18 September 2018 at 
https://www.rferl.org/a/georgia-miners-strike/27571572.html. 
RFE/RL (2017), ‘Miners’ Deaths Spark Protests In Georgia’, accessed 23 September 2018 at 
https://www.rferl.org/a/georgia-miners-deaths-protests/28478206.html. 
Rhoades, R. E. (2006), Development with Identity: Community, Culture and Sustainability in the 
Andes, CABI. 
Ribot, J. C., A. Agrawal and A. M. Larson (2006), ‘Recentralizing While Decentralizing: How 
National Governments Reappropriate Forest Resources’, World Development, 34 (11), 
1864–86. 
Ribot, J. C. and N. L. Peluso (2003), ‘A Theory of Access’, Rural Sociology, 68 (2), 153–81. 
Rich Metals Group (2014), Rich Metals Group - About Us, accessed 28 February 2019 at 
http://www.richmetalsgroup.com/index.php?a=main&pid=9&lang=eng. 
Rimple, P. (2012), Who Owned Georgia, 2003-2012, Tbilisi, Georgia: Transparency 
International Georgia, p. 102. 
Rimple, P. (2014), ‘Georgia Opts for Gold Mining at Protected Historical Site’, accessed 23 
September 2018 at https://eurasianet.org/georgia-opts-for-gold-mining-at-protected-
historical-site. 
RMG Gold Ltd. (2013), Environmental Impact Assessment Report of Exploitation of Sakdrisi 
Mine Heap Leaching Enterprise Area, Tbilisi, Georgia: RMG Gold Ltd., p. 65. 
RMG/არემჯი Richmetalsgroup (2017), ინფო-ტური ბოლნისის ახალ მუზეუმში/Info-Tour 
in New Museum of Bolnisi, 16 January, accessed 23 September 2018 at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1rtnKr6oB0I. 
 
 297 
Robbins, P. (2000), ‘The rotten institution: corruption in natural resource management’, Political 
Geography, 19 (4), 423–43. 
Robbins, P. (2004), Political Ecology: A Critical Introduction, Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub. 
Robbins, P. (2006), ‘The politics of barstool biology: Environmental knowledge and power in 
greater Northern Yellowstone’, Geoforum, 37 (2), 185–99. 
Robbins, P. (2007), Lawn People: How Grasses, Weeds, and Chemicals Make Us Who We Are, 
annotated edition edition, Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 
Robbins, P. (2008), ‘Chapter 12: The State in Political Ecology: A Postcard to Political 
Geography from the Field’, in K. R. Cox, M. Low, and J. Robinson (eds), The SAGE 
Handbook of Political Geography, SAGE Publications, pp. 205–18. 
Robbins, P. (2012), ‘Review of Causal Explanation for Social Scientists’, Human Ecology, 40 
(4), 657–9. 
Robbins, P. and B. Marks (2010), ‘Assemblage Geographies’, in S. Smith, R. Pain, S. A. 
Marston, and J. P. Jones (eds), The SAGE Handbook of Social Geographies, SAGE 
Publications, pp. 176–95. 
Robertson, M. M. (2004), ‘The neoliberalization of ecosystem services: wetland mitigation 
banking and problems in environmental governance’, Geoforum, 35 (3), 361–73. 
Robertson, M. (2010), ‘Performing environmental governance’, Geoforum, 41 (1), 7–10. 
Robertson, M. (2015), ‘Environmental Governance: Political ecology and the state’, in T. 
Perreault, G. Bridge, and J. McCarthy (eds), The Routledge Handbook of Political 
Ecology, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge. 
Robertson, M. and J. Wainwright (2013), ‘The Value of Nature to the State’, Annals of the 
Association of American Geographers, 103 (4), 890–905. 
Robinson, A. (2014), ‘Alain Badiou: The Event’, accessed 6 January 2017 at 
https://ceasefiremagazine.co.uk/alain-badiou-event/. 
Rocheleau, D. E. (2008), ‘Political ecology in the key of policy: From chains of explanation to 
webs of relation’, Geoforum, 39 (2), 716–27. 
Rocheleau, D. E. (2015), ‘Networked, rooted and territorial: green grabbing and resistance in 
Chiapas’, The Journal of Peasant Studies, 42 (3–4), 695–723. 
Rocheleau, D. and D. Edmunds (1997), ‘Women, men and trees: Gender, power and property in 
forest and agrarian landscapes’, World Development, 25 (8), 1351–71. 
Rocheleau, D. and R. Roth (2007), ‘Rooted networks, relational webs and powers of connection: 
Rethinking human and political ecologies’, Geoforum, 38 (3), 433–7. 
Rocheleau, D., B. Thomas-Slayter and E. Wangari (2013), Feminist Political Ecology: Global 
Issues and Local Experience, Routledge. 
Rogerson, P. A. (2015), Statistical Methods for Geography: A Student’s Guide, Fourth edition, 
Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications Ltd. 
Rose (1997), ‘Situating knowledges: positionality, reflexivities and other tactics’, Progress in 
Human Geography, 21 (3), 305–20. 
Rose, G. (2012), Visual Methodologies: An Introduction to the Interpretation of Visual 
Materials, SAGE Publications. 
RT International (2018), ‘Where does Russia keep its huge gold reserves?’, accessed 3 February 
2019 at https://www.rt.com/business/434500-russia-gold-reserves-history/. 
Rzymski, Piotr, K. Tomczyk, Pawel Rzymski, B. Poniedziałek, T. Opala and M. Wilczak (2015), 
‘Impact of heavy metals on the female reproductive system’, Annals of Agricultural and 
Environmental Medicine, 22 (2), 259–64. 
 
 298 
Sack, R. D. (1986), Human Territoriality: Its Theory and History, Cambridge Cambridgeshire ; 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Safirova, E. (2012), 2012 Minerals Yearbook, Georgia, U.S. Department of the Interior, U.S 
Geological Survey, p. 6. 
Said, E. W. (2001), ‘The Clash of Ignorance’, The Nation, 4 October, accessed 6 January 2018 at 
https://www.thenation.com/article/clash-ignorance/. 
Saladze, S. (2014), Sakdrisi-Kachagiani - From the Cultural Heritage to the Contemporary Gold 
Mining, Tbilisi, Georgia: Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association (GYLA), p. 29. 
Saladze, S. (2015), Sakdrisi-Kachaghiani - Destruction in the Name of the Law, Tbilisi: 
Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association (GYLA), p. 34. 
Salukvadze, J. (1999), ‘Land reform and land management in post-Soviet Georgia’, 
Anthropology of East Europe Review, 17 (2), 4–12. 
Sandlos, J. and A. Keeling (2016), ‘Toxic Legacies, Slow Violence, and Environmental Injustice 
at Giant Mine, Northwest Territories’, Northern Review, 0 (42), accessed 15 May 2017 at 
http://journals.sfu.ca/nr/index.php/nr/article/view/566. 
Sassen, S. (2003), ‘Globalization or denationalization?’, Review of International Political 
Economy, 10 (1), 1–22. 
Sassen, S. (2008), Territory, Authority, Rights : From Medieval to Global Assemblages, 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
Sassen, S. (2009), ‘Bordering Capabilities Versus Borders: Implications for National Borders’, 
Michigan Journal of International Law; Ann Arbor, 30 (3), 567–97. 
Sassen, S. (2013a), ‘Land Grabs Today: Feeding the Disassembling of National Territory’, 
Globalizations, 10 (1), 25–46. 
Sassen, S. (2013b), ‘When Territory Deborders Territoriality’, Territory, Politics, Governance, 1 
(1), 21–45. 
Sassen, S. (2018), ‘Embedded borderings: making new geographies of centrality’, Territory, 
Politics, Governance, 6 (1), 5–15. 
Sassen, S. and A. Aneesh (2017), ‘“Relocating Global Assemblages”: An Interview with Saskia 
Sassen’, Science, Technology & Society, 22 (1), 128–34. 
Sassen, S. and A. Ong (2014), ‘The Carpenter and the Bricoleur’, in M. Acuto and S. Curtis 
(eds), Reassembling International Theory: Assemblage Thinking and International 
Relations, London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, pp. 17–24. 
Sassen, S. and G. Torino (2017), ‘Age of Extraction: An Interview With Saskia Sassen’, 
accessed 12 December 2018 at http://kingsreview.co.uk/articles/interview-saskia-sassen/. 
Saunders, R. A. (2017), Popular Geopolitics and Nation Branding in the Post-Soviet Realm, 
Abingdon, Oxon ; New York: Routledge. 
Sayre, N. F. (2005), ‘Ecological and geographical scale: parallels and potential for integration’, 
Progress in Human Geography, 29 (3), 276–90. 
Sayre, N. F. (2015), ‘Scales and Polities’, in T. Perreault, G. Bridge, and J. McCarthy (eds), The 
Routledge Handbook of Political Ecology, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge, 
pp. 213–23. 
Schatz, E. (2009), Political Ethnography: What Immersion Contributes to the Study of Power, 1 
edition, Chicago ; London: University Of Chicago Press. 
Schlosser, K. (2013), ‘Regimes of Ethical Value? Landscape, Race and Representation in the 
Canadian Diamond Industry’, Antipode, 45 (1), 161–79. 
 
 299 
Schoenberger, E. (2011), ‘Why is gold valuable? Nature, social power and the value of things’, 
Cultural Geographies, 18 (1), 3–24. 
Schoenberger, E. (2016), ‘Environmentally sustainable mining: The case of tailings storage 
facilities’, Resources Policy, 49 (Supplement C), 119–28. 
Schueth, S. (2012), ‘Apparatus of capture: Fiscal state formation in the republic of Georgia’, 
Political Geography, 31, 133–43. 
Schulze, G. G. and N. Zakharov (2018), ‘Corruption in Russia’, in B. Warf (ed), Handbook on 
the Geographies of Corruption, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Pub, pp. 195–212. 
Schurman, R. A. (1998), ‘Tuna Dreams: Resource Nationalism and the Pacific Islands’ Tuna 
Industry’, Development and Change, 29 (1), 107–36. 
Secor, A. J. (2001), ‘Toward a Feminist Counter-geopolitics: Gender, Space and Islamist Politics 
in Istanbul’, Space and Polity, 5 (3), 191–211. 
Secor, A. (2004), ‘“There Is an Istanbul That Belongs to Me”: Citizenship, Space, and Identity in 
the City’, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 94 (2), 352–68. 
Secor, A. J. (2007), ‘Between longing and despair: state, space, and subjectivity in Turkey’, 
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 25, 33–52. 
Sharp, J. P. (2000), ‘Remasculinising geo-politics? Comments on Gearoid O’Tuathail’s Critical 
Geopolitics’, Political Geography, 19 (3), 361–4. 
Sharp, J. (2007), ‘Geography and gender: finding feminist political geographies’, Progress in 
Human Geography, 31 (3), 381–7. 
Shaw, I. G. (2012), ‘Towards an evental geography’, Progress in Human Geography, 36 (5), 
613–27. 
Shaw, J. (2016), ‘Emergent ethics in participatory video: negotiating the inherent tensions as 
group processes evolve’, Area, 48 (4), 419–26. 
Shaw, I. G. R., P. F. Robbins and J. P. Jones (2010), ‘A Bug’s Life and the Spatial Ontologies of 
Mosquito Management’, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 100 (2), 
373–92. 
Shermadini, O. (2017), ‘Land rights in Georgia: the stench of corruption’, accessed 11 October 
2018 at 
https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/land_rights_in_georgia_the_stench_of_corru
ption. 
Sherman-Morris, K. (2013), ‘The Public Response to Hazardous Weather Events: 25 Years of 
Research’, Geography Compass, 7 (10), 669–85. 
Shin, L. (2017), ‘The First Government To Secure Land Titles On The Bitcoin Blockchain 
Expands Project’, accessed 11 October 2018 at 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/laurashin/2017/02/07/the-first-government-to-secure-land-
titles-on-the-bitcoin-blockchain-expands-project/. 
Sica, C. E. and M. Huber (2017), ‘“We Can’t Be Dependent on Anybody”: The rhetoric of 
“Energy Independence” and the legitimation of fracking in Pennsylvania’, The Extractive 
Industries and Society, 4 (2), 337–43. 
Sikor, T. and C. Lund (2009), ‘Access and Property: A Question of Power and Authority’, 
Development and Change, 40 (1), 1–22. 
Slater, T. (2017), ‘Planetary Rent Gaps’, Antipode, 49 (S1), 114–37. 
Slezkine, Y. (1994), ‘The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted 
Ethnic Particularism’, Slavic Review, 53 (2), 414. 
 
 300 
Smith, N. (1984), Uneven Development: Nature, Capital, and the Production of Space, New 
York, NY: Blackwell. 
Smith, A. (2005), ‘The genealogy of nations: An ethno-symbolic approach’, in A. Ichijo and G. 
Uzelac (eds), When Is the Nation?: Towards an Understanding of Theories of 
Nationalism, Psychology Press, pp. 94–112. 
Smith, N. (2008), Uneven Development: Nature, Capital, and the Production of Space, 3rd 
edition, Athens: University of Georgia Press. 
Smith, G. (2009), ‘Nationalism’, in D. Gregory, R. Johnston, G. Pratt, M. J. Watts, and S. 
Whatmore (eds), The Dictionary of Human Geography, 5th ed., Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 
488–9. 
Smith, N. (2009), ‘Nature as Accumulation Strategy’, Socialist Register, 43 (43), accessed 4 
August 2014 at http://socialistregister.com/index.php/srv/article/view/5856. 
Smith, G., V. Law, A. Wilson, A. Bohr and E. Allworth (1998), Nation-Building in the Post-
Soviet Borderlands: The Politics of National Identities, Cambridge, England ; New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Smith, S., N. W. Swanson and B. Gökarıksel (2016), ‘Territory, bodies and borders’, Area, 48 
(3), 258–61. 
Smolnik, F. and A. Weiss (2017), ‘Transboundary processes and (re-)configurations of political 
space in the Caucasus’, Eurasian Geography and Economics, 58 (5), 469–80. 
Solzhenitsyn, A. I. (1974), The Gulag Archipelago, 1918-1956: An Experiment in Literary 
Investigation, 1st ed, New York: Harper & Row. 
Sparke, M. (2006), ‘Political geography - political geographies of globalization II: governance’, 
Progress in Human Geography, 30 (2), 1–16. 
Sparke, M. (2018a), ‘Geoeconomics, Globalisation and the Limits of Economic Strategy in 
Statecraft: A Response to Vihma’, Geopolitics, 23 (1), 30–7. 
Sparke, M. (2018b), ‘Globalizing capitalism and the dialectics of geopolitics and geoeconomics’, 
Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space, 50 (2), 484–9. 
Spiegel, S. J. (2014), ‘Rural place-making, globalization and the extractive sector: Insights from 
gold mining areas in Kratie and Ratanakiri, Cambodia’, Journal of Rural Studies, 36, 
300–10. 
Staeheli, L. A. (2011), ‘Political geography: Where’s citizenship?’, Progress in Human 
Geography; London, 35 (3), 393–400. 
Staeheli, L. A. (2018), ‘Learning to be citizens: exploring social cohesion and security in times 
of uncertainty’, Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human Geography, 100 (2), 61–3. 
Staeheli, L. A., P. Ehrkamp, H. Leitner and C. R. Nagel (2012), ‘Dreaming the ordinary: Daily 
life and the complex geographies of citizenship’, Progress in Human Geography, 36 (5), 
628–44. 
Stawkowski, M. E. (2016), ‘“I am a radioactive mutant”: Emergent biological subjectivities at 
Kazakhstan’s Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site’, American Ethnologist, 43 (1), 144–57. 
Stead, V. (2015), ‘Homeland, territory, property: Contesting land, state, and nation in urban 
Timor-Leste’, Political Geography, 45, 79–89. 
Stengers, I. (2010), ‘Including Nonhumans in Political Theory: Openeing Pandora’s Box?’, in B. 
Braun and S. J. Whatmore (eds), Political Matter: Technoscience, Democracy, and 
Public Life, Minneapolis: Univ Of Minnesota Press, pp. 89–117. 
 
 301 
Stöllner, T. and I. Gambashidze (2015), THE GOLD MINE OF SAKDRISI AND EARLIEST 
MINING AND METALLURGY IN THE TRANSCAUCASUS AND THE KURA-VALLEY 
SYSTEM, accessed 16 January 2018 at http://saunje.ge/index.php?id=1533&lang=ru. 
Stöllner, T. and I. Gambashidze (2016), The Gold of Sakdrisi. Man’s First Gold Mining 
Enterprise., Bochum/Rahden: Veröffentlichungen aus dem DBM Bochum 211. 
Stratford, E., G. Baldacchino, E. McMahon, C. Farbotko and A. Harwood (2011), ‘Envisioning 
the Archipelago’, Island Studies Journal; Charlottetown, 6 (2), 113–30. 
Strønen, I. Å. (2017), ‘Corruption and the Extractive State’, in I. Å. Strønen (ed), Grassroots 
Politics and Oil Culture in Venezuela: The Revolutionary Petro-State, Cham: Springer 
International Publishing, pp. 279–307. 
Sundberg, J. (2015a), ‘Ethics, Entanglement and Political Ecology’, in T. Perreault, G. Bridge, 
and J. McCarthy (eds), The Routledge Handbook of Political Ecology, Abingdon, Oxon ; 
New York, NY: Routledge. 
Sundberg, J. (2015b), ‘Feminist Political Ecology’, in The International Encyclopedia of 
Geography, Wiley-Blackwell & Association of American Geographers. 
Suny, R. G. (1993), The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the 
Soviet Union, Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press. 
Suny, R. G. (1994), The Making of the Georgian Nation, Indiana University Press. 
Suny, R. G. (1996), Transcaucasia, Nationalism, and Social Change: Essays in the History of 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, Revised Edition edition, Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press. 
Suny, R. G. (2000), ‘Provisional Stabilities: The Politics of Identities in Post-Soviet Eurasia’, 
International Security, 24 (3), 139–78. 
Suny, R. G. and T. Martin (2001), A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of 
Lenin and Stalin, Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press. 
Suslov, M. (2018a), ‘“Russian World” Concept: Post-Soviet Geopolitical Ideology and the Logic 
of “Spheres of Influence”’, Geopolitics, 0 (0), 1–24. 
Suslov, M. (2018b), ‘“Russian World” Concept: Post-Soviet Geopolitical Ideology and the Logic 
of “Spheres of Influence”’, Geopolitics, 0 (0), 1–24. 
Svanidze, T. (2018), ‘Georgia’s growing cultural divide: a sign of far-right populism?’, accessed 
1 August 2018 at https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/tako-svanidze/georgia-
growing-cultural-divide. 
Swyngedouw, E. (2004), Social Power and the Urbanization of Water : Flows of Power, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Swyngedouw, E. and N. C. Heynen (2003), ‘Urban Political Ecology, Justice and the Politics of 
Scale’, Antipode, 35 (5), 898–918. 
Syrmopoulos, J. (2018), ‘Russia Triples Gold Reserves in Preparation for Full-Scale Economic 
War with the U.S. Dollar’, accessed 3 February 2019 at 
https://www.globalresearch.ca/russia-triples-gold-reserves-in-preparation-for-full-scale-
economic-war-with-the-u-s-dollar/5615113. 
Tarrow, S. (2008), ‘Charles Tilly and the Practice of Contentious Politics’, Social Movement 
Studies, 7 (3), 225–46. 
Taylor, B. D. (2018), The Code of Putinism, New York: Oxford University Press. 
Tchelidze, T., G. Melikadze, J. Leveinen, J. Kaija and S. Kumpalainen (2003), Assessment and 
Modelling of Heavy Metal Contamination from Madneuli Open-Pit Mine, Georgia, Nice, 
France, accessed at http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2003EAEJA....14256T. 
 
 302 
The Ministry of Finance of Georgia (2018), ‘Common Budget’, accessed 24 February 2019 at 
https://mof.ge/en/4559. 
The Parliament of Georgia (1996), Law of Georgia ‘On Subsoil’, No 1894, accessed at 
https://matsne.gov.ge/ka/document/view/33040. 
The Parliament of Georgia (1997), Law of Georgia ‘On State Property Privatization’, accessed 
at https://matsne.gov.ge/ka/document/view/1887171. 
The Parliament of Georgia (2005), Resolution N136 of the Government of Georgia ‘On Approval 
of the Regulation on the Procedure and Terms and Conditions for Issuance of License for 
Mineral Resources Extraction’, accessed at 
http://environment.cenn.org/app/uploads/2016/10/Regulation-on-the-procedure-for-
Issuance-of-License-for-Mineral-Resources-Extraction.pdf. 
The Parliament of Georgia (2010), Law of Georgia ‘On State Property’, accessed at 
https://matsne.gov.ge/ka/document/view/1887171. 
The Parliament of Georgia (2012a), Law of Georgia “On Environmental Protection", accessed at 
https://matsne.gov.ge/en/document/download/1043717/93/en/pdf. 
The Parliament of Georgia (2012b), Law of Georgia “Tax Code of Georgia", accessed at 
https://matsne.gov.ge/en/document/download/1043717/93/en/pdf. 
The World Bank (2019a), ‘Ease of doing business index’, accessed 31 January 2019 at 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IC.BUS.EASE.XQ?year_low_desc=false. 
The World Bank (2019b), ‘GDP (current US$)’, accessed 24 February 2019 at 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.TOTL.RT.ZS?contextual=region&location
s=GE. 
The World Bank (2019c), ‘Total natural resources rents (% of GDP)’, accessed 24 February 
2019 at 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.TOTL.RT.ZS?contextual=region&location
s=GE. 
Thrift, N. (2004), ‘Intensities of Feeling: Towards a Spatial Politics of Affect’, Geografiska 
Annaler. Series B, Human Geography, 86 (1), 57–78. 
TI Georgia (2015), ‘Who owns RMG Gold?’, accessed 18 September 2018 at 
https://www.transparency.ge/en/blog/who-owns-rmg-gold. 
TI Georgia (2017), ‘The new moratorium on the sale of agricultural land to foreign citizens is 
also unconstitutional’, accessed 27 December 2018 at 
https://www.transparency.ge/en/blog/new-moratorium-sale-agricultural-land-foreign-
citizens-also-unconstitutional. 
Tilly, C. (2002), Stories, Identities, and Political Change, Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield. 
Tilly, C. (2008), Contentious Performances, 1 edition, Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Tishkov, V. (1997), Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and After the Soviet Union: The Mind 
Aflame, SAGE. 
Tittensor, D. (2016), ‘Doing political ethnography in a difficult climate: A Turkish case study’, 
Ethnography, 17 (2), 213–28. 
Toal, G. (2017), Near Abroad: Putin, the West and the Contest over Ukraine and the Caucasus, 
Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. 
Tolia-Kelly, D. P. (2013), ‘The geographies of cultural geography III Material geographies, 
vibrant matters and risking surface geographies’, Progress in Human Geography, 37 (1), 
153–60. 
 
 303 
Tolz, V. (1998), ‘Conflicting “Homeland Myths” and Nation-State Building in Postcommunist 
Russia’, Slavic Review, 57 (2), 267–94. 
Transparency International (2018), ‘Anti-Corruption Glossary’, accessed 19 February 2019 at 
https://www.transparency.org/glossary. 
Transparency International Georgia (2018), ‘Statement About the Ongoing Electoral Process’, 
accessed 10 January 2019 at https://www.transparency.ge/en/post/statement-about-
ongoing-electoral-process-0700-2000. 
Trubina, E. (2014), ‘Mega-events in the context of capitalist modernity: the case of 2014 Sochi 
Winter Olympics’, Eurasian Geography and Economics, 55 (6), 610–27. 
Tsing, A. (1993), In the Realm of the Diamond Queen, Princeton, N.J: Princeton University 
Press. 
Tsing, A. L. (2003), ‘Natural Resources and Capitalist Frontiers’, Economic and Political 
Weekly, 38 (48), 5100–6. 
Tsing, A. L. (2005), Friction: An Ethnography of Global Connection, Princeton University 
Press. 
Tsing, A. L. (2015), The Mushroom at the End of the World: On the Possibility of Life in 
Capitalist Ruins, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Uitermark, J. (2018), ‘The territorial lens: operational spaces of extraction and resistance’, 
Territory, Politics, Governance, 6 (1), 1–4. 
UNDP (2018), ‘Human Development Reports’, accessed 31 January 2019 at 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/HDI. 
United Nations Economic Commission For Europe (2016), Environmental Performance Reviews 
- Georgia: Third Review, New York: United Nations, p. 296. 
USAID (2010), USAID Country Profile: Property Rights and Resource Governance, Georgia, p. 
22, August. 
Valdivia, G. (2008), ‘Governing relations between people and things: Citizenship, territory, and 
the political economy of petroleum in Ecuador’, Political Geography, 27 (4), 456–77. 
Valdivia, G. (2015), ‘Eco-Governmentality’, in T. Perreault, G. Bridge, and J. McCarthy (eds), 
The Routledge Handbook of Political Ecology, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: 
Routledge. 
Valentine, G. (2005), ‘Geography and ethics: moral geographies? Ethical commitment in 
research and teaching’, Progress in Human Geography, 29 (4), 483–7. 
Valentine, G. (2008), ‘Living with difference: reflections on geographies of encounter’:, 
Progress in Human Geography, 32 (3), accessed at 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0309133308089372. 
Varshalomidze, T. (2014), ‘Environmental cost of Kyrgyzstan’s gold mine’, accessed at 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/06/environmental-cost-kyrgyzstans-
gold-mine-201461616400788735.html. 
Vaughan-Williams, N. (2009), Border Politics : The Limits of Sovereign Power, Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press. 
Vaughan-Williams, N. (2015), Europe’s Border Crisis: Biopolitical Security and Beyond, First 
edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Vayda, A. P. (1983), ‘Progressive contextualization: Methods for research in human ecology’, 
Human Ecology, 11 (3), 265–81. 
Vayda, A. P. (2011), ‘Author response’, Dialogues in Human Geography, 1 (3), 385–9. 
 
 304 
Vayda, A. P. and B. B. Walters (1999), ‘Against Political Ecology’, Human Ecology, 27 (1), 
167–79. 
Vela-Almeida, D. (2018), ‘Territorial partitions, the production of mining territory and the 
building of a post-neoliberal and plurinational state in Ecuador’, Political Geography, 62 
(Supplement C), 126–36. 
Verdery, K. (2003), The Vanishing Hectare: Property and Value in Postsocialist Transylvania, 
Cornell University Press. 
Veyne, P. (1990), Bread and Circuses: Historical Sociology and Political Pluralism, London: 
Viking Adult. 
Veyne, P. (1997), ‘Foucault revolutionizes history’, in A. I. Davidson (ed), Foucault and His 
Interlocutors, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 146–82. 
Vihma, A. (2018a), ‘Geoeconomic Analysis and the Limits of Critical Geopolitics: A New 
Engagement with Edward Luttwak’, Geopolitics, 23 (1), 1–21. 
Vihma, A. (2018b), ‘Geoeconomics Defined and Redefined’, Geopolitics, 23 (1), 47–9. 
Visser, O. and M. Spoor (2011), ‘Land grabbing in post-Soviet Eurasia: the world’s largest 
agricultural land reserves at stake’, The Journal of Peasant Studies, 38 (2), 299–323. 
Vivoda, V. (2009), ‘Resource Nationalism, Bargaining and International Oil Companies: 
Challenges and Change in the New Millennium’, New Political Economy, 14 (4), 517–34. 
Vogel, C. (2018), ‘Between Tags & Guns: Fragmentations of public authority around eastern 
Congo’s artisanal 3T mines’, Political Geography, 63, 94–103. 
Waal, T. de (2010), The Caucasus: An Introduction, Oxford ; New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
Wagner-Pacifici, R. E. (2017), What Is an Event?, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
Walker, R. (2016), ‘Value and Nature: From Value Theory to the Fate of the Earth’, Human 
Geography, 9 (1), 1–15. 
Walsh, S. (2016), ‘Critiquing the politics of participatory video and the dangerous romance of 
liberalism’, Area, 48 (4), 405–11. 
Walters, W. (2006), ‘Rethinking Borders Beyond the State’, Comparative European Politics, 4 
(2), 141–59. 
Walters, B. B. and A. P. Vayda (2009), ‘Event Ecology, Causal Historical Analysis, and 
Human—Environment Research’, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 
99 (3), 534–53. 
Ward, K. (2006), ‘Geography and Public Policy: Towards Public Geographies’:, Progress in 
Human Geography, 30 (4), 495–503. 
Ward, K. (2007), ‘Geography and public policy: activist, participatory, and policy geographies’:, 
Progress in Human Geography, 31 (5), 695–705. 
Ward, C. and M. B. Aalbers (2016), ‘Virtual special issue editorial essay: “The shitty rent 
business”: What’s the point of land rent theory?’, Urban Studies, 53 (9), 1760–83. 
Warf, B. (2018), ‘Introduction to the Handbook on the Geographies of Corruption’, in B. Warf 
(ed), Handbook on the Geographies of Corruption, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Pub, 
pp. 1–14. 
Watts, M. J. (1983), Silent Violence: Food, Famine, and Peasantry in Northern Nigeria, Athens: 
University of Georgia Press. 
Watts, M. J. (2004), ‘Resource curse? governmentality, oil and power in the Niger Delta, 
Nigeria’, Geopolitics, 9 (1), 50–80. 
 
 305 
Watts, M. J. (2015), ‘Now and Then: The origins of political ecology and the rebirth of 
adaptation as a form of thought’, in T. Perreault, G. Bridge, and J. McCarthy (eds), The 
Routledge Handbook of Political Ecology, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge. 
Watts, M. J. (2018), ‘Frontiers: Authority, Precarity, and Insurgency at the Edge of the State’, 
World Development, 101, 477–88. 
Watts, M. J. and R. Peet (2004), ‘Liberating Political Ecology’, in R. Peet and M. J. Watts (eds), 
Liberation Ecologies: Environment Development, and Social Movements, London: 
Routledge, pp. 3–29. 
Wedel, J. R. (2001), ‘Part II: “State” and “Private”: Up against the organizational realities of 
Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union’, Trends in Organized Crime, 7 
(1), 6–46. 
Wedel, J. R. (2003), ‘Clans, cliques and captured states: rethinking “transition” in Central and 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union’, Journal of International Development; 
Chichester, 15 (4), 427–40. 
Wedel, J. R. (2012), ‘Rethinking Corruption in an Age of Ambiguity’, Annual Review of Law 
and Social Science, 8 (1), 453–98. 
Whatmore, S. (2002), Hybrid Geographies: Natures Cultures Spaces, SAGE. 
Whatmore, S. (2006), ‘Materialist returns: practising cultural geography in and for a more-than-
human world’, Cultural Geographies, 13 (4), 600–9. 
Wilford, J. (2010), ‘Sacred archipelagos: geographies of secularization’, Progress in Human 
Geography; London, 34 (3), 328–48. 
Williams, J. and V. Massaro (2013), ‘Feminist Geopolitics: Unpacking (In)Security, Animating 
Social Change’, Geopolitics, 18 (4), 751–8. 
Wooden, A. (2017), ‘Images of Harm, Imagining Justice: Gold Mining Contestation in 
Kyrgyzstan’, in K. Jalbert, A. Willow, D. Casagrande, and S. Paladino (eds), 
ExtrACTION: Impacts, Engagements, and Alternative Futures, 1 edition, Routledge. 
Woodward, K., I. Jones John Paul and S. A. Marston (2010), ‘Of eagles and flies: orientations 
toward the site’, Area, 42 (3), 271–80. 
Wooldridge, J. (2017), ‘Russian real estate mogul Vlad Doronin stretches his world from 
Moscow to Miami’, accessed 18 September 2018 at 
https://www.miamiherald.com/entertainment/visual-arts/art-basel/article124495419.html. 
World Bank Group (2015), Georgia Country Environmental Analysis - Institutional, Economic, 
and Poverty Aspects of Georgia’s Road to Environmental Sustainability, ACS13945, 
Washington, DC: IBRD / The World Bank, p. 98, June. 
Yiftachel, O. (2002), ‘Territory as the Kernel of the Nation: Space, Time and Nationalism in 
Israel/Palestine’, Geopolitics, 7 (2), 215–48. 
Zalik, A. (2015), ‘Trading on the Offshore: Territorialization and the Ocean Grab in the 
International Seabed’, in K. Ervine and G. Fridell (eds), Beyond Free Trade - Alternative 
Approaches to Trade, Politics and Power | K. Ervine | Palgrave Macmillan, Palgrave 
Macmillan UK, pp. 173–90. 
Zapatistas (2005), ‘Sixth Declaration of the Selva Lacandona’, accessed 27 January 2019 at 
https://zcomm.org/znetarticle/sixth-declaration-of-the-selva-lacandona-by-
subcomandante-marcos/. 
ZeroHedge (2018), ‘Russia Set To Double Gold Mining, Becoming World’s 2nd Biggest Gold 
Producer’, accessed 3 February 2019 at https://www.zerohedge.com/news/2018-06-
03/russia-set-double-gold-mining-becoming-worlds-2nd-biggest-gold-producer. 
 
 306 
Zimmerer, K. S. and T. J. Bassett (2003), Political Ecology: An Integrative Approach to 
Geography and Environment-Development Studies, 1 edition, New York: The Guilford 
Press. 
Žižek, S. (2014), Event: A Philosophical Journey through a Concept, Brooklyn: Melville House. 
სტუდია მონიტორი / Studio Monitor (2012), Polluted Mashavera, 28 January, accessed 23 
September 2018 at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jq9nYlYUJpU. 
სტუდია მონიტორი / Studio Monitor (2014), საყდრისი - პრემიერის ‘ოქროს შუალედი’, 
6 April, accessed 2 January 2019 at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oAQCmApCmso. 
 
 
 
 
 307 
Vita 
 
Jesse Swann-Quinn 
www.jesseswannquinn.com 
jquinn@syr.edu    +1 (315) 783-8611  
Department of Geography 
Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs 
Syracuse University 
144 Eggers Hall, Syracuse, NY 13244 
 
EDUCATION 
PhD, Geography, Syracuse University                                     May 2019 
Dissertation title – Malleable Territories: The Politics and Effects of Mining Governance in Post-
Soviet Georgia 
Committee – Drs. Natalie Koch (Advisor), Tom Perreault, Jamie Winders, Matt Huber, Jessica 
Graybill (Colgate University), Brian Taylor (Chair) 
MA, Geography, University of Arizona                                              May 2013 
Thesis title – Exceptional Forests: Forest governance, state structure, and territory in the Republic 
of Georgia 
Committee – Drs. Beth Mitchneck (Advisor), Paul Robbins, Tracey Osborne 
BA, Geography, Colgate University                                               May 2007 
Summa Cum Laude, with Honors and High Distinction, Dean’s List, Film & Media Studies minor 
Thesis title – A Drop in the Wave: Individual and Global Perceptions of Transformation in the Post-
Socialist Albanian Diaspora 
 
PUBLICATIONS 
Journal Articles 
Swann-Quinn, J. (FORTHCOMING). “Mining the Homeland: Imagining Resources, Nation, and 
Territory in Post-Soviet Georgia.” Eurasian Geography and Economics. 
Swann-Quinn, J. (UNDER REVIEW). “Toward Extractive Archipelagos: Embedded Borderings in the 
Georgian Mining Industry.” Under review at: Territory, Politics, Governance.  
Swann-Quinn, J. (2019). “More-Than-Human Government and the Tbilisi Zoo Flood.” Geoforum 
102: 167-81.  
Quinn, J. (2017). “gatekhili Mountains, gatekhili State: Fractured alpine forest governance and 
post-Soviet development in the Republic of Georgia.” Journal of Alpine Research | Revue 
de géographie alpine: 105-1.   
 
 
 
 308 
Book Chapters 
Swann-Quinn, J. (In Progress, invited contribution). “Digging Deep: Crossing Scale in the Georgian 
Mining Industry.” In Environmental Geopolitics: A Research Agenda, O’Lear, S. (ed.), 
Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing.  
Reviews, Reports, and Edited Volumes 
Quinn, J. (2017). “Review of Grimm, Dieter, ‘Sovereignty: the origin and future of a political and 
legal concept’.” H-Citizenship, H-Net Reviews in the Humanities & Social Sciences. 
House-Peters, L, S. Kelly-Richards, L. Radonic, J. Minor, and J. Quinn. (2013). Public political 
ecology field course: Report on a two-day critical theory and mixed methods 
course. Public Political Ecology Lab, http://ppel.arizona.edu/?p=352. 
Owen, G., & J. Quinn. (Eds.). (2013). making sense - a creative exploration of sensing the world. 
you are here: the journal of creative geography (Vol. 16). Tucson, AZ: University of 
Arizona. Retrieved from http://youareheregeography.com/wp-
content/uploads/archive/2013.pdf. 
TEACHING EXPERIENCE 
Syracuse University 
AY 2018-2019  Teaching Associate   Global Community, MAX 132 
Summer 2018  Instructor of Record  Mapping Today: Technology and Spatial  
Thinking, GEO 108 
AY 2017-2018  Instructor of Record  World Cultures, GEO 272 
AY 2016-2017  Teaching Associate  Global Community, MAX 132 
Spring 2016  Teaching Assistant  Mapping 2.0: Understanding Spatial  
Thinking, GEO 100 
Fall 2015  Teaching Assistant  Principles of GIS, GEO 683-383 
Fall 2014  Instructor of Record  World Cultures, GEO 272 
Spring 2014  Teaching Assistant  Cities of the World, GEO 200 
Fall 2013  Teaching Assistant  World Cultures, GEO 272 
University of Arizona 
Spring 2012  Lead Teaching Assistant Human Geography & Global  
Systems, GEOG 150 
Falls 2011, 2012 Teaching Assistant  GIS for Natural and Social  
Sciences, GEOG 617-417 
Colgate University 
2006-2007  Teaching Assistant   Introduction to Photography,  
ARTS 241 
 
 
 309 
GRANTS, FELLOWSHIPS, AND AWARDS 
External: 
2017 Field Research Travel Award, Eurasia Specialty Group, Association of American 
Geographers ($250) 
 Graduate/Postdoctoral Fellowship, American Research Institute of the South Caucasus 
($1500) 
2016  Public Humanities Fellowship, New York Council for the Humanities ($8000) 
2013  Emmy Award for Outstanding Cinematography - Documentary and Long Form, Academy 
of Television Arts & Sciences; “Untamed Americas,” National Geographic Television, 
Associate Producer 
  Graduate Fellowship, American Research Institute of the South Caucasus ($1500) 
2011  Emmy Awards for Outstanding Cinematography - Nature and Outstanding Music & 
Sound, Academy of Television Arts & Sciences; “Great Migrations,” National Geographic 
Television, Segment Producer and Associate Producer 
2007  National Geographic Society Geography Internship 
Internal: 
2018 People’s Choice Award, Syracuse University 3-Minute Thesis Competition 
 Geography Department Summer Research Fund ($2335) 
2017 Geography Department Summer Research Fund ($4000) 
2016 Roscoe Martin Graduate Student Dissertation Research Support, Maxwell School of 
Citizenship and Public Affairs ($1000) 
  Geography Department Summer Research Fund ($3500) 
2015  Syracuse University Outstanding Teaching Assistant Award 
 Moynihan Institute Center for European Studies Summer Research Grant, Maxwell School 
of Citizenship and Public Affairs ($1500) 
2006 Colgate University Social Science Undergraduate Research Grant ($2000)  
PRESENTATIONS, INVITED LECTURES, AND ORGANIZED WORKSHOPS 
2019 “Post-Socialist Political Ecologies.” Session series organizer at American Association of 
Geographers annual meeting, Washington, DC. April 6. 
“Assembling Benthic Power.” Session series organizer at American Association of 
Geographers annual meeting, Washington, DC. April 3. 
“Imagining Extractive Archipelagos? Toward a Lived Geopolitics of Deep Seabed Mining.” 
Paper presented at American Association of Geographers annual meeting, Washington, 
DC. April 3. 
2018 “Mining in the Anthropocene.” Invited lecture, GEO 215 Global Environmental Change, 
Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY. November 26. 
 
 310 
“Powerful Dispossessions: Power, Borders, and Environment in the Georgian Mining 
Industry.” Paper presented at Central Eurasian Studies Society’s (CESS) 19th Annual 
Conference, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA. October 25. 
“Imagining the Mine, Imagining the Homeland: Resource Nationalisms in post-Soviet 
Georgia.” Paper presented at Association for the Study of Nationalities (ASN) 23rd Annual 
World Convention, New York, NY. May 4. 
 “Bordering the Mine: Mining governance, territory, and invisible violence in post-Soviet 
Georgia.” Paper presented at American Association of Geographers Annual Meeting, New 
Orleans, LA. April 13. 
“Extracting Eurasia: Power, nature, and space in regional context.” Session organizer at 
American Association of Geographers annual meeting, New Orleans, LA. April 12. 
“Securing the Tiger: The Tbilisi Zoo tragedy and the post-Soviet bio-social.” Paper 
presented at Political Geography Specialty Group AAG Pre-Conference, New Orleans, LA. 
April 9. 
2017 “Geopolitical Ecologies: The politics and effects of mining governance in post-Soviet 
Georgia.” Invited presentation for Works-in-Progress series hosted by the Caucasus 
Research Resource Center, American Research Institute of the South Caucasus, and 
American Councils, Tbilisi, Georgia. July 12. 
“Precious Earth: Stories of Mining and Political Change in the Adirondack Mountains.” 
Public Humanities Fellowship invited presentation, Syracuse University Humanities 
Center, Syracuse, NY. April 28. 
 “'The Russians Blew It Up!': Environmental imaginaries and gold mining after the Rose 
Revolution.” Paper presented at American Association of Geographers Annual Meeting, 
Boston, MA. April 8. 
2016 “Extractive Territories: Mining and Borders in the Republic of Georgia.” Invited paper 
presented at ‘Bordered: Conceptualizing Eurasia,’ a conference of the Russian and 
Eurasian Studies Program, Colgate University, Hamilton, NY. April 8.  
“Myth, Image, Territory: Visual Geopolitics in the Republic of Georgia.” Presented at AAG 
2016 Annual Meeting, San Francisco, CA. March 30. 
2015 “Territorial Claims and Gold Mining in Georgia: A Videographic Geography.” Paper 
presented at Caucasus Research Resource Center ‘Regional Methods Conference’, Tbilisi, 
Georgia. June 26. 
2014 “Feminist Geopolitics and Political Ecology: Reconsidering Post-Soviet Environmental 
Governance in the Republic of Georgia.” Paper presented at ‘Political Geography of the 
Environment’ conference of the International Geographical Union, hosted by the 
University of Oregon, Eugene, OR. June 20. 
 “Video Production as Engaged Method in Political Ecology.” Paper presented at American 
Association of Geographers annual meeting in conjoined session and roundtable 
‘Engaged Scholarship in Critical Geography: Theory, Practice and Pedagogy’, Tampa, FL. 
April 12.  
 
 311 
2013 “Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies Public Political Ecology Workshop.” Co-
led workshop on public political ecology with Dr. Tracey Osborne, New Haven, CT. 
November 14.  
 “Forest governance and state structure in the Republic of Georgia.” ARISC Georgia 
Graduate Fellow Presentation, at the Georgian Geographic Society, Tbilisi, Georgia. 7 
August. 
 “Exceptional Forests: Forest governance and state structure in the Republic of Georgia.” 
Paper presented at American Association of Geographers annual meeting, Los Angeles, 
CA. April 11. 
 “Making Sense – A creative exploration of sensing the world.” Session organizer / 
discussant at American Association of Geographers annual meeting, Los Angeles, CA. 
April 12.  
2012 “Return to Sender: International Return Migration Between Russia and Georgia.” 
Presented research from NSF funded research project ‘People, Power, and Conflict in the 
Eurasian Migration System’ with Dr. Beth Mitchneck at the Kennan Institute at the Wilson 
Center conference titled Labor Migration in Eurasia: Links to Global Migration and 
Human Security Trends, Washington, DC. September 21. 
 “you are here: The Cartographic Turn in Literary Studies.” Invited discussant for panel, 
American Association of Geographers annual meeting, New York, NY. February 26. 
“Media and the Academy Brown Bag.” Invited co-leader on panel for fellow graduate 
students at the University of Arizona, focus on methods and strategies for using media in 
geographic research and engaging with media outlets to help with research 
dissemination, Tucson, AZ. May 2. 
2008 “A Drop in the Wave: Individual/Global Perceptions of Transformation in the post-
socialist Albanian Diaspora.” Paper presented at American Association of Geographers 
annual meeting, Boston, MA. April 19.  
RESEARCH EXPERIENCE 
Summers 2013, 2015, 2016, 2017 Doctoral dissertation research 
Six months of preliminary and primary research on the Georgian mining sector; performing semi-
structured interviews, collaborating with activists, and collecting additional data resources. 
Summers 2012, 2013   MA thesis research 
Four months of field research consisting of semi-structured interviews with key players in the 
Georgian forestry sector. 
Fall 2011 – Spring 2013 Research assistant  
Working under Dr. Beth Mitchneck at the University of Arizona with research team of four on NSF 
funded research project “People, Power, and Conflict in the Eurasian Migration System”. 
Fall 2011 – present    Public Political Ecology Lab 
Film and edit video interviews with prominent political ecologists, assist with website creation, 
work with small team under Dr. Tracey Osborne at the University of Arizona. 
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Aug 2006 – May 2007   Undergraduate senior research project in Geography 
Honors thesis on summer’s work in Albania.  Perform conversational narrative analyses focused 
on theories of migration, development and cultural identity. 
Spring 2007    Upstate Institute Research, Colgate University 
Established a working database of functional job descriptions at the Madison County Social 
Services Department for state government research 
Summer 2006    Shala Valley Project / Balkans Peace Park Project, Albania 
Field GIS technician for archeological survey project while also collaboratively assisting with the 
development of a trans-boundary peace park in Albanian highlands. 
PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS 
- Association of American Geographers (AAG) 
o Cultural and Political Ecology Specialty Group 
o Energy and Environment Specialty Group 
o Political Geography Specialty Group 
o Eurasian Specialty Group 
o Geographic Information Science and Systems Specialty Group 
o Animal Geographies Specialty Group 
o Coastal and Marine Specialty Group 
 
- Association for the Study of Nationalities (ASN) 
 
- Central Eurasian Studies Society (CESS) 
MANUSCRIPT REVIEWER 
- Capitalism Nature Socialism 
 
- Demokratizatsiya 
  
- Polar Geography 
SERVICE 
AY 2017-2019 
 Student Board Member, American Association of Geographers Eurasian Specialty Group 
AY 2016-2017 
Future Professoriate Program Coordinator 
Coordinator of the Geography Department’s Future Professoriate Program branch, 
organizing annual GeoFest event and departmental FPP events for graduate students. 
Spring 2015 
Graduate Admissions Committee, Geography Department, Syracuse University  
Graduate representative to department admissions committee, reviewing applications 
and contributing to admissions and funding decisions. 
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Fall 2013-Present  
Future Professoriate Program Member 
Member of student professional development association within the Syracuse University 
Geography Department 
AY 2012-2013 
Editor, you are here: the journal of creative geography 
Co-Editor for issue titled “Making Sense – A creative exploration of sensing the world,” 
http://youareheregeography.com/wp-content/uploads/archive/2013.pdf.  
AY 2011-2012 
Assistant Editor, you are here: the journal of creative geography 
Editorial staff for issue titled “Suspensions: Spaces between illness and health,” 
http://youareheregeography.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/2012.pdf.    
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE 
August 2007 – January 2012 
National Geographic Television, Natural History Unit – Washington, DC 
Various positions including Segment Producer, Associate Producer, Field Producer, Lead 
Researcher, Media Manager, and Series Coordinator on high profile wildlife 
documentaries / series 
- Untamed Americas (2012)  
o Winner of 2013 Emmy award for cinematography  
o Best Natural History Film award at 2012 Banff Mountain Film Festival 
o In this television series narrated by Josh Brolin and comprising four, hour-long 
episodes, we tell stories of wildlife survival and conservation throughout the 
Americas, from the most remote regions to our urban backyards. 
o For further information, see http://www.natgeotv.com/int/untamed-americas  
 
- Sea Strikers (2011) 
o In this one hour special, we use high-speed photography to investigate the 
biomechanics of fish jaw structure and behavior in high-speed, pelagic predators. 
o For further information, see http://natgeotv.com/asia/sea-strikers 
 
- Great Migrations (2010) 
o Winner of two Emmy awards in 2011 for cinematography and music/sound design 
o The National Geographic Society’s largest project to date. 
o A cross-platform multimedia initiative with world-wide synchronous release, a paired 
cover story with the National Geographic Magazine, and multiple citizen science 
events. 
o Working alongside and in consultation with top animal migration scholars (including 
E.O. Wilson and scientists from the Max Planck Institute, WCS, WWF, and more), 
narrated by Alec Baldwin, and comprising seven diverse hours of programming, our 
team tells stories of animal migrations around the planet. 
o For further information, see http://www.nationalgeographic.com.au/tv/great-
migrations/ 
 
- Moose: Titans of the North (2008) 
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o This one hour special documents the lives of moose populations, explaining basic 
ecology, biology, and interactions with human populations. 
o For further information, see 
http://tvblogs.nationalgeographic.com/2010/07/22/moose-titans-of-the-north/  
LANGUAGE 
Limited working proficiency in Georgian (reading, writing, speaking) 
 
TECHNICAL PROFICIENCIES 
ESRI ArcGIS suite   NVIVO  
SPSS     Apple Final Cut Pro 
STATA     Adobe Premiere / Photoshop 
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